Alli v. Decker

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________

No. 10-2297
_______________

ALEXANDER ALLI; ELLIOT GRENADE,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

Appellants

v.

THOMAS DECKER, Field Office Director, Immigration &
Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in his official
capacity and his successors and assigns; JANET
NAPOLITANO, Secretary of Homeland Security, in her
official capacity and her successors and assigns; ERIC H.
HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney General, in his official capacity
and his successors and assigns; MARY SABOL, Prison
Warden, York County Prison Facility, in her official capacity
and her successors and assigns; JOHN P. TORRES, in his
official capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; WILLIAM
CAMPBELL, in his official capacity as Warden, Columbia
County Prison, Bloomsberg, Pennsylvania; JANINE
DONATE, in her official capacity as Warden, Lackawanna
County Prison, Scranton, Pennsylvania; WILLIAM F.
JURACKA, in his official capacity as Warden, Carbon
County Correctional Facility, Nesquehonin, Pennsylvania;
CRAIG A. LOWE, in his official capacity as Warden, Pike
County Correctional Facility, Lords Valley, Pennsylvania;
RUTH RUSH, in her official capacity as Warden, Snyder
County Prison, Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania; MICHAEL
ZENK, in his official capacity as Warden, CI Moshannon
Valley Correctional Institution, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania;
JERRY C. MARTINEZ, in his official capacity as Warden,
FCI Allenwood (Low), Allenwood, Pennsylvania; DAVID
EBBERT, in his official capacity as Warden, FCI Allenwood
(Medium), Allenwood, Pennsylvania; R. MARTINEZ, in his
official capacity as Warden, FCI Allenwood (High),
Allenwood, Pennsylvania; THOMAS V. DURAN, in his
official capacity as Warden, Clinton County Correctional
Facility, McElhattan, Pennsylvania
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:09-cv-00698)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III
_______________

Argued January 24, 2011
_______________

Before: FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
POLLAK, District Judge *

(Opinion filed: June 21, 2011)

Judy Rabinovitz (argued)
Michael Tan (argued)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004

Thomas B. Schmidt, III
Pepper Hamilton
100 Market Street, P.O. Box 1181
Suite 200
Harrisburg , PA 17108-1181

Counsel for Appellants

*
Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation.

2
Theodore W. Atkinson (argued)
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Nicole Prairie (argued)
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Appellees

Craig Shagin
The Shagin Law Group, LLC
120 South Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Amicus Appellant Pennsylvania
Immigration Resource Center and Legal Aid Society

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

POLLAK, District Judge

Appellants in this case seek to represent a putative
class of aliens who are detained, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), pending their removal proceedings. The class
complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sought a declaratory
judgment that the continued detention of the class members,

3
without bond hearings, violates the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The District Court denied the class
certification motion and dismissed the class complaint,
finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) deprived the court of
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an application for
declaratory relief on behalf of the plaintiff class. Section
1252(f)(1) precludes class actions that seek to “enjoin or
restrain the operation of” several immigration statutes,
including 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The District Court concluded
that “restrain” encompasses declaratory relief. We reverse.

I.

Appellants Alexander Alli and Elliot Grenade are
lawful permanent residents whom the government deems
removable from the United States as a result of past criminal
convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Appellants were
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 1 which provides that
the Attorney General “shall take into custody any alien who .
. . is deportable by reason of having committed” certain
enumerated offenses. 2

After Alli and Grenade had been detained for,
respectively, 9 months and 20 months, they filed a combined
habeas petition and civil complaint alleging that their
continued detention violated the INA and the Due Process
Clause. They sought, inter alia, an order directing the
government to provide them with a bond hearing. In addition

1
In the District Court, appellant Grenade argued that part of
his detention could not be authorized by § 1226(c), and
instead asserted that the detention came under § 1226(a),
which allows the Attorney General to release a detained alien
on bond. The dispute is not relevant to the issue we confront
on appeal.
2
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most
immigration-related functions of the Attorney General—
including the detention authority at issue in this case—to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135. For the sake of convenience, we use the term
Attorney General as contained in the statutes.

4
to their individual claims, appellants sought to represent a
class of lawful permanent residents residing in Pennsylvania
or, in the alternative, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
who had been or would be detained without hearing, pursuant
to § 1226(c), for over six months. The putative class sought a
declaration that the failure to afford such a hearing violates
the INA and the Due Process Clause.

