UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5259
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID LEE GLENN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-01327-GRA-1)
Submitted: June 17, 2011 Decided: July 8, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, E. Jean Howard, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Lee Glenn was sentenced to 300 months in prison
following his conviction of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (d) (2006). Glenn now appeals his sentence,
contending that the district court did not adequately explain
why it rejected his plea for a lower sentence. We affirm.
According to Glenn’s presentence investigation report
(PSR), his base offense level was 20. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(a) (2009). Two levels were added
because the property of a federal financial institution was
taken. See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(1). Three levels were added because
Glenn brandished a dangerous weapon. See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E).
Glenn’s adjusted offense level was 25. (J.A. vol. 2).
Glenn was a career offender. See USSG § 4B1.1(a).
The maximum statutory penalty for armed bank robbery is twenty-
five years. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). Accordingly, Glenn’s offense
level as a career offender was 34. See USSG § 4B1.1(b)(B).
Because this was higher than the level calculated under USSG
§ 2B3.1, Glenn’s offense level was 34. See id. His criminal
history category was VI. See id. Taking into account the
statutory maximum of twenty-five years, Glenn’s advisory
Guidelines range was 262-300 months.
At sentencing, defense counsel agreed that the
calculations in the PSR were correct. The court rejected
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Glenn’s request that he receive an adjustment based on
acceptance of responsibility. Glenn then asked for a below-
Guidelines sentence based on his having been a productive member
of society who had met his job and family responsibilities.
After hearing from Glenn, the court sentenced him to
300 months in prison. In imposing sentence, the court stated
that it had considered the advisory Guidelines as well as the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors. According to the
court, the chosen sentence reflected the seriousness of Glenn’s
offense and provided just punishment for that offense.
Additionally, the sentence took into account Glenn’s criminal
history and the need to protect the public and to deter future
criminal conduct.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). In conducting our review, we first examine the
sentence for “significant procedural error,” including “failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence. . . .” Id. In imposing sentence, the district
court must provide an “individualized assessment” based upon the
specific facts before it. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
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325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). A sentence within the properly
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. See
United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
Assuming that the sentence is procedurally reasonable,
we then “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. At this stage, we “take into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Here, the district court correctly calculated Glenn’s
advisory Guidelines range, performed an individualized
assessment of the § 3553(a) factors as they applied to the case,
and stated in open court the reasons for the selected sentence.
Glenn’s sentence, which falls within his correctly calculated
Guidelines range of 262-300 months, is presumptively reasonable.
We reject Glenn’s contention that his sentence is
unreasonable because the court did not specifically address his
request for a below-Guidelines sentence. “Where a [sentencing]
matter is . . . conceptually simple . . . and the record makes
clear that the sentencing court considered the evidence and
arguments,” extensive explanation of the sentence is not
required. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007). Nor
is it necessary that the sentencing court address every
§ 3553(a) factor on the record, United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006), or respond to “each and every
argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a
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reasonable sentence.” United States v. Jarilla-Luna, 478 F.3d
1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007).
We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Glenn to 300 months in prison.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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