Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-2775
_____________

MERCK & CO., INC.,
Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 2-05-cv-2575)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
___________

Argued March 24, 2011

Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit
Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 20, 2011)
Charles W. Hall
William S. Lee
Nancy T. Bowen
Tom C. Godbold
Reagan M. Brown
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
Houston, TX 77010

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued)
Tillman J. Breckenridge
Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.
801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Attorneys for Appellant

John A. DiCicco
Gilbert S. Rothenberg
Kenneth L. Greene
Judith A. Hagley (argued)
Tax Division
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 502
Washington, D.C. 20044
Attorneys for Appellee

2
 OPINION OF THE COURT

Fuentes, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Schering-Plough, Inc.1 brings this action
against the United States for recovery of nearly $500 million
in taxes it claims the IRS incorrectly assessed against it. It
argues, first, that the funds it received as a result of two
transactions were not, as the IRS contends, immediately
taxable in full as proceeds of loans from foreign subsidiaries;
and, second, that it suffered disparate treatment in comparison
with another taxpayer who engaged in similar transactions but
was not assessed taxes on the proceeds in the same way. The
United States prevailed on both claims in the District Court,
and Schering-Plough timely appealed. For the reasons given
below, we will affirm the District Court’s decision on both
claims.2
I.

1
During the course of this action, Schering-Plough purchased
Merck, Inc., and the combined entity is now known as Merck.
For the sake of consistency with the prior opinions in this
case, we shall continue to refer to plaintiff as Schering-
Plough.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3
 A. Background

In the early 1990s, Schering-Plough, a New Jersey
pharmaceuticals company, was the ultimate owner of two
Swiss subsidiaries, Scherico and Limited. These subsidiaries
conducted significant manufacturing operations in Ireland,
which, at the time, had a favorable corporate income tax.
Each of the subsidiaries held significant cash reserves.
Scherico had a modest amount of earnings not yet taxed in the
United States, whereas Limited had earnings of nearly $1
billion untaxed in the United States.

Schering-Plough wished to make use of those cash
reserves to engage in certain business activities, such as a
stock repurchase program. However, Subpart F of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-965, which governs
the taxation of the income of U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries,
dictates that, while such income is not taxable in the United
States when earned, it is subject to taxation if it is ever
invested in “United States property.” Such property is
defined to include any debt obligation of U.S. companies. In
other words, if a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company lends
or distributes money to its parent, the U.S. company is
required to recognize that money as income.3 Thus,
Schering-Plough’s subsidiaries, Scherico and Limited, could
not simply make a loan or pay dividends to Schering-Plough

3
This is in contrast to the ordinary treatment of loans, which
are usually not treated as income for tax purposes. A U.S.
company therefore has an incentive to characterize any funds
received from a foreign subsidiary as the proceeds of a sale,
rather than a loan.

4
without the proceeds being subject to taxation in full that
year.

To avoid immediate taxation under Subpart F of the
entire sum it wished to repatriate, Schering-Plough consulted
Merrill Lynch, an investment bank that had devised other tax-
management strategies for Schering-Plough. Merrill Lynch
proposed to Schering-Plough a scheme involving interest rate
swaps. Under the scheme, Scherico would provide the funds
desired to Schering-Plough. In return, Schering-Plough
would transfer to Scherico one of Schering-Plough’s accounts
receivable. To create the receivable for transfer to Scherico,
Schering-Plough negotiated an interest rate swap with an
accommodating party—Algemene Bank Nederland (“ABN”),
a Dutch financial institution. Schering-Plough then assigned
its receivable payment stream resulting from this swap to
Scherico.

An interest rate swap is a common and legitimate
corporate transaction.4 We draw background information
concerning the nature of a swap from the District Court’s
extensively researched findings. “The counterparties [i.e.,
Schering-Plough and ABN] agreed to make interest payments
to each other based on a notional amount of principal, and
[for each] to make payments under a different interest rate for
a set term of years. The parties only exchanged the interest
payments, not the notional principal [which was used only as
the basis of calculating the payments due]. . . . The
standardized swap terms permitted ABN and Schering-

4
Swaps are often used, for instance, to hedge away the risk
that an interest rate that a company is exposed to will
fluctuate in an unfavorable way.

5
Plough to offset (net) the two payments, such that the party
owing the higher amount paid only the difference.”
Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219,
229 (D.N.J. 2009).

