COLUMBIAN FINANCIAL CORP. v. BancInsure, Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

June 21, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

COLUMBIAN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION; CARL
MCCAFFREE,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 10-3077
BANCINSURE, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 2:08-CV-02642-CM)

James D. Oliver, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Overland Park, Kansas, (Keith Witten,
Gilliland & Hayes, P.A., Overland Park, Kansas, with him on the briefs), for
Defendant - Appellant.

Lyndsey J. Conrad (Micheal Thompson with her on the brief), Husch Blackwell
LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for Plaintiffs - Appellees.

Before MURPHY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION

BancInsure, Inc. (BancInsure) appeals a declaratory judgment in favor of

Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree,

(collectively, the Insureds) handed down by the United States District Court for

the District of Kansas. The court held that the claims-made directors-and-officers

liability policy (the Policy) issued by BancInsure covered claims made until the

expiration of the Policy on May 11, 2010, even though the Kansas State Bank

Commissioner had declared the bank insolvent and appointed the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver on August 22, 2008.

We vacate the judgment below because the district court lacked jurisdiction

when it was entered. Although there may have been an actual controversy under

the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), when suit was filed, no such

controversy existed by the time of the district court’s ruling. Only one claim had

been made for which the Policy might provide coverage, and during the litigation

BancInsure had stipulated that the Policy covered the claim. The parties failed to

present to the district court any reason to believe that a claim against the Insureds

would arise in the future that would lead to a dispute between BancInsure and the

Insureds regarding coverage. Nor did they suggest any other reason why they

needed a judicial construction of the Policy.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Policy

The Policy was a claims-made policy whose term ran from May 11, 2007,

to May 11, 2010, “or the date on which the Policy [wa]s effectively terminated,

whichever [wa]s sooner.” Aplt. App. at 17. Under a claims-made policy,

“coverage is effective if a [covered] act is discovered and brought to the attention

of the insurance company during the period of the policy, no matter when the act

occurred.” Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 809

n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Policy covered any

claim reported to BancInsure during the policy period that was made against a

Columbian officer or director for a “Wrongful Act,” which meant “any actual or

alleged error, misstatement, misleading statement, act or omission, or neglect or

breach of duty by any Insured Person acting solely in their Insured Capacities.”

Aplt. App. at 16.

The Policy provision upon which the parties have focused on appeal is

§ X.E, which concerns the scope of coverage if Columbian is placed in

receivership or otherwise ceases to engage in active banking business. Entitled

“Reorganization/Cessation of Business,” the section states in relevant part:

If after the effective date of this Policy, the Company shall cease to
engage in an active banking business or cease to accept deposits for
any reason, coverage shall cease as of the date of the cessation of
such business, and, absent a specific written agreement to the
contrary, the Company shall not be entitled to obtain the extended

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 coverage provided under Section II. of the Policy. For the purposes
of this clause, the cessation of the business of banking shall include,
but not be limited to, the appointment by any federal or state banking
regulators of a receiver, liquidator or person in a similar capacity and
any Transaction occurring at the request of any federal or state
regulator. The Company shall provide written notice of such
cessation of business to the Insurer as soon as practicable together
with such information as the Insurer may request.

Id. at 21. The parties interpret this language rather differently. The Insureds

contend that if Columbian goes into receivership, the Policy covers all claims

made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful

Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contends that the Policy

covers only claims made (or deemed to be made) before the receivership.

Two further provisions need to be mentioned. Under § IX.B, a claim made

after the Policy terminates is treated as having been made during the policy period

if Columbian provides written notice of the potential claim to BancInsure within

30 days of the end of the period. In addition, if the Policy is canceled or not

renewed, § II permits Columbian to purchase additional coverage for claims made

during an Extended Reporting Period of up to three years for Wrongful Acts

committed during the policy period.

B. The Receivership and Litigation

The operation of § X.E became relevant on August 22, 2008, when the

Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed

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the FDIC as its receiver. Columbian stopped accepting deposits and engaging in

active banking business the same day.

Soon thereafter BancInsure received a letter dated August 28, 2008, from

the FDIC, providing notice of “potential claims against the former directors and

officers of [Columbian] for mismanagement of lending by the institution and for

other activities which may constitute a ‘wrongful act’ or a ‘wrongful lending act,’

as defined in [the Policy].” Id. at 228. On September 3 an attorney representing

Columbian and its officers and directors sent a letter notifying BancInsure of

potential claims by the FDIC and others. And on September 18 Columbian

forwarded to BancInsure a September 12 letter from the Construction Industry

Laborers Training Fund (the Laborers Fund) demanding payment of $486,998.06,

the amount of its uninsured deposits with Columbian on August 22. BancInsure

admits that it received these notices of potential claims by both the FDIC and the

Fund within 30 days of August 22.

