FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 1, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 10-8008
BARRY KECK, a/k/a Lonekoyte,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. NO. 09-CR-140-ABJ)
Thomas A. Fleener, Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming, for Appellant.
Stuart S. Healy III, Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher A. Crofts,
United States Attorney, with him on the brief) Office of the United States
Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee.
Before MURPHY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
A federal jury found Barry Keck guilty on eight counts relating to a drug
and money-laundering conspiracy based in Wyoming. Keck now appeals his
conviction, contending the jury’s verdict rests on insufficient evidence and
improper evidentiary decisions by the district court. He also contends the district
court erred in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or the
Guidelines). We find no legal basis to reverse the conviction, and any error in
applying the Guidelines did not affect his sentence.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
Barry Keck was the ringleader of a drug conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine in several Mountain West states. About once a week, he would
travel to Oregon to purchase drugs for distribution in Wyoming, Montana, and
South Dakota. In 2008, agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) began an investigation,
gathering evidence from confidential informants, controlled purchases, physical
and video surveillance, and other sources. They then received authorization from
the district court to intercept calls and text messages sent or received by Keck’s
mobile phone. After monitoring Keck’s phone “seven days a week . . . 15 to 18
hours a day” between November 2008 and January 2009, DEA and DCI agents
intercepted 8,078 calls, 3,181 of which were deemed pertinent to the conspiracy.
In several intercepted calls, Keck discussed distributing methamphetamine
and traveling to Oregon to purchase drugs from a distributor. DEA agents also
recorded Keck negotiating drug prices and involving his 17-year-old daughter in
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drug sales. Finally, on some intercepted calls Keck discussed wire transfers used
as part of the conspiracy.
In 2009, Keck was charged with seven counts relating to a conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and one count related to a
conspiracy to launder money. He pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury,
which convicted him of all counts. After the district court sentenced him to life
imprisonment, Keck timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Keck makes the following contentions on appeal: (1) the jury lacked
sufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the district court made several
evidentiary errors that affected the trial’s outcome; and (3) the district court’s
application of the Guidelines improperly resulted in a sentence of life
imprisonment. We find none of these arguments persuasive, and affirm for the
reasons set forth below.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Keck was convicted of participating in two criminal conspiracies: a
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and a conspiracy to launder money.
He contends the testimony of government witnesses did not adequately provide
direct or circumstantial evidence of either conspiracy. We disagree.
The sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999). On
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appeal, we “ask only whether taking the evidence—both direct and circumstantial,
together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—in the light most
favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do more than raise a
suspicion of guilt. See United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.
1997). In conducting this review, we “may neither weigh conflicting evidence
nor consider the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d
1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted). It is for the
jury, as the fact finder, to resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, and
draw inferences from the facts presented. See United States v. Nieto, 60 F.3d
1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995).
1. Evidence of the Drug Conspiracy
To prove a criminal conspiracy, the government must show: (1) an
agreement with another person to violate the law; (2) knowledge of the essential
objectives of the conspiracy; (3) knowing and voluntary involvement; and
(4) interdependence among the alleged conspirators. United States v. Evans, 970
F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992).
At trial, the government presented the following evidence that Keck
participated in a criminal conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substance Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801–971: (1) a series of wire-tap recordings and intercepted text
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messages in which Keck personally discussed the purchase, transportation, and
redistribution of methamphetamine; (2) his daughter’s testimony about his role in
the conspiracy, including his regular travel to Oregon to purchase drugs; (3) a
DEA agent’s expert and lay testimony regarding the evidence gathered during the
investigation; and (4) drugs seized during the investigation. Altogether, the
evidence easily proves all the elements of criminal conspiracy.
Keck contends the DEA agent’s testimony, “we kind of put it all together in
2008,” is vague and amounts to an admission that the agent did not have personal
knowledge of the methamphetamine conspiracy. R., Vol. 3 at 226. But he was
only referring to the information available at the beginning of the investigation,
before investigators received authorization to monitor Keck’s phone—as his next
sentence indicates. See id. (“We put it all together from 2008 just to start our
investigation . . . for me to officially start the investigation.”) This early
information was gathered over several years from witness interviews, telephone
pin registers, recordings of drug purchases made by a confidential informant, and
other sources. Id. at 224–28.
