Pabon v. Mahanoy

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________

No. 08-1536
_______________

ANGEL PABON,
Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT S.C.I. MAHANOY;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-04199)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
_______________

Argued September 23, 2010
_______________

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO
and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
 (Opinion filed: July 12, 2011)

Elayne C. Bryn, Esquire (Argued)
1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Suite 1230
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellant

Thomas W. Dolgenos, Esquire
Anne Palmer, Esquire (Argued)
Office of the District Attorney
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellees
_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

I. OVERVIEW

Angel Pabon appeals the District Court‟s dismissal of
his pro se petition for habeas corpus as untimely. He is
serving consecutive life sentences for two related murder
convictions in Pennsylvania state court. He concedes that his
federal habeas petition was not timely under the one-year
statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but
contends that equitable tolling should be granted.

2
Specifically, Pabon maintains that his inability to speak, read,
or write English, coupled with the prison‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials and repeated denials of translation
assistance, are extraordinary circumstances that prevented
him from timely filing his habeas petition despite diligent
efforts to pursue his federal claims.

The District Court dismissed Pabon‟s habeas petition
as untimely and denied equitable tolling. We granted a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) on that issue. We
subsequently issued an order staying oral argument due to a
potential defect in our COA, as it had not addressed whether
Pabon had made a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” a jurisdictional prerequisite before a
COA may issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Our jurisdiction turns
on whether the trial court may have committed a Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause violation under Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), by allowing a non-
testifying codefendant‟s confession to be admitted into
evidence despite its potential to prejudice Pabon‟s defense.

We conclude that Pabon has made a substantial
showing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation may
have been violated. On the equitable tolling issue, we hold
that the facts Pabon alleges regarding his language inability
(if true), coupled with the prison system‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials or interpreters, would be
extraordinary circumstances. We also hold that Pabon
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims. Thus,
we reverse the District Court‟s ruling that Pabon was not
reasonably diligent, vacate its order of dismissal, and remand
for an evidentiary hearing on the factual issue of whether
Pabon faced the extraordinary circumstances he claims.

3
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

The back-story begins with Elias Pagan, a drug dealer
who in 1997 controlled the corner of Eighth and Birch Streets
in Philadelphia. Six men who worked for Pagan were
involved in the crime at issue or the subsequent trial: Carlos
Robles (“Guatauba”), Arisbel Ortiz, George Roman, José
DeJesus, Jonathan Hernandez, and the petitioner, Pabon.
Aileen Centeno, Pagan‟s common-law wife, lived with him
and knew these men.

On March 18, 1997, Felix Vargas, a member of a rival
drug group, shot and injured Guatauba, who vowed to kill
Vargas. Elias Pagan witnessed the shooting and told
Guatauba that he would pay him if he killed Vargas. On May
30, 1997, Guatauba, Ortiz, Roman, Hernandez, DeJesus,
Pabon and Centeno were present at Pagan‟s home when plans
were made to kill Vargas later that night. Around 10:30 p.m.,
Ortiz reported to Pagan that he had found Vargas, and Pagan
told Ortiz to come to Pagan‟s house with his car. At the
house, Pagan provided the men with guns and black ski
masks to wear during the planned shooting.1 Pagan
distributed three weapons: AK-47 rifles for Guatauba and
DeJesus, and a handgun for Hernandez. Pabon was not
provided a weapon. His confession, later taken by
Philadelphia police, states that he already possessed a 9mm
handgun that he used in the shooting.

1
Pabon is the only member of the group that was not alleged
to have worn a mask.

4
 After leaving Pagan‟s house, Ortiz drove his car to the
intersection of Franklin and Indiana Streets, blocking the
parked car in which Vargas was sitting. Guatauba allegedly
was in the front passenger seat of Ortiz‟s car, while DeJesus,
Pabon and Hernandez were in the back seat. Wearing their
ski masks, Guatauba and two or three other men2 got out of
Ortiz‟s car and started shooting at Vargas. He was killed
immediately and a bystander, Elizabeth Carrisquilla, was also
fatally shot. Two other female bystanders, both on Franklin
Street, were shot but survived their injuries.

