UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4050
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD WAYNE BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greenboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00072-WO-1)
Argued: May 12, 2011 Decided: June 23, 2011
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and DAVIS, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded for resentencing by unpublished opinion.
Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler
and Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Mark Everette Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Harry L. Hobgood, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
This case involves interpreting the scope of the language
in a restitution clause of a plea agreement. On November 24,
2009, in the Middle District of North Carolina, Ronald Wayne
Bryant was sentenced to twenty-six months in prison and ordered
to pay $110,325 in restitution. Bryant only appeals the order
of restitution, arguing that the district court misconstrued the
plea agreement when it held that the restitution clause
encompassed uncharged conduct as well as charged conduct. We
agree and remand this matter for resentencing as to restitution
only in accordance with our decision.
I.
Bryant was indicted on thirteen counts of making false
claims to the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). For
our purposes, it is uncontested that Bryant submitted twenty-
seven false tax returns from 2002 until 2006. Only thirteen of
those false returns were included in the indictment. Following
a Rule 11 plea colloquy, Bryant pled guilty to two of the
thirteen counts with a written plea agreement.
The restitution clause of the plea agreement stated that
Bryant “agree[d] to pay restitution for the total loss suffered
by all victims which resulted from and is related to the
offenses charged in the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added).
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During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court specifically
reviewed the restitution clause with Bryant, explaining that it
allowed the court to order “restitution for all of the offense
conduct in the case.” J.A. 28. When asked for clarification,
the district court further stated that “you are agreeing that
the [c]ourt can order restitution for all of the offense conduct
under the indictment without regard to whether it would fall
under a dismissed count or a count to which you plead guilty.”
J.A. 29 (emphasis added).
The presentence report calculated Bryant’s guidelines
sentence to be twenty-one to twenty-seven months. The
presentence report also calculated his restitution to be
$110,325 including all twenty-seven fraudulent tax returns.
Bryant objected to the amount of restitution. He argued that
the restitution should be limited to losses from the thirteen
offenses charged in the indictment, which totaled $54,295.
At the sentencing hearing, Bryant renewed his objection to
the amount of restitution. He argued that his understanding of
the plea agreement was that he would pay restitution for the
indicted charges, including those that were dismissed, but not
for any conduct outside the indictment. After hearing from the
Government, the district court found that the broadly worded
language of the restitution provision encompassed losses
resulting from the additional uncharged fraudulent tax returns
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filed by Bryant. The district court sentenced Bryant to twenty-
six months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution in the amount
of $110,325. Bryant timely appealed.
II.
We review orders of restitution for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). The
district court may order restitution for non-convicted conduct
based on a defendant’s plea agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)
(2006). When, as here, the parties dispute the interpretation
of language in the plea agreement, we apply basic contract
principles. United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 2007). However, “we analyze a plea agreement with greater
scrutiny than we would apply to a commercial contract. We thus
hold the Government to a greater degree of responsibility than
the defendant for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements.” Id. 509 F.3d at 196 (citations and quotations
omitted).
In Hughey v. United States, the Supreme Court held that in
the absence of clear statutory authority to do so, district
courts lacked the authority to order restitution beyond
convicted counts. 495 U.S. 411, 442 (1990). In response,
Congress passed a statute which stated that “courts may also
order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to
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by the parties in a plea agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (a)(3)
(2011). This essentially overturned Hughey by allowing plea
agreements to expand the courts’ authority to order restitution.
In our analysis, we first turn to the language of the plea
agreement. It states that restitution can be ordered for losses
“which resulted from and is related to the offenses charged in
the Indictment.” J.A. 19 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
conduct must be both related to the indicted conduct and result
from it. Though they might be related, the (uncharged) fourteen
separately prepared tax returns do not clearly result from the
charged conduct. Based on this record, each unique tax return
was prepared and filed separately and did not occur as the
result of another tax return being filed. Therefore, we
conclude that the language in the plea agreement can be fairly
interpreted as ambiguous.
Where there are ambiguities in a plea agreement, courts may
look to extrinsic evidence to show that the parties to the
agreement had “mutually manifested their assent to [] an
interpretation Jordan, 509 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted).
Here, the district court’s guidance to the defendant on
restitution at the plea colloquy cleared up any existing
ambiguities. The court explained that restitution included “all
of the offense conduct under the indictment without regard to
whether it would fall under a dismissed count or a count to
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which you plead guilty,” effectively limiting restitution to the
conduct from the indictment. J.A. 29 (emphasis added). The
district court’s explanation confirms the defendant’s
interpretation on appeal, and makes clear that the defendant
correctly believed that in pleading guilty, the scope of his
restitution would be the charged conduct.
The government makes much out of two statements made during
the plea agreement. At one point, defense counsel noted that
“[Bryant] agrees to pay restitution for the total loss suffered
by all victims in the case.” J.A. 26. Later, the district
court noted that the defense agreed to pay “restitution for all
of the offense conduct in the case.” J.A. 28. However, both of
these statements were made before the court’s above quoted
clarifying statement and do not clearly manifest an intent to
include the uncharged conduct in the restitution.
Further, the government argues that “related to” must mean
the additional tax returns otherwise it would be superfluous
language. Bryant argues that “related to” was meant to
encompass legal expenses and fees for the people named on the
illegal tax returns. However, the district court determined
that the government was the only victim in this scheme and thus
these related expenses, anticipated in the plea agreement, were
not applicable. Since “related to” is susceptible to multiple
interpretations, we construe it against the government and find
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that it was meant to encompass only the extraneous expenses
suffered by Bryant’s clients. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d
294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986).
III.
In conclusion, we find that the plea agreement’s
restitution clause was, at best, ambiguous and thus, construing
ambiguities against the government, find that it does not
encompass uncharged conduct. Accordingly, this matter is
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING AS TO RESTITUTION ONLY.
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