Pagayon v. Holder

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRYAN VINCENT I. PAGAYON, a.k.a. 
Deny Moniker, a.k.a. Bryan Nos. 07-74047
Vincent Idhaw, and
Petitioner, 07-75129
v.  Agency No.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney A45-622-497
General, OPINION
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted
April 13, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed June 24, 2011

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, N. Randy Smith,
Circuit Judge, and Frederic Block, District Judge.*

Per Curiam Opinion

*The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

8617
8620 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
COUNSEL

Victor Jih and Victoria Schwartz (argued), O’Melveny &
Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; Jessica Barclay-Strobel
(argued), UCLA School of Law Ninth Circuit Clinic, Los,
Angeles, California, for the petitioner.

Michael C. Heyse, United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C.,
for the respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bryan Vincent I. Pagayon petitions for review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals directing his removal,
as well as the Board’s order denying reconsideration. We
deny the petitions, and write principally to address Pagayon’s
claim that the removal order was improperly based, in part, on
admissions he made before the immigration judge (IJ).

I

Pagayon, a native of the Philippines, was a legal permanent
resident of the United States. On November 30, 2006, he was
placed into removal proceedings based on allegations that he
had been convicted of violations of (1) section 12021(a)(1) of
the California Penal Code, relating to possession of firearms
by felons and drug addicts, and (2) section 11377(a) of the
California Health and Safety Code, relating to possession of
controlled substances.

At an initial hearing before the IJ, the government produced
an abstract of judgment and the two informations that ostensi-
bly underlay the convictions. The IJ summarized the
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8621
documents—copies of which were given to Pagayon—as fol-
lows:

They’ve given to you and to me a copy of an abstract
of judgment list[ing] as Count A-l, possession, fire-
arm, felon or addict. . . . Two-year sentence. . . .
Count B-2, possession controlled substance.

Attached to this is a copy of an information, posses-
sion of firearm by a felon, one prior, in violation of
Penal Code 12021(a)(1), felony. . . . There’s another
information following. Count 2 there was listed as
possession, controlled substance, 11377(a), listing it
as methamphetamine. It looks like on the abstract of
judgment it indicates convicted by jury as to the first
count, and as to possession of controlled substance,
it looks like it was based upon a plea.

When the IJ asked, “Are these your convictions?” Pagayon
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”

Pagayon did not initially dispute the IJ’s representation that
those convictions rendered him removable. Instead, he
applied for relief from removal and, in addition, advanced a
claim of citizenship through his maternal grandmother. Based
on the claim of citizenship, a successor IJ allowed Pagayon to
withdraw his admission of removability.

At a later hearing before the new IJ, Pagayon testified as to
the basis for his claim for relief from removal. Because the IJ
did not make an adverse credibility determination, we take
Pagayon’s testimony as true. See Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d
1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).

Pagayon’s father worked as an investigator for the Philip-
pines’ National Bureau of Investigation. He was shot to death
on November 27, 1984. Pagayon, then seven years old,
recalled hearing family members and his father’s co-workers
8622 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
opining that his father had been murdered by members of the
National Police (NP) in the course of an investigation into the
NP’s involvement in crime syndicates. No one was arrested
or charged in connection with the death, and an official inves-
tigation had “no result.”

Following his father’s death, Pagayon saw a group of peo-
ple, some wearing NP uniforms, “patrolling” the streets
around his grandmother’s house; someone later called the
house to tell “family members not to file a complaint for [his]
dad.” When Pagayon’s aunt tried to bring the circumstances
of her brother’s death to light, she was shot (though not
fatally). Shortly thereafter, one of Pagayon’s uncles pulled
him out of school and told him the family needed to relocate.
This process repeated itself often, triggered by warnings from
family friends in the Philippine government that NP retalia-
tion was imminent. It stopped only when Pagayon and his
immediate family came to the United States in 1996; other
family members emigrated to other countries.

At the conclusion of his testimony, Pagayon opined that he
could not return to the Philippines because those responsible
for his father’s murder would find out and “assume that [he
was] back for revenge [or] to expose them from whatever
scheme that they’re doing.”

In an oral decision rendered on May 16, 2007, the IJ sus-
tained the charges of removability based on Pagayon’s prior
admission to both convictions. He then held that Pagayon had
no claim to United States citizenship.