On December 18, 2008, Columbian filed an action in federal court seeking

a declaratory judgment. The complaint noted disputes between Columbian and

BancInsure regarding the meaning of the Policy and asserted that “[a]n actual

controversy exist[ed] between Columbian and Banc[I]nsure regarding the[ir]

rights, liabilities, and duties . . . under the Policy.” Id. at 12. Count I sought a

determination that “[u]nder the terms of the Policy, coverage ceased by the

appointment of a receiver, but the policy was not canceled”; “that the Policy . . .

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remain[ed] in full force and effect”; and that “notice of a Claim or Wrongful Act

[wa]s [timely] if such [wa]s received by BancInsure on or before May 11, 2008.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). (An amended complaint extended the

alleged deadline for timely notice to May 11, 2010.) Count II pleaded in the

alternative that if the court treated the Policy as canceled, it should declare that

Columbian had the right to purchase “an Extended Reporting Period under

Section II of the Policy.” Id. at 13.

A few months later, in early March 2009, the Laborers Fund filed a lawsuit

in Missouri state court against Brian McGowan, a former officer of Columbian.

After learning of the claim, BancInsure sent McGowan a letter notifying him “that

the Policy include[d] no duty to defend, but d[id] include a duty to pay reasonable

defense costs, and reserved its rights in regard to the claim brought by the

[Laborers] Fund . . . .” Id. at 167. The same letter, which is not in the record,

allegedly “indicated that [BancInsure] would deny coverage for the claim brought

by [the Laborers] Fund against Brian McGowan, claiming that notice was not

provided during the Policy Period.” Id. at 77. In response, Columbian, now

joined by McCaffree as a plaintiff, filed on April 28 a second amended complaint,

which added a Count III seeking a declaration that:

the notices of potential claims sent to BancInsure on or about
September 3, 2008 and September 18, 2008 regarding potential
claims filed by the FDIC, uninsured depositors, and the [Laborers]
Fund were timely and that [the Insureds] are therefore entitled to

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 have any claims which were specifically identified in those notices
treated as claims made during the Policy Period.

Id. at 80.

The dispute about coverage for McGowan was short-lived. On

September 3, 2009, the parties stipulated that the “claim asserted against Brian

McGowan” brought by the Laborers Fund in Missouri state court “[wa]s covered

under the Policy.” Id. at 167. Both the Insureds and BancInsure then filed

motions for summary judgment. The district court denied BancInsure’s motion

and granted the Insureds’ as to Count I. It ruled that “the language of the policy

[was] unambiguous” and that “[t]he policy period continue[d] until May 10,

2010.” Id. at 332. It determined that it need not address the alternative claim in

Count II. And it held that the Insureds waived Count III by not preserving the

issue in the pretrial order.

III. DISCUSSION

The sole issue that we must resolve on appeal is the district court’s

jurisdiction. Although neither party has raised this issue, we have a duty to do so

sua sponte when we notice a substantial question regarding our jurisdiction. See

Tafoya v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984).

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: “In a case of actual controversy

within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an

appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

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interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could

be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). “[T]he phrase ‘case of actual

controversy’ in the Act refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are

justiciable under Article III” of the United States Constitution. MedImmune, Inc.

v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).

Article III has long been interpreted as forbidding federal courts from

rendering advisory opinions. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[T]he

implicit policies embodied in Article III . . . impose the rule against advisory

opinions on federal courts.”). To be sure, an advisory opinion may sometimes be

valuable. Often two persons (or many more) disagree about what the law requires

and one, or both, would be willing to incur the expense of having the courts

resolve the matter. But more is required before one can invoke the authority of

courts created by Article III. It is not the role of federal courts to resolve abstract

issues of law. Rather, they are to review disputes arising out of specific facts

when the resolution of the dispute will have practical consequences to the conduct

of the parties.

Unfortunately, there is no formula to determine in every dispute whether

the Article III “Case or Controversy” requirement has been satisfied. The classic

attempt at a formulation in the declaratory-judgment context is set forth in Aetna

Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), which, in Justice Jackson’s

later words, “used the whole catalogue of familiar phrases to define and delimit

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the measure of [a proper declaratory-judgment action].” Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.

Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952). Aetna said:

The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Id. at 240–41 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court

recently observed, however, “Aetna and the cases following it do not draw the

brightest of lines between those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the

case-or-controversy requirement and those that do not.” MedImmune, Inc., 549

U.S. at 127. The question comes down to “‘whether the facts alleged, under all

the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties

having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the

issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Maryland

Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 273); see Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of

Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1111 n.12 (10th Cir. 2010) (courts presented with

declaratory-judgment actions “face the difficult task of distinguishing between

actual controversies and attempts to obtain advisory opinions on the basis of

hypothetical controversies” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nevertheless, a review of Supreme Court decisions can be quite instructive.