Keck also suggests the DEA agent could not identify him on the intercepts
because he had no firsthand knowledge of Keck’s voice. In fact, the DEA agent
testified he became familiar with Keck’s voice after “listen[ing] to him every day
for months.” Id. at 235. The thousands of intercepted calls involving Keck
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support this testimony. The DEA agent also stated he was able to link the
recorded voice to Keck through physical surveillance. Id. at 236.
In sum, the record amply demonstrates the DEA agent had personal
knowledge of Keck’s criminal activities. When combined with the telephonic
intercepts, his daughter’s testimony, and the drugs themselves, the evidence was
sufficient to support Keck’s drug conspiracy conviction.
2. Evidence of the Money-Laundering Conspiracy
Keck also challenges the evidence supporting his money-laundering
conviction. The elements of a money-laundering conspiracy require the
government to prove: (1) an agreement with another person to knowingly conduct
a financial transaction involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, with
the intent to further specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956;
(2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the conspiracy; (3) knowing and
voluntary involvement; and (4) interdependence among the alleged conspirators.
See Evans, 970 F.2d at 668; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(I).
The government presented the following evidence in relation to the money-
laundering conspiracy: (1) Western Union and MoneyGram wire-transfer records;
(2) testimony from Western Union and MoneyGram employees that Keck was
involved in wire transfers; (3) the daughter’s testimony that she wired money to
her father as part of the methamphetamine conspiracy, including money from
individuals who owed Keck for previously fronted drugs; and (4) telephonic
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intercepts related to money transfers used in the criminal conspiracy, including a
recorded phone call in which a co-conspirator informs Keck she wired money to
their methamphetamine source to help pay for the drugs that Keck was about to
purchase.
Keck contends that, because the Western Union and MoneyGram
employees could only testify that Keck’s name appeared on money transfer
records, the government failed to provide witness testimony that the transfers
were used for money laundering and drug purchases. This misrepresents the
evidence.
In fact, the government did present witness testimony by the defendant’s
daughter that money transfers were used for drug purchases. Specifically, she
testified she wired money to her father almost every time he traveled to Oregon to
purchase drugs. She also explained she would collect the money she wired to
Oregon from individuals in Wyoming to whom her father had fronted drugs. And
occasionally, her father would instruct her to distribute drugs and then wire the
sale proceeds to him in Oregon. This testimony, which is corroborated by wire-
transfer records and the telephonic intercepts, is sufficient evidence to support
Keck’s conviction for conspiring to launder money.
B. Evidentiary Decisions
Keck next challenges the district court’s decisions to exclude certain
defense exhibits and to admit wire-transfer records. In particular, he claims the
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district court abused its discretion by refusing to permit the use of exhibits
demonstrating how his daughter’s cooperation with the government would reduce
her sentence. Furthermore, he argues the admission of the wire-transfer records
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Both evidentiary decisions,
he alleges, caused reversible error and affected his trial’s outcome.
Evidentiary rulings “generally are committed to the very broad discretion
of the trial judge, and they may constitute an abuse of discretion only if based on
an erroneous conclusion of law, a clearly erroneous finding of fact or a manifest
error in judgment.” Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th
Cir. 1998). Even if the court finds an erroneous evidentiary ruling, a new trial
will be ordered “only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a
party.” Hinds v. General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1049 (10th Cir. 1993).
1. Proposed Exhibits Regarding the Daughter’s Potential Sentence
At trial, Keck sought to undercut his daughter’s testimony by
demonstrating how her cooperation with the government would reduce her
sentence under the Guidelines from 151 months’ imprisonment to 37 months’
imprisonment. He proposed using two exhibits to make this point: the drug
quantity table under USSG §2D1.1, to show how drug quantities correlate to
offense levels, and the sentencing guideline table, to show the prison time she
faced.
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The district court prohibited the use of the exhibits on the grounds of
relevancy, waste of time, and confusion of the jury. The court also held the
exhibits would invade upon its responsibility to instruct the jury concerning the
law. Nonetheless, the court told defense counsel he could “cross examine [Keck’s
daughter] to your heart’s content” about her knowledge of the plea agreement, its
likely impact on her sentence, and any resulting bias. R., Vol 3. at 429.
Furthermore, the court stated that, if defense counsel could demonstrate the
witness was competent on technical sentencing issues, such as safety valve, he
could cross examine her on those topics. In the end, defense counsel chose not to
cross examine her.