Turning to Pagayon’s claims for relief, the IJ concluded
that the firearm conviction was an “aggravated felony” that
rendered Pagayon ineligible for asylum. The IJ next addressed
whether that conviction was also a “particularly serious
crime” disqualifying Pagayon from withholding of removal.
He concluded that “the nature and circumstances of the
offense” and the length of the sentence showed that Pagayon
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8623
“can be considered a danger to the safety of persons and prop-
erty in the United States as well as a danger to the community
of which he is a member.” Reaching the merits of the with-
holding claim in the alternative, the IJ accepted Pagayon’s
claim that his father had been murdered by the NP, but con-
cluded that there was

absolutely no evidence to indicate that [Pagayon]
would be in any danger of returning to the Philip-
pines at this date, and therefore he would not meet
the burden of proving it is more likely than not that
he would be so persecuted on the basis of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or because of an expressed political
opinion or political opinion imputed to him by the
persecutors.

The IJ rejected Pagayon’s claim for relief under the Conven-
tion Against Torture (CAT) for essentially the same reasons.

Pagayon appealed to the Board. In his notice of appeal, he
claimed that the IJ (1) “failed to take consideration of the
totality of the evidence presented and failed to apply the cor-
rect legal standard to the facts and evidence,” and (2) “denied
the Respondent of a full and fair hearing in violation of due
process of law.” Pagayon did not file a brief. The Board sum-
marily affirmed the IJ’s decision.

Pagayon then filed a petition for review with this Court,
and simultaneously filed a “motion to reconsider and remand”
with the Board. In the latter, he argued (1) that the evidence
presented to the IJ did not establish the nature of his convic-
tions, (2) that the IJ failed to apply the proper factors in his
“particularly serious crime” assessment, (3) that the IJ vio-
lated due process, and (4) that the IJ did not apply the correct
law to his CAT claim. The Board denied the motion on the
ground that those “specific contentions” were raised for the
8624 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
first time on reconsideration. Pagayon thereupon filed a sec-
ond petition for review, which we consolidated with the first.

II

Before turning to the merits, we must address the govern-
ment’s argument that Pagayon failed to exhaust his claims
before the Board. “A court may review a final order of
removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative
remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). This requirement “generally bars us, for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, from reaching the merits of a legal
claim not presented in administrative proceedings below.”
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). If the
petitioner does not file a brief before the Board, then we look
to the notice of appeal to determine which issues he
exhausted. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th
Cir. 2009).

A petitioner must specify which issues he intends to raise
on appeal; a “general challenge to the IJ’s decision” will not
suffice. Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004).
On the other hand, the petitioner is not limited to raising
issues in exactly the same terms as they were presented to the
Board. See Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 873
(9th Cir. 2008). We are particularly careful to give claims
raised by pro se petitioners their most liberal construction. See
id. Under these forgiving standards, we are satisfied that
Pagayon’s notice of appeal gave the Board an adequate
opportunity to pass on the arguments he presents here.

III

“When the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision, we
review the IJ’s decision as the final agency action.” See Zeha-
tye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006).
Pagayon challenges that decision on three grounds. He argues
(1) that the IJ erred in finding him removable, (2) that the IJ
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8625
erred in finding him ineligible for withholding of removal,
and (3) that the IJ violated his due-process rights.

A. Removability

Having abandoned his claim of citizenship, Pagayon’s chal-
lenge to the IJ’s removability determination is limited to the
findings regarding the nature of his convictions. Whether a
particular conviction makes an alien removable is “a legal
question subject to de novo review.” Cazarez-Gutierrez v.
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004).

The IJ found Pagayon removable because (1) his firearm
conviction was for an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and (2) his drug conviction related to a
controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Since
either finding is sufficient to require removal, we opt to
address only the second.1