We begin with Aetna itself, the first decision of the Supreme Court under the

Declaratory Judgment Act and, appropriately, one involving an insurance policy,

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although not, as here, a liability policy. Aetna had issued five insurance policies

on Haworth’s life. If the policies were in effect, Haworth could collect the cash

values or his beneficiary could collect the policy amounts upon his death. The

policies also provided disability benefits. Haworth presented formal claims to

Aetna contending that he had become disabled and that his disability had both

relieved him of the obligation to pay premiums and entitled him to receive

disability payments. Aetna rejected the claims. See Aetna, 300 U.S. at 237–39.

But instead of Haworth’s bringing suit to challenge Aetna’s rejection, Aetna filed

an action for a declaratory judgment that Haworth was not disabled and that his

policies had therefore lapsed for nonpayment. Reversing the court of appeals, the

Supreme Court held that there was jurisdiction to hear the case. As the Court

noted, a suit by Haworth for currently payable disability benefits undoubtedly

would have been justiciable. Id. at 243. Yet “the character of the controversy

and of the issue to be determined is essentially the same whether it is presented

by the insured or by the insurer.” Id. at 244. The fact of Haworth’s disability

was “a definite fact,” id. at 243, and the parties had adopted “adverse positions

with respect to their existing obligations.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added). Aetna, it

said, should not have to wait until Haworth sued because evidence of current facts

could be lost and Aetna was, absent resolution in its favor, “compelled

[presumably by state law] to maintain reserves in excess of $20,000" with respect

to the policies. Id. at 239. In short, when the insured could file suit on identical

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issues and, upon success, be entitled to payments from the insurer, the insurer can

bring a declaratory-judgment action without waiting for suit by the insured, at

least when the factual issues have fully matured (that is, the factual premise is not

“hypothetical”), the parties have formally expressed their differences on the issue

(there is a “real and substantial controversy”), and the likelihood of the insured,

or his beneficiary, eventually bringing a claim is high, if not inevitable (the

controversy is “of sufficient immediacy and reality”).

The most recent opinion of the Supreme Court on declaratory-judgment

jurisdiction adds a gloss. In MedImmune a patent licensee, who had continued to

pay royalties for use of the patent, brought a declaratory-judgment action against

the patent holder to determine whether the patent was invalid or unenforceable.

549 U.S. at 121–25. What appeared to be missing in the case was the requisite

immediacy—there was little likelihood that the patent holder would ever bring

suit against the licensee, because the licensee was continuing to pay royalties.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that there was an actual case or controversy

because the licensee’s payment of royalties was “coerced” by the looming threat

of the licensee’s having to pay treble damages if it halted payments and the patent

was ultimately upheld. Avoidance of such dilemmas “was the very purpose of the

Declaratory Judgment Act.” Id. at 129.

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 As Aetna and MedImmune illustrate the breadth of declaratory-judgment

jurisdiction, Supreme Court decisions dismissing such actions best illustrate the

limits of the procedure. We summarize several of those decisions.

Perhaps the simplest case rejecting jurisdiction is Golden v. Zwickler, 394

U.S. 103 (1969). Zwickler brought a declaratory-judgment action challenging the

constitutionality of a New York law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous

literature in connection with an election campaign. But the only candidate whom

Zwickler wished to criticize in anonymous literature was a candidate for Congress

who had been placed on the state Supreme Court by the time of the argument

before the United States Supreme Court. The Court said that “the fact that it was

most unlikely that the Congressman would again be a candidate for Congress

precluded a finding that there was ‘sufficient immediacy and reality’” to present a

case or controversy. Id. at 109. It rejected the notion that the importance of the

constitutional issue sufficed to confer jurisdiction, stating: “It was not enough to

say, as did the District Court, that nevertheless Zwickler has a ‘further and far

broader right to a general adjudication of unconstitutionality in his own interest as

well as that of others who would with like anonymity practise free speech in a

political environment.’” Id. at 109–10 (alternations omitted). “The constitutional

question,” it explained, “must be presented in the context of a specific live

grievance.” Id. at 110 (emphasis added).

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 Two cases concerning foreign policy illustrate the need for the facts to

mature before declaratory-judgment jurisdiction arises. In Rabinowitz v.

Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964), the Court held that the petitioner attorneys were

not exempt from registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. But it

refused to consider whether the questions asked on the registration forms were

proper. Noting that the forms advised registrants that government regulations

allowed them to apply for waivers of inappropriate or unduly burdensome

requirements, it said: “Since petitioners have made no attempt to determine

which questions must be answered and how much information disclosed, this

issue is not ripe for adjudication.” Id. at 610. And in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1

(1965), the Court refused to consider Zemel’s claim that he was constitutionally

entitled to travel to Cuba. The Court explained that it would need to know the

specifics of the travel:

The complaint filed in this case does not specify the sort of travel to
Cuba appellant has in mind—e.g., whether he plans to proceed to
Cuba directly or travel there via one or more other countries. Nor
can we tell from the papers filed whether the Government will, in the
event appellant journeys to Cuba, charge him under § 215(b) with
leaving the United States on a carrier bound for Cuba with a passport
not validated for Cuba; leaving the United States with such a
passport with the intent of traveling to Cuba before he returns home;
leaving the United States with such a passport on a journey which in
fact takes him to Cuba; re-entering the United States with such a
passport after having visited Cuba; some other act—or whether it
will charge him at all. Whether each or any of these gradations of
fact or charge would make a difference as to criminal liability is an
issue on which the District Court wisely took no position. Nor do
we. For if we are to avoid rendering a series of advisory opinions,

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 adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of § 215(b) must await
a concrete fact situation.

Id. at 19–20.

Moreover, even if all the relevant facts regarding a particular legal issue

are known or knowable, a court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the issue

unless that issue arises in a specific dispute having real-world consequences. In

Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, Inc., 323 U.S. 316 (1945), the Court considered

a declaratory-judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the Royalty

Adjustment Act. Coffman, the owner of a patent, licensed Breeze’s predecessor

to sell the patented device at a 6% royalty. See id. at 319. Breeze then entered

into a contract to supply the device to the government. See id. The Royalty

Adjustment Act permitted the government to reduce the royalty rate on products it

purchased when it determined that the rate was unreasonable; the licensee who

sold the products to the government was not to pay the excess royalty to the

licensor, could not charge the government for the excess, and was protected

against suit from the patent holder. See id. at 319–20. The licensor could,

however, recover the unpaid royalties by suing the United States. See id. at 320.

The government had reduced the royalty rate owed by Breeze to Coffman and had

ordered Breeze to pay the excess to the Treasury. See id. at 321. Coffman had

brought a separate action against Breeze for an accounting for the royalties owed.

See id. The suit before the Court sought a declaration of unconstitutionality of

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the Royalty Adjustment Act and of the order under that Act that Breeze pay

excess royalties to the Treasury. See id. at 321–22. But the Court refused to

resolve the constitutional issue because no case or controversy was presented. Id.

at 322. The Court explained that “the constitutionality of the Act is without legal

significance and can involve no justiciable question unless and until [Coffman]

seeks recovery of the royalties, and then only if [Breeze] relies on the Act as a

defense.” Id. at 324. The complaint merely sought “an advisory opinion as to the

validity of the defense to a suit for recovery of the royalties.” Id.

[Breeze] could have made such a defense but does not appear to have
done so in the pending accounting suit and does not assert its validity
here. The bill of complaint thus fails to disclose any ground for the
determination of any question of law or fact which could be the basis
of a judgment adjudicating the rights of the parties.

Id.

Similarly, Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948), held that a

declaratory-judgment action was not ripe. The Bank sought to challenge a

condition imposed on its membership in the Federal Reserve System that

restricted ownership of its stock by Transamerica Corp. Transamerica had

acquired a few shares of stock but only for investment, not to obtain any control

over the Bank, which was what the membership condition was meant to prevent.

See id. 430–31. Apparently, the concern that caused the Bank to file suit was that

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had said that if the Bank lost its

membership, its deposits would not be insured. See id. at 427. When suit was

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brought, however, the Bank had failed to show “[t]he actuality of [its] need for a

declaration of [its] rights.” Id. at 432 (emphasis added). The Federal Reserve

Board had “disavow[ed] any action to terminate the Bank’s membership” under

the existing circumstances. Id. As the Court described the suit:

[T]he Bank seeks a declaration of its rights if it should lose its
independence [from Transamerica], or if the Board of Governors
should reverse its policy and seek to invoke the condition even
though the Bank remains independent and if then the Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should not change their policy
not to grant deposit insurance to the Bank as a non-member of the
Federal Reserve System.

Id. In the Court’s view, “The concurrence of these contingent events, necessary

for injury to be realized, is too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial

determinations.” Id. It concluded, “[The] Bank’s grievance here is too remote

and insubstantial, too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the

Board of Governors, and therefore equally inappropriate for a declaration of

rights.” Id. at 434. The Bank’s desire to rid itself of an obnoxious condition on

its Federal Reserve System membership was not enough in itself to support

jurisdiction.

