Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 29, 2011
No. 08-30477 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
PRINCESS P. LACAZE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
WARDEN LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN,
also known as Mariana Leger,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:
Princess P. LaCaze (hereinafter “LaCaze”), Louisiana prisoner # 403264,
was convicted in state court of second-degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. LaCaze filed a habeas petition in federal district court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied. This court then granted a certificate of
appealability on two issues: first, whether the State withheld Brady material
concerning a promise made to LaCaze’s co-defendant, see Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and second, whether the trial court unconstitutionally denied
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her an impartial jury, see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). We REVERSE
and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ.
I.
Meryland Robinson, a long-time friend of the victim, was driven by his
fourteen-year-old son to the home of Michael LaCaze (hereinafter “Michael
LaCaze”) in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana under the guise of returning a gun
that Robinson had borrowed. Robinson shot Michael LaCaze through the
shoulder, killing him. After the shooting, Robinson tossed items from the
victim’s desk onto the floor to make it look like a botched robbery. Princess
LaCaze, the victim’s wife, was not home at the time of the shooting.
Although LaCaze initially denied any knowledge regarding her husband’s
death, she later told the police that he may have arranged his own death due to
his failing kidneys. She admitted that she knew beforehand that Robinson
planned to kill her husband. Michael LaCaze had previously told her he would
never be dependent on a machine to stay alive, and was scheduled to begin
dialysis within days of the murder. Still later, she admitted that she had called
Robinson the day of the murder, and he told her that “it would be taken care of
that day” and not to return to her home until seven o’clock that evening. She
also admitted that she had been having an extramarital relationship with
Robinson at the time of the shooting, but again maintained that Michael LaCaze
had sought Robinson’s help in ending his life due to his declining health.
Soon after Robinson killed Michael LaCaze, LaCaze began seeing another
man. It was only after LaCaze had Robinson arrested for knocking on the wall
of her house at night that Robinson made a statement implicating LaCaze,
contrary to his prior repeated denials of her involvement. Based on his
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statement, both parties were indicted in January 1998 for second-degree murder.
Prior to trial, LaCaze filed a motion for discovery of any evidence “which
in any way and to any extent” was favorable to her, specifically including “the
existence and substance of any and all agreements or understandings,
assurances or representations, formal or informal, oral or written, confected
between the prosecution and any and all persons involved in the case in any
manner.” The State responded that Robinson had agreed to testify at LaCaze’s
trial in exchange for the reduction of his charge from second-degree murder to
manslaughter and a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. The State
maintained that it knew of “no direct exculpatory evidence,” but provided as
potentially favorable evidence that Robinson initially denied involvement in the
crime and gave an alibi to a deputy. The State never disclosed, however, that it
had assured Robinson that his son would not be prosecuted if he agreed to make
a statement implicating LaCaze.
Pursuant to his plea agreement, Robinson testified at LaCaze’s trial.
Robinson and Michael LaCaze had been friends for over twenty years. Robinson
became close to Princess LaCaze through his friendship with her husband, and
eventually, they began having an extramarital affair. Robinson testified that
LaCaze told him that Michael LaCaze treated her badly. He explained that,
when he began his involvement with LaCaze, “nothing else mattered”; he
“couldn’t do nothing else but focus on her and she . . . just meant everything.”
Robinson then testified that LaCaze asked him if he knew anyone who
would kill her husband, and he told her he would ask around. Finally, he agreed
to do it himself. Telephone records reflect that she called him from a pay phone
the morning of the shooting. Robinson testified that the purpose of that call was
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to confirm the plan and to coordinate when she should come home. Later that
day, Robinson went with his son, Rodney Robinson, to the LaCazes’ house. He
knocked on the door, greeted Michael LaCaze, and went back to his car to
retrieve his gun. Upon returning to the house, Robinson shot him from the
doorway.
Robinson admitted that Michael LaCaze had told him he would not go on
dialysis and had asked him to end his life about one year before the murder. He
also testified that he had witnessed him tell LaCaze that he did not want to have
surgery. In fact, another witness, Glenda Froreich, testified that Michael
LaCaze had told her five or six months prior to his death that he definitely did
not want medical attention to help him live longer. He mentioned suicide, and
he and Froreich discussed Froreich’s own attempted suicide by overdosing on
pills. He told her he did not plan to do it that way. Nonetheless, Robinson
testified that the real reason he killed Michael LaCaze was because LaCaze had
requested that he do so.