[1] Section 1127(a)(2)(B)(i) “requires the government to
prove that the substance underlying an alien’s state law con-
viction for possession is one that is covered by Section 102
of the [federal Controlled Substances Act].” Ruiz-Vidal v.
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007). Because not
all substances prohibited by California law are “controlled
substances” under federal law, the simple fact of conviction
under section 11377(a) of the California Health and Safety
Code does not prove that the conviction involved a controlled
substance. See id. at 1078. Instead, we must look behind the
conviction by applying a “modified categorical approach.”
See Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.
2005).
1
As a result, we need not address whether, as a consequence of the
antique exception to the federal definition of “firearm,” see 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(3)(D), the government must prove that a conviction under a state
law lacking a similar exception involved a non-antique.
8626 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
Our inquiry under the modified categorical approach is
confined to a “narrow, specified set of documents that are part
of the record of conviction.” Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004). “These documents include the
indictment, the judgment of conviction, the jury instructions,
a signed guilty plea, and the transcript from the plea proceed-
ings.” Malilia v. Holder, 632 F.3d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 2011).
Comparable judicial records of the same information—such
as minute entries and abstracts of judgment—are also accept-
able. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
Limiting our consideration to these documents allows us to
determine reliably the nature of a conviction without inviting
inappropriate relitigation of the underlying facts. See Tokatly,
371 F.3d at 622 (“We are required to determine whether
Tokatly has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence—
not whether he in fact committed such a crime.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).

[2] The abstract of judgment here establishes only that
Pagayon was convicted of possessing some drug; it may or
may not have been a controlled substance under federal law.
The underlying information charges him with possession of
a controlled substance (methamphetamine), but, as we have
explained, a charging document does not, standing alone,
demonstrate that the crime charged and the crime of convic-
tion are one and the same. Something else must connect the
two, such as a reference to the charging document in the
record of conviction. See United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d
1072, 1088 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Velasco-Medina,
305 F.3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2002). Alternatively, a copy of the
jury instructions (in the case of a conviction after trial) or of
the plea agreement (in the case of a conviction on a guilty
plea) will demonstrate whether the conviction was for the
crime charged.

In principle, there is no reason why an alien could not
admit to the necessary connection between a charging docu-
ment and a conviction. Yet our cases have been equivocal. In
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8627
Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2007), we
noted that an IJ had improperly considered an alien’s testi-
mony that the conviction at issue was “for delivering eight
ounces of methamphetamine from a friend to another person
in exchange for $450.” Id. at 1129 n.7. Just three months later,
we upheld a removability finding based on the alien’s admis-
sion that he had been convicted of solicitation to possess a
certain amount of marijuana. See Barragan-Lopez v.
Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2007).

[3] We reconciled this apparent inconsistency in Cheuk
Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2010). There,
we addressed the effect of the alien’s admission to the accu-
racy of an “unidentified ‘conviction document’ ” showing that
he had been convicted of distributing MDMA, a removable
controlled substance offense. See id. at 1031, 1035. Because
the document was not in the record, we “ha[d] no way to
review whether the document established with certainty that
Yong’s conviction was a controlled substance offense.” Id. at
1035. We held that “admissions alone” cannot constitute
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence of removability,
and distinguished Barragan-Lopez on the ground that the IJ
in that case had been “presented with reliable documents of
conviction in addition to the alien’s judicial admissions.” Id.
at 1036 (citing Barragan-Lopez, 508 F.3d at 905).

Here, the IJ did not rely solely on Pagayon’s admission.
The abstract of judgment established the crime of conviction,
while the information established that the drug charge was for
possession of methamphetamine. Pagayon’s admission was
needed only to confirm that the conviction was for the
charged crime.

[4] We therefore make explicit what Cheuk Fung S-Yong
suggests: An IJ may consider an alien’s admissions regarding
removability if they are corroborated by the “narrow, speci-
fied set of documents that are part of the record of convic-
tion,” Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620. Absent some claim of
8628 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
mistake, duress or the like—which Pagayon does not raise—
an admission is just as reliable as an explicit reference to the
charging document in an abstract of judgment. And since an
admission like Pagayon’s does no more than establish that the
conviction at issue was for the crime charged, it does not
invite the IJ to improperly relitigate the criminal case by
inquiring into the underlying facts of the crime. Cf. id. at 623
(IJ not allowed to consider testimony of victim to establish
“domestic” nature of crime of violence); Huerta-Guevara v.
Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven if the
facts as represented in Huerta’s brief are taken as a true
account of what she did, it is not clear that these are the ele-
ments to which she pled guilty.”).

[5] Coupled with Pagayon’s admission, the record of con-
viction clearly, convincingly and unequivocally shows that
Pagayon was convicted of a controlled substance offense.2
The government met its burden of establishing removability.

