United States v. Jones

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2010 Decided June 28, 2011

No. 09-3132

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLEE

v.

DANNIE JONES, ALSO KNOWN AS SMILEY,
APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:08-cr-00118)

Gregory Stuart Smith, appointed by the court, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Stephanie C. Brenowitz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.
Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth
Trosman, Darlene M. Soltys, John K. Han, and B. Patrick
Costello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit
Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
 2

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Dannie Jones pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100
grams or more of heroin. Although Jones faced a mandatory life
sentence if he went to trial and lost, his plea agreement provided
for a sentence of sixty months. Before he was sentenced,
however, Jones moved to withdraw his guilty plea, maintaining
that he had not understood that he was pleading guilty to
conspiracy. The district court denied the motion and sentenced
Jones to the agreed-upon term. On appeal, Jones contends that
the district court abused its discretion both in denying his motion
and in failing to order a competency hearing before doing so.
We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment of the
district court.

I

On October 23, 2008, a grand jury charged Jones and seven
co-defendants with a variety of drug trafficking offenses. Jones
was included in two counts of the 39-count indictment: Count
One, which charged each defendant with conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(i); and Count 38, which charged Jones with
distributing heroin on a specific date (February 15, 2008), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). If convicted,
Jones faced a mandatory statutory sentence of life in prison in
light of his prior drug trafficking convictions. Initial Sentencing
Hr’g Tr. 6-7 (Mar. 18, 2009).

The government’s theory was that Jones was a street-level
dealer in a drug operation run by Rex Pelote and Edward Farley,
who conspired with Jones and numerous others to distribute
heroin in the area of Langston Terrace in the District of
Columbia. According to the government’s proffers to the
district court: Pelote would purchase the heroin wholesale; a co-
 3

conspirator named Shannon would divide it into $10 ziplock
bags; Pelote, Shannon, and Farley would allocate it to street
dealers; the street dealers, including Jones, would distribute it;
and Shannon would then collect the proceeds from the dealers
for delivery to Pelote. See Plea Hr’g Tr. 14, 33-34, 61-62 (Jan.
6, 2009). As part of the government’s investigation: an
undercover officer bought heroin from Jones in Langston
Terrace on February 15, 2008; officers videotaped Jones
conducting other drug transactions in the area with several of the
co-conspirators; government wiretaps intercepted telephone
conversations in which Farley discussed how many ziplocks to
give Jones and how much Jones still owed for prior sales;
additional wiretaps captured Jones calling Farley to advise him
that customers were out seeking drugs; and still other wiretaps
captured Jones warning Farley that police were in the area. See
id. at 61-62; Initial Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8-10 (Mar. 18, 2009);
Status Hr’g Tr. 5-6 (Aug. 10, 2009).

On January 6, 2009, the day the trial was set to begin, Jones
and two co-defendants entered guilty pleas. Jones, represented
by appointed counsel, pled guilty to a lesser-included offense of
Count One of the indictment -- conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i) --
with an agreed-upon sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).1 Prior to
entering the plea, Jones had signed the government’s factual
proffer, acknowledging that it was true. App. 32-36. Referring
to the proffer, the court confirmed with Jones that: he “worked

1
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides that a plea agreement may specify that
the government will “agree that a specific sentence . . . is the
appropriate disposition of the case.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
“[S]uch a recommendation . . . binds the court once the court accepts
the plea agreement.” Id.
 4

with Rex Pelote and Edward Farley and others to sell heroin in
Langston Terrace”; he was “doing hand-to-hand heroin sales on
the street”; although he was “getting the heroin that [he was]
selling from someone named Shannon, [he] knew that Shannon
was getting it from Rex Pelote”; and, he “would get the money
from the sales[,] would give the money back to Shannon,
and . . . knew that Shannon would get the money back to
Pelote.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 33-34 (Jan. 6, 2009).

