In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-3063
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
D ANIEL L ITTLEDALE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 07 CR 00447—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
A RGUED A PRIL 5, 2011—D ECIDED JULY 12, 2011
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and B AUER, Circuit
Judge, and Y OUNG, District Judge.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. Daniel Littledale pleaded guilty
to distributing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) but reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
The Honorable Richard L. Young, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, sitting
by designation.
2 No. 10-3063
I. BACKGROUND
In early 2007, agents from the Department of Homeland
Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
discovered that an individual in Illinois was using the
username “neodmoney” to send and receive images of
child pornography. Upon further investigation, they
learned that the username was associated with an
address in Hanover Park where Richard Ahrens, Dale
Ahrens (Richard’s brother), and Cynthia Littledale resided.
Special Agent Jennifer Sapper prepared a federal
warrant for the residence. The operational plan
associated with this warrant indicated that Richard was
the target of the investigation and believed to be
“neodmoney” because (1) he lived in the house; (2) he
attempted suicide in 2002; and (3) ICE has found that
individuals who possess and distribute child pornography
are predominately male. The operational plan also as-
signed ICE agents to interview Richard, Cynthia, and
other individuals the agents expected to encounter
during the search; no agent was assigned to interview
Daniel Littledale, Cynthia’s twenty-year-old son, because
ICE agents did not yet know he resided in the home.
When ICE agents executed the search warrant, Cynthia
Littledale informed them that Daniel Littledale lived in
the house and that he attended school at the College
of DuPage. Because it is ICE’s practice to interview all
occupants of the home, Agent Sapper immediately dis-
patched Agents Demetrius Flowers and Timothy Morris
to the college. The purpose of interviewing all residents
of a household is to (1) learn the passwords on the com-
No. 10-3063 3
puters, if any; (2) identify individuals who had access
to the computers, saw child pornography on the com-
puters, or saw another person view child pornography
on the computers; and (3) rule out from suspicion those
individuals who reside in the home but who have not
possessed or viewed child pornography.
Agents Flowers and Morris were met by campus
police officers when they arrived at the College
of DuPage. The officers were in uniform and car-
rying holstered weapons, but the agents wore blue
jeans and T-shirts, one of which read “Special Agent.” At
this time, the agents did not consider Littledale to be
a suspect.
Upon arriving at Littledale’s classroom, a campus
police officer informed Littledale’s professor, “We need
Mr. Littledale.” Littledale then left the classroom and
stood in the hallway while Agent Flowers introduced
everyone and asked Littledale if he would agree
to speak with them in a private office located within
the campus police station. They did so because other
people were in the hallway, Littledale’s class was ad-
journing soon, and the agents thought Littledale might
appreciate discussing child pornography outside the
presence of his peers. Littledale consented. During the
short walk to the campus police station, the agents
chatted with the defendant about school. They did not
draw their weapons, handcuff Littledale, physically
touch or threaten to touch Littledale, or search Littledale
or his backpack. They used a monotone tone of voice,
and they testified that Littledale appeared calm.
4 No. 10-3063
The private office in which the agents interviewed
Littledale contained a desk, a computer, and other
personal items; it was not an interrogation room or an
interview room. Littledale sat behind the desk, the
agents sat opposite him, and the officers waited outside
in the hallway. The door was either mostly or completely
shut.
Agent Flowers began the interview by assuring
Littledale that he was not under arrest and that he was
not in any trouble. The agent then told Littledale that
other ICE agents were executing a search warrant at his
home and that they would like to ask Littledale some
questions. Littledale again agreed to speak to the agents.
Approximately twenty-five minutes later, Littledale
admitted that he had seen child pornography on the
guest bedroom computer, that he had been sending
and receiving child pornography for about five or six
years, and that his username was “neodmoney” and
his password was “blackrose.” Agent Flowers then
read Littledale his Miranda rights and prepared a state-
ment of rights form, with the words “I was taken
into custody” scratched out. Littledale signed the form.
He then confessed again, adding that his mother had
caught him looking at child pornography in the past.