At trial, a ballistics expert testified that there were five
firearms involved in the attack: two AK-47s, two 9mm semi-
automatic handguns, and one .45 caliber handgun.
Prosecutors contended that the assailants used four of those
guns. The fifth gun, one of the two 9mm handguns, was used
to shoot at the assailants by an unknown person who was
never identified. A shot from that fifth gun injured Ortiz,
who drove away with some of the other shooters, purportedly
leaving Pabon and the other remaining shooter behind to flee
on foot.

Back at Pagan‟s house on Birch Street, Pagan told
Centeno to give two bundles of $2,500 each to Guatauba in
payment for the murder. Guatauba kept one bundle and gave
the other to DeJesus. A few days later, Pabon went with
Pagan and Centeno and their kids, along with Hernandez and
Roman, to Wildwood, New Jersey, for one week. On

2
There was confusion at trial regarding how many shooters
there were. Witnesses saw three shooters, all wearing masks.
However, the prosecution alleged that there were four
shooters, one of whom was not wearing a mask (Pabon).

5
returning to Philadelphia, Pabon was shot in an unrelated
incident. After being released from the hospital, he stayed
with Pagan for a few days and then went to his home town in
Puerto Rico.

Police arrested Pabon in Puerto Rico on charges
related to the murders of Vargas and the bystander,
Carrisquilla, and read him his Miranda rights in Spanish.
After his extradition to Philadelphia, Philadelphia Police
interrogated him in Spanish.3 Pabon ultimately gave a
confession, conducted in Spanish but translated into English
by Detective Perez, in which he admitted to dealing drugs and
to being one of the shooters in the attack on Vargas.

B. The Structure of Pabon’s Joint Trial

The Philadelphia DA‟s Office, on behalf of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, prosecuted Pabon jointly
with four codefendants for the murders of Vargas and
Carrisquilla. His codefendants were: (1) Pagan, alleged to
have planned and paid for the killing but not to have been one
of the shooters; (2) Centeno, Pagan‟s common-law wife who
the DA claimed was involved in the conspiracy to murder
Vargas; (3) DeJesus, an alleged shooter; and (4) Hernandez,
an alleged shooter.

3
Pabon has maintained from the time of his arrest that he
reads, writes, and understands only Spanish. Detective Carlos
Perez (who speaks Spanish) asked Pabon “[D]o you read,
write and understand English?” Pabon‟s answer was “no.”
Detective Perez then questioned Pabon in Spanish and
answers were recorded by Detective John McDermott in
English.

6
 Guatauba, also believed to be one of the shooters, was
not apprehended by authorities at the time of trial. Ortiz, the
purported driver, accepted a plea deal to avoid the death
penalty and testified for the Commonwealth. Roman, a
member of the drug group who was not involved in the
shooting, also testified for the Commonwealth as part of a
cooperation agreement regarding a different murder charge.

Judge Jane Greenspan presided over the joint jury trial.
Each of the five defendants was represented by his or her own
defense counsel. All of the defense attorneys moved for
severance, but their motions were denied. The defense
attorneys later moved for recusal of Judge Greenspan based
on remarks made by her during voir dire, but those motions
also were denied. Pabon used a court translator for pre-trial
hearings and during the trial.

The Commonwealth‟s decision to introduce
confessions given by several of the non-testifying
codefendants raised the potential for violations of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution. Thus, the trial transcript reflects negotiated,
line-by-line edits to these confessions, made by Judge
Greenspan in discussion with prosecutors and several of the
defense attorneys.

Pabon‟s court-appointed counsel in this habeas appeal
points to one passage in DeJesus‟s statement as a Bruton
violation. The relevant portion of his statement reads:

Question: José, is there anything
you would like to add to your
statement? Answer, Yeah. I know
that I didn‟t shoot the girl who got

7
 killed. Another should be
arrested for this. He paid it off.
He even gave me the Grand
National for helping to do this
besides the money that Guatauba
paid me.

