Jones v. Sternheimer Brothers, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-2375

SPENCER E. JONES, III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STERNHEIMER BROTHERS, INC.,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

ROSS STERNHEIMER, CEO, Everything Casual, incorporated f/n/a
Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; PAT MONEY,
Assistant CEO, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer
Bro., Inc., t/a A & N Stores; ADDRIANE LATHAN, Head of Human
Resources, Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro.,
Inc., t/a A & N Stores; JAMES BAILEY, Warehouse Manager,
Everything Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A
& N Stores; ANGELA CRAWLEY, Dock Supervisor, Everything
Casual, Inc., f/n/a Sternheimer Bro., Inc., t/a A & N
Stores; HAROLD ELLIOTT, Dock Manager; GLORIA CRAWLEY,
Clothes Supervisor; MARK STERNHEIMER,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cv-00187-REP)

Submitted: March 30, 2010 Decided: April 22, 2010

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Spencer E. Jones, III, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher E.
Gatewood, HIRSCHLER FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
PER CURIAM:

Spencer E. Jones, III appeals the district court’s

order granting summary judgment as to Jones’s action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) in favor of Everything Casual, Inc., and

several employees of the corporation. Everything Casual, Inc.,

a corporation formerly known as Sternheimer Bros, Inc., operated

the now-defunct A & N stores in Virginia. In his complaint,

Jones contended that during his employment, he was denied

training due to his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (“ADEA”). 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). The

district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants. On

appeal, Jones reasserts the merits of his claims, and

additionally contends that Defendants Angela Crawley and James

Bailey perjured themselves in their affidavits regarding the

dates Jones was offered training. We affirm.

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549

F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted

only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, “[c]onclusory or speculative

allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of

evidence in support of his case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec.

3
Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment will be granted

unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We may affirm

a district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the

record. Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.

2006).

Under the ADEA, it is illegal for an employer to

discriminate against an employee due to the employee’s age. 29

U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). The ADEA provides a civil cause of

action for employees who are discriminated against by their

employers because of their age. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2006). An

employee may establish an ADEA discrimination claim “through two

alternative methods of proof: (1) a mixed-motive framework,

requiring evidence that the employee’s age motivated the

employer’s adverse decision, or (2) a pretext framework

identical to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used

in Title VII cases.” E.E.O.C. v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co.,

Inc., 364 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

In his pleadings below, Jones asserted that the

Defendants refused to offer adequate training due to his age.

However, Jones entirely failed to provide any “evidence of

4
conduct or statements that reflect directly the alleged

discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested

employment decision.” Id. Therefore, he failed to establish

age discrimination under the mixed-motive framework.

In order to establish an ADEA claim under the

McDonnell Douglas framework, Jones must first demonstrate a

prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence. Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004).

In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory

denial of training, Jones must show: “(1) [he] is a member of a

protected class; (2) the defendant[s] provided training to

[their] employees; (3) [Jones] was eligible for the training;

and (4) [Jones] was not provided training under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Thompson, 312

F.3d at 649-50 (setting out McDonnell Douglas framework for

discriminatory denial of training based on race). If Jones is

successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,

the burden then shifts to the defendants “to articulate a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for their failure to

adequately train Jones. Mereish, 359 F.3d at 334. Jones must

then prove that the defendants’ proffered justification was

pretextual. Id. “This final burden . . . merges with the

ultimate burden of persuading the court that [Jones] ha[s] been

the victim[] of intentional discrimination.” Id.

5
 After reviewing the record, we find that Jones failed

to meet his burden in establishing a prima facie case of age

discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas doctrine.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

6