We see no abuse of discretion. In light of defense counsel’s broad
opportunity to cross examine the witness, the district court did not err in
prohibiting potentially confusing and time-wasting exhibits. And since defense
counsel chose not to cross examine her, he cannot demonstrate the court’s
evidentiary decision, even if in error, caused prejudice.
2. MoneyGram Records of Wire Transfers
As further evidence of a money-laundering conspiracy, the government
introduced spreadsheets of MoneyGram transactions allegedly involving the
defendant. Keck contends the admission of these spreadsheets denied him a right
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Applying our recent precedent in
United States v. Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d 673, 678–79, (10th Cir. 2011), cert.
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denied, 131 S. Ct. 2172 (2011), we find the spreadsheets are non-testimonial and
admissible as evidence.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.” U.S. C ONST . Amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), the Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause
guarantees a defendant’s right to confront those who “bear testimony” against
him. Under Crawford, out-of-court testimonial statements are inadmissible
“unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.). We have
defined a testimonial statement as “a statement that a reasonable person in the
position of the declarant would objectively foresee might be used in the
investigation or prosecution of a crime.” United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285,
1291 (10th Cir. 2010).
In Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d at 678–79, we considered mobile phone records
similar to the wire-transfer records in this case. We began by observing the
phone records fell under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule, F ED .
R. E VID . 803(b). Id. at 678. We also noted the Supreme Court’s suggestion in
Crawford that business records are, by their nature, non-testimonial and hence not
subject to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 679 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56
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(“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy.”)). After examining the disputed phone records, we concluded they
were not testimonial because they were created for the administration of the
phone company’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact at trial. Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 396 F. App’x 573, 574–75 (11th
Cir. 2010) (unpublished)).
Yeley-Davis controls our analysis in this case, although we recognize an
ambiguity in the testimony authenticating the MoneyGram spreadsheets.
MoneyGram’s records custodian testified that he received the wire-transfer data
in the form of computer-generated Excel worksheets, and that the records were
not altered in any way. But he also testified, “I was asked to put them on one
sheet, and I did . . . [by] cop[ying] the information and past[ing] it.” R., Vol. 3
at 397. This testimony is ambiguous because the word “sheet” could refer to
either (1) a spreadsheet (implying he created a compilation by combining data
from several documents into a new one), or (2) a sheet of paper (implying he
reformatted the document to fit related data together on one page).
Keck contends that, since the records custodian cut and pasted information,
there is no way to know what data were retained or excluded. In response, the
government contends the records custodian only moved data onto different pages
so the government could introduce separate, authenticated exhibits for each
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transaction, and therefore the exhibits, as a whole, contain all the information
originally provided in the computer-generated spreadsheets.
Keck’s argument is foreclosed by Yeley-Davis. Like the phone records in
that case, the records of wire-transfer transactions involving Keck were created
for the administration of MoneyGram’s affairs and not the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact at trial. See Yeley-Davis, 632 F.3d at 679. And since the
underlying wire-transfer data are not testimonial, the records custodian’s actions
in preparing the exhibits do not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation.
Nor do these actions render the spreadsheets inadmissible as evidence. If
the records custodian had created a compilation by copying data from several
spreadsheets into a new document, then that compilation would be admissible as a
summary under Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 While a summary is
admissible only if all the records from which it is drawn are otherwise admissible,
see State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 762 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir.
1985); United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 1999),
Keck’s counsel conceded at oral argument that the original, computer-generated
1
See F ED . R. E VID . 1006 (“The contents of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may
be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or
duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other
parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced
in court.”).
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Excel worksheets were business records for the purpose of the business-record
exception to the hearsay rule.
Alternatively, if the records custodian merely repaginated the data so each
transaction could be admitted as a separate exhibit, then the records would remain
non-testimonial business records under Rule 803(6). See United States v. Ary,
518 F.3d 775, 786–87 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing the business-record hearsay
exception’s requirements). In the context of electronically-stored data, the
business record is the datum itself, not the format in which it is printed out for
trial or other purposes. As the district court concluded,
I do not think that the Government needs to produce the computer
from Minneapolis . . . . The fact that the document was downloaded,
the information was pulled from that file cabinet, and placed on a
tangible spreadsheet for—on a piece of paper, I don’t think that
changes the fact that it is a business record.