From the point of view of either party, the swap
consisted both of a “pay leg” (the responsibility to pay the
other according to the first interest rate designated in the
contract) and a “receive leg” (the right to receive payments
from the other based on the other interest rate designated in
the contract). This swap agreement permitted the assignment
of the receive leg to a third party. “Significantly, upon any
assignment, the parties could no longer net payments; rather,
each periodic payment would be due in full to the party
owning the right to the particular income stream . . . . In other
words, upon assignment of its receive leg rights, Schering-
Plough remained duty-bound to make the entire periodic pay
leg distributions to ABN,” regardless of whether ABN
fulfilled its “parallel obligation to make the payments to
Schering-Plough’s third-party designee.” Id. The same
applied to ABN; it would have to make its payments to
Schering-Plough’s assignee regardless of whether Schering-
Plough was making payments to it.

At the time Merrill Lynch made its proposal to
Schering-Plough, the sale of notional principal contracts such
as interest rate swaps was governed by IRS Notice 89-21,
which provided that, when a party sells one “leg” of a swap,
so that it receives a lump sum in exchange for the right to
receive revenues over the remaining life of the swap, that sum
should not be recognized as income all at once, but rather

6
should be accounted for over the whole life of the swap.5
Notice 89-21 specifically stated that “[n]o inference should be
drawn from this notice as to the proper treatment of
transactions that are not properly characterized as notional
principal contracts, for instance, to the extent that such
transactions are in substance properly characterized as
loans.” (emphasis added) This notice has since been
repealed, and parties are now required to recognize all such
payments as loans. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.446-3(g)(4), h(4)(1).

In accordance with the scheme designed by Merrill
Lynch, Schering-Plough entered into a 20-year interest rate
swap (with payments at six-month intervals) with a bank,
ABN. This swap agreement included a “credit trigger” which
allowed ABN to terminate it if Schering-Plough’s credit
rating was downgraded for more than 60 days. ABN,
meanwhile, entered into a “mirror” swap with Merrill Lynch
that was essentially designed to perfectly offset the swap with
Schering-Plough, as well as compensating ABN for its
involvement. That is, to whatever extent ABN might be the
loser in the swap with Schering-Plough, it would be the
gainer in the swap with Merrill Lynch.6

5
In general, parties wish to delay recognition of income for
income tax purposes for as long as possible, as this gives
them “free use,” at least in the short term, of the money that
would otherwise be paid as taxes. Therefore, Notice 89-21
dictated a generally favorable tax treatment of such sales.
6
Essentially, in the “mirror” swap, Merrill Lynch paid ABN a
sum calculated with respect to the same interest rate that
ABN was already using to calculate its obligation to
Schering-Plough, while ABN paid Merrill Lynch a sum
calculated with respect to the same interest rate that Schering-

7
 Schering-Plough then assigned the “receive leg” of the
swap to Scherico for a lump sum, as was explicitly permitted
under the terms of the initial swap.7 Scherico also received a

Plough was using to determine what it owed ABN. The
Schering-Plough-ABN and ABN-Merrill Lynch swaps were
thus designed to cancel each other out, so that (except for a
fee for its participation) the economic effect on ABN would
be neutral. (Schering-Plough also paid Merrill Lynch several
million dollars for its role in engineering these transactions.)
7
Actually, Schering-Plough first sold the first five years of
the “receive leg” to an unrelated party, Banco di Roma,
ostensibly to establish its market value. Thus, only fifteen
years of the “receive leg” were sold to Scherico.

Interestingly, the funds for Banco di Roma to purchase the
“receive leg” from Schering-Plough were provided as a zero-
coupon certificate of deposit by ABN. ABN had the right to
purchase the receive leg from Banco di Roma, and Banco di
Roma had the right to sell the receive leg to ABN. Rather
than paying periodic interest to ABN, Banco di Roma was
compensated for each year that it continued to hold the
receive leg. ABN ultimately purchased the receive leg from
Banco di Roma in March 1993, thereby ending its obligation
to pay Banco di Roma (as it now held the right to receive
funds from itself). Although the District Court did not need
to consider the question, it certainly appears as if
“independent third party” Banco di Roma were being
compensated to enter into a “sale,” with financing provided
entirely by ABN, structured to establish the desired “market
value” for the remaining years of the swap contract (i.e., the
amount that Schering-Plough wished to repatriate). Once a

8
“put option” which gave it the right to sell the “receive leg”
back to Schering-Plough for its current market value at any
time.8 Most of the funds paid over to Schering-Plough,
however, were actually channeled from Limited through
Scherico (as Limited held most of the untaxed earnings).9 We
will refer to the scheme as a whole as the (first) Transaction.