(N.T. 8/2/99: 44) (emphasis added). The statement referred
to Pagan, who employed the other men and was alleged to
have paid for the killings. Pagan‟s attorney objected, asking
that the statement be limited to “I know that I didn‟t shoot the
girl who got killed” to avoid a violation of his client‟s Sixth
Amendment rights. The Commonwealth argued that the
statement should not be redacted because it did not name
Pagan explicitly. Ultimately, his attorney and the DA agreed
to limit the statement to “I know that I didn‟t shoot the girl
who got killed. Another should be arrested for this.” Pabon‟s
claim that this redacted statement, in the context of the trial,
violated his Confrontation Clause rights is discussed in part
III.B below.

C. Evidence Admitted at Trial

In addition to Pabon and DeJesus‟s confessions,
several of Pabon‟s codefendants gave statements to the police
that were introduced at trial. Pagan‟s initial statement to the
police implicated Guatauba, Hernandez, DeJesus and Ortiz in
the murder, but did not implicate Pabon. However, Roman,
who was not a codefendant but was part of the drug group,
testified at trial that Pabon was involved in the conspiracy to
kill Vargas, participated in the shooting, and fled
Philadelphia. Ortiz, the driver, testified that he drove Pabon
to the shooting, but he did not know if all of the men fired
weapons when they got out of his car. Roman and Ortiz‟s

8
testimony both conflicted with their past statements to the
police.4

Eyewitnesses at the scene saw a car fitting the
description of Ortiz‟s car. They saw three males get out of
the car, one from the driver‟s side and two from the
passenger‟s side. All three were wearing black clothes and
face masks.5 No eyewitness placed Pabon at the scene of the
crime. Eyewitnesses testified that on returning to Birch Street
after the murder, three males—identified as Ortiz, Hernandez,
and Guatauba—got out of the car. Another witness testified
that she saw Pagan, Centeno, Hernandez, and Guatauba
celebrating after the shooting, but did not see Pabon. One
witness testified about Pabon‟s involvement in drug dealing
but did not link him to the shooting.

Pabon‟s confession was the Commonwealth‟s
strongest evidence against him at trial. In his statement to
Philadelphia police, he admitted to dealing drugs, having a
9mm handgun for protection, and participating in the

4
Like Pagan, Roman did not implicate Pabon in his initial
statement to the police, although he did implicate Guatauba,
DeJesus, Hernandez, and Pagan in the shooting. Roman later
testified against Pabon after taking a plea deal regarding a
different homicide. Ortiz, who also pled guilty to avoid the
death penalty, had previously stated that Guatauba and
DeJesus got out of the car and shot Vargas, making no
mention of Pabon.
5
The prosecution‟s theory was that a fourth man (Pabon) got
out of the car but did so after the witnesses had ducked for
cover. They also argued that Ortiz, the driver, never had a
gun and thus it was likely that he did not get out of the car.

9
shooting. It also states: “While I was shooting at [Vargas], I
heard [Ortiz] holler I am shot. I look at [Ortiz]. He was
holding his head. The way his car was parked, I knew the
shot that hit [Ortiz] came from Franklin Street, so I started
firing in that direction.”

At trial, Pabon attempted to repudiate his confession.
He presented testimony from a forensic document examiner
that the signature on his confession was unlikely his own.
Pabon also argued that there was no new information
provided in his statement that the police did not already
know. Additionally, he pointed out that questions commonly
asked in such interviews, to which the police would not have
known the answers, were not asked in Pabon‟s interrogation.6
In rebuttal, however, the DA presented its own document
examiner who testified that the signature on the confession
was likely Pabon‟s. During deliberations, the jury requested
to see, in their words, Pabon‟s “alleged confession.” Judge
Greenspan informed them they could only have it read to
them and see only the signatures.7

