FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 28 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANNA M. PIATZ, No. 10-15943
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02666-JAM-
EFB
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL MEMORANDUM *
SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 16, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BEA, Circuit Judges, and SAMMARTINO, District
Judge.**
Anna Piatz (“Piatz”) appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor
of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). The district court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying Piatz
Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits under
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The ALJ concluded, on the basis of
step five in the five-step sequential analysis in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g), that
Piatz was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3),
because she could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
On appeal, Piatz contends that the ALJ did not take into account evidence
diagnosing her specific disabling conditions – fibromyalgia and carpal tunnel
syndrome. The ALJ, however, adequately considered the nature of Piatz’s health,
both with respect to her muscle pain and carpal tunnel syndrome, in determining
her residual functional capacity. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169,
1174 (9th Cir. 2008).
Piatz also contends that the district court erred when it chose not to consider
the subsequent ALJ decision awarding benefits to Piatz on a separate application.
The 2009 decision issued by ALJ L. Kalei Fong was not material, since it related to
a separate application which alleged an onset date four years after the alleged onset
date of the disability presented in the present application. See Mayes v. Massanari,
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276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the district court correctly held that the
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
3