On March 18, 2009, at what was to have been his
sentencing hearing, Jones moved to withdraw his plea. He told
the judge that he had thought he “was taking a plea to possession
of -- distributing heroin, not conspiracy.” Initial Sentencing
Hr’g Tr. 10 (Mar. 18, 2009). “What I have here is one sale,” he
said. “I admit to selling that, but it was less than 100
grams . . . less than . . . half a gram of heroin.” Id. at 9-10 He
did not, he said, want “to take a cop to 100 grams.” Id. at 10.
Jones’ counsel advised the court that Jones had “refused to
discuss the situation” the last three times counsel had gone to
see him, and for that reason counsel had filed a motion to
withdraw from the representation. Id. The court then granted
counsel’s motion, continued the defendant’s sentencing, and
subsequently appointed new counsel.

Jones’ new counsel appeared with him for a status hearing
on May 8, 2009. Counsel reported that Jones had refused to talk
to her as well. In response to a question from the court
regarding the status of the guilty plea, Jones again said that he
“thought [he] was pleading guilty to my sales that they said I
had made, not to no conspiracy, not to no 100 grams.” Status
Hr’g Tr. 2 (May 8, 2009). He told the court that he did not want
his new attorney, and that he would seek to retain a lawyer or
possibly represent himself. The court noted that Jones was
refusing to cooperate with a psychologist the court had asked to
 5

screen him, and postponed the sentencing to allow Jones to
obtain counsel.

The court held two more status hearings before conducting
Jones’ sentencing. At the first hearing, the court explained that
Jones had requested another appointed counsel because he had
been unable to retain one on his own. Jones told the court that
he still wanted to withdraw his plea, and the court appointed a
third lawyer for him. Status Hr’g Tr. 2-4 (Aug. 10, 2009). At
the second and final status hearing, Jones’ newly appointed
counsel reported that Jones had refused to see him when he
twice visited Jones at the jail. The court told Jones that it was
not inclined to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
that sentencing would proceed the next day. The court observed
that there was “nothing incompetent” about Jones; he was just
being “obstinate.” Status Hr’g Tr. 7 (Nov. 23, 2009).

Jones’ sentencing hearing took place on November 24,
2009. The court stated for the record that Jones was going to
represent himself, but that the last attorney the court had
appointed was present to serve as stand-by counsel if Jones
chose to consult him.

The court first addressed the question of Jones’
competency. It noted that Jones’ second attorney had suggested
that Jones was incompetent and had asked the court to order a
psychological screening. The court had just received the report
from the psychologist, who advised that Jones had refused to
cooperate, telling her: “I won’t take the exam. I know what I’m
doing. I’ll see the judge in court.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 4 (Nov.
24, 2009). Although the psychologist recommended that Jones
be sent to an inpatient facility for a competency examination, the
judge declined, saying: “I’ve been observing you in court on the
several occasions you’ve been here . . . . I don’t think there’s
 6

anything wrong with your head. I think you’re perfectly
competent.” Id. at 5.

The court then proceeded to consider Jones’ motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Jones again said that he had not
understood he was pleading to a conspiracy, and that he just
wanted to plead to the “10 ziplocks that I supposedly sold to the
undercover police officer.” Id. at 6-8. Jones admitted that he
“bought them from Shannon” and that he knew Shannon got the
bags from Farley. Id. at 8. Then, for the first time, he asserted
that he bought the ziplocks for his own personal use, and that he
“didn’t sell no drugs to nobody.” Id.

Applying the factors that this circuit has held relevant to
motions to withdraw guilty pleas, the district court concluded
that Jones did not proffer a “fair and just reason” to justify
withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at 17. The court found that
Jones did not present “a viable claim of innocence,” that the
government would be “considerably” -- although “maybe not
horrendously” -- prejudiced by withdrawal, and that there was
“no taint” in the colloquy the court had conducted when it took
Jones’ plea on January 6. Id. at 17-18.

Finally, the court proceeded to sentencing. Jones was given
an opportunity to consult with stand-by counsel, which Jones
agreed to do. After the consultation, counsel asked the court to
impose the agreed-upon 60 months’ incarceration. The court
imposed the 60-month sentence, notwithstanding that the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines range for the offense to which Jones pled
was 188-235 months.2 This appeal followed.