Another early decision holding that there was no jurisdiction to hear a

declaratory-judgment action was Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff,

344 U.S. 237. Wycoff alleged that he engaged in “a course of importing,

processing and transporting picture film and newsreels” and that their “carriage

between points in Utah was so integrated with their interstate movement that the

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whole constituted interstate commerce,” which was not subject to regulation by

the Commission. Id. at 239. The trial court had found, however, that the

Commission had not interfered or threatened to interfere with the within-state

transportation of the materials. See id. at 240. The Supreme Court therefore held

that the lower courts had improperly considered the case, saying: “The

disagreement must not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on fixed

and final shape so that a court can see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect

its decision will have on the adversaries, and some useful purpose to be achieved

in deciding them.” Id. at 244 (emphasis added). The case before it fell far short:

The complainant in this case does not request an adjudication that it
has a right to do, or to have, anything in particular. It does not ask a
judgment that the Commission is without power to enter any specific
order or take any concrete regulatory step. It seeks simply to
establish that, as presently conducted, [its] carriage of goods between
points within as well as without Utah is all interstate commerce. One
naturally asks, so what?

Id. (emphasis added). The Court made clear that generally one cannot bring a

declaratory-judgment action just to resolve one isolated issue in a possible future

controversy. A declaratory judgment that would not have practical consequences

without later additional litigation is not proper. The Court wrote:

The carrier’s idea seems to be that it can now establish the major
premise of an exemption, not as an incident of any present
declaration of any specific right or immunity, but to hold in readiness
for use should the Commission at any future time attempt to apply
any part of a complicated regulatory statute to it. . . . If there is any
risk of suffering penalty, liability or prosecution, which a declaration
would avoid, it is not pointed out to us. If and when the State

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 Commission takes some action that raises an issue of its power, some
further declaration would be necessary to any complete relief. . . .

Id. at 245–46 (emphasis added). The Court summed up: “[W]hen the request is

not for ultimate determination of rights but for preliminary findings and

conclusions intended to fortify the litigant against future regulation, it would be a

rare case in which the relief should be granted.” Id. at 246.

The Supreme Court followed these precedents in its most recent decision

rejecting declaratory-judgment jurisdiction. In Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740

(1998), a California state prisoner sought to bring a class action establishing that

the State had not satisfied the conditions to qualify for certain procedural

advantages in federal habeas litigation provided by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. In particular, the prisoner wished to

establish that prisoners were entitled to the ordinary one-year limitations period

for bringing federal habeas actions, rather than the 180-day period that would

apply if the State met the statutory conditions. The Ninth Circuit ruled that “the

case-or-controversy requirement was satisfied . . . because the State’s threats to

invoke [the 180-day limitations period] will significantly affect the plaintiff-

class’s ability to obtain habeas corpus review by a federal court.” Id. at 744

(internal quotation marks omitted). But the Supreme Court rejected the view that

this legal issue could properly be characterized as a “controversy.” The

“underlying ‘controversy’ between petitioners and [the prisoner],” it said, “is

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whether [the prisoner] is entitled to federal habeas relief setting aside his sentence

or conviction obtained in the California courts.” Id. at 746. It was not proper to

limit the declaratory-judgment action to only one issue, however important, in

that controversy. No “final or conclusive determination [of whether the prisoner

was entitled to habeas relief] was sought in this action. Instead, [the prisoner]

carved out of that claim only the question whether, when he sought habeas relief,

California would be governed by [special provisions for which the State must

qualify].” Id.

As in Coffman, [the prisoner] here seeks a declaratory judgment as to
the validity of a defense the State may, or may not, raise in a habeas
proceeding. Such a suit does not merely allow the resolution of a
‘case or controversy’ in an alternative format, as in Aetna, but rather
attempts to gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an advance
ruling on an affirmative defense . . . . Any judgment in this action
thus would not resolve the entire case or controversy as to any
[prisoner], but would merely determine a collateral legal issue
governing certain aspects of their pending or future suits.

Id. at 747. The Court said that the case before it “illustrates the need . . . to

prevent federal-court litigants from seeking by declaratory judgment to litigate a

single issue in a dispute that must await another lawsuit for complete resolution.”

Id. at 748 (emphasis added).

Turning to the case before this court, there appears to have been the

necessary “actual controversy” when Columbian initially filed suit. A claim had

been made against a Columbian officer, and BancInsure initially disclaimed

coverage. But the actual controversy must exist not only at the time that the

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complaint is filed; it must continue until the district court issues its declaratory

judgment. As a leading treatise states: “The presence of a controversy must be

measured at the time the court acts. It is not enough that there may have been a

controversy when the action was commenced if subsequent events have put an end

to the controversy, or if the opposing party disclaims the assertion of

countervailing rights.” 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2757, at 495–96 (3d ed. 1998); see Prier

v. Steed, 456 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Actions under the Declaratory

Judgment Act must comport with the same mootness principles as any other suit,”

and “[t]he crucial question [in determining mootness] is whether granting a

present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real

world.” (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The problem in this case is that by the time of judgment, BancInsure had

agreed that the Policy covered the only claim that had been made against an

insured, the claim against former Columbian officer McGowan. Absent another

identifiable claim against Columbian, there was no actual controversy to be

resolved in the declaratory-judgment action.