Thus, initially, Schering-Plough and ABN had
reciprocal obligations to each other alone, to pay each other at
intervals according to the interest rates defined in each swap
agreement. In practice, this meant that the party who was the
net loser on the swap would pay the net gainer the difference.
But by splitting the normally paired “pay leg” and “receive
leg” of the swap, the parties created a triangular relationship
among Schering-Plough, ABN, and Scherico. Schering-
Plough was obligated to pay ABN at intervals based on a
particular interest rate (as defined in the original swap).
ABN, meanwhile, was obligated to pay Scherico based on
another interest rate (because Scherico had been assigned the
“receive leg” of the swap from Schering-Plough). Schering-
Plough had received a lump sum of money from Scherico in

seemly period of time had passed, ABN effectively nullified
the sale, leaving Banco di Roma with a little something in its
pocket for its trouble.
8
Ultimately, the “receive leg” of the first Transaction was
repurchased in this fashion, and the swaps were terminated in
2004. It appears that the second Transaction (described
below) lacked this explicit put option.
9
Schering-Plough has stipulated that, if the transactions are
characterized as loans, the lender should be deemed to be
Limited, not Scherico.

9
exchange for the “receive leg” of the swap. The parties then
repeated this transaction (the second Transaction) the
following year, but with another Swiss subsidiary of
Schering-Plough, Essex Chemie, A.G., replacing Scherico.

This scheme was intended to allow Schering-Plough to
report the lump sum it received as income over the life of the
swap under Notice 89-21, rather than all at once, as it would
have had to under Subpart F if it simply took a loan or
dividends from Scherico. That is, instead of accounting for it
immediately as an investment in “United States property,”
Schering-Plough accounted for it as a sale of a leg of a swap,
which under Notice 89-21 meant—if the transactions were
not loans (as Schering-Plough claimed they were not)—that it
should be taxed ratably over the life of the Transactions. This
was desirable from Schering-Plough’s perspective because, as
discussed above, a taxpayer generally wishes to delay the
recognition of income as long as possible.

Schering-Plough and Scherico did not generate formal
loan documentation concerning the transfer of the “receive
leg.” However, intercompany loans at Schering-Plough
generally lacked such documentation. Also, despite a policy
requiring that the Board of Directors pre-approve any
investment having a maturity of more than one year,
Schering-Plough did not seek approval for the Transactions
before executing them, as a Schering-Plough witness
conceded that it should have if it regarded them as sales rather
than loans.

Schering-Plough then reported each of the
Transactions to the IRS as a sale, in purported accordance
with Notice 89-21. More precisely, beginning in 1996 (to

10
account for the sale of the first five years to an unrelated
party), Schering-Plough began reporting a ratable portion of
the lump sum paid by Scherico as income. Schering-Plough
did not, either in 1991 or 1992, report the transactions to the
IRS on Form 5471, which is meant to disclose inter-company
loans or sales involving foreign subsidiaries (in order to
assure compliance with Subpart F).

Ultimately, Schering-Plough repatriated approximately
$690.4 million from its subsidiaries through the Transactions.

B. Procedural history

In 2004, after an audit, the IRS assessed Schering-
Plough deficiencies of $472,870,042 for the tax years 1989,
1991, and 1992, on the basis of its conclusion that the
Transactions were loans, not sales, and thus immediately
taxable under Subpart F. Schering-Plough paid the assessed
tax and filed suit in district court seeking a refund, arguing
both that it had been treated differently from a similarly-
situated taxpayer and that the tax was assessed incorrectly
because the Transactions were sales, not loans. The District
Court granted the government summary judgment on the
disparate-treatment claim. The District Court then held a
bench trial at which it heard extensive testimony both from
experts provided by both parties and from various individuals
who had been involved in the design and execution of the
Transactions. After the trial, the District Court found in favor
of the government on the tax-refund claim, as well. The
District Court held, in a thorough and thoughtful opinion, that
the Transactions were, in substance though not in form, loans
from the subsidiaries to Schering-Plough, or, in the

11
alternative, that the Transactions had no economic substance
and should be disregarded for tax purposes.10

Schering-Plough moved for a new trial, and the
District Court denied the motion. Schering-Plough now
appeals the District Court’s holding on both claims.

II.
Discussion

We begin by addressing the overarching theme of
Schering-Plough’s arguments before us: that in reporting the
funds it received from its subsidiaries in exchange for the
“receive leg” of the ABN swap ratably over the life of the
Transactions, it merely complied, as it was required to do,
with Notice 89-21. Therefore, it contends, to tax the
Transactions as loans would be to ignore Notice 89-21 and
disrupt Schering-Plough’s legitimate settled expectations as
to their tax treatment. However, Notice 89-21 explicitly
stated that it did not address the tax treatment of “transactions
[that] are in substance properly characterized as loans.” If the
Transactions were, in fact, loans, then Notice 89-21 simply
did not bear on their tax treatment; instead, they should have
been treated, like other loans with the same characteristics, as
dictated by Subpart F—that is, as fully taxable. Schering-
Plough certainly could not have had settled expectations to
the contrary. Therefore, whether we affirm the District Court
turns simply on whether it accurately characterized the
Transactions as loans, not on whether Schering-Plough

10
Because we uphold the District Court’s characterization of
the Transactions as loans, we do not reach its alternative
conclusion that the Transactions lacked economic substance.