A few days after the murder, Robinson cut up the gun and scattered it
around town, throwing a piece of it in the river, which he told LaCaze. The man
LaCaze began dating shortly after Michael LaCaze’s death testified that LaCaze
told him she “wished [the police] would leave her alone,” because the “gun was
in the river.”
In its opening statement, the State told the jury that Robinson was the
most important part of its case. It asked that the jury find him credible,
explaining, “there may be some talk and there was probably some talk about
deals and he’s lying because he got a deal, well as far as I’m concerned, folks,
forty years and being seventy something years old before you get out of jail is a
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life sentence. And he’s doing time.” The prosecutor then previewed the most
important parts of Robinson’s testimony, including that LaCaze frequently asked
Robinson to kill her husband and that LaCaze knew that Robinson had cut up
the gun and thrown it in the river. In closing argument, the State again
emphasized Robinson’s credibility, saying he had “never seen anybody pour the
truth out from their soul like I saw him and you saw it too.” After the defense
emphasized Robinson’s sentencing agreement during its closing argument, the
State reiterated on rebuttal that Robinson would not have lied to obtain his
forty-year plea agreement, which was basically a life sentence. The prosecutor
said, “It’s really the rest of his natural life. And that’s the earliest he’ll get out.
He may be seventy-six if he lives that long before he gets out. So when [the
defense] talks about [us] cutting a deal with him, that ain’t much of a deal. That
ain’t much of a deal.”
The jury found Princess LaCaze guilty of second-degree murder based on
a finding of “specific intent,” which required a showing that “the circumstances
indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequence
to follow from her act or failure to act.” She subsequently received a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence. State v. LaCaze, 759 So. 2d 773, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1999). On direct appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
her conviction, id. at 789, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied her writ of
certiorari, State v. LaCaze, 770 So. 2d 359 (La. 2000).
LaCaze then sought post-conviction relief in state court based on the
undisclosed understanding between the prosecutor and Robinson. The trial
court denied her request, finding that the assurance Robinson received from the
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prosecutor was immaterial, but the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court held two evidentiary hearings. At the first hearing,
Robinson’s attorney, Mike Bonnette, testified that he sought certain assurances
prior to Robinson’s giving his statement to the police. Bonnette was “concerned”
about Robinson’s statement “because there was a possibility of him implicating
his son.” So, before Robinson gave his statement, he received assurances from
Danny Hall, an investigator with the district attorney’s office, that his son would
not be prosecuted. LaCaze’s trial attorney then testified that, although he
requested all such information, the State never disclosed that assurance. Had
he known about the assurance, he said, he “certainly would have tried to cross-
examine him on that and I would have felt that it was relevant.” Later, Hall
testified that, although he remembered meeting with Robinson and Bonnette,
he could not remember what was said but did remember that he did not make
any assurance to Robinson. At the second evidentiary hearing, Robinson
testified that, before he agreed to give a statement, he asked Danny Hall “over
and over again” that his son not be prosecuted. He testified that he probably
would not have given a statement without the assurance that his son would not
be prosecuted.
The Louisiana trial court concluded that “the evidentiary hearing
testimony proves without doubt to this Court that while the 14 year old son of
Meryland Robinson did in fact drive his father to and from the home of the
murdered victim,” the son had no part in the planning of and did not participate
in the murder, so “[t]here was nothing for the prosecutor to pin any hope of
conviction on even if charges were in fact brought against the youngster.” The
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trial court further found, however, that “Meryland Robinson did express his
concern as to whether his 14 year old son would be arrested. He was assured
that his son would not be arrested.” Nonetheless, the trial court found that
“there was no written ‘deal’” concerning Robinson’s son. The court also found
that Robinson agreed to testify because of his agreement to plead guilty to
manslaughter, not because of the assurance he received related to his son. The
trial court denied relief because “[t]he totality of the evidence [was] so
overwhelming in favor of the finding of guilty by the jury that the evidence
relating to the 14 year old young man is irrelevant.”