The District Court granted appellants’ individual
petitions but refused to consider their class claims, finding
that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) stripped it of jurisdiction to
entertain a class action requesting declaratory relief. The
government did not appeal the ruling on the individual
petitions, but appellants sought review of the class decision.

II.

A.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over legal
conclusions associated with orders dismissing claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. White-Squire v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).

Although not raised by either party, we briefly address
a procedural wrinkle that implicates the mootness doctrine.
The District Court denied appellants’ motion for class
certification on August 10, 2009. Dkt. 56. In the same order,
the District Court dismissed the portions of appellants’
complaint and habeas petition that sought class relief. But on
January 26, 2010, the District Court ruled that both of
appellants’ detentions were unreasonably prolonged, and thus
ordered individualized bond hearings for each appellant. 3
Dkt. 88. Accordingly, appellants no longer have a personal
stake in the merits of the class claim. Nevertheless, because
the denial of class certification occurred when appellants’
individual claims were still live, their appeal is not moot. See

3
Neither appellant actually received a bond hearing. Instead,
Alli was immediately released on no bond and, after a
conference with the District Court, the parties agreed to a
form of conditional release for Grenade.

5
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980)
(“[A]n action brought on behalf of a class does not become
moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive
claim, even though class certification has been denied.”);
Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 1226 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A]
federal appellate court retains jurisdiction over a named
plaintiff’s challenge to a denial of class certification, even if
the plaintiff has not maintained a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation since that decision.”). We may
therefore review the District Court’s conclusion that §
1252(f)(1) deprived it of jurisdiction to certify appellants’
class claim for declaratory relief.

B.

Section 1252(f)(1) provides:

Regardless of the nature of the action or claim
or of the identity of the party or parties bringing
the action, no court (other than the Supreme
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to
enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions
of part IV of this sub-chapter, as amended by
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with
respect to the application of such provisions to
an individual alien against whom proceedings
under such part have been initiated. 4

At issue in this case is whether the term “restrain,” in §
1252(f)(1), encompasses, and thus bars, appellants’ class

4
Section 1252(f)(1) was enacted as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-
546. “[M]any provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting
the Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can
fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.” Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
486 (1999) (emphasis omitted).

6
 5
claim for declaratory relief regarding § 1226(c) detention
practices. 6

The parties agree that use of the disjunctive “or”
demands that “restrain” have some meaning other than
“enjoin.” See Chalmers v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir.
1994) (“We see no basis to construe the disjunctive ‘or’ in
any way other than its plain meaning . . . .”); see also
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“[W]hen interpreting a statute, courts should endeavor to
give meaning to every word which Congress used and
therefore should avoid an interpretation which renders an
element of the language superfluous.”).

5
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is a “provision[] of part IV of this
subchapter.” Section 1252(f)(1) is in subchapter II of Chapter
12. Part IV of subchapter II, “Inspection, Apprehension,
Examination, Exclusion, and Removal,” includes 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1221–1232.
6
In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
525 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of § 1252(f), albeit only in passing. The Court
sought to determine the limits of § 1252(g), which restricts
judicial review of the Attorney General’s “decision or action”
to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this Act.” The Ninth
Circuit had found that § 1252(g) was limited by § 1252(f),
which the Ninth Circuit had described as an affirmative grant
of jurisdiction. In rejecting this conclusion, the Supreme
Court’s analysis of § 1252(f) was limited to a determination
of whether § 1252(f) is a grant of or limit on federal court
jurisdiction. In that regard, the Court observed that “[b]y its
plain terms, and even by its title, that provision [§1252(f)] is
nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.” Id. at
481. Thus, the Reno Court did not, as we must do here,
address the scope of § 1252(f)(1), but instead simply
determined that § 1252(f) is a limit on jurisdiction. We
cannot, therefore, treat Reno as controlling on the more
specific question of the meaning of “restrain.”

7
 But the parties dispute what we may and may not
consider in construing the statute. Appellants argue that the
meaning of “restrain” may be derived by reference to the
statute’s context (including neighboring provisions), while the
government contends that resort to statutory context is only
appropriate where the term in question is ambiguous. The
government claims (and the District Court found) that
“restrain” is not ambiguous, but merely broad, and thus that it
is improper to consult the provision’s context. See Appellees’
Br. at 31 (“Ambiguity . . . may [not] be read into a statutory
term or phrase simply because Congress used a different term
or phrase in another part of the same statute.”); Alli v. Decker,
644 F.Supp.2d 535, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (“That Congress
employed different language in another portion of the statute
does not change [the] plain meaning [of ‘restrain’].”).