12
complied with Notice 89-21, or what its expectations were in
that regard.11

A. Substance over form

A taxpayer challenging a tax assessment by the IRS as
erroneous bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Univ. of
Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 166 n.1 (3d Cir.
2007). We review the district court’s ultimate
characterization of the Transactions de novo, and its findings
of fact for clear error. “The general characterization of a
transaction for tax purposes is a question of law subject to
review. The particular facts from which the characterization
is to be made are not so subject.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 561, 581 n.16 (1978).

The District Court’s decision rested on its finding that
the Transactions were, in substance, loans rather than sales.
The District Court held that, under the guise of a one-time
payment to Schering-Plough to assume the receive leg of the
ABN swap, Scherico actually lent those funds to its parent.
Meanwhile, Schering-Plough paid Scherico back over a
number of years by itself paying ABN on the “pay leg” of the
swap, while ABN paid Scherico on the “receive leg” Scherico

11
Schering-Plough raises a further point, that it is difficult to
know what transactions were covered by Notice 89-21 if the
Transactions were not. Of course, we are not here asked to
and need not find that there were no transactions whatsoever
that could have qualified for treatment as a sale under Notice
89-21, merely that the transactions in question did not.

13
had been assigned. In other words, Schering-Plough did not
repay Scherico directly, but rather used ABN as a
passthrough to disguise the nature of the transaction.
Although ABN was paying sums to Scherico on the “receive
leg” which would often differ from the sums it was receiving
from Schering-Plough on the “pay leg,” ABN had another
swap with Merrill Lynch that was intended to perfectly offset
any difference in the two. ABN was even compensated for
its participation in the scheme. Therefore, the District Court
concluded, the Transactions were nothing but disguised loans.
It is this analysis of the Transactions that we review.

The substance of a transaction, rather than its formal
characterization, has always dictated its tax treatment. “The
Court has never regarded the simple expedient of drawing up
papers as controlling for tax purposes when the objective
economic realities are to the contrary.” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S.
at 573 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “To
determine whether a given transaction constitutes a loan, the
substance, rather than the form, of the transaction is
controlling.” Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v. Comm’r,
494 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2007). And, since “where the
same persons occupy both sides of the bargaining table, the
form of a transaction does not necessarily correspond to the
intrinsic economic nature of the transaction,” transactions
between related parties merit extra scrutiny. Geftman v.
Comm’r, 154 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Therefore, we must carefully analyze the economic
reality of the Transactions to determine whether it
corresponds to their formal characterization as sales. In
particular, we have held that determining whether a

14
transaction qualifies as a loan requires analysis both of the
objective characteristics of the transaction and of the parties’
intentions.

For disbursements to constitute true loans there
must have been, at the time the funds were
transferred, an unconditional obligation on the
part of the transferee to repay the money, and an
unconditional intention on the part of the
transferor to secure repayment. In the absence
of direct evidence of intent, the nature of the
transaction may be inferred from its objective
characteristics . . . .

Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Schering-Plough challenges whether the District Court’s
findings were sufficient evidence of its “direct intent.”
Further, as Geftman does not make it clear whether the intent
of the parties by itself is sufficient to create a loan, or whether
that intent must also be reflected in the objective
characteristics of the transaction in question, we analyze both
questions. Both, it transpires, support the conclusion that the
Transactions were actually loans.

1. Intentions of the parties

With respect to the parties’ intentions, there is no
reason to disturb the well-supported finding by the District
Court that Schering-Plough, Scherico, ABN, and Merrill
Lynch believed that they were crafting a loan, rather than a
sale. Schering-Plough’s director of financial reporting
recorded in his notes that “[w]e are really accounting for the
net deferred income as a loan, but tax could not have us
record it as a loan.” The same director created a loan

15
amortization schedule for the Transactions which referred to
balances, “payment,” “interest,” and “principal reduction.”
Schering-Plough has offered no convincing explanation for
the use of such language outside the context of a loan. A
near-contemporary ABN credit proposal relating to the
Transactions explained that Schering-Plough “through this
mechanism receives a 20 year amortizing loan from
subsidiary without incurring any negative tax implications in
the U.S.” Schering-Plough’s Board did not demand
preapproval of the Transactions, which it was required to do
for loans under its own policy, and its own treasury
department described the transaction to the board as causing
Scherico to “own[] financial assets which will earn interest,”
which is consistent with a loan, not a stream of future
payments.