B. Relief from Removal

Because we have not addressed whether Pagayon’s firearm
conviction involved a removable “aggravated felony,” we
cannot, as the IJ did, conclude that Pagayon is automatically
ineligible for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2), and ineligi-
ble for withholding of removal because the conviction was for
a “particularly serious crime,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).3
Instead, we turn to the IJ’s alternative conclusion that
Pagayon failed to meet his burden of proving entitlement to
withholding.
2
By contrast, the record of the firearm conviction does not, even with
Pagayon’s admission, show that he was convicted of possessing a non-
antique firearm. As noted, we leave for another day whether such proof
is required to establish removability based on a conviction under Cal.
Penal Code § 12021(a)(1).
3
Pagayon has abandoned his claim for relief under CAT.
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8629
[6] “To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must
demonstrate that ‘it is more likely than not that he would be
subject to persecution on one of the specified [protected]
grounds.’ ” Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984)).
Factual findings concerning entitlement to withholding are
reviewed for substantial evidence, and must be upheld if “sup-
ported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.” Zhou v. Gonzales, 437
F.3d 860, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). They may be reversed only if the evi-
dence is “such that a reasonable fact-finder would have been
compelled” to reach a contrary result. Id. at 865 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).

[7] The record does not compel the conclusion that
Pagayon will face persecution in the Philippines for two rea-
sons. First, notwithstanding Pagayon’s relocation within the
Philippines 15 years ago, he has not demonstrated that he
would face reprisals from the NP if he returned now. His sis-
ter, for instance, continues to live there unmolested.

[8] Second, Pagayon has not conclusively established that
the NP would target him on a protected ground. As the IJ rec-
ognized, withholding is available only to those who face per-
secution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or an actual or imputed political
opinion. See Sharma v. Holder, 633 F.3d 865, 869-70 (9th
Cir. 2011). Although Pagayon casts his claim as one based on
imputed political opinion, his narrative to the IJ described the
NP’s motive as an attempt to discourage his family from
exposing or avenging his father’s murder. A personal dispute
is not, standing alone, tantamount to persecution based on an
imputed political opinion. See Molina-Morales v. INS, 237
F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (personal disputes not
grounds for asylum unless connected to a protected ground).

That Pagayon is not entitled to withholding does not neces-
sarily mean that he cannot satisfy the less stringent “well-
8630 PAGAYON v. HOLDER
founded fear” standard for asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“[T]o show a ‘well-
founded fear of persecution,’ an alien need not prove that it
is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his
or her home country.”). The IJ did not address Pagayon’s asy-
lum claim on the merits, relying instead on the firearm con-
viction to find him ineligible. We need not remand, however,
because asylum, like withholding, protects only those who
risk persecution based on a protected ground. See Sharma,
633 F.3d at 869. Thus, even if Payagon could show a well-
founded fear of reprisals by the NP, he could not, as explained
above, establish that the reprisals would be based on an
imputed political opinion.

C. Due Process

Pagayon argues that the IJ violated his due-process rights
by not allowing him time to submit a letter recapitulating his
oral testimony, and by refusing to take telephonic testimony
from family members.4 We review this claim de novo. Ibarra-
Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006).

Assuming that one or both of the IJ’s decisions were error,
they do not amount to due-process violations unless they
deprived Pagayon of “a full and fair hearing” of his claims.
Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005).
In other words, Pagayon must show prejudice, “which means
that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by
the alleged violation.” Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001,
1007 (9th Cir. 2003).

[9] Prejudice may be inferred “even absent any allegations
as to what the petitioner or his witnesses might have said.”
Zolotukhin, 417 F.3d at 1077 (citing Colmenar v. INS, 210
4
He also argues that the IJ was biased against him. Because this claim
is offered strictly as a basis for reassignment to a different IJ in case of
remand, we do not address it.
 PAGAYON v. HOLDER 8631
F.3d 967, 972 (9th Cir. 2000)). In this case, however, we can
find no connection between the additional evidence and the
outcome of the proceeding. Since the IJ accepted Pagayon’s
version of the facts, corroborating evidence was not neces-
sary. And since that version of the facts portrays a personal
vendetta against someone intending to expose the NP’s mis-
deeds, Pagayon cannot plausibly claim that the additional evi-
dence would have contradicted his own testimony by
suggesting a different motive for his father’s murder.

IV

The government satisfied its burden of proving removabil-
ity. Pagayon, by contrast, failed to carry his burden of proving
that he is entitled to relief from removal, or that the IJ violated
his due-process rights. Accordingly, his petitions for review
are

DENIED.