UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
VAUGHN RAMONE GROVE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:09-cr-00263-1)
Submitted: June 9, 2011 Decided: June 17, 2011
Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney,
Monica L. Dillon, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Vaughn Ramone Grove pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). The district court
sentenced Grove to 151 months in prison, and Grove now appeals.
We affirm.
On appeal, Grove first contends that the district
court erred in applying an enhancement pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2009). A two-level
increase is authorized under § 2D1.1(b)(1) if the defendant
possessed a dangerous weapon during the offense. Application
Note 3 to § 2D1.1 explains that the enhancement “should be
applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” The
district court’s factual finding that Grove possessed a
dangerous weapon during the offense is reviewed for clear error.
United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2001).
The government “need show only that the weapon was possessed
during the relevant illegal drug activity.” Id. “[P]roof of
constructive possession of the dangerous weapon is sufficient,
and the Government is entitled to rely on circumstantial
evidence to carry its burden.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the firearm was found in
close proximity to a large sum of cash and was readily
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accessible, we readily conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in applying the two-level enhancement.
Grove next contends that his 151-month sentence is
unreasonable. This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564
F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine
the sentence for “significant procedural error,” including
“failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court is not
required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th
Cir. 2006). However, the district court “must place on the
record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular
facts of the case before it. This individualized assessment
need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide a
rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate
to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’” United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 50) (internal footnote omitted).
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A reviewing court then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. This
court presumes on appeal that a sentence within a properly
calculated advisory Guidelines range is reasonable. United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding
presumption of reasonableness for within—Guidelines sentence).
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Grove
because his sentence was both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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