[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14155 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 17, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02525-TWT
JEFFERY A. BRYAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BENNY BELLAMY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 17, 2011)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffery A. Bryan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s order
denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of its order
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Benny Bellamy, a police officer
working in the municipal court in Atlanta. We affirm.
In his complaint, Bryan alleged the following. One morning, Bryan
reported to municipal court to contest a traffic citation. Upon his arrival, he filled
out the necessary paperwork to the satisfaction of the Clerk of Court and entered
the courtroom. Once inside the courtroom, however, a female court officer was
unable to read Bryan’s paperwork, and Bryan proceeded to make the necessary
corrections. At that point, Officer Bellamy confiscated Bryan’s papers and
ordered him to complete a new set of paperwork. Bryan requested that Officer
Bellamy return his papers, but Bellamy refused to do so. Officer Bellamy then
threatened to arrest Bryan if he did not leave the building, and Bellamy began
physically assaulting Bryan by pushing him out the door. Once outside, and
notwithstanding that no court hearing had occurred, Officer Bellamy informed
Bryan that he was in contempt of court for failing to appear and was required to
pay $100 in order to re-enter to the courtroom. Bryan alleged that Officer Bellamy
violated his civil rights by assaulting him, destroying his legal papers, and denying
him access to the courts.
The district court granted Bellamy’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Without referencing any of Bryan’s
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allegations or claims, the district court recited general pleading standards and,
notwithstanding the factual allegations described above in the complaint,
concluded without further explanation that Bryan “fails to allege any facts
showing a violation of his constitutional rights.” However, Bryan did not timely
appeal this order, and it is therefore not properly before us. Instead, he filed a
motion requesting the court to provide case law validating conduct similar to
Bellamy’s. The court construed Bryan’s motion as a motion for reconsideration,
and denied it. Bryan then filed the instant Rule 60(b) motion reiterating his
request, as well as adding a request that the court recuse itself. The court
summarily denied the motion. Bryan then filed this appeal.
In a prior order, we expressly limited this appeal only to the district court’s
order denying Bryan’s Rule 60(b) motion. Although we construe Bryan’s pro se
brief liberally, Timson v. Samson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008), he does not
challenge that order, but rather challenges only the court’s underlying dismissal
order. He has therefore not shown that the court abused its discretion in denying
his Rule 60(b) motion. See Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528
F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we must affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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