2
See Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 104; supra note 1.
 7

II

Jones asserts that the district court committed two errors.
First, he contends that the court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a “fair and just
reason” for withdrawal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
Second, he argues that, even if he did not present a fair and just
reason, the court erred in denying the motion without first
holding a competency hearing. We address these contentions
below.3

A

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets
forth the requirements for judicial consideration and acceptance
of guilty pleas, as well as for the withdrawal of such pleas. Rule
11(d) provides that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior
to sentencing if he “can show a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
“Although [w]ithdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to
be liberally granted, we review a district court’s refusal to
permit withdrawal only for abuse of discretion.” United States
v. Curry, 494 F.3d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see United States v.

3
Jones further contends that his sentencing counsel was
ineffective in not asking the district court to recommend that he be
placed in the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential Drug Abuse Program.
This claim is raised for the first time on appeal, and it is “‘this court’s
general practice . . . to remand [such a] claim for an evidentiary
hearing unless the trial record alone conclusively shows that the
defendant either is or is not entitled to relief.’” United States v.
Shabban, 612 F.3d 693, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). As the trial
record does not resolve the issue, we remand so that the district court
may address it in the first instance.
 8

Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Reversal is
“uncommon.” United States v. Shah, 453 F.3d 520, 522 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014,
1017 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

In reviewing a district court’s refusal to permit withdrawal,
this court considers three factors: “‘(1) whether the defendant
has asserted a viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay
between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has
substantially prejudiced the government’s ability to prosecute
the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted.’”
Curry, 494 F.3d at 1128 (quoting, inter alia, United States v.
McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The third factor --
taint -- is the “most important,” United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d
249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993), while the second -- prejudice -- “has
never been dispositive in our cases,” Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988.
We will therefore re-order the factors and consider them in the
order of their importance. See United States v. Robinson, 587
F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d
1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

1. The gravamen of Jones’ claim of taint is that he thought
he was merely pleading guilty to a single sale of 10 ziplocks of
heroin to an undercover officer, and that he did not understand
that he was actually pleading guilty to a conspiracy involving
100 or more grams of the drug. It is hard to see how this could
have been so.

The district court’s first question to Jones at the plea
hearing was whether he wanted to enter a plea of guilty to
“conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute
100 grams or more” of heroin. Plea Hr’g Tr. 22 (Jan. 6, 2009).
Jones said: “Yes, I do.” Id; see also id. at 32 (statement by the
court that the guilty plea is to “conspiracy”). The court also
asked whether Jones had read and understood his plea
 9

agreement; Jones confirmed that he had, and that he had gone
over it with his attorney. Id. at 23. The first line of that
agreement, which Jones signed, states that Jones agreed to
“enter a plea of guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess
with Intent to Distribute 100 grams or more” of heroin. App.
37 (bolding in original). See id. at 38 (acknowledging that the
defendant “is accountable for at least 100 grams but less than
400 grams of heroin” (bolding in original)). Finally, the court
confirmed with Jones that he had “signed a piece of paper called
a factual proffer in support of guilty plea.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 32
(Jan. 6, 2009). The first line of that proffer likewise stated that
Jones had agreed to enter a plea of guilty to “Conspiracy to
Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute 100 grams
or more” of heroin. App. 32.

