[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14520 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 1, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-14057-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANGEL ANTONIO CRUZ-MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(July 1, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Angel Cruz-Martinez appeals his 30-month total sentence imposed after
pleading guilty to one count of making a false statement in an application for a
United States passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (“Count 1”), and one
count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (“Count
3”). The district court sentenced Cruz-Martinez to 6 months as to Count 1, and 24
months as to Count 3, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Cruz-Martinez
argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because
(1) the district court did not specifically mention 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), its
purposes, or how it applied the statute; and (2) his sentence was greater than
necessary to implement the goals of § 3553(a), specifically those relating to the
seriousness of the offense, because both offenses arose from the same conduct.
We review a final sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The district court must
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with
the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
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training or medical care. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular
sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available,
the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission, the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims. Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The district court does
not have to discuss each § 3553(a) factor so long as the record indicates that it
considered the factors in some form. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936,
944 (11th Cir. 2007) (“nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to
state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or
to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors”).
A sentence is substantively reasonable if it achieves the purposes of
sentencing as enumerated in § 3553(a). United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788
(11th Cir. 2005). This Court may reverse if it is left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.
2008). Indicia of substantive reasonableness include being within the applicable
guidelines range, Talley, 431 F.3d at 788, and the sentence’s relation to the
applicable statutory maximum, See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,
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1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (considering that defendant’s sentence was well below the
statutory maximum in finding the sentence substantively reasonable). The
appellant carries the burden of demonstrating a sentence is unreasonable in light of
the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Cruz-Martinez’s sentence is reasonable. Although it did not specifically
cite them, the record shows that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors.
See Dorman, 488 F.3d at 944-45 (finding sentence reasonable although district
court did not articulate that it had considered § 3553(a) because it considered
defendant’s objections and motion for downward departure that implicated the
factors). The Court ensured that it was applying the correct guidelines range, and
the parties presented arguments as to the appropriate sentence that implicated
§ 3553(a). Further, the sentence was within the applicable guidelines range, and
such sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable. Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
Cruz-Martinez received a statutorily mandated sentence of 2 years as to Count 3,
and his 6-month sentence as to Count 1 was well below the 10-year maximum
sentence permitted. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1542; see also
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. While Cruz-Martinez argues that both of his
sentences arise from the same conduct, this does not mean that his sentence is
unreasonable. The penalty statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, required the district court
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to impose consecutive sentences, and Cruz-Martinez has not conclusively shown
that commission of both offenses results in the same harm. Accordingly, we
affirm the sentence as reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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