LaCaze appealed that decision to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, which ruled that the trial court erred in denying her application for
post-conviction relief and remanded the case for a new trial. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed in a two-paragraph, per curiam opinion, with two
judges noting that they “would grant [the writ] and docket.” State v. LaCaze,
947 So. 2d 716, 717 (La. 2007). The court observed that “[t]he undisclosed
revelation that the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] former extramarital lover,
sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same
incident before he made a statement to the police was relevant to the witness’s
credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at trial.” Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, however, that LaCaze had not
satisfied the third element of the Brady analysis, materiality, for two reasons:
first, because Robinson’s agreement to plead guilty to manslaughter for a lesser
sentence was revealed to the jury, along with his criminal record, and second,
because his testimony was corroborated. Id. The court pointed to the testimony
of LaCaze’s new boyfriend, which the court characterized as testimony that
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LaCaze “told him she would evade charges because the murder weapon was
unrecoverable,” and to the defendant’s admission that she had discussed her
husband’s alleged death wish with Robinson and knew Robinson planned “to
take care of it.” Id. The court reinstated the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
After being denied post-conviction relief by the Louisiana Supreme Court,
LaCaze sought habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district
court, raising twenty-one grounds for relief. Without holding a hearing, the
magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the writ. With
regard to the Brady claim, the magistrate judge stated that, “[w]eighed against
his criminal history alone, the fact that Robinson sought assurances from the
State that his son would not be prosecuted before he gave a statement to the
police becomes much more significant.” LaCaze v. Leger, No. 07-CV-0236, 2008
WL 1836374, at *6 (W.D. La. April 03, 2008). The magistrate judge nonetheless
determined that the assurance was not material because LaCaze “knew, from
pretrial discovery, that Robinson had pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of
manslaughter and a forty year sentence,” yet “she did not use that evidence to
impeach Robinson at trial.” Id. Had that plea agreement been revealed to the
jury, it would have rendered immaterial the non-disclosure of the assurance
shielding Robinson’s son from prosecution because that information would have
been “essentially cumulative and not material.” Id.
In a short, one-page order, the district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, dismissed the petition with prejudice, and
denied a certificate of appealability. This court then granted a certificate of
appealability on two issues: (1) whether the State withheld Brady material
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concerning her co-defendant, and (2) whether the trial court unconstitutionally
denied her an impartial jury.
II.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides
that a federal court may not grant habeas relief after adjudication of a claim in
state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”
§ 2254(d)(2). Clearly established federal law comprises “the holdings, as opposed
to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant
state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court
decision is contrary to federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal
rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of
the particular state prisoner’s case,” id. at 413, or where it “extends a legal
principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not
apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where
it should apply,” id. at 407. Thus, under AEDPA’s standard of review, “a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.
We review the state court’s “ultimate decision” for unreasonableness.
Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2011). Here, we review the
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Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, see id., giving deference to the Louisiana
trial court’s factual findings, see Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 267-68
(5th Cir. 2007). Although we review only the ultimate legal determination by
the Louisiana Supreme Court and not whether the court provided exhaustive
reasoning to support the result, “a thorough and well-reasoned state court
opinion may be more likely to be correct and to withstand judicial review . . . .”
Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (en banc).
III.
To show that the state court’s proceeding resulted in a “decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), LaCaze must show that the prosecution’s failure to
disclose requested impeachment evidence constituted a violation of due process
pursuant to Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, and that the state court’s application of
Brady was unreasonable. See Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2008).
LaCaze must show that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence
was favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence was material. Lawrence v.
Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1994).
A.
The Louisiana trial court found that the prosecution had suppressed
evidence favorable to LaCaze, satisfying the first and second prongs of the Brady
analysis. Specifically, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found
that Robinson “did in fact voice his concern in the investigative stage of the case
about his son being prosecuted” and “was assured that his son would not be
arrested.” Those facts were accepted on appeal. Although the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the writ, it agreed
with the trial court’s findings, saying that “the State failed to disclose
information concerning the plea arrangement made with a critical witness.”
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State v. LaCaze, KW 05-01170 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/06). The Louisiana Supreme
Court, while reinstating the defendant’s conviction, stated that the prosecution
failed to disclose that “the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] extramarital lover,
sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same
incident before he made a statement to the police,” which was “relevant to the
witness’s credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at
trial.” LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717. We defer to the trial court’s findings, which
were accepted by both appellate courts, as we must under AEDPA. See Moody,
476 F.3d at 267-68.
Notwithstanding those findings, the State now contends that the evidence
did not need to be disclosed because Robinson and the district attorney never
actually reached a “deal.” However, the Supreme Court has never limited a
Brady violation to cases where the facts demonstrate that the state and the
witness have reached a bona fide, enforceable deal. In Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 270 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that the key question is not
whether the prosecutor and the witness entered into an effective agreement, but
whether the witness “might have believed that [the state] was in a position to
implement . . . any promise of consideration.” Id.; see Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Tassin v. Cain, 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A
promise is unnecessary.”). In fact, “evidence of any understanding or agreement
as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [the witness’s] credibility.”