Further, there is meaningful indirect evidence that the
parties knew they were creating a loan and thus seeking to
evade taxation on the repatriated funds. Notably, there is no
explanation whatsoever as to why Schering-Plough directed
Limited to funnel its payments through Scherico, whose
earnings had already largely been taxed in the United States,
rather than to pay Schering-Plough directly. If Schering-
Plough genuinely believed the Transactions not to be loans, it
had no need to take an additional step whose only plausible
purpose was to disguise the fact that the source of the funds
was Limited’s significant pool of earnings untaxed in the
United States. Further, Schering-Plough failed to report the
Transactions on its Form 5471s for the relevant years. If the
Transactions were sales, Schering-Plough should have
included them on their Form 5471s. Their failure to do so is
certainly suggestive of a desire to avoid scrutiny of the
Transactions by the IRS.

16
 Schering-Plough’s attempts to downplay the
significance of this evidence are unconvincing and at times
disingenuous. The District Court’s assessment of the
intentions of the parties involved determinations of
credibility, which “are ensconced firmly within the province
of a trial court, afforded broad deference on appeal.”
Neonatology Assoc. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 229 n.9 (3d
Cir. 2002). The District Court certainly did not commit clear
error in making its findings.

2. Objective economic attributes: intention or
obligation to repay

The more difficult question is whether the
Transactions had the objective economic attributes of loans.
As the United States’ experts established at trial, the
Transactions had certain objective indicia of loans, such as a
fixed maturity date, a fixed principal sum, periodic interest
payments, and a payment schedule. However, the main point
of contention is whether, as our case law requires, the
Transactions created “an unconditional obligation on the part
of [Schering-Plough] to repay the money.” Geftman, 154
F.3d at 61. Schering-Plough argues that ABN was obligated
only to make payments to Scherico based on the floating
interest rate that was the basis for the swap, and only for a
limited time.12 Thus, ABN might never have paid the
equivalent of the lump sum to Scherico. That is, had the
relevant interest rates dropped low enough, ABN’s payments
to Scherico, based on those interest rates, would not have

12
We discuss the implications for the nature of the
Transactions of third party ABN’s involvement below.

17
been sufficient to repay the funds provided to Schering-
Plough by Scherico.

There is little case law establishing the contours of the
“unconditional obligation” doctrine. Indeed, even in
Geftman, the court refers to the transferee’s intention to repay
as if that were synonymous with its obligation. Id. at 70
(discussing “a bona fide loan with the requisite unconditional
intention to repay” (emphasis added)). The case that most
directly addresses the role of “obligation” in creating a
transaction which must be treated as a loan rather than a sale
is Comtel Corp. v. Comm’r, 376 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1967). In
that case, the Second Circuit upheld the tax court’s treatment
of a complicated series of real estate transactions as a
“complex, prearranged financing plan” rather than a sale,
even though “there was no legal obligation binding [the
plaintiff] to exercise its option [to repurchase certain shares,
and thereby repay the obligation].” Id. at 794.
“Realistically,” the court noted, “[the plaintiff] was compelled
to” repay the sums in question, or else lose its other
investments in the project. Id. The situation in Comtel is not
identical to that here. The District Court did not find that
Schering-Plough was “compelled,” even in a practical sense,
to repay the funds, as in Comtel. However, Comtel does
make it clear that a formal “legal obligation” is not an
absolute prerequisite for a determination that a transaction is a
loan.

In the face of the tax code’s general insistence on the
controlling effect of economic reality rather than form, it is
more appropriate that, in determining whether there was an
“obligation” to repay, the court look to whether the
transferor’s intention was to structure the transaction to

18
ensure repayment of funds as a practical matter, rather than to
whether there were literally no conditions on repayment. It
would be simplicity itself for two parties, especially related
parties, to draft a contract in which repayment would not
occur in the event of some occurrence so unlikely that both
parties could be confident that it would never transpire, and
thus repayment would occur despite the transfer being
“conditional.” It cannot be true that a party may convert a
loan into a sale merely by including a provision establishing
one condition precedent for repayment, no matter how
unlikely that condition.

Nonetheless, under many, perhaps most,
circumstances, repayment might be sufficiently conditional to
prevent characterization of a transaction as a loan. In this
case, however, the evidence shows that the Transactions were
deliberately planned, as a practical matter, so as to ultimately
provide Scherico with repayment of the funds transferred to
Schering-Plough (plus interest). “The determinative fact is
the intention as it existed at the time of the transaction.”
Geftman, 154 F.3d at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Schering-Plough has conceded that the interest rates in
question needed to average only 2.93% for Scherico to be
repaid, a figure beneath which they had not dropped since
1962. Indeed, the government contends that, even with the
collapse of interest rates at the end of the 2000s, Schering-
Plough would have been repaid. Further, as Schering-Plough
had the right to repurchase the receive leg from Scherico (at
least for the first Transaction), Schering-Plough could have
arranged full repayment regardless of interest rates. There is
little better evidence for the “conditionality” involved at the
time of the transaction than the parties’ own discussion of the
Transactions as a means of ensuring repayment to Schering-

