[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15163 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 21, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 9:10-cr-80034-WJZ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EUGENE MATTHEWS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 21, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eugene Matthews, Jr. appeals his 114-month within-Guidelines sentence,
imposed after pleading guilty to conspiring to possess oxycodone with the intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, Matthews argues that his
sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not
adequately explain his sentence and failed to explicitly respond to his arguments
for a downward variance. He also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court exclusively relied upon the fact that he
involved his son in his criminal offense. We affirm.
Matthews pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess oxycodone and admitted
that he arranged for his son to deliver money, drugs, and pre-addressed FedEx
envelopes to a confidential source who would send the drugs to Matthews. The
district court calculated Matthews’s sentencing guideline range as 108 to 135
months imprisonment. The statutory maximum sentence was twenty years’
imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). At sentencing, Matthews presented
mitigating evidence in support of his request for a downward variance. The court
noted Matthews’s criminal history, which involved many alcohol-related
incidents, and the two pending cases against him for the sale of oxycodone. The
government requested a sentence in the middle of the guideline range, noting that
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when faced with the charges in the other cases, Matthews had fled the country and
used his son to continue his drug transactions.
The district court expressed concern over Matthews’s decision to involve
his son. After stating that it had considered the advisory guideline range, the
parties’ arguments, the presentence investigation report (PSI), and “all of the
statutory factors,” the court sentenced Matthews to 114 months’ imprisonment.
The court explained that this sentence would serve the sentencing objectives of
sufficient punishment and deterrence. This is Matthews’s appeal.
We review a district court’s compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) de
novo, even where the defendant did not object to his sentence before the district
court. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006). We review
a final sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court must explain
its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, and, where the applicable Guideline
range exceeds 24 months and a within-Guidelines range is imposed, the reason for
choosing a particular point within that range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). When
stating its reasons, the district court should tailor its comments to demonstrate the
appropriateness of the sentence in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
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Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1181. The district court, however, does not have to cite the
specific language of § 3553(a), or articulate its consideration of each particular
factor where it is obvious that it considered them. Id. at 1182. Rather, we
consider the entire sentencing hearing to evaluate the district court’s reasons for
imposing a particular sentence, and do not simply rely on the district court’s
“summary statement at the close of the sentencing hearing.” Id.
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if, after considering the totality of
the facts and circumstances, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
factors so that the sentence falls outside the range of reasonable sentences as
dictated by the facts. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189-90 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 10-727). Sentences that
fall within the applicable Guideline range are ordinarily expected to be reasonable.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). That a sentence falls
well below a statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of reasonableness. United
States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). The party challenging
the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable. Talley, 431
F.3d at 788.
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In this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed was procedurally
reasonable. The district court adequately explained Matthews’s sentence and
specifically cited the need for punishment and deterrence. The record further
demonstrates that the court considered Matthews’s criminal history and the fact
that he had involved his son in his offense. The district court also stated that it
had considered Matthews’s mitigating arguments, the government’s arguments,
the PSI, and the § 3553(a) factors; thus, the district court’s statement was
sufficient, and the district court was not required to explain in greater detail why it
rejected his request for a downward variance.
We also conclude that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable in
light of the district court’s consideration of the need for deterrence, the § 3553(a)
factors, and the parties’ arguments that implicated several of the statutory factors.
Matthews received a within-Guidelines sentence that was less than half the
statutory maximum penalty that he faced. Under these facts and circumstances,
we cannot say that the court abused its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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