Nor is there room for an argument that the district court
failed to sufficiently explain the meaning of the offense to which
Jones was pleading. As Jones concedes, “the district judge did
separately state that ‘a conspiracy is an agreement between two
or more people to violate the law,’ and that ‘the basic charge
here . . . is that you were working together with other people in
the heroin distribution business.’” Appellant’s Reply Br. 4
(referencing Plea Hr’g Tr. 32 (Jan. 6, 2009)). Indeed, the court
did more. Referring to the factual proffer, the court confirmed
with Jones that: he “worked with Rex Pelote and Edward Farley
and others to sell heroin in Langston Terrace”; he was “doing
hand-to-hand heroin sales on the street”; although he was
“getting the heroin that [he was] selling from someone named
Shannon, [he] knew that Shannon was getting it from Rex
Pelote”; and, he “would get the money from the sales[,] would
give the money back to Shannon, and . . . knew that Shannon
would get the money back to Pelote.” Plea Hr’g Tr. 33-34 (Jan.
6, 2009). The factual proffer further advised Jones that “the
essential elements” of the conspiracy offense to which he was
pleading were: “1. That an agreement existed between two or
 10

more persons to commit the crimes of distribution and
possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance;
and 2. That the defendant intentionally joined in that
agreement.” App. 32 (citing United States v. Lam Kwong Wah,
924 F.2d 298, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). We detect
no error in any of this, and no basis for believing that Jones
failed to understand he was pleading guilty to a conspiracy
involving 100 or more grams of heroin.

As this court has previously explained, “[i]f we determine
that there was no error in the taking of the defendant’s plea, we
will be extremely reluctant to reverse the district court, even if
the defendant makes out a legally cognizable defense to the
charges against him.” Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; accord Robinson,
587 F.3d at 1131. “That is, a defendant who fails to show some
error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden
if he is ultimately to prevail.” Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; accord
Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131. Jones has shown no error, and we
now turn to the remaining factors to determine whether he has
met that burden.

2. Jones maintains that he asserted a viable claim of
innocence in the district court. “To satisfy this standard, an
appellant ‘must do more than make a general denial in order to
put the Government to its proof; he must affirmatively advance
an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent, for he
has waived his right simply to try his luck before a jury.’”
Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Curry, 494 F.3d at 1129
(quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209)).

The district court found that Jones did not advance a viable
claim, given his previous admissions that he sold drugs he
bought from Shannon and that he knew the drugs had come from
the alleged co-conspirators. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8 (Nov. 24,
 11

2009). The court indicated that Jones had thus admitted an
“ongoing business relationship” that constituted a conspiracy.
Id. Indeed, the proffer and admissions we described in the
previous section were more than sufficient to establish Jones’
on-going participation in the conspiracy. His “‘general denial’”
of the offense without a denial of the behavior constituting the
offense was “insufficient to satisfy the [second] factor.” Curry,
494 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Cray, 47 F.3d at 1209); see
Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1131-32.

On appeal, Jones does not dispute that such an ongoing
relationship would vitiate a claim of innocence. Appellant’s Br.
22. Nor does he dispute that he sold drugs to the undercover
agent on February 15, 2008. Id. Rather, he claims “that his
ongoing business relationship involved his buying of drugs from
Shannon for his own use, not selling.” Id. And he denies that
he sold to anyone “else beyond this one February 15, 2008 sale
to an undercover officer.” Appellant’s Br. 22-23.

But this is not quite what Jones told the district court, and
we cannot regard that court as having abused its discretion in
rejecting a claim not made to it. On March 18, the first time
Jones suggested that he wanted to withdraw his plea, he
“admit[ted] to selling” heroin to the undercover officer, but said
that was just “one sale.” Initial Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 9-10 (Mar.
18, 2009). He did not say anything about his buying from
Shannon only for personal use until the November 24 hearing.
And contrary to his contention on appeal, Jones’ claim there was
not that the 10-ziplocks sale to the undercover police officer was
the only sale he had ever made. Rather, he claimed that even the
10 ziplocks seized on February 15, 2008 contained drugs for his
own personal use, and that he “didn’t sell no drugs to nobody”
at that or any other time. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 8 (Nov. 24,
2009); see id. at 9. Far from acknowledging the sale, as he does
on appeal and as he had previously done on March 18, he said
 12

only that he would plead to the “10 ziplocks that I supposedly
sold to the undercover police officer.” Id. at 8 (emphasis
added).

