REVISED - October 2, 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-30185
SHEILA STOCKSTILL JACOBS, Deceased; ANTHONY
JULIUS LAFORTE, Son of Sheila Stockstill Jacobs; and
CHRISTOPHER LOFORTE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
WEST FELICIANA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants,
BILL DANIEL; EARL REECH; and WAYNE RABALAIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
September 13, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
In this section 1983 claim brought by the sons of a woman who
committed suicide as a pretrial detainee in a Louisiana jail,
Defendants-Appellants, West Feliciana Sheriff Bill Daniel, Deputy
Earl Reech, and Deputy Wayne Rabalais have filed this interlocutory
appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss
this appeal as it relates to claims against Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity for
Sheriff Daniel and Deputy Reech, and we reverse the denial of
qualified immunity for Deputy Rabalais.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 21, 1996, Sheila Jacobs was arrested for the
attempted, second-degree murder, by shooting, of her uncle. Jacobs
had become enraged at her uncle when she learned that he had
allegedly sexually molested one of her sons years before. The
arresting state troopers informed an investigator for the West
Feliciana Sheriff’s Department that Jacobs told them shortly after
her arrest that, after shooting her uncle, she had tried to kill
herself by placing a loaded gun in her mouth and pulling the
trigger, but the gun had jammed. The investigator conveyed this
information to Sheriff Daniel.
Sheriff Daniel and Deputy Rabalais both testified that they
were, indeed, told that Jacobs had attempted suicide shortly before
her arrest. After processing Jacobs, the officers at the West
Feliciana Parish Prison placed Jacobs in a “detox” cell, which is
used to house inmates who are intoxicated, who need to be isolated
2
for safety reasons, or who are designated for placement on a
suicide watch. According to Deputy Rabalais’s deposition
testimony, when Jacobs was placed in the detox cell, the officers
had her on suicide watch and had placed a note to that effect in
the control center. The various defendants testified that the
detox cell could be constantly observed from the jail’s control
room through a window, but that a substantial portion of the cell,
including the bunk area, fell into a “blind spot,” and was not
visible from the control room. This cell could be completely
observed only if an officer viewed it from the hallway. The cell
also had several “tie-off” points (bars and light fixtures from
which a makeshift rope could be suspended), despite Sheriff
Daniel’s acknowledgment that a suicide prevention cell should not
have such tie off points and despite the fact that another inmate,
James Halley, had previously committed suicide in the very same
cell by hanging himself with a sheet from one of these tie-off
points. To the best of Deputy Rabalais’s knowledge, and pursuant
to Sheriff Daniel’s directive, Jacobs was not given sheets on the
first night of her detention, August 21.
On the morning of August 22, Jacobs appeared before a
Louisiana state district judge, who appointed attorney Clayton
Perkins to represent her. The next morning, Friday, August 23,
Perkins visited Jacobs at the jail. Perkins requested that Sheriff
Daniel leave Jacobs in the detox cell, and perhaps provide her with
a blanket and towel. Sheriff Daniel instructed one of his deputies
3
to give these items to Jacobs, but the record reflects only that
Jacobs received a sheet (which she eventually used to kill
herself), and there is no evidence that she received either a towel
or a blanket. In his report, Sheriff Daniel stated that he had
been thinking about moving Jacobs to another cell with other female
detainees, but decided to leave her in the detox cell after she
asked him not to move her because she was afraid the other women
would hurt her. He also noted that Jacobs had asked for her
hepatitis medication and had given no other indications that she
was planning to attempt suicide or to harm herself.
Deputies Reech and Rabalais were on duty at the West Feliciana
jail facility from 11:30 p.m. the night of August 23, until 7:30
a.m. the next morning, August 24. The record reveals that the
defendants still regarded Jacobs as a suicide risk during that
time. Indeed, Sheriff Daniel testified that Jacobs was on a
“precautionary,” though not a “straight” suicide watch. Our review
of the record reveals few discernable differences between these two
types of suicide watches. When an inmate was on “strict” suicide
watch, the informal policy at the jail was to have the inmate
checked on every fifteen minutes. Deputy Reech testified that he
and Deputy Rabalais made periodic checks on Jacobs; however, it is
unclear exactly how often the deputies checked on Jacobs while she
was under the “precautionary” suicide watch. What is clear is that
as many as 45 minutes elapsed from the time a deputy last checked
on Jacobs to the time she was discovered hanging from the light
4
fixture in the detox cell.
Specifically, the record reveals that, after having observed
Jacobs in the detox cell at 12:22 a.m. and 1:00 a.m., Deputy Reech
checked on Jacobs at 1:22 a.m., and he observed her lying awake in
her bunk. At 2:00 a.m., Deputy Rabalais went to investigate some
loud music down the hall, and on his way back to the control
station, he observed Jacobs lying awake in her bunk. Deputy
Rabalais testified that both he and Deputy Reech checked on Jacobs
sometime between 2:00 and 2:44 a.m., and that Jacobs was still
awake in her bunk. After this last check, Deputy Reech returned to
the jail lobby to read his newspaper. At approximately 2:44 a.m.,
Deputy Rabalais looked into the detox cell from the control room
and saw what appeared to be part of an arm hanging from the
ceiling. Concerned, he went to find Deputy Reech, who was still
reading the newspaper, to help him get into the detox cell. When
the deputies arrived at the cell, they found Jacobs hanging from a
sheet that had been tied around the caging surrounding a ceiling
light fixture. Deputy Rabalais found a knife and enlisted the
assistance of another inmate in cutting the sheet and lowering
Jacobs onto the floor. By all indications, Jacobs had torn a small
string from the bunk mattress and wrapped that string around the
sheet to form a make-shift rope. The paramedics who arrived only
moments later were unable to resuscitate Jacobs. Jacobs’s suicide
was the third suicide at the jail during Sheriff Daniel’s tenure
there. As noted above, James Halley’s suicide had occurred in the
5
same cell where Jacobs killed herself. The third suicide had
occurred in a cell down the hallway from the detox cell.
On July 8, 1997, Anthony LaForte commenced this action in the
Eastern District of Louisiana. The case was transferred to the
Middle District, which includes the Parish of West Feliciana. On
April 6, 1998, Jacobs’ other son, Christopher LoForte,1 was added
as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged a
violation of section 1983 by the Parish of West Feliciana, the West
Feliciana Parish Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Daniel, in his
individual and official capacities, and Deputies Reech and
Rabalais, in their individual capacities. The plaintiffs asserted
that the individual defendants violated Jacobs’s rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to her
obvious suicidal tendencies and failing to protect her from self-
inflicted harm. They also contended that Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity, violated Jacobs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by
failing to implement a suitable policy for accommodating the
medical and psychiatric needs of pretrial detainees like Jacobs.
On January 26, 1998, the case was transferred to a magistrate judge
and the parties consented to disposition by a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On August 31, 1998, Sheriff
Daniel, Deputy Reech, and Deputy Rabalais, moved for summary
judgment, claiming qualified immunity with respect to the claims
1
We have retained the seemingly inconsistent spellings of the
sons’ last names which appear in the record before us.
6
asserted against them in their individual capacity. Additionally
the defendants claimed that the medical/psychiatric accommodation
policy for pretrial detainees was constitutionally sufficient to
defeat the claim asserted against Sheriff Daniel in his official
capacity. The Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing on October 16,
1998, and on January 19, 1999, denied the motion. The individual
defendants have now timely filed this interlocutory appeal from the
denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, we must consider whether we have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. “Normally, we do not have
appellate jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a
motion for summary judgment because such [an order] is not a final
one within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Lemoine v. New
Horizons Ranch and Center, Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1999).
There is an exception to this rule, however, when a summary
judgment motion is based on an official’s claim of absolute or
qualified immunity and the district court's disposition is premised
upon a legal conclusion, and not simply a dispute with regard to
the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. (citing Mitchell v.
Forsythe, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985)). The district court's order in
this case states that the defendants' conduct was not objectively
7
reasonable in light of the applicable legal standard of deliberate
indifference. Accordingly, we have interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction to review the denial of the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, but only insofar as the denial considered the
viability of the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, which
defense is applicable only to the claims against Sheriff Daniel,
Deputy Reech, and Deputy Rabalais in their individual capacities.
We are without jurisdiction to review the denial of the
defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding Sheriff Daniel in his
official capacity. Municipal governments may not raise immunity
defenses on interlocutory appeal. See Nicoletti v. City of Waco,
947 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing McKee v. City of
Rockwell, 877 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1989)). And since a suit
against Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity is a suit against
the Parish, we may not review the Magistrate Judge’s denial of
summary judgment regarding Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity.
For these reasons, we must dismiss this appeal as it relates to the
claim against Sheriff Daniel in his official capacity. The
district court's decision that the individual defendants are not
entitled to immunity will be reviewed on the merits.
B. The Individual Capacity Claims
We review a denial of summary judgment based on a claim of
qualified immunity de novo, and consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. See Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d
8
298, 301 (5th Cir. 1994). To determine whether an official is
entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine: (1) whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the defendant’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law at the time of the incident. See Hare v. City of
Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Colston v.
Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997)).2
Regarding the first inquiry, the plaintiffs have stated a
claim under currently applicable law for the denial of Jacobs’s
substantive due process rights. Unlike convicted prisoners, whose
rights to constitutional essentials like medical care and safety
are guaranteed by the Eight Amendment, pretrial detainees look to
the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these same basic needs.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). A pretrial detainee’s
due process rights are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Hare II, 74 F.3d
at 639 (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S.
2
We pause here to identify the three Hare decisions which are
referenced in this opinion. The original panel opinion in Hare v.
City of Corinth, 22 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994) is referred to as Hare
I; our en banc review of that panel opinion in Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc) is referred to as
Hare II; and the second panel opinion, Hare v. City of Corinth, 135
F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1998), which followed the remand ordered by our
en banc opinion, is referred to as Hare III.
9
Ct. 2979, 2983 (1983)). In Hare II, which was a somewhat factually
analogous prison suicide case, we observed that “the State owes the
same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to
provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
human needs, including medical care and protection from harm,
during their confinement.” Id. at 650.
The plaintiffs have alleged that the individual defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Jacobs’s obvious need for
protection from self-inflicted harm. It is well-settled in the law
that “a state official’s episodic act or omission violates a
pretrial detainee’s due process rights to medical care [and
protection from harm] if the official acts with subjective
deliberate indifference to the detainee’s rights.” Nerren v.
Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Hare II, 74 F.3d at 647-48).3 By alleging deliberate indifference
to Jacobs’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights, the
plaintiffs have cleared the first hurdle in defeating the
defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
The second part of our qualified immunity analysis is to
3
The claim against the individual defendants is properly
analyzed as an “episodic act or omission” case, as opposed to a
“condition of confinement” case. See Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51,
53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“In an ‘episodic act or omission’
case, an actor usually is interposed between the detainee and the
municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a
particular act or, or omission by, the actor and then derivatively
to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality
that permitted or caused the act or omission.”).
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determine whether the defendants’ conduct was objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of
Jacobs’s suicide. As noted above, we have observed that at least
since 1989, it has been clearly established that officials will
only be liable for episodic acts or omissions resulting in the
violation of a detainee’s clearly established constitutional rights
if they “had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate
indifference to that risk.” Hare II, 74 F.3d at 650; see also
Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A
detainee’s right to adequate protection from known suicidal
tendencies was clearly established when Flores committed suicide in
January 1990.”). Thus, we must hold the defendants to the standard
of subjective deliberate indifference in determining whether their
conduct was objectively reasonable. See Hare III, 135 F.3d at 327.
The determination of the objective reasonableness of particular
conduct in light of the subjective deliberate indifference standard
is a question of law for the court. See id. at 328. In Hare III,
we explained the somewhat confusing relationship between the
deliberate indifference and objective reasonableness standards as
follows:
. . . for [an] appeal on qualified immunity,
the subjective deliberate indifference
standard serves only to demonstrate the
clearly established law in effect at the time
of the incident . . . . And under that
standard–the minimum standard not to be
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deliberately indifferent–the actions of the
individual defendants are examined to
determine whether, as a matter of law, they
were objectively unreasonable.
Hare III, 135 F.3d at 328. In other words, we are to determine
whether, in light of the facts as viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the conduct of the individual
defendants was objectively unreasonable when applied against the
deliberate indifference standard. See id. at 329.
In denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
regarding the individual capacity claims, the Magistrate Judge
first found that for purposes of summary judgment, Sheriff Daniel
and the two deputies all had subjective knowledge that Jacobs posed
a serious risk of suicide throughout her confinement.
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the defendants had
placed Jacobs on some kind of suicide watch, that she remained
classified as being a suicide risk at all relevant times, and that
a reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that they regarded
her as a suicide risk until the moment she killed herself. The
Magistrate Judge found that despite this subjective knowledge, the
defendants:
“(1) placed Jacobs in a detox cell that purportedly
permitted constant observation from the control
room but which in fact had a substantial