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155. The question is “the extent to which the testimony
misled the jury, not whether the promise was indeed a promise . . . .” Tassin,
517 F.3d at 778 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 270).
Here, Robinson testified that he “asked . . . over and over again” that his
son not be prosecuted, that the prosecutor gave him an assurance that he would
not be, and that Robinson believed him. Indeed, Robinson testified that he
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probably would not have given his statement implicating LaCaze if he had not
received such an assurance. Robinson’s attorney corroborated Robinson’s
testimony, saying that he had “an understanding” with the prosecutor. Thus,
the evidence demonstrates that the assurance impacted Robinson’s decision to
implicate LaCaze, regardless of whether there was any possibility Robinson’s son
would have been prosecuted without that assurance. The prosecution had a duty
to disclose it.
B.
We now consider the question of materiality. Whether evidence is
material, for purposes of a Brady violation, is a mixed question of law and fact,
which we review de novo. Mahler, 537 F.3d at 500. We review the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s holding to determine whether “the adjudication of the claim
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see
Moody, 476 F.3d at 267. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the
failure to disclose the assurance was immaterial because Robinson’s agreement
to plead guilty to manslaughter for a lesser sentence was revealed to the jury,
and because his testimony was corroborated by other evidence.
“[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted
ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995). Rather, the question is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435; see also Tassin, 517 F.3d at 780. Or, put
another way, whether the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence” in the absence of the favorable
evidence. Kyles, 514 U.S at 434. “The materiality of Brady material depends
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almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence
mustered by the state.” Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A Brady violation is more likely to occur when the
impeaching evidence “would seriously undermine the testimony of a key witness
on an essential issue or there is no strong corroboration.” Id. at 397.
The State primarily argues that the undisclosed agreement regarding
Robinson’s son was immaterial because Robinson’s sentencing agreement,
pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a forty-year
sentence, was disclosed to the jury. Despite its determination that the non-
disclosure was relevant as a possible motive to lie, the Louisiana Supreme Court
accepted this argument, finding that it was immaterial because the “main
source” of Robinson’s bias and motivation to lie, his plea agreement, had been
disclosed. However, this is not the proper legal standard. The materiality
inquiry does not turn on which of two competing sources of bias a court, in
hindsight, determines the jury would have considered more important. Rather,
the inquiry is whether an undisclosed source of bias—even if it is not the only
source or even the “main source”—could reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in a different light. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35. The Louisiana Supreme
Court neither cited nor applied that standard.
Moreover, in Napue, 360 U.S. at 270, the United States Supreme Court
made clear that an undisclosed source of bias can be material even if it is not the
main source of bias. There, the jury knew that “someone whom [the witness]
had tentatively identified as being a public defender” had promised “to do what
he could” to reduce the witness’s sentence, but was not told that the prosecutor
had promised the same thing. Id. at 268, 270. The Court rejected the idea that
“the fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for believing that the
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witness . . . may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned
what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Id. at 270; see also Tassin,
517 F.3d at 780 (holding that the jury’s knowledge of other aggravating factors
justifying the death sentence did not render the failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence as to the other factor immaterial). Likewise, here, the argument that
relief should be denied simply because the jury knew one of two completely
unrelated bases for Robinson to lie cannot be sustained under the Supreme
Court’s precedent in Kyles and Napue.
Therefore, applying both AEDPA and Kyles, we must consider whether
there was some other reason why the suppressed information was not material.