It is true that “[w]here the statutory language is
unambiguous, the court should not consider statutory purpose
or legislative history,” Parker v. NutriSystem, Inc., 620 F.3d
274, 277 (3d Cir. 2010), and that “‘the title of a statute . . .
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text,’” Dep’t of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1988) (quoting
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29
(1947)). But neither the government nor the District Court
has cited to any authority that requires a court to ignore other
provisions within a statute when making the threshold
ambiguity determination. 7 Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has

7
For example, Florida Department of Revenue. v. Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008), did not, as the
government contends, treat facial ambiguity as a prerequisite
to contextual interpretation. In fact, the Piccadilly Court
suggested that contextual interpretation is a permissible
means of discerning ambiguity. See id. at 47 (considering,
then rejecting, contextual arguments, and noting that “even if
we were fully to accept Piccadilly’s textual and contextual
arguments, they would establish at most that the statutory
language is ambiguous.”). The District Court’s citation to
Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 155
(3d Cir. 2009) is also inapposite. In Kaufman, we observed
that “when the plain meaning cannot be derived, the provision
at issue must be viewed in the context of the statute as a
whole.” Id. But it does not follow that a court may assess the

8
stated consistently that the text of a statute must be
considered in the larger context or structure of the statute in
which it is found.” United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145,
151 (3d Cir. 2006); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining
whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at
issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may
only become evident when placed in context.”). Accordingly,
the District Court’s approach to discerning the existence of
ambiguity—an approach based on dictionary definitions—
was insufficient. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118
(1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional
possibilities but of statutory context.”). 8

context of the statute only if “the plain meaning cannot be
derived” in isolation.
8
Thus it may be true that, as the District Court found, class
declaratory relief would “restrain” the operation of the
detention statutes if “restrain” were interpreted solely under
its broad dictionary definition. See, e.g., 2 Oxford English
Dictionary 554 (Compact ed. 1971) (defining “restrain” as
“[t]o check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from
some course of action . . . .”). But the Supreme Court has
noted that

[t]he definition of words in isolation . . . is not
necessarily controlling in statutory construction.
A word in a statute may or may not extend to
the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.
Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon
reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and
consulting any precedents or authorities that
inform the analysis.

Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). We
accordingly decline to confine ourselves to the dictionary
definitions proffered by the government.

9
 We therefore turn to the statutory context of §
1252(f)(1). A closely adjacent provision, § 1252(e)(1)(A),
precludes courts from entering “declaratory, injunctive, or
other equitable relief in any action pertaining to an order to
exclude an alien . . . .” This provision is compelling evidence
that Congress knew how to preclude declaratory relief, but
chose not to in § 1252(f)(1). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“‘[Where] Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.’” (quoting Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). In Nken v. Holder, the Supreme
Court followed this presumption in interpreting § 1252(f)(2),
immediately adjacent to the provision at issue here, and noted
that the presumption was “particularly true . . . where [the]
subsections . . . were enacted as part of a unified overhaul of
judicial review procedures.” See Nken v. Holder, 129 S.Ct.
1749, 1759 (2009).

Even if the contrast between “enjoin or restrain” in §
1252(f)(1) and “declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable
relief” in § 1252(e)(1)(A) does not, by itself, demonstrate that
“restrain” does not encompass declaratory relief, it at least
underscores an ambiguity that encourages consideration of
§ 1252(f)(1)’s section heading. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008)
(“[S]tatutory titles and section headings are ‘tools available
for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.’”)
(quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The title of § 1252(f), “Limit on
injunctive relief,” counsels in favor of interpreting “restrain”
as referring to a form of injunctive relief. This reading is
reinforced by the broader heading of § 1252(e)(1),
“Limitations on relief.” As noted above, § 1252(e)(1)—
unlike § 1252(f)(1)—expressly bars jurisdiction over both
injunctive and declaratory relief. We therefore read “Limit
on injunctive relief” to mean what it says, and we conclude
that “restrain” refers to one or more forms of temporary
injunctive relief, such as a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction.

10
 In sum, viewing the provision in context and then
taking into consideration the heading of the provision, it is
apparent that the jurisdictional limitations in § 1252(f)(1) do
not encompass declaratory relief. This moderate construction
of “restrain” is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s
instruction that statutes limiting equitable relief are to be
construed narrowly. See Porter v. Warren Holding Co., 328
U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (“Unless a statute in so many words, or
by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to
be recognized and applied.”); see also Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66, 70 (1971) (“[A] suit for declaratory judgment
[is] . . . ‘essentially an equitable cause of action’ . . . .”
(quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293, 300 (1943))). 9 Our conclusion is consistent with
the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the identical question, and with
the First Circuit’s conclusion in a slightly different context.
See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010);
Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003). 10

C.

