FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 06 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SVEN E. SAMPSON, No. 10-35718
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05329-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 6, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and GONZALEZ,
Chief District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief District Judge for the United
States District Court, Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
Appellant Sven E. Sampson (Sampson) challenges the district court’s
decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Sampson’s
application for disability insurance benefits.
1. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered the Veterans
Administration’s (VA’s) disability rating and gave specific and legitimate reasons,
supported by substantial evidence for giving less weight to the VA’s disability
rating. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
an ALJ may disagree with the VA’s disability determination when giving
“persuasive, specific, [and] valid reasons” supported by the record).
2. The ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence and sufficiently explained
her rejection of the treating physicians’ opinions. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d
1393, 1394-1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that all evidence need not be
discussed in the ALJ’s decision; the ALJ must simply “explain why significant
probative evidence has been rejected”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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3. Because the ALJ properly rejected the treating physicians’ opinions, any
error in rejecting the Global Assessment of Function (GAF) scores was harmless,
since the scores alone would not establish disability. See Tommasetti v. Astrue,
533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing harmless error).
4. Stating specific and legitimate reasons to support her conclusion that the
claimant’s testimony was not entirely credible, the ALJ sufficiently substantiated
her adverse credibility determination. See Tomasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039.
5. The ALJ properly determined Sampson’s residual functional capacity (RFC)
from the medical expert’s testimony as corroborated by evidence from the medical
records. Because the ALJ’s hypothetical to the Vocational Expert (VE)
encompassed the RFC and the VE identified available jobs in the national and local
economy, the ALJ’s finding of no disability was supported by substantial evidence.
See Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that if the
RFC allows the claimant to adjust to work existing in the economy he is not
disabled).
AFFIRMED.
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