At trial, the parties did not dispute that Robinson killed Michael LaCaze. Nor
did they dispute that LaCaze knew in advance that Robinson planned to kill
him. Rather, what the two sides contested, and what was integral to LaCaze’s
defense, was whether she intended for Robinson to kill him. Importantly,
Robinson’s testimony provided the only direct evidence of that intent, as the
other member of an alleged two-member conspiracy.1
1
Moreover, as in Tassin, the State here “capitalized on this misrepresentation in [its]
closing argument” by repeatedly arguing that Robinson had not received a deal that would give
him a reason to lie—which itself shows the materiality of the undisclosed deal. See Tassin,
517 F.3d at 779. In its opening statement, the State told the jury Robinson was critical to its
case. It asked that the jury find him credible, arguing that Robinson’s agreement was a de
facto life sentence and therefore not worth lying to obtain: “There may be some talk and there
was probably some talk about deals and he’s lying because he got a deal, well as far as I’m
concerned, folks, forty years and being seventy something years old before you get out of jail
is a life sentence. And he’s doing time.” In its closing argument, the State emphasized
Robinson’s credibility, saying he had “never seen anybody pour the truth out from their soul
like I saw him and you saw it too,” and then again called Robinson’s sentencing agreement
basically a life sentence on rebuttal. The State’s argument that an unrevealed deal is
immaterial after going to such lengths to emphasize Robinson’s credibility and lack of any
motives for lying at trial simply lacks force.
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In determining that the Brady evidence was not material, the Louisiana
Supreme Court then held that there was sufficient other evidence to support
LaCaze’s conviction, specifically her statement about the gun’s being in the river
and her admitted knowledge of Robinson’s intent to kill her husband, which
rendered the failure to disclose immaterial. LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717. Again,
the court used the wrong standard. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 n.8. “[I]t is not
a sufficiency of evidence test.” Id. at 434. Rather, the state court must consider
whether the undisclosed agreement “could reasonably be taken to put the whole
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”2 Id. at
435. Using that standard, the undisclosed assurance, which the court held was
“relevant” and “a possible motive” for his testimony, LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717,
was material.
Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence presented by the State
to show a critical element: LaCaze’s intent to have her husband killed. LaCaze’s
own statements—particularly those in which she admitted she knew Robinson
intended to kill her husband and did nothing to stop it—are damaging, but they
do not establish the requisite mens rea to commit the crime. Knowledge does not
equal intent. See State v. Wiley, 672 So. 2d 185, 187-88 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
In fact, LaCaze’s statements were consistent with her defense at trial that
Michael LaCaze requested that Robinson kill him, which she admitted she knew.
Further, the testimony by LaCaze’s new boyfriend did not establish her intent,
2
Although its analysis more closely approximated a sufficiency of the evidence
standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the standard as follows: “Evidence is material
[and reversal warranted] only if it is reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding
would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. A reasonable
probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” But even that
standard, which requires that the evidence probably undermined the result, is not the same
as the lesser standard in Kyles, which requires only that the evidence could have undermined
the result.
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as the court determined. After-the-fact acknowledgment that she knew where
the murderer hid the murder weapon does not establish her specific intent. See
id.
This case bears a striking resemblance to Tassin, 517 F.3d at 780, in which
this court granted habeas relief based on a Brady violation. There, as here, the
government’s key witness—the only witness testifying to the defendant’s
intent—had received “an understanding” of leniency that the prosecution failed
to disclose. Id. at 779-80. The government’s theory of the case was that
Georgina and Robert Tassin had conspired to commit armed robbery and had
killed the victim in the course of the robbery. As the only other member of the
two-member conspiracy, Georgina’s testimony was “crucial” to the jury’s finding
that Robert had intended to commit armed robbery. If the jury had known of the
prosecutor’s assurance that it would seek a favorable sentence for Georgina, it
“may have chosen to believe Robert’s story over [Georgina’s].” Id. at 780-81.
Indeed, the court found it “most important[]” that the state capitalized on the
non-disclosure when it argued to the jury that the witness had no reason to lie.
Id. at 779. Given the absence of evidence supporting the government’s theory
of the case and corroborating Georgina’s testimony, the court found that the non-
disclosure was material and granted the writ.
Likewise, here, Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence of
LaCaze’s intent, and disclosure of his bias to the jury might have put the whole
case in a different light. In its opening statement, closing argument, and
rebuttal, the State argued that Robinson had no reason to lie. In circumstances
like these, where “the jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of [the
witness] may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” the failure to disclose
Brady information is material. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; see also Mahler, 537
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No. 08-30477
F.3d at 503. As in Tassin, the state court’s determination to the contrary was
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
IV.
This case raises a reasonable probability that disclosure of the agreement
between the prosecution and Robinson would have produced a different result.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. Based on our disposition of LaCaze’s Brady claim, we
need not consider the merits of her claim pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81 (1988). We reverse and remand with instruction to grant the writ under
whatever conditions the district court may set.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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