9
Moreover, our reading is informed by the general rule that
“the narrower construction of a jurisdiction-stripping
provision is favored over the broader one.” Ana Int’l v. Way,
393 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 480–82
(1999)).
10
In Arevalo, the First Circuit was called upon to interpret §
1252(f)(2), which provides that “no court shall enjoin the
removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this
section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is
prohibited as a matter of law.” Judge Selya, writing for the
panel, ruled that “enjoin” in that provision does not
encompass stays pending review of a final order of removal.
Judge Selya’s § 1252(f)(1) finding—that “restrain” in
§1252(f)(1) refers to “temporary injunctive relief (such as
stays)”—was thus primarily used to buttress his answer to the
§ 1252(f)(2) question, and it did not address the question of
declaratory relief. Nevertheless, we find Arevalo’s reasoning
persuasive on the issue we confront in this case.

11
 The government contends that “restrain” should be
construed to include declaratory relief because, in this
context, such relief is the functional equivalent of injunctive
relief. Specifically, the government contends that our
interpretation leads to “an absurd result” by creating a “cause-
of-action loophole that stops just short of ordering injunctive
relief but establishes on a class-wide basis the right to such
injunctive relief.” Appellees’ Br. at 29; see also, e.g., Lamie
v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well
established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its
terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Under certain circumstances, declaratory relief has
been deemed “functionally equivalent” to injunctive relief.
For example, in California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U.S. 393 (1982), the Supreme Court assessed whether
declaratory relief was permissible under the Tax Injunction
Act, which provides that district courts “shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the . . . collection of any tax under State
law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added). In ruling that
the Act precludes both injunctive and declaratory relief, the
Court observed that “the declaratory judgment ‘procedure
may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of
the state taxes until the litigation is ended,’” Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. at 408 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943)), and that a
prohibition on declaratory relief was consistent with the
“principal purpose” of the Act: “‘to limit drastically federal
district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local
concern as the collection of taxes.’” Id. at 408 (quoting
Rosswell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)). 11

11
As a textual matter, it is not clear that Grace Brethren
compellingly supports the government’s position that
“restrain” includes declaratory relief. The Court did not
expressly state whether “suspend” or “restrain”—or, perhaps,
the combination of the two—encompassed declaratory relief.
And to the extent the Court did tie its analysis to a particular
term, it appears that the Court read “suspend”—which is
absent from § 1252(f)(1)—to refer to declaratory relief. See

12
 But declaratory relief will not always be the functional
equivalent of injunctive relief. In Steffel v. Thompson, the
Supreme Court noted that “‘[t]he express purpose of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder
alternative to the injunction remedy.’” 415 U.S. 452, 467
(1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The
Steffel Court noted that “[t]he only occasions where this Court
has . . . found that a preclusion of injunctive relief inevitably
led to a denial of declaratory relief have been cases in which
principles of federalism militated altogether against federal
intervention in a class of adjudications.” Id. at 472; see also
id. at 462 (“When no state proceeding is pending and thus
considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little
vitality, the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief
may properly be considered independently of a request for
injunctive relief.”). 12

Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408 (“[T]he Act divests
the district court . . . of jurisdiction to take actions that
‘suspend or restrain’ the assessment and collection of state
taxes. Because the declaratory judgment procedure may in
every practical sense suspend collection of state taxes until
the litigation is ended, the very language of the Act suggests
that a federal court is prohibited from issuing declaratory
relief . . . .”(emphasis added)); see also Rodriguez, 591 F.3d
at 1119 (“[T]he conspicuous absence of suspend in
[§ 1252(f)(1)] suggests that Congress intended Section
1252(f)’s scope to be more limited than the Tax Injunction
and Johnson Acts.”).
12
The government relies on National Union Fire Insurance
Co. v. City Savings to support its argument that declaratory
and injunctive relief are, in this context, equivalent.
Appellees’ Br. at 39. In National Union, we held that a
jurisdiction-stripping statute includes an implicit prohibition
on declaratory relief. 28 F.3d 376, 389–90 (3d Cir. 1994).
We further held that the prohibition was consistent with due
process because it did not entirely preclude the opportunity to
be heard, it merely delayed such opportunity. Id. at 390–91.
We buttressed this ruling by citation to an analogous holding
in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)—
which assessed a due process challenge to a statute stripping