19
Plough. Both Schering-Plough’s assistant treasurer and its
expert testified at trial that Schering-Plough expected the
subsidiaries to be able to recover their principal.13

In another case where the court found a loan rather
than a sale to have occurred, it noted: “We readily admit that
the distinction is narrow between selling a property right to
future income and assigning anticipated income as collateral
to secure financing. Nevertheless, we feel that the distinction
seems logically and practically to turn upon an out-and-out
economically realistic transfer of a substantial property
interest.” Mapco Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110
(Ct. Cl. 1977). In this instance, the “asset” in which a
property interest was transferred was precisely engineered to
produce no net effect on the parties’ positions (except for the
payment of precalculated interest). If the Transactions had
been designed so that there was serious uncertainty as to the
return Scherico might receive, then one might argue that a
substantial property interest had been, realistically,
transferred. Instead, it was as if no property had changed
hands at all.14

13
Again, the District Court’s assessment of whether the
subsidiaries could expect, as a practical matter, to be fully
repaid under the terms of the Transaction involved its
assessment of conflicting testimony, including that of experts,
and is owed deference by this Court. Schering-Plough does
not establish, as it must, that this assessment was clear error.
14
It should also be noted that prepaid interest rate swaps in
general do not involve a “legal obligation” to repay the
prepaid sum, and for the same reason Schering-Plough raises
here: the rates might fluctuate in such a manner that the
payments might not equal the prepaid sum before the end of

20
 Thus, the evidence in this case is sufficient to show
that, within the meaning of Geftman, the parties intended to
secure a repayment to Scherico of the funds initially paid over
to Schering-Plough that was, effectively if not explicitly,
unconditional.

3. Objective characteristics: third-party
involvement

Schering-Plough argues that the involvement of ABN
means that the Transactions could not have been loans
between Schering-Plough and its subsidiaries. There is no
reason, however, that a loan cannot be arranged among three
parties. Such was the case, for instance, in Mapco Inc. v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1107 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see also United
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d
Cir. 1986). Schering-Plough does not seriously dispute this
point.

ABN might also, as the District Court found in the
alternative, be properly considered as a mere conduit for
payments between Schering-Plough and Scherico. “In the
conduit theory of the substance over form doctrine, the court
may disregard an entity if it is a mere conduit for the real
transaction at issue.” Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States,
553 F. Supp. 2d 716, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Comm’r v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)). “The contours of

the life of the contract. However, as discussed above, the IRS
has treated such prepaid swaps as loans for a number of years,
and Schering-Plough does not challenge that general
characterization by the IRS.

21
the conduit theory are not well defined,” id., and we have not
developed it extensively in this Circuit. However, both
parties in this case agree that Enbridge provides useful
guidance. In Enbridge, the court analyzed several factors:

(1) whether there was an agreement between the
principals to do a transaction before the
intermediary participated; (2) whether the
intermediary was an independent actor; (3)
whether the intermediary assumed any risk; (4)
whether the intermediary was brought into the
transaction at the behest of the taxpayer; and (5)
whether there was a nontax-avoidance business
purpose to the intermediary's participation.

Id. at 730.

In this case, the Enbridge factors favor a finding that
ABN was a conduit. The Transactions were structured by
Merrill Lynch and Schering-Plough before ABN was brought
in. Although ABN is, in a legal sense, an “independent
actor,” it has previously accommodated Merrill Lynch in
other tax shelter arrangements, and there is little evidence that
it had anything to gain from the swap itself, rather than from
being paid for its presence in the Transactions. See ASA
Investerings Partnership v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir.
2000). And from Schering-Plough’s point of view as well,
there appears to be no independent purpose to ABN’s
participation. That is, Schering-Plough might have borrowed
the money from its subsidiaries; it might even have entered
into a prepaid swap directly with the subsidiaries (selling
them, for a sum up front, the right to receive a stream of
future payments based on a particular interest rate). Both of
these approaches would have achieved the same end as the

22
Transactions themselves, making it appear that ABN was
brought into the deal simply to mask the true nature of the
Transactions.