Littledale also agreed to prepare a written statement
and to initial images of child pornography that he remem-
bered seeing or downloading. When the interview con-
cluded, Littledale was not placed under arrest, and he
walked out of the police station unescorted and with
his backpack.
No. 10-3063 5
Littledale moved to suppress all statements that he
made before and after he was read his Miranda rights.
The district court denied this motion and held that
Littledale was never in custody and that the agents were
thus never required to read him his Miranda rights.
Littledale then pleaded guilty, but reserved his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The
judge sentenced him to 96 months in prison and 20 years
of supervised release.
II. DISCUSSION
Littledale appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. We review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear
error. United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir.
2010).
A. Littledale Was Not in Custody
Law enforcement officers must advise suspects of
their constitutional right to remain silent and to have
counsel present before subjecting them to custodial inter-
rogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1996).
An interrogation is custodial when “a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
The pertinent question is whether, given the totality of
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004). The
6 No. 10-3063
inquiry is objective, and relevant factors include whether
the encounter occurred in a public place; whether the
suspect consented to speak with the officers; whether
the officers informed the individual that he was not
under arrest and was free to leave; whether the
individual was moved to another area; whether there
was a threatening presence of several officers and a
display of weapons or physical force; and whether the
officers’ tone of voice was such that their requests
were likely to be obeyed.1 United States v. Snodgrass, 635
F.3d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 2011).
Applying these factors to this case, we find that
Littledale was not in custody at the time of his confes-
sion. Littledale twice consented to be interviewed, there
was no display of force or physical touching, the officers
and agents used a monotone tone of voice, and even
though the agents did not tell Littledale that he was
free to leave, they did assure him that he was not
1
The Supreme Court recently held that a minor’s age is
relevant in the custody analysis, “so long as the child’s age
was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or
would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.”
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-11121, 2011 WL 2369508, *9 (U.S.
June 16, 2011). Littledale was not a minor. While he has
Asperger’s Syndrome, the Supreme Court has not indicated
that this is a relevant factor in the custody analysis. Neverthe-
less, to the extent J.D.B. applies, we note that nothing in the
record indicates that Littledale’s mental health condition
was known to the agents or officers at the time of the inter-
view or that it was objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.
No. 10-3063 7
under arrest. Additionally, although the officers carried
holstered weapons, neither the officers nor the agents
physically touched, threatened to touch, or handcuffed
Littledale.
Finally, although the interview took place in the
campus police station, this fact is not dispositive. Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (stating that
Miranda rights are not required “simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because
the questioned person is one whom the police suspect”).
The relevant inquiry is still whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave. Here, Littledale
was led to a private office in the campus police station
(not an interrogation room or an interview room), he
twice consented to be interviewed in the office space,
he was not a suspect at the time the agents led him to
the office, and the agents brought Littledale to a more
private space only because they wanted to avoid dis-
cussing child pornography in front of Littledale’s peers.
These facts, along with the agents’ conduct described
above, lead us to conclude that under the totality of
circumstances a reasonable person would have felt free
to leave. We therefore affirm the district court’s holding
that Littledale was not in custody and that the agents
were not required to read him his Miranda rights.
8 No. 10-3063
B. The District Court Never Made a “Deliberateness”
Finding
The government argues that even if Littledale was in
custody, the agents did not conduct a two-step inter-
view—otherwise known as the “question first, Mirandize
later” tactic—in violation of Missouri v. Seibert. 542 U.S. 600
(2004). There can be no finding of an improper two-step
interrogation, however, unless the officers deliberately
withheld Miranda warnings until after the suspect con-
fessed. United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Whether officers deliberately used a two-step interroga-
tion method designed to circumvent Miranda is a factual
inquiry that we review only for clear error. Stewart,
536 F.3d at 719. Here, the district court never made a
deliberateness finding. It did not do so because, after
finding that Littledale was not in custody, the district
court was not required to address the government’s
alternative arguments. Because we are not in the bus-
iness of finding facts, we decline to address this argu-
ment any further.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the district
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.
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