The issue that the parties wish this court to resolve boils down to when

notice of a claim must be given by an insured for BancInsure to have an

obligation to indemnify it against loss. BancInsure asserts that notice must have

been given within 30 days of the initiation of the receivership. The Insureds

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contend that notice could be given up to 30 days after the expiration of the

original term of the policy (which, perhaps, could be extended further). But as

the Supreme Court asked in Wycoff, “so what?” 344 U.S. at 244. What “useful

purpose [would] be achieved in deciding” this issue? Id. From what the parties

have presented to us, the only matter of practical consequence is whether

BancInsure will indemnify Columbian against a liability claim. But they have

failed to identify any claim on which they disagree regarding the right to

indemnification. Perhaps some claim may still arise. But we cannot know now

the specific facts relevant to indemnification. As in Rabinowitz and Zemel, the

factual predicate for a potential indemnification claim is too uncertain to permit

judicial intervention; no claim has “taken on fixed and final shape.” Wycoff, 344

U.S. at 244. And, as in Coffman, Eccles, and Wycoff, the issue that the parties

wish us to resolve may be irrelevant to a future dispute—because, for instance,

other policy provisions may require or disallow indemnification. (The parties

may even agree that, based on those other provisions, there is or is not

coverage—as they ultimately agreed that there was coverage for the claim against

McGowan.) A declaration of rights in this case would not provide complete relief

to either party in the event of a future claim against Columbian for which it

sought indemnification from BancInsure. As stated in Calderon, we “need . . . to

prevent federal-court litigants from seeking by declaratory judgment to litigate a

single issue in a dispute that must await another lawsuit for complete resolution.”

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523 U.S. at 748. We will not allow a party to invoke our jurisdiction simply “to

gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an advance ruling on an affirmative

defense” or an element of its cause of action. Id. at 747. This is not a case in

which resolution of the legal issue presented by the parties would “require[] an

immediate and significant change in the [parties’] conduct of their affairs.”

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967).

To be sure, the question posed by the parties might be characterized as

whether the Policy terminated when the receivership was instituted, and in Aetna

the Supreme Court held that there was jurisdiction to hear a declaratory-judgment

action regarding whether Haworth’s life-insurance policies were still in force.

But in Aetna Haworth had filed a formal claim, all relevant facts had occurred,

and the declaratory judgment would have immediate practical consequences: If

he won, Haworth would be entitled to receive disability payments and have a

right to be paid the cash value of his policies; and if Aetna won, it would be

relieved of the requirement of maintaining a reserve with respect to the policies.

Here, neither party has asserted that any such consequence would necessarily

result from our decision. In particular, BancInsure has not suggested that a

decision would affect what reserves it would be legally required to maintain; and

Columbian has not asserted that BancInsure’s position has required Columbian to

purchase insurance coverage that it believed to be already provided by the

BancInsure policy.

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 Neither party has cited to us, nor has our research discovered, any

declaratory-judgment action in federal court to construe the coverage of a

liability-insurance policy in which the insured has failed to identify a specific

claim or potential claim against it. True, the injured party may not yet have sued

the insured. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d

707, 711 (8th Cir. 1992) (jurisdiction present even though insured had not yet

been sued with respect to several potential claims because insured “had made a

clear demand for payment of defense and indemnity costs” and insurer “disputed

those demands”); Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, Inc., 474

F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Va. 2007) (court had jurisdiction in declaratory-

judgment action brought by insurer even though insured had not yet been sued

because injured party had been pursuing a claim, and facts relevant to coverage

had been stipulated to by insured and insurer); Icarom, PLC v. Howard Cnty.,

Md., 904 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. Md. 1995) (coverage dispute regarding future

claims was ripe because “[a]ll the salient facts establishing a right to declaratory

relief ha[d] already occurred,” several injured third parties had submitted claims,

and settlement negotiations with seven injured parties had begun); T.H.E. Ins. Co.

v. Dowdy’s Amusement Park, 820 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (suit had not

been filed against insured, but injured party had retained attorney who gave

insurer notice of intent to pursue a claim; failure to resolve coverage would affect

settlement discussions and investigation of claims); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