Schering-Plough objects that ABN cannot be a conduit
because it incurred risks and costs of various kinds.
Schering-Plough points to the holding in Frank Lyon that a
company was not a conduit because it was “exposed . . . to [a]
real and substantial risk” that “affected substantially” its
“financial position.” Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 577. However,
each risk or cost identified by Schering-Plough in this case
ultimately appears to be insubstantial, illusory, or highly
speculative. Because ABN entered into a “mirror swap” with
Merrill Lynch (that is, one which balanced out the swap with
Schering-Plough, so that, to the extent ABN lost to Schering-
Plough, it would gain from Merrill Lynch), the transaction
was designed to cost ABN nothing (and provide it a fee). If
Schering-Plough was forced to default on its contract with
ABN, then ABN would, of course, be left with its
independent obligation to pay Scherico, and thus would have
lost money. However, the government presented unrebutted
evidence that the odds of such an occurrence were 0.0005%.15
It is also true that, if the swap held with Schering-Plough
went “into the red” and Merrill Lynch defaulted on its mirror
swap, then ABN would be facing a risk of loss. (Even then,
ABN, as a creditor, might well be able to recover some or all

15
Due to the credit downgrade trigger in the contract, which
would have permitted ABN to terminate the swap if Schering-
Plough’s credit rating dipped below a certain point for two
months, the catastrophe leading to default would have had to
have overtaken Schering-Plough in less than sixty days.

23
of its losses in bankruptcy.) However, this risk, too, must be
regarded as small.

Schering-Plough also argues that ABN faced
“opportunity cost” because the Basel Accords required a
certain set-aside of capital as a result of the swap, and thus
that capital was not available for use in other financing
transactions.16 First, it should be noted that, since ABN
received a fee for its participation in the Transactions, it was
effectively compensated for the “tying up” of its capital.
ABN may have projected that it could have received more
compensation for the use of its capital than it actually did, but
the court need not recognize its hopes that it could have done
better than it did in the deal that it voluntarily entered into as
a “cost.” Finally, the District Court credited the testimony of
the ABN negotiator of the deal that it did have the capacity to
place the swap in what is known as a “special purpose
vehicle,” which would have obviated the need for a capital
set-aside; it simply failed to do so.17 Schering-Plough asserts

16
The Basel Accords, a set of international agreements,
govern, among other things, the capital a company must set
aside to provide for the risk of counterparties’ default on
loans. That is, they require that companies maintain a certain
“cushion” against losses arising from credit defaults.
Roughly speaking, the amount of capital is determined as a
percentage of the amount of loans outstanding. The larger the
debt outstanding, then, the more capital a company must set
aside.
17
A “special purpose vehicle” is a device used by
corporations to create ostensibly independent entities that take
on a particular liability and thereby obviate the necessity to
include that debt on the corporate balance sheet. If a debt is

24
the contrary, but does not offer any meaningful argument to
overturn the District Court’s finding of fact on this point.
Hence, any “cost” was the result of poor accounting, rather
than the deal itself.

Schering-Plough claims that, according to Enbridge,
“a party is not a conduit if it incurs any risk at all.” (App’t
Br. 41) However, this is not an accurate citation of the
passage of Enbridge cited (which is quoted in full above).
Enbridge merely considers whether the intermediary assumed
“any risk” as one factor in a multifactor test. In this instance,
with most factors favoring a finding that ABN was a conduit,
an extremely modest risk assumed by ABN should not
outweigh them. Therefore, the participation of ABN, a
technically independent third party, in the Transactions by
itself is not sufficient to prevent the characterization of the
Transactions as loans.

We therefore hold that the District Court correctly
found that the Transactions were in substance loans, not sales.

B. Disparate-treatment claims

Schering-Plough also argues that it suffered disparate
treatment at the hands of the IRS because another taxpayer
(“Taxpayer One”18) engaged in a transaction substantially

committed to an SPV, Basel does not currently require that a
corporation set aside any capital to cover the risk of loss
(since the liability, theoretically, no longer belongs to the
company).
18
We continue the government’s sound practice of not
identifying an individual non-party taxpayer by name and

25
similar to the Transactions and was not assessed a deficiency.
In fact, when Taxpayer One was being audited in the mid-
1990s, the IRS National Office issued a Field Service Advice
(a guide on applying tax law to a particular situation) to its
personnel examining Taxpayer One indicating that
transactions of this kind would not be taxable as loans.
Schering-Plough asserts that the IRS should be bound by its
treatment of Taxpayer One’s transaction. The District Court
rejected this argument. Our review of its decision is de novo.
Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).

This claim, too, fails. Schering-Plough argues that the
IRS cannot treat similarly-situated taxpayers differently,
relying primarily on International Business Machines Corp.
v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In IBM, one of
IBM’s competitors obtained a private-letter ruling holding
that certain of its products were not subject to a certain excise
tax. IBM immediately requested a similar ruling holding that
its effectively identical products were not subject to the same
tax. After two years, the IRS denied the request. At the same
time, it informed the competitor that its products would be
subject to the tax, but only prospectively. Id. at 921. In
effect, therefore, only IBM was obliged to pay the excise tax
for goods sold during the two years before the IRS’s denial,
though both IBM and its competitor were obliged to pay the
excise tax for goods sold after the IRS’s denial. The Court of
Claims ultimately concluded that this was an abuse of
discretion. Id.

encourage appellant’s counsel to adopt this practice in the
future.

