UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5004
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES TYLER ALLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:01-cr-00263-JAB-4)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand,
United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Tyler Allen was convicted of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (2006). Allen was sentenced to
seventy-eight months in prison, followed by a five-year term of
supervised release. While on supervised release, Allen violated
two conditions of his supervised release. The district court
revoked Allen’s supervised release term and sentenced him to
thirty-six months in prison. On appeal, Allen contends that the
district court erred in revoking his term of supervised release
because the only evidence supporting the revocation was a law
enforcement officer’s hearsay testimony identifying Allen as
having sold on several occasions a controlled substance to a
confidential informant. We affirm.
We review the district court's decision to revoke a
defendant's supervised release for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999).
The district court need only find a violation of a condition of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S.
694, 700 (2000). The factual determinations informing the
district court’s conclusion that a violation occurred are
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d
1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003). A district court’s evidentiary
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rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and harmless error.
United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010).
A defendant at a supervised release hearing is afforded a
limited right “to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”
Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). The defendant
must, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b),
have the opportunity at a revocation hearing “to question any
adverse witness, unless the court determines that the interest
of justice does not require the witness to appear.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). Under this rule, “the court should
apply a balancing test at the hearing itself when considering
the releasee’s asserted right to cross-examine witnesses” and
should “balance the person’s interest in the constitutionally
guaranteed right to confrontation against the government’s good
cause for denying it.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 advisory
committee’s note (2002).
Here, the district court admitted over Allen’s
objection hearsay evidence concerning a confidential informant’s
and a law enforcement official’s observations during controlled
purchases of narcotics, and their identification of Allen as the
person who sold the drugs. In doing so, the district court
failed to assess, under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C), whether the
admission of the evidence was in the interest of justice.
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However, our review of the record convinces us that admission of
the hearsay evidence for purposes of assessing whether Allen
committed the charged violations was harmless. The district
court had ample grounds for revoking Allen’s supervised release,
including Allen’s admissions during the execution of a search
warrant at his residence, which substantially corroborated the
hearsay testimony concerning Allen’s identification and drug
dealing efforts. Thus, we find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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