13
 The reasoning of Steffel significantly undermines the
government’s wholesale attempt to equate declaratory and
injunctive relief, and it supports the conclusion that our
reading of § 1252(f)(1) would not produce “an absurd result.”
The distinct purpose and effect of a declaration, as compared
to an injunction, presents an entirely plausible basis upon
which Congress might choose to bar one form of relief but
not the other. Moreover, in this context a classwide
declaration would not—indeed, by the plain terms of the
statute, could not—form the basis for classwide injunctive
relief. Though appellants do not dispute that class members
could pursue individual injunctions after issuance of a
classwide declaration, see Steffel, 415 U.S. at 461 n.11
(“[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2202 a declaratory judgment might
serve as the basis for issuance of a later injunction . . . .”),
such individual relief is expressly permitted under §
1252(f)(1). 13

courts of jurisdiction to award injunctive relief—and we
stated that Bob Jones was apposite because “‘there is little
practical difference between injunctive and declaratory
relief.’” Id. at 391 n.17 (quoting Grace Brethren Church, 457
U.S. at 408). Thus, we found that the due process concerns
raised by a statute barring declaratory relief were equivalent
to the due process concerns raised by a statute barring
injunctive relief.
But the government fails to explain why the remedial
equivalency in National Union mandates a similar finding of
equivalency in this case. We are concerned here with the
practical effect of allowing declaratory relief, whereas
National Union discussed the constitutional effect of barring
declaratory relief. Moreover, we need only find that
Congress had a plausible basis for finding that, in this
context, declarations and injunctions are not equivalent. As
discussed above, the distinct purposes and effects of the two
remedies are a sufficient basis. We accordingly decline to
read National Union as a categorical pronouncement of the
equivalency of declaratory and injunctive relief.
13
We recognize that the judiciary has “long presumed that
officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as
declared by the court.” Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 542

14
 Finally, as one respected scholar has noted, allowing
classwide declaratory relief would “facilitate the Supreme
Court review that Congress apparently intended.” See Gerald
L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1686–87 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1252(f)(1) (“. . . no court (other than the Supreme Court)
shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain . . . .”
(emphasis added)). The Supreme Court could not exercise
original jurisdiction over such a class action, and “[a]n
appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial
determination, some judgment, decree, or order of an inferior
tribunal, from which an appeal could be taken.” The Alicia,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869). “If instead section 1252(f)(1)
were interpreted as permitting classwide declaratory—but not
injunctive—relief in the lower courts, there would be a
justiciable class action that could be subjected to appellate
review.” Neuman, 78 TEX. L. REV. at 1686. Thus Professor
Neuman has articulated an additional reason that our
interpretation of “restrain” would not lead to an unreasonable
result.

In summary, we conclude that construing § 1252(f)(1)
to permit class declaratory relief would not produce an
“absurd result.” We accordingly decline the government’s
invitation to disregard the most natural reading of the statute.

* * * * *

F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But we also note that the
Department of Justice has recently taken the position that, at
least under certain circumstances, this presumption applies
only after appellate review is exhausted. Defendant’s Motion
to Clarify at 4, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, No. 10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2011) (“[The]
injunction-like effect of a declaratory judgment against
defendants . . . would apply after appellate review is
exhausted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Though the
district judge in that case rejected the government’s view of
the effect of the declaratory judgment, see id. ECF No. 167 at
12–13, we are satisfied, for the purposes of this case, that
Congress had at least a plausible basis for believing that
declaratory and injunctive relief would have different effects.

15
 The problem in this case is to determine the scope of
what Congress intended in using the word “restrain” in §
1252(f)(1). The government places particular emphasis on
that term’s dictionary definitions. We think that, in
construing a statute, dictionary definitions may be helpful
starting points, but over-reliance on dictionaries—to the
exclusion of sources such as adjacent statutory provisions—
can lead a court astray. As we have noted previously, see
supra note 8, the Supreme Court has given prudent counsel:
“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of
the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that
inform the analysis.” Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. Accordingly,
we (1) reverse the District Court’s dismissal of those portions
of appellants’ amended habeas petition and civil complaint
that sought class relief, (2) vacate the district court’s denial of
class certification, and (3) remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

16
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.