R., Vol. 3 at 400.
In any event, Keck cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the
exhibits’ admission. First, even if the Excel spreadsheets were inadmissible, the
data they contained were not. So the records custodian could testify to the data
because they are non-testimonial and fall under the business-record hearsay
exception. Second, the money-laundering conviction did not rest entirely—or
even primarily—on wire-transfer records. These exhibits merely corroborated his
daughter’s uncontested testimony that wire transfers were used as part of a
criminal conspiracy. Because her testimony was sufficient to establish the
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elements of the money-laundering charge, Keck cannot demonstrate that the
evidentiary decision to admit the wire-transfer records affected a substantial right.
In summary, the admission of the MoneyGram spreadsheets did not deny
Keck a right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment because the
spreadsheets were not testimonial. And because the original spreadsheets
constitute business records, the evidence is admissible, either directly under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(b) or as a summary under Federal Rule of Evidence
1006.
C. The Sentencing Guidelines
Finally, Keck contends the district court misapplied the Guidelines by
finding him responsible for a drug quantity over 1.5 kilograms and by applying
upward adjustments on his drug-conspiracy conviction. The government agrees
the district court erred in one respect, by incorrectly calculating the applicable
offense level, but asserts the court’s error was harmless.
We review sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness.
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). To assess whether
a sentence is reasonable, we first “determine whether the district court considered
the applicable Guidelines range, reviewing its legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. A non-harmless error in this calculation entitles
the defendant to a remand for resentencing.” Id. An error is harmless if it “did
not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” United States v.
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Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005). “In non-constitutional
harmless error cases, the government bears the burden of demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the substantial rights of the defendant were
not affected.” United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
1. The District Court’s Drug Quantity Determination
Keck first contends the district court erred in finding him responsible for a
drug quantity of over 1.5 kilograms, even though the jury only convicted him of
conspiring to distribute over 50 grams of drugs.
Our precedents foreclose this argument. We held in United States v.
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005), that “when a district court makes
a determination of sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the now-
advisory Guidelines, it is not bound by jury determinations reached through
application of the more onerous reasonable doubt standard.” Because Magallanez
directly controls, the district court’s drug-quantity determination was not clearly
erroneous in light of the evidence presented at trial.
2. Applicability of the Upward Adjustments
Keck also claims the district court erred when it applied enhancements to
the drug conspiracy offense. We disagree.
We begin with a brief overview of the Guidelines, which set forth a multi-
step process for determining a recommended sentencing range. The Guidelines
are divided into several chapters, each of which constitutes a particular step in the
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process. For example, Chapter Two sets forth specific offenses, while Chapter
Three details upward or downward adjustments, based on considerations such as
obstructing justice or accepting responsibility. The first step in the sentencing
process is to determine the offense section that is applicable to the offense of
conviction, identify the appropriate offense level, and then follow the instructions
contained in the applicable guideline. USSG §1B1.1(a)(1)–(2). The second step
is to apply the adjustments described in Chapter Three. Id. at §1B1.1(a)(3). If
there are multiple counts of convictions, a court should repeat these steps for each
count, grouping the various accounts and adjusting the offense level accordingly.
Id. at §1B1.1(4). Occasionally, in multiple-conviction cases, the offense level of
one offense is determined by reference to a related offense in another guideline;
in these cases, the adjustments ordinarily are also determined in respect to the
referenced guideline. Id. at §1B1.5(c). For example, if a defendant bribed a
public official in order to facilitate a fraud, then the bribery’s offense level would
be equal to the fraud’s offense level, and any enhancement on the bribery offense
for obstructing justice would be based on the underlying fraud. Id. at
§2C1.1(c)(1).
At sentencing, the district court determined Keck’s drug conspiracy
convictions fell under USSG §2D1.1 and his money-laundering conviction fell
under USSG §2S1.1. The offense level for the money-laundering offense is
determined with reference to the offense from which the laundered funds were
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derived, which in this case was the drug conspiracy. USSG §2S1.1(a)(1). But
Application Note 2(C) to §2S1.1 specifies:
Notwithstanding §1B1.5(c) [the general instruction to base
adjustments on the underlying offense], in cases in which subsection
[§2S1.1](a)(1) applies, application of any Chapter Three adjustment
shall be determined based on the offense covered by this guideline
(i.e., the laundering of criminally derived funds) and not the
underlying offense from which the laundering funds were derived.