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Co. v. Sampson, 305 F. Supp. 50, 52 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (lack of a pending claim by

injured parties was not a barrier to jurisdiction because it was “obvious that suit

[was] imminent pending the outcome of this litigation”); Manhattan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Nassau Estates II, 217 F. Supp. 196, 198 (D.N.J. 1963)

(jurisdiction present even though injured party had not yet sued insured because

the insurer was “on actual notice of the occurrence of the accident, and of the

severity of the injuries,” and insurer could otherwise be put to an unnecessary

burden of investigating the accident). But cf. Union Ins. Co. v. Soleil Group, Inc.,

465 F. Supp.2d. 567, 573–75 (D.S.C. 2006) (insurer’s duty to defend cannot be

determined until complaint filed so that allegations can be compared to policy

language); Georgia Am. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 712 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Miss.

1989) (insurer’s declaratory-judgment action was premature because the injured

father of insured had not filed suit against insured and it was “only conjecture as

to whether any suit w[ould] be filed”); AMCO Ins. Co. v. Western Drug, Inc.,

2008 WL 4368929, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (declaratory-

judgment action dismissed; U.S. attorney had written insured a letter threatening

civil suit, but more than year had passed without a suit and no settlement

negotiations were underway).

But the sine qua non is an identifiable specific claim that has risen above

the horizon. Cf. Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir.

1993) (declaratory-judgment action to determine whether seller of hazardous-

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waste site must indemnify buyer for environmental liability arising from sites

owned by third parties where waste from purchased site was disposed of; issue

not ripe because the record made “no mention of any pending environmental

claim as to any third-party site”); Am. Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Monsanto

Co. (In re Am. Commercial Lines, Inc.), 781 F.2d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1985)

(plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that defendant barge company must

indemnify it if plaintiff was held liable for third-party injuries stemming from

barge accident; no actual controversy because no “substantial probability” that a

claim would be brought against plaintiff).

Moreover, even if a claim can be identified, there must be a disagreement

about coverage. The decision in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Casualty &

Surety Co., 68 F.3d 409 (11th Cir. 1995), is illustrative. Atlanta Gas Light

Company (AGL) filed a declaratory-judgment action “to determine the extent of

its insurers’ liability for environmental cleanup costs arising from twelve of its

former manufactured gas plants.” Id. at 411. The day before filing the

declaratory-judgment action, AGL had sent notice to 23 insurers of their potential

liability for costs of cleaning up its former sites. See id. At the time of this

notice, however, no one had filed a claim against AGL, nor had any government

agency ordered a clean-up. And the insurers had taken no position on their duties

under the policies should future claims be brought. The court held that no actual

controversy existed when the complaint was filed, explaining:

-25-
 AGL filed its complaint before the insurance companies received the
notice of potential liability AGL mailed to them the previous day.
The insurers not only had no chance to respond to AGL’s notice
before the complaint was filed, they had no knowledge that notice
had been given. It is therefore difficult to understand how AGL
could assert that the insurance companies had failed to defend or
indemnify it for cleanup of its MGPs when the insurers had taken no
position at that time with regard to their duties under AGL’s
policies. To support its claims, AGL’s complaint asserts only that
the defendant insurers denied coverage to similar utilities under
similar circumstances in the past. In essence, AGL filed its
complaint as an anticipatory maneuver designed to preempt whatever
actions the insurers may have taken after they received AGL’s
notice.
Regardless of how well-founded AGL’s concerns about its
insurers may have been, speculation based on the insurance
companies’ dealings with other insureds does not present a concrete
case or controversy. At the time the complaint was filed, AGL could
claim neither actual nor threatened injury resulting from the insurers’
conduct, nor any injury traceable to the insurance companies at all.
When AGL sought the court’s guidance through a declaratory
judgment, the issues it presented were no more than conjectural
questions based on the fact that other utilities had battled with
insurers over . . . cleanup costs.

Id. at 414–15 (emphasis added); see Solo Cup Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178,

1189 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The mere possibility that proceedings might be

commenced against an insured regarding an act of the insured’s as to which the

insurer might contest coverage, is not sufficient to create a controversy within the

meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act or Article III of the Constitution.”

(emphasis added)); cf. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931

F.2d 744, 747–49 (11th Cir. 1991) (settlement agreement in which insurer agreed

-26-
to defend and indemnify insured deprived court of jurisdiction over declaratory-

judgment action to construe the policy).