6
For example, the question “what was the last grade you
completed” appeared in DeJesus‟s confession, but not
Pabon‟s.
7
Pabon‟s confession and the testimony of the two co-
conspirators who became state‟s witnesses, Roman and Ortiz,
were the primary evidence that put Pabon at the scene of the
crime. The DA‟s limited physical evidence consisted of
Pabon‟s fingerprints on the outside of Ortiz‟s car. The DA
argued that Pabon‟s own confession explains why
eyewitnesses did not see him after the crime: after they killed
Vargas, it states, “[Ortiz] then took off in his car down

10
 D. Pabon’s Conviction and State Court Appeals

At trial, the jury found Pabon guilty on all counts but
could not agree on a sentence. Judge Greenspan imposed two
consecutive life sentences for the murders of Vargas and
Carisquilla, six to 20 years for conspiracy, concurrent terms
of five to 20 years for each aggravated assault conviction, one
to two years for possessing an instrument of crime, and one to
two years for reckless endangerment.

Pabon‟s appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
raised six substantive issues, including the Bruton issue into
which we now make a threshold inquiry. The Superior Court
adopted an opinion written by Judge Greenspan as its own
and affirmed Pabon‟s convictions. Commonwealth v. Pabon,
768 A.2d 886 (Pa. Super. 2002). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court then denied Pabon‟s petition for allowance of appeal.

Pabon timely filed a pro se petition pursuant to the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Sondra Rodrigues
was appointed counsel and filed an amended petition and
memorandum of law. The PCRA Court, in an opinion written
by Judge Greenspan, dismissed the petition on the merits
without a hearing.

Pabon appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
which affirmed the PCRA Court‟s dismissal in an
unpublished decision. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
again denied allowance of appeal. Pabon‟s subsequent

Indiana [Street] with two guys, then I ran. We went to Birch
Street.” It also stated that he changed his clothes in an
abandoned house down the street and did not return to the
area.

11
petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court.

E. Pabon’s Pro Se Habeas Petition in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania

Pabon filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus with
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
September 20, 2007 and it was received by the Court on
October 5, 2007.8 The District Court referred the matter to a
Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”). It concluded that Pabon‟s petition was filed ten
months after AEDPA‟s one-year statutory deadline and was
therefore time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The R&R also
concluded that there was no basis for equitable tolling of the
limitations period.

Pabon filed hand-written objections to the R&R,
arguing that he was entitled to have the time for filing
equitably tolled because he does not read, write or speak
English and he was repeatedly denied access to Spanish
language materials or a translator while in prison. The Court
overruled Pabon‟s objections, adopted the R&R, and
dismissed the habeas petition as untimely. Pabon filed a
timely notice of appeal in our Court and, subsequently, an
application for a COA.

We granted the COA on “whether the habeas petition
was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), including the
8
The federal “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that a
document is deemed filed on the date it is given to prison
officials for mailing. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113
(3d Cir. 1998).

12
question whether there is a basis for equitably tolling the
limitations period.” We later issued an order staying oral
argument, however, pending resolution of a possible
jurisdictional defect in the COA. The order directed the
parties to brief whether Pabon had made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required by
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

That jurisdictional issue and Pabon‟s equitable tolling
claim are now before us. We conclude that Pabon has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
based on the alleged Bruton violation. Pabon‟s codefendant
DeJesus‟s redacted confession, when combined with Pabon‟s
own confession and the limited number of codefendants
allegedly involved in the shooting, may have created a
damaging inference that DeJesus was accusing Pabon of
being a shooter in the crime and violated Pabon‟s Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against
him.

Further, we hold that Pabon is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his equitable tolling claim. The
District Court misinterpreted the evidence before it, stating
that Pabon had access to a Spanish speaking attorney when in
fact he did not. Pabon‟s claim that he does not speak, read, or
write in English exceeds the initial showing of extraordinary
circumstances required by two other Courts of Appeals. See
Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008), and Mendoza v.
Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). He has also shown a
significant degree of due diligence—including reaching out to
an attorney he thought spoke Spanish (who did not) and
requesting translation assistance multiple times despite the
prison‟s repeated denials. While there is not enough evidence
in the record to determine whether Pabon‟s language

13
deficiency actually caused the delay in bringing his habeas
claim, an evidentiary hearing is warranted.