Accordingly, the innocence claim that Jones ultimately put
to the district court was that he had never sold drugs to anyone.
This claim was belied, of course, by the government’s evidence.
More important, it flatly contradicted Jones’ prior admissions,
made during both the January 6 plea colloquy and the March 18
hearing. A “motion that can succeed only if the defendant
committed perjury at the plea proceedings may be rejected out
of hand unless the defendant has a compelling explanation for
the contradiction.” Shah, 453 F.3d at 523 (quoting United States
v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005)). As Jones
offered no explanation for the contradiction (and still offers
none), the district court’s conclusion that he failed to assert a
viable claim of innocence was hardly an abuse of discretion.
See Curry, 494 F.3d at 1129; Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988.

3. Finally, we consider whether the delay between Jones’
guilty plea and his motion to withdraw substantially prejudiced
the government’s ability to prosecute the case. At the
sentencing hearing, the government argued that it was
prejudiced because by then it had “been about 10, 11 months,”
the cooperating witnesses had already been sentenced, and it
would at that point be more difficult for the government to
prosecute its case. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 15 (Nov. 24, 2009).
Although the court did not specify its rationale, it agreed that the
government would be “considerably” -- although “maybe not
horrendously” -- prejudiced by withdrawal. Id. at 17.

Jones notes that he first moved to withdraw his plea on
March 18, 2009, only two-and-a-half months after he entered his
plea, not ten or eleven. He argues, correctly, that the proper
time frame for evaluating prejudice is generally the period
 13

“between the plea ‘and the motion to withdraw,’” Appellant’s
Br. 23 (quoting Robinson, 587 F.3d at 1126), rather than
between the plea and the court’s ruling on that motion. Here,
however, the issue is clouded somewhat by the fact that Jones
sought to discharge his first counsel at the same time he moved
to withdraw his plea -- and then followed up by rejecting two
more attorneys in succession -- thus rendering a swift ruling on
his motion next to impossible. In addition, we have the
government’s representation that, even by the March 18 date,
most of the co-defendants and cooperators had already been
sentenced. Appellee’s Br. 26-27 n.11.

Although it may nonetheless be true that we should
downgrade the district court’s perception of the prejudice the
government suffered from “considerable” to “slight,” we need
not belabor the point because the degree of prejudice to the
government has to date “never been dispositive in our cases.”
Curry, 494 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hanson, 339 F.3d at 988); see
also Cray, 47 F.3d at 1208; United States v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16,
20 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Here, because we find no taint in the taking
of Jones’ plea, nor any unreasonableness in the district court’s
determination that Jones failed to assert a viable claim of
innocence, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial
of Jones’ motion to withdraw his plea.

B

Jones’ second contention is that, “[e]ven if [he] did not
demonstrate a ‘fair and just reason’ sufficient to justify the
withdrawal of his guilty plea . . . , the district court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his plea prior to” conducting a
competency hearing. Appellant’s Br. 26. A defendant has a
right to a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to
 14

the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see United States
v. Perez, 603 F.3d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Prior to the date of
the hearing, “the court may order that a psychiatric or
psychological examination of the defendant be conducted.” 18
U.S.C. § 4241(b) (emphasis added). This court “review[s] the
district court’s failure to hold a competency hearing under §
4241 for abuse of discretion.” Perez, 603 F.3d at 47.

Jones argues that the district court should have held a
competency hearing because both his former counsel and the
court-appointed psychologist recommended that the court order
a competency evaluation. As set forth in Part I above, at Jones’
sentencing hearing the district court noted that Jones’ second
counsel had suggested that Jones was incompetent and had
asked the court to order a psychological screening. The court
stated that it had done so, and that it had received back from the
psychologist a report advising that Jones refused to cooperate,
saying only: “I won’t take the exam. I know what I’m doing.
I’ll see the judge in court.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 4 (Nov. 24,
2009). The psychologist recommended that Jones be sent to an
inpatient facility for a competency evaluation, but the court
declined, concluding from its own observations that Jones was
“perfectly competent.” Id. at 5.