The Majority concludes that, although 8 U.S.C. §
1252(f)(1) prohibits class action relief to “enjoin or restrain”
immigration laws that regulate the detention of aliens
convicted of crimes pending their removal, these
jurisdictional limitations “do not encompass declaratory
relief.” Maj. Op. at 11. I disagree because a class action for
declaratory relief has the effect of restraining the operation of
laws, like 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), that regulate pre-removal
detention in immigration proceedings—precisely what the
plain text of § 1252(f)(1) prohibits.

The statute at issue in this case provides as follows:

Regardless of the nature of the action or claim
or of the identity of the party or parties bringing
the action, no court (other than the Supreme
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to
enjoin or restrain the operation of the
provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other
than with respect to the application of such
provisions to an individual alien against whom
proceedings under such part have been initiated.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (emphases added). Although this
provision bars class action suits to “enjoin or restrain” the
immigration laws that regulate the detention of aliens subject
to removal, Alli argues that, by its plain language, §
1252(f)(1) contains no prohibition on declaratory relief. He
points out that the text does not use the term “declaratory”
and that the section is entitled “Limit on Injunctive Relief.” I
find these arguments unpersuasive. The real issue in this case
is whether the word “restrain” bars a class claim for
declaratory relief that would have the same practical effect as
a class claim for injunctive relief. The Majority concludes
that it does not because the word “restrain” refers to
“temporary injunctive relief.” Maj. Op. at 11. This is
incompatible with the Majority’s conclusion that the word
“restrain” should have a meaning different from the word
“enjoin.” Maj. Op. at 8. In my view, while the term “enjoin”
refers to injunctive relief—including the temporary kind—the
1
term “restrain” is a broad one that includes, among other
things, declaratory relief. For this reason, I respectfully
dissent.

The District Court rejected Alli's interpretation of §
1252(f)(1) and, for several reasons, I find its analysis
persuasive. First, because we endeavor to interpret statutes
according to their “ordinary meaning,” Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991), I find dictionary definitions
helpful. See Massie v. United States Dep't of Housing and
Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 356 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the
dictionary is the “proper starting place for ascertaining the
plain meaning of words”). In this case, those definitions
comport with common-sense understanding. The word
“restrain” means “restrict, limit, confine,” and “to hold back
from action; keep in check or under control; repress.” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1487
(4th ed. 2009); Random House Webster’s Unabridged
Dictionary 1642 (2d ed. 1998); The Compact Oxford English
Dictionary 1573 (2d ed. 1989).

A class-wide declaratory judgment that aliens detained
pursuant to § 1226(c) must receive an individualized hearing,
as the Majority would allow, necessarily “restricts or limits”
the Executive Branch’s implementation of that statute. I find
nothing ambiguous about this result. 1 As the government

1
The Majority asserts that, because the “injunction-like effect
of a declaratory judgment” action does not occur until after
appellate review is exhausted, Congress could plausibly
assume that the effect of a declaratory judgment is different
from the effect of an injunction. Maj. Op. at 15 n.13. This is
indicative of the Majority's penchant for elevating form over
substance. The timing of a judgment's effect has no bearing
on its substance. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct, a
declaratory judgment can act to “restrain” the operation of §
1226(c) even if it differs in effect from an injunction. The
question is not whether declaratory judgments and injunctions
are equivalent; the question is whether a declaratory judgment
acts to “restrain.” As the Majority concedes, the judiciary
presumes that officials of the Executive Branch adhere to our
interpretations of the law. Id. (citing Comm. on Judiciary v.
Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). A declaratory
2
argues, the term “restrain” is simply broad: Congress was so
concerned about judicial second-guessing of its policy that it
used a broad term in order to prevent it. See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Broad general
language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional
objectives require broad terms.”); In re Philadelphia
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As a
general matter of statutory construction, a term in a statute is
not ambiguous merely because it is broad in scope.”).

Alli's class action petition for declaratory relief
operates to “restrain” the operation of the law and is therefore
barred by § 1252(f)(1). In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff generally cannot file an action in
federal court to enjoin a pending state prosecution. 401 U.S.
37 (1971). A companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971), recognized that allowing declaratory judgments in
such cases would largely undermine Younger’s holding. The
Supreme Court explained that “the propriety of declaratory
and injunctive relief should be judged by essentially the same
standards.” Id. at 72. Applying this principle, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that allowing declaratory judgments
against pending state criminal prosecutions would (1) “serve
as the basis for a subsequent injunction against those
proceedings . . . and thus result in a clearly improper
interference with the state proceedings,” and (2) “even if the
declaratory judgment is not used as a basis for actually
issuing an injunction, the declaratory relief alone [would
have] virtually the same practical impact as a formal
injunction . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). In this way, it
recognized that a declaratory judgment had the same practical
limiting effect on a state prosecution as an injunction. Id. at
73. (“Ordinarily, however, the practical effect of the two
forms of relief will be virtually identical . . . .”)