III. JURISDICTION

A. Standard of Review

Before a circuit court may rule on an appeal from a
district court, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus
relief must obtain a COA as a “jurisdictional pre-requisite.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)). Slack v. McDaniel, interpreting §
2253(c), clarifies that when a district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of
the underlying constitutional claim, as here, a COA may issue
only if the petitioner shows that: (1) “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling;” and (2) “jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

An appellate court‟s “COA determination under §
2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas
petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 336. This is a “limit[ed],” “threshold inquiry”
that “does not require full consideration of the factual or legal
bases adduced in support of the claims.” Id.9 In Miller-El,

9
The Commonwealth argues that we should use the AEDPA
standard for deciding the merits of habeas claims brought by
state prisoners in our COA determination. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court”
must have “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

14
the Supreme Court “reiterate[d] that a prisoner seeking a
COA need only demonstrate „a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.‟” Id. at 327 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2)). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court‟s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Id. (citing Slack,
529 U.S. at 484). While a state prisoner must show
“„something more than the absence of frivolity‟ or the
existence of mere „good faith‟ on his or her part,” he or she is
not required “to prove, before the issuance of a COA, that
some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus.
Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of
reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the
case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not
prevail.” Id. at 338 (internal citation omitted).

Federal law” for relief to be granted). This attempt to raise
our standard of review at the COA stage is precisely what the
Supreme Court rejected in Miller-El. It noted that the Fifth
Circuit Court had used “too demanding a standard on more
than one level.” 537 U.S. at 341. “It was incorrect for the
Court of Appeals” to import the standard from § 2254(d)(2),
as it “applies to the granting of habeas relief rather than to the
granting of a COA.” Id. at 341-42. It was also “incorrect for
an even more fundamental reason. Before the issuance of a
COA, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to resolve the
merits of petitioner‟s constitutional claims . . . . Deciding the
substance of an appeal in what should only be a threshold
inquiry undermines the concept of a COA. The question is
the debatability of the underlying constitution claim, not the
resolution of that debate.” Id. at 342.

15
 We determined in our initial COA that reasonable
jurists could dispute the District Court‟s dismissal of Pabon‟s
habeas petition as untimely filed, also noting that the Second
and Ninth Circuit Courts have concluded that there may be a
basis for equitably tolling AEDPA‟s limitations period due to
severe language barriers. See Diaz, 515 F.3d 149; Mendoza,
449 F.3d 1065. We now decide that the second jurisdictional
requirement, a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, has been met.

B. Pabon’s Confrontation Clause Claim

Pabon claims that the introduction at trial of the
confession of DeJesus, Pabon‟s non-testifying codefendant,
violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right
under Bruton. To resolve whether this claim is debatable,
we make a threshold inquiry regarding the application of
Bruton and its progeny to Pabon‟s trial and conviction.
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

1. Bruton and Progeny

Trials with multiple defendants create opportunities for
violations of the Sixth Amendment right of cross-
examination. Bruton held that, in a joint trial, a defendant‟s
right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
is violated by introducing a non-testifying codefendant‟s
confession that implicates the defendant as a participant in the
crime. Such statements violate the Sixth Amendment even
when the jury is explicitly instructed that the testimony at
issue is only to be considered as evidence against the

16
codefendant.10 This is because jurors in joint trials cannot be
expected to “perform the overwhelming task of considering”
a codefendant‟s confession “in determining the guilt or
innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in
determining the guilt or innocence of any codefendants . . . .”
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131.11 In these circumstances, jury
instructions are “intrinsically ineffective” because the
inadmissible confession “cannot be wiped from the brains of
the jurors.” Id. at 129.