26
 Schering-Plough argues that IBM establishes that the
IRS cannot issue one taxpayer written advice assuring it that a
tax will not be assessed and then tax another under the same
circumstances. Unfortunately for Schering-Plough, although
we have never construed IBM ourselves, other courts, using
persuasive reasoning, have applied it very narrowly. The
Court of Federal Claims has “limit[ed] . . . . the holding of
[IBM] to its facts.” Amergen Energy Co., LLC ex rel. Exelon
Generation Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 413, 417 n.6
(Fed. Cl. 2010). Other circuits have limited its application to
cases where two taxpayers requested or received conflicting
private letter rulings from the IRS. Hostar Marine Transp.
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 592 F.3d 202, 210 (1st Cir. 2010);
Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465, 1469 n.9 (11th Cir.
1984) (“taxpayers who have not requested or received private
letter rulings from the IRS will not succeed on a claim of
discriminatory treatment because other taxpayers have
received private letter rulings on the tax consequences of the
same activities”).

Although it may seem unfair to require one taxpayer to
pay a tax when another similarly-situated taxpayer has been
able to avoid it, there are sound reasons that such disparate
treatment is not ordinarily considered a defense to tax
liability. “Despite the goal of consistency in treatment, the
IRS is not prohibited from treating . . . taxpayers disparately.
Rather than being a strict, definitive requirement, the
principle of achieving parity in taxing similarly situated
taxpayers is merely aspirational.” Hostar, 592 F.3d at 210.
The policy concerns implicated here are obvious. A simple
error by the IRS in applying the tax code should not
effectively nullify that provision of the code for all other
taxpayers, especially as it is not possible for the IRS to pursue

27
every taxpayer who errs in calculating his tax liability.
Further, as the IRS is constantly confronted with attempts of
ever-increasing sophistication and variety to evade the tax
code, it must be permitted to pursue later tax evaders even if
it initially fails to detect a scheme which permits evasion.19
And if taxpayers could routinely challenge tax assessments by
pointing to others who had not been compelled to pay under
similar circumstances, the IRS would be swamped by
collateral litigation of this kind rather than being able to focus
on whether the taxpayer actually complied with the law—
which is, in the end, the taxpayer’s legal obligation.

Although this case does not require us to determine the
precise limits of IBM, we can say with assurance that it does
not apply to Schering-Plough’s present situation. In this
instance, Taxpayer One did not receive a formal written
ruling from the IRS holding that the Transactions were not
taxable, as the competitor did in IBM and which other circuits
have required to sustain a claim of disparate treatment.
Although the IRS did issue a Field Service Advice respecting
Taxpayer One, FSAs are not binding documents, nor, at the
time, were they even public; they are meant as guidance for
the team conducting an audit, not as an assurance for the
taxpayer being audited.

19
The United States claims that this is what occurred with
respect to Taxpayer One’s transaction. Given the obvious
complexity of the scheme originated by Merrill Lynch, this
claim is entirely plausible. The IRS should not be deterred
from assessing deficiencies in this case simply because it had
not fully grasped the potential for misuse of Notice 89-21
when it was assessing Taxpayer One.

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 Perhaps more importantly, an FSA issued in 1997 and
not intended for public consumption can hardly be said to
have been the basis of reasonable reliance by Schering-
Plough in determining the tax treatment of the Transactions in
the early 1990s. In IBM, IBM was aware at once of the
private-letter ruling in favor of its competitor and
immediately applied for a similar letter, on an urgent basis. It
would appear that the Court of Claims felt that that, because
IBM was selling effectively identical products, it could
reasonably rely at once on the assumption that the IRS would
eventually issue it such a ruling, as well. However, since it
was impossible for Schering-Plough to have seen the FSA
concerning Taxpayer One’s situation before entering into the
Transactions and choosing not to report the proceeds as
receipts from loans under Subpart F, it had no such basis for
confidence.

Schering-Plough further complains that the IRS had
inappropriate motives for pursuing its audits and requests
discovery to explore this allegation further. The language
from IRS documents that Schering-Plough quotes indicates
that at least one IRS agent thought that Schering-Plough’s
approach to determining its tax liabilities was less than
conscientious, given prior findings of evasion (which were
upheld by this circuit, as the District Court noted, see
Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F.Supp.2d at 226-27 & n.7). The
chutzpah of this argument is notable. To the extent that the
IRS pursued Schering-Plough more vigorously because
Schering-Plough had a history of failing to comply with the
tax laws, this represents commendable agency diligence in the
light of past experience, not some kind of impermissible bias
against Schering-Plough. Schering-Plough offers no
persuasive basis for us to order further discovery.

29
 III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court=s grant of summary judgment in the United States’
favor.

30