I am not persuaded by the Majority’s reliance on
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), to dismiss this
authority. Steffel did not purport to overrule Samuels. It
merely acknowledged that “different considerations enter into

judgment respecting an entire class of aliens surely
“restrains,” i.e., “limits,” “restricts,” the Executive Branch's
exercise of discretion over the members of that class.
3
a federal court’s decision as to declaratory relief, on the one
hand, and injunctive relief, on the other.” Steffel, 415 U.S. at
469. This is certainly true: the decision to grant declaratory
judgment is a purely discretionary one. See Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287-88 (1995). The question is
whether the considerations that led the Supreme Court to
decide in Samuels that allowing declaratory judgments would
undermine its holding in Younger are also applicable here.
They are.

The concern in Samuels was that declaratory
judgments would have the same practical effect of interfering
with pending state proceedings as an injunction. Here, the
concern is that a declaratory judgment has the same practical
effect of interfering with pending immigration proceedings in
immigration courts established by Congress and administered
by the Executive branch. In both situations, a declaratory
judgment will “serve as the basis for a subsequent injunction
against those proceedings” and “even if the declaratory
judgment is not used as a basis for actually issuing an
injunction, the declaratory relief alone [would have] virtually
the same practical impact as a formal injunction . . . .”
Samuels, 401 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added). This
consideration was not present in Steffel, which reaches the
sensible conclusion that a declaratory judgment action can be
filed when there is no pending proceeding to interfere with.
415 U.S. at 462.

Furthermore, the fact that district courts must consider
a variety of factors in deciding between declaratory and
injunctive relief is irrelevant to whether a declaratory
judgment “restrains.” The Majority implies that a declaratory
judgment only restrains if it is the “functional equivalent” of
an injunction. Maj. Op. at 13. In this case, I believe that the
two forms of relief are functionally equivalent. But even if
they are not—even if a declaratory judgment is a “milder”
form of relief—a milder form of relief can still “limit,”
“restrict” or “keep [someone] back from action.” In this light,
I am unconvinced that a declaratory judgment does not
“restrain” the operation of § 1226(c).

Indeed, if a declaratory judgment does not “restrain”—
that is “restrict, limit, confine” or “ keep . . . under control”

4
the operation of a law—then what does it do? At its
inception, the concept of declaratory relief was controversial
because of the concern that such judgments were merely
impermissible advisory opinions. See 10B Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2753 (3d ed.
1998). These concerns remain real, which is why courts are
required to ensure that a declaratory judgment action presents
an actual controversy and not just an abstract question of law.
See Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp.
of Am., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1958). The “fundamental
test is whether the plaintiff seeks merely advice or whether a
real question of conflicting legal interests is presented for
judicial determination.” Id. Here, it must be assumed that
plaintiffs are seeking a determination of their legal rights as a
class, not merely advice. Surely the determination of the
legal rights of an entire class of aliens “restrains” the
Executive Branch’s legal authority over that class. See
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 n.21
(1982) (“In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress
recognized the substantial effect declaratory relief would have
on legal disputes.”).

Second, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar
statutory phrases also supports my reading of § 1252(f)(1).
The Tax Injunction Act states that district courts “shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the . . . collection of any tax under
State law . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Recognizing that there is
“little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory
relief,” the Supreme Court held that this language stripped
district courts of their jurisdiction to issue declaratory
judgments as well as injunctions. Grace Brethren Church,
457 U.S. at 408. Circuit courts interpreting the Johnson Act,
which contains similar language limiting the ability of district
courts to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of” public
utility rates set by state agencies, have reached the same
conclusion: the phrase “enjoin, suspend or restrain” covers
declaratory relief. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec.
Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1991); Tennyson v. Gas
Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1974).

Alli is correct to point out that these statutes implicated
concerns of federalism. But I find this attempt to distinguish
the cases more illuminating than discouraging: if concerns of

5
federalism were enough to persuade the Supreme Court to
conclude that declaratory judgments would “enjoin, suspend
or restrain” state tax systems, analogous concerns of inter-
branch relations would seem enough to conclude that class-
wide declaratory judgments would “enjoin or restrain” the
operation of a system created by Congress and implemented
by the Executive Branch.