The Supreme Court elaborated on Bruton‟s core
holding in a case issued the same day, Cruz v. New York, 481
U.S. 186, 194 (1987). When a defendant‟s confession
substantially “interlocks” with the non-testifying
codefendant‟s confession, this exacerbates the potential for a
Bruton violation rather than rectifying it. Id. at 192. This is
because it is not the reliability of the codefendant‟s
confession that is at issue in Bruton situations, but the
likelihood that the jury is not able to disregard it. Id. at 192-
93. The more “interlocking” the codefendant‟s confession,
10
“Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a
joint trial is not considered to be a witness „against‟ a
defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony
only against a codefendant.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.
200, 206 (1987). This is based on the “assumption . . . that
jurors follow their instructions.” Id. Bruton provides a
narrow exception to that assumption.
11
As Justice Stewart wrote in his oft-quoted concurrence in
Bruton, those statements “are at once so damaging, so
suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be
trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves.” Id. at 138.

17
the less likely jurors will be capable of putting it out of their
minds in deciding the defendant‟s guilt or innocence. Id.
Thus, while a “codefendant‟s confession will be relatively
harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from
that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, [it
would be] enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential
respects, the defendant‟s alleged confession.” Id. at 192. The
damage to the defendant might be less “devastating” “if [he]
were standing by his confession . . . .” Id. (emphasis in
original). However, “in the real world of criminal litigation,
[when] the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession,” the
damage is significant, like that in Bruton. Id. (emphasis in
original).

Two subsequent cases addressed the thorny issue of
redacted statements of non-testifying codefendants. In
Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that when “any reference
to [the defendant‟s] existence” has been removed and the
confession “bec[omes incriminating] only when linked with
evidence introduced later at trial,” limiting instructions may
cure what would otherwise be a Bruton violation. 481 U.S.
200, 211, 208 (1987). While the testimony in Bruton directly
named the defendant, in Richardson “the confession was not
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked
with” the defendant‟s testimony. Id. at 208. The Court noted
that “[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a
less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the
instruction to disregard the evidence.” Id.

However, the distinction between directly naming a
codefendant and indirect linkage is not rigid. Even redacted
confessions that remove the defendant‟s name completely,
using a blank space or neutral pronoun instead, may
sometimes violate Bruton. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 189

18
(1998). “Redactions that simply replace a name with an
obvious blank space or a word such as „deleted‟ or a symbol
or other similarly obvious indications of alteration . . . so
closely resemble Bruton‟s unredacted statements that . . . the
law must require the same result.” Id. at 192. An “obvious
deletion” is likely to “call the jurors‟ attention specifically to
the removed name” and may “overemphasize the importance
of the confession‟s accusation.” Id. at 193. Jury instructions
are likely to exacerbate the situation, as the instruction itself
“will provide an obvious reason for the [redaction].” Id.

In limiting Richardson, Gray noted that “inference
[connecting a codefendant‟s statement to the defendant] pure
and simple cannot make the critical difference” between a
Bruton violation and permissible testimony under
Richardson. Id. at 195. It is the “kind of, not the simple fact
of, inference” that might lead a jury to infer that testimony
incriminated a codefendant in some redacted statements but
not others. Id. at 196 (emphases in original). Thus, context is
relevant to determining whether a Bruton violation has
occurred, regardless whether the challenged testimony has
been redacted or curative instructions given.

For example, our Court held in Vazquez v. Wilson, 550
F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008), that even when neutral pronoun
substitution or its equivalent is used (in that case, “my boy”
or “the other guy”), if there is a strong implication that the
non-testifying codefendant‟s confession refers to the
defendant, it may still violate Bruton despite the substitution
and use of jury instructions.12 In addition, the number of
12
Similarly, in United States v. Hardwick we determined that
substituting the phrase “others in the van” was not adequately
protective, as the phrase clearly referred to only two of the

19
codefendants that could be implicated in a Gray analysis,
where redactions or substitutions have been used, is also
important. Compare United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335,
341 (3d Cir. 2001) (Bruton violated where only three people
were involved in crime) with Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d
394, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (“another guy” did not implicate
any particular person given that at least 15 persons were
involved in the crime, and the placeholder used was “bereft of
any innuendo [linking] them” to particular defendants, in
contrast to Richards in which redactions “were tantamount to
an explicit reference” to a codefendant).