Accordingly, after calculating Keck’s offense level under Chapter Two, the
district court applied three adjustments under Chapter Three: (1) a two-level
enhancement for the use of a minor under USSG §3B1.4; (2) a four-level
enhancement for being the organizer or leader of a criminal activity under
§3B1.1(a); and (3) a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under
§3C1.1. 2
Keck does not dispute he engaged in conduct described by the
enhancements, but he argues this conduct related only to the drug conspiracy, not
the money laundering. Relying on Application Note 2(C), he contends Chapter
Three adjustments cannot be applied to his drug conspiracy unless the
adjustments related specifically to his money-laundering conviction.
2
USSG §3C1.1 specifies:
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the
defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct, or (ii) a
closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
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We have not previously considered, in the context of multi-offense
convictions involving money laundering, the applicability of enhancements that
are based on other offenses. Thus, whether Application Note 2(C) entirely
prohibits Chapter Three adjustments unless they are based on the money-
laundering offense, or merely prevents the double-counting that would arise if
enhancements were applied to both the underlying crime and the money-
laundering offense, is an open question.
The only circuit to have directly considered this issue has rejected an
interpretation of Application Note 2(C) similar to that proposed by Keck. 3 In
United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222, 226–28 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit
affirmed the sentence of a defendant who, like Keck, received a two-level
increase under §3C1.1 for obstructing justice after being convicted of money
laundering and other offenses. The court rejected “the defendant’s argument that
an application note to a separate guideline implicitly ‘creates an exception’ to
§3C1.1,” because this interpretation “would negate, sub silentio, substantial
portions of an entirely different guideline.” Id. at 228.
3
At this time, the only other federal case considering the meaning of this
provision is United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 440 F.3d 44, 48–49 (1st Cir.
2006), in which the First Circuit, in dicta, arguably adopts Keck’s interpretation.
The court held the enhancement was not applicable but on other grounds. See id.
(holding §3B1.3 was inapplicable because “the money-laundering offense level
was itself determined pursuant to a cross-reference that already required an
upward adjustment based on abuse of trust”). Thus, the focus in Cruzado-
Laureano was on whether the underlying offense affected the role of
enhancements on the money-laundering offense, and not the reverse.
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Instead, the court attempted to harmonize the commentary with the
Guidelines by “treat[ing] references to the ‘offense of conviction’ in §3C1.1 as
references to the offense of money laundering.” Id. So in the context of money
laundering, the court read the adjustment language as follows:
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the [money laundering
offense], and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the
defendant’s [money laundering offense] and any relevant conduct; or
(ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
Id. Because the Byors defendant’s obstruction (A) occurred during the money-
laundering investigation and (B) related to fraud, which was a relevant conduct or
at least an offense that closely related to the money-laundering offense, the court
upheld the application of §3C1.1. Id.
In this case, if the district court had taken the Second Circuit’s approach
during sentencing and considered the Chapter Three adjustments with reference to
the money-laundering conviction, it likely would have reached the same result.
With regard to the obstruction of justice enhancement, Keck’s drug conspiracy
was closely related to the money-laundering offense. Although the other
enhancements do not use §3C1.1’s broad language, but only refer to “the
offense,” see USSG §3B1.1(a) (the adjustment for being the organizer of criminal
activity) and §3B1.4 (the adjustment for using a minor), the record indicates they
would have been appropriate even if they applied only to the money-laundering
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conviction. Because Keck used his daughter, a minor, to wire money, an
adjustment under §3B1.4 would be proper. Likewise, §3B1.1 is applicable, even
under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, because Keck organized a money-
laundering conspiracy involving five or more participants. See R., Vol. 3 at
385–89 (identifying Keck and four other individuals as having sent or received
wire transfers associated with the money-laundering conspiracy).
Nonetheless, we do not adopt wholesale the Second Circuit’s approach.