Although not dispositive, a defense attorney’s view about
the competence of her client or the need for a psychological
evaluation is “unquestionably a factor which should be
considered” by the district court. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 178 n.13 (1975); see United States v. Klat, 213 F.3d 697,
703 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In this case, the court gave defense
counsel’s view due consideration and sent a clinical
psychologist to the jail to conduct a psychological screening.
But the court also knew that counsel had no basis for making a
 15

competency evaluation of her own, because she reported to the
court that Jones “had refused to talk to her.” Sentencing Hr’g
Tr. 4 (Nov. 24, 2009).

Needless to say, a court must also consider the professional
evaluation of a psychologist the court itself sends to screen a
defendant. But that psychologist reported that Jones “wouldn’t
talk to [her],” either. Id. at 5. In context, then, it is clear that
this psychologist likewise had no basis for a professional
evaluation of her own. She recommended that Jones be sent for
an inpatient examination not because she thought him
incompetent, but because his refusal to speak to her prevented
her from making an evaluation.

Beyond relying on the attorney’s and psychologist’s
recommendations, Jones does not point to anything in his
behavior, demeanor, or prior medical history as indicating that
a competency examination or hearing was necessary. See
Drope, 420 U.S. at 180 (holding that these factors are “relevant
in determining whether further inquiry” regarding a defendant’s
competency “is required”).4 Jones does not, for example, point
to his refusal to cooperate with the psychologist and his
appointed attorneys. The court attributed that refusal to his
“obstinancy,” not to a lack of “mental competency,” repeating
that “I think you’re perfectly competent and intelligent and
know what you’re about.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24,
2009). Under the circumstances, that was a reasonable
conclusion. “The relevant legal question is not whether
appellant will ‘assist properly in his defense,’ but whether ‘he is

4
In this regard, Jones’ case is considerably different from United
States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997), a case he cites on
appeal. In Williams, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court should
have held a competency hearing in light of the defendant’s “irrational
behavior” at trial, including her “outbursts and hysteria.” Id. at 1160.
 16

able to do’ so.” United States v. Battle, 613 F.3d 258, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 655
(1st Cir. 1989)) (first emphasis added). As we have previously
noted, “uncooperativeness with one’s counsel does not alone
prove an inability to communicate.” United States v. Caldwell,
543 F.2d 1333, 1349 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1975); accord Battle, 613
F.3d at 263.

Finally, although Jones does not expressly contend that his
persistence in trying to withdraw from a favorable plea
agreement was itself sufficient reason to believe that he was
suffering from a mental disease or defect, he does hint that
“some observers believed” he was acting “irrationally” in doing
so. Appellant’s Br. 29. The district court rejected that
suggestion, concluding that Jones’ problem was not “mental
capacity” but “obstinancy” -- he “just decided [he] didn’t like
the deal [he] cut.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24, 2009). We
have no ground for overturning that conclusion. Cf. Perez, 603
F.3d at 48 (concluding that, although the defendant “held
dubious legal views and pursued an inadvisable strategy, none
of this provided reasonable cause for the district court to
question his competence to stand trial”).

By contrast to the attorney and psychologist, the district
judge did have an opportunity -- over the course of six hearings
-- to speak with Jones and observe his demeanor. On that basis,
the judge told Jones: “I’ve been observing you in court on the
several occasions you’ve been here . . . . I don’t think there’s
anything wrong with your head. I think you’re perfectly
competent.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 5 (Nov. 24, 2009). As we held
in Battle, “[b]ecause ‘evidence of a defendant’s . . . demeanor at
trial . . . [is] relevant’ in determining competency,” a district
“court [i]s justified in relying on its own observations” as part of
determining whether a competency examination or hearing is
required. 613 F.3d at 263 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180).
 17

And because there was nothing in the record before the court to
give it “reasonable cause” to believe that Jones might be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Jones’ motion to withdraw his
plea without first holding a competency hearing or ordering
another examination.

III

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Jones’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In keeping
with this court’s general practice, we remand Jones’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, raised for the first time on appeal,
for an evidentiary hearing before the district court. See supra
note 3.

So ordered.