The lack of an actual controversy in this case is even clearer than in Atlanta

Gas Light. In that case the court held that it was not enough that the insurers had

denied coverage in allegedly similar cases because they had not denied coverage

to AGL. Here, in stark contrast, the insurer, BancInsure, had conceded coverage

in the only comparable situation, the claim against former officer McGowan. The

parties provided no reason to believe that BancInsure would deny coverage with

respect to any claim described in the notices to BancInsure sent within 30 days of

the receivership, and no reason to believe that a claim against an insured would

be made that was not described in one of the notices. On the contrary, in

response to the Insureds’ interrogatories, BancInsure stated that a claim brought

“by a deposit insurance organization acting as receiver” of Columbian would be

covered if “notice of a potential claim was provided to BancInsure within thirty

(30) days following the end of the Policy Period,” Aplt. App. at 262, and it

stipulated that it had received written notice of potential FDIC claims within 30

days of August 22, 2008. Accordingly, we hold that there was no actual

controversy between the parties when judgment was entered and that the district

court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

We recognize that both parties contend that the district court had

jurisdiction to enter its judgment. They apparently desire a judicial construction

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of the Policy regarding the meaning of “coverage shall cease” in § X.E and,

perhaps, regarding an insured’s right to purchase extended coverage after a

receivership. But, to repeat what the Supreme Court said in Aetna, an actual

controversy exists only when the parties “ha[ve] taken adverse positions with

respect to their existing obligations.” 300 U.S. at 242. The “obligation” at issue

here is the obligation to provide coverage; as long as there is no real dispute that

BancInsure would provide coverage for any foreseeable claim because of the

language in § IX.B (providing a 30-day grace period), it is irrelevant whether

§ X.E would or would not also result in coverage. The meaning of that provision

would not affect BancInsure’s “obligation.” 1

IV. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with instructions to

vacate its judgment.

1
We also note that even if we had jurisdiction, we would not address
whether Columbian had a right to purchase extended coverage under § II. Neither
party appealed the district court’s refusal to address this issue. And the issue that
BancInsure did raise—the meaning of the cessation-of-coverage language in
§ X.E—is irrelevant to whether Columbian is entitled to purchase extended
coverage.

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10-3077, Columbian Financial Co. v. Bancinsure, Inc.

GORSUCH, J., concurring.

I agree we lack jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the parties haven’t

offered any evidence suggesting that a judicial decision resolving their dispute

would make any difference to either of them. Unlike the insurer in Aetna, for

example, Bancinsure hasn’t argued that it requires a judicial resolution to

determine the level of reserves it must maintain. 300 U.S. at 239. For its part,

Columbian hasn’t claimed that it had to purchase fallback coverage or suffered

any other harm due to Bancinsure’s purported cancellation of the policy. In fact,

and despite having fought the matter past summary judgment, neither party has

shown any harm it is suffering (or has suffered) as a result of their differing

contract interpretations — no lost business opportunity, no actual or potential

expense, no emotional distress, not even the risk of a sleepless night. Without a

record suggesting something is at stake in the outcome of this suit for the

litigants, this case lacks a “substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy

and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc.,

549 U.S. at 127. Of course, this hardly means we never have jurisdiction to settle

insurance policy disputes unless and until losses are incurred or claims arise. No

doubt a future plaintiff could — and likely could easily — show some harm

resulting from a disagreement about whether he remains covered (or liable) for

future losses, and do so well before any putatively insured loss or claim occurs.
And under Aetna such a dispute would be “manifestly susceptible of judicial

determination” under Article III because it would call “for an adjudication of

present right upon established facts.” 300 U.S. at 242. The lack of a substantial

and immediate controversy in this case is thus essentially peculiar to the proof the

parties have — or, really, haven’t — presented in this case.

Second, there exists an even narrower reason why this case must be

dismissed. Even assuming the district court had faced a justiciable Article III

case or controversy when it granted summary judgment, any such dispute appears

to have become moot during the pendency of this appeal. In December 2009, the

district court issued a declaration that the policy’s coverage remained in effect

until its stated expiration date of May 11, 2010. But by the time oral argument in

this court took place, that date had come and gone. And at oral argument both

sides conceded that no claims had been filed during the policy period and on

which they disagreed about Bancinsure’s insurance obligations. Neither have the

parties suggested in their appellate briefs any way in which a decision by this

court about the propriety of the district court’s declaratory judgment would make

a difference to them now that the policy period has passed uneventfully. See Fed.

R. App. P. 28(a)(4)(B) & 28(b)(1) (requiring parties to set forth a factual basis

establishing appellate jurisdiction); United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933

(10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the “facts supporting jurisdiction must be

affirmatively alleged”). All this means that even if a live dispute once existed,

-2-
the parties have failed their obligation to show that it remains live now, rather

than having come and gone, mooted by the march of time. The parties’ failure to

do so, their failure to present a continuing basis for this court’s appellate

jurisdiction, stands as an independent basis for dismissing this case. See

Wyoming v. Dep’t of the Interior, 587 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2009).

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