Under AEDPA‟s deferential review standard, our
Court in Vazquez rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s
seeming “bright-line rule that when terms like „my boy,‟ the
„other guy,‟ or the „other man‟ are used [as substitutions,] . . .
there cannot be a Bruton violation.” Vazquez, 550 F.3d at
281. Rather, as Vazquez instructs, using a bright line is “an
unreasonable application „of clearly established Federal law
under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States‟” given the necessity of determining how strongly a
codefendant‟s statement implicates the defendant and the
likelihood that it would be disregarded by the jury. Id. at 282.

multiple codefendants on trial. 544 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir.
2008). We “underscore[d] . . . that the nature of the linkage
between the redacted statement and the other evidence in the
record is vitally important in determining whether a
defendant's Confrontation Clause right has been violated.”
Id.

20
 2. DeJesus‟s Confession in the Context of Pabon‟s
Joint Trial

Pabon‟s codefendant DeJesus confessed to the crime
(from the conspiracy to murder Vargas through payment he
received for the murder) in a statement recorded by Detective
McDermott. The relevant portion of DeJesus‟s confession
that Detective McDermott read to the jury at trial follows:

Question, José, when the
shootings happened, how many
times did you shoot? Answer,
like a good twelve times. I was
standing in front of [Vargas]‟s car
shooting into it.

Question, did you see a female
standing near [Vargas]‟s car when
you were shooting? Answer,
yeah. She was on the side of the
car. I screamed at her, yo, get the
fuck out of here. She moved
away, and that is how I know I
didn‟t hit the girl. I am standing
real close to [Vargas]‟s car, so I
know that everything I shot was at
[Vargas]. How could I miss, I
was so close.

Question, do you know how the
two females who were standing on
Franklin Street were shot?
Answer, no, I didn‟t even see
them.

21
 ...

Question, José, is there anything
you would like to add to your
statement? Answer, Yeah. I
know that I didn’t shoot the girl
who got killed. Another should be
arrested for this.

(N.T. 8/2/99: 42-44) (emphases added).

As noted above, DeJesus‟s statement initially
implicated Pagan. It stated that the person who should be
arrested for Carisquilla‟s shooting should be the person who
“paid it off” (i.e., provided money and weapons). (N.T.
8/2/99: 22-23). However, it was truncated to stop at “another
should be arrested for this,” with all further references to
Pagan‟s identity and role deleted, as Pagan‟s counsel
requested because of his own client‟s Bruton rights. (N.T.
8/2/99: 1-33). The prosecution, defense counsel, and trial
court were involved in redacting DeJesus‟s statement. Judge
Greenspan instructed the jury that DeJesus‟s confession could
only be used as evidence against him, not any of his
codefendants. (N.T. 8/2/99: 38-39). She repeated this
caution at the end of trial in regard to Pabon in particular.

Though DeJesus‟s confession did not identify Pabon
by name, he argues that the use of “another” (in the statement
“[a]nother should be arrested for this”) was an “unnatural
locution” that revealed reference to a codefendant‟s
participation in the shooting. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 192
(“obvious indications of alteration” may cause a Bruton
violation even in a redacted statement). He claims that
DeJesus‟s confession would have implicated Pagan, had it

22
not been truncated, but was altered to implicate Pabon (or
Hernandez or Gautauba) as read to the jury at trial.

In context, DeJesus‟s statement that “another” should
be arrested for Carrisquilla‟s death does seem to refer to
“another” of the alleged shooters.13 It is in a passage of
DeJesus‟s confession discussing how the shooting