Third, § 1252(f)(1)’s reservation of jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court does not support the Majority’s interpretation.
The Majority’s argument runs as follows: if “restrain” bars
class actions seeking either an injunction or a declaratory
judgment, then the district court would never have
jurisdiction to certify a class; if the district court cannot have
jurisdiction over a class action, there can never be appellate
jurisdiction over a class action; if there is no appellate
jurisdiction over a class action, then the Supreme Court could
never have jurisdiction; thus, § 1252(f)(1) must allow
jurisdiction over classes seeking declaratory relief. The
problem with this argument is that it proves too much. Since
Professor Neuman acknowledges that Article III jurisdiction
is remedy-specific, his argument also demonstrates that the
Supreme Court will never have jurisdiction to “enjoin” the
operation of § 1226(c). Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts in
Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1661, 1686 (2000).
Moreover, Professor Neuman recognizes that the scope of the
Supreme Court’s authority to certify a class under its
appellate jurisdiction is an open question. Id. The
reservation of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court raises
interesting issues of abstract law, but it has no bearing on the
meaning of the word “restrain” and does nothing to support
the Majority’s interpretation.

Fourth, because the statute is not ambiguous, we do
not need to look to other portions of the statute for guidance.
Alli concedes that the title of a statute does not trump its plain
text; the title is relevant only as a tool to resolve doubt about
its meaning. See Appellant Br. at 16 n.6; see also
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
212 (1998) (“The title of a statute . . .cannot limit the plain
meaning of the text.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Here, I have no doubts about its meaning. And
even if I did, if “limit on injunctive relief” “mean[s] what it

6
says,” Maj. Op. at 11, then it would be silly to allow class-
wide injunctions as long as plaintiffs use two steps—a class
action for declaratory relief followed by individual injunction
actions—instead of one. 2

In my view, the Majority’s strongest argument
regarding statutory context is that the closely adjacent
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A) prohibits “declaratory,
injunctive, or other equitable relief.” However I do not see
the relevance of the use of the term “declaratory” in §
1252(e)(1). The absence of that term in § 1252(f)(1) does not
mean that Congress did not want to prevent actions for
declaratory relief. Indeed, if I am right, Congress used the
unambiguous word “restrain” because the word has a broad
meaning that would encompass declaratory judgments. The
words used in § 1252(f)(1) make it plain that the section is
broader in scope than § 1252(e)(1)(A). The latter section,
which applies to individual aliens, uses nouns to prohibit
specific forms of relief. Section 1252(f)(1) seeks to limit a
remedy that applies to entire classes and, to achieve that aim,
uses broad verbs—”enjoin or restrain”—that encompass a
range of court actions. See Philadelphia Newspapers, 599

2
The illusion that a class-wide declaratory judgment
ultimately differs in effect from a class-wide injunction
quickly dissipates once it becomes apparent that every single
member of the class can, and will, immediately seek an
injunction grounded on the authority of the declaratory
judgment. See Samuels, 401 U.S. at 72 (noting that a
declaratory judgment can serve as the basis for a subsequent
injunction); Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 119
(3d Cir. 1990) (observing that “an action maintainable under
both [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23](b)(2) and (b)(3)
should be treated under (b)(2) to enjoy its superior res
judicata effect and to eliminate the procedural complications
of (b)(3), which serve no useful purpose under (b)(2)”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Of course, §
1252(f)(1) allows an individual to bring an injunction, but this
misses the point. A class-wide declaratory judgment,
followed by individual injunctions from every member of the
class is, in every consequence that matters, the same as a
class-wide injunction. This is precisely the restraint that §
1252(f)(1) purports to prevent.
7
F.3d at 310 (“In employing intentionally broad language,
Congress avoids the necessity of spelling out in advance
every contingency to which a statute could apply.”). That
Congress uses different words to accomplish different
objectives in different sections of a statute does not render its
commands ambiguous.

Finally, Alli argues that he is not seeking a declaratory
judgment to restrain the operation of the statute, but only to
prevent a violation of it. This is legal sleight of hand. Alli
wants to obtain a declaration that the Executive Branch’s
execution of the law is unconstitutional. This is an attempt to
“restrain”—to “keep in check or under control” the Executive
Branch’s execution of the law.

In short, the language of § 1252(f)(1) states that courts
have no jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of
immigration detention laws as they apply to entire classes of
aliens. I believe that a declaratory judgment, no less than an
injunction, is such a restraint. For that reason, I would affirm
the District Court.

8