When applied to enhancements other than USSG §3C1.1, their construction has
the potential of significantly negating the applicability of Chapter Three
adjustments in multi-offense cases. Like the Second Circuit, “we construe the
guideline and its commentary together and seek to harmonize them. If a
harmonizing interpretation is possible, that is the proper one (so long as it does
not violate the Constitution or a federal statute).” See United States v. Pedragh,
225 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2000). But although “[t]he intent of the Sentencing
Commission is demonstrated in part through its commentary,” a district court is
not obliged to follow the explanatory application if it is inconsistent with the
Guidelines. See United States v. Mojica, 214 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000)
(citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993)). Because Chapter
Three adjustments often refer only to “the offense,” substituting “the offense of
money-laundering” would make many of these enhancements inapplicable on
related offenses in some cases. Thus, a defendant convicted of a drug conspiracy
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might receive a substantially lower sentencing recommendation if he or she was
also convicted of money laundering. This paradoxical result is inconsistent with
the Guidelines, which do not articulate a limitation in cases involving money
laundering.
Instead, we interpret Application Note 2(C) as governing only the
applicability of adjustments on money-laundering convictions, as opposed to the
offense calculations of other, related offenses. Thus, the phrase “in cases where
subsection (a)(1) applies” in the application note refers to “money-laundering
convictions whose base offense level are determined by reference to the offense
level of the underlying offense.” Consequently, the sentencing court may still
apply adjustments to other offenses of conviction for conduct relating to those
convictions. This construction maintains consistency between the commentary
and the Guidelines, while also achieving the application note’s goal of preventing
double-counting. See United States v. Arthur, No. 04-CR-122, 2006 WL 3857491
at *2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 22, 2006).
With this construction in mind, the district court did not commit error by
adding eight levels based on Chapter Three adjustments.
3. The Total Offense Level
Keck was convicted of multiple counts, requiring the district court to
separately determine the offense level for each group and apply the greater of the
two. See USSG §1B1.1(d); §3D1.3(a). Instead, the district court calculated a
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total offense level of 46 for Keck’s drug conspiracy group and then improperly
added two levels based on a specific offense characteristic for money laundering.
See R., Vol. 2 at 65.
Although the district court erred in this last step, its calculation of the
offense level for Keck’s drug conspiracy offense was otherwise correct. After
finding Keck’s drug conspiracy offense involved at least 1.5 kilograms of actual
methamphetamine, the district court calculated a base offense level of 38 under
USSG §2D1.1(c)(1). As noted above, the court then applied a two-level
enhancement for the use of a minor under §3B1.4, a four-level enhancement for
being the organizer or leader of a criminal activity under §3B1.1(a), and a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice under §3C1.1. But the court declined
to adopt a two-level increase under §2D1.1(b)(1) for the involvement of
dangerous weapons. Thus, the court reached a final offense level of 46 for the
drug-conspiracy offense.
Keck contends the offense level for his money-laundering conviction under
§2S1.1 should have been 40. But since §3D1.3(a) requires a sentencing court to
apply the greatest of the offense levels when a defendant has multiple
convictions, Keck’s minimum total offense level remains at 46—the properly-
calculated offense level of Keck’s drug-conspiracy conviction.
4. Whether the Error is Harmless
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According to the sentencing table, an offense level of 43 or above results in
an advisory sentence of life imprisonment. Because the district court’s error only
increased Keck’s offense level from 46 to 48, it did not affect Keck’s advisory
sentence.
Before imposing a sentence, the district court noted Keck was “a major
source of methamphetamine for a lengthy period of time in northeast Wyoming,
South Dakota, and Montana.” R., Vol. 3 at 698. The court also observed,
Something really needs to be done to speak clearly about this offense
and the terrible damage that it has done and to allow the law to do its
work by way of deterrence, advising other persons that they would be
foolish to engage in this conduct. And the Court is at a point where,
I have to admit, I am losing patience and have only the guidelines
. . . to turn to for guidance in that respect.
Id. at 699. After concluding Keck “represents a threat to the community should
he be released,” the court found no circumstances to justify a variance and
imposed the recommended sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 700.
Thus, the district court indicated it relied on the Guidelines’ advisory
sentence, based upon (1) the severity of the offense; (2) the necessity to protect
the community and to deter future drug conspiracies; and (3) the lack of
circumstances justifying a variance. See id. And because the sentencing error did
not affect either the advisory sentence or the district court’s reasoning in
imposing a life sentence, it did not affect the court’s selection of the sentence
Keck received. As a result, the sentencing error was harmless.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Keck’s conviction and sentence.
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