10-1705-ag
Zhou v. Holder
BIA
A072 785 324
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
York, on the 17th day of June, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
FEI H. ZHOU,
Petitioner,
v. 10-1705-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Peter Lobel, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director;
Allen W. Hausman, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for
review is DENIED.
Fei Hua Zhou, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of an April 2, 2010, order of
the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Fei Hua Zhou, No.
A072 785 324 (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 2010). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of this case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition
that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d
515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
322-23 (1992)). There is no dispute that Zhou’s August 2009
motion to reopen was untimely because her administrative order
of removal became final in 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
Although Zhou contends that the time and number limitations do
not apply to her motion to reopen as it is “based on changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), her arguments are unavailing.
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Zhou asserts that she presented evidence both that she
had converted to Christianity and that conditions for
Christians in China have recently worsened. However, as the
BIA found, Zhou's alleged conversion to Christianity was a
change in her personal circumstances, not a change in country
conditions. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d
Cir. 2008). Indeed, the law contains provisions specifically
designed to prevent the manufacturing of new asylum claims,
and those provisions would be defeated by allowing aliens to
change their personal circumstances in response to changes in
their country and thereby reopen their removal proceedings
closed years prior. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270,
274 (2d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, there is no indication that the BIA ignored any
material evidence Zhou submitted. See Jian Hui Shao v.
Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
the Court has rejected the notion that the agency must
“expressly parse or refute on the record each individual
argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner”); see
also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337
n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken into
account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record
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compellingly suggests otherwise”). The record supports the
BIA’s determination that, although China has engaged in
discrimination and abuse against Christians, Zhou failed to
establish that conditions in China had changed fundamentally
since her merits hearing, as required to warrant reopening.
See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.”); Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342 (holding that the
weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration
proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency).
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA's denial
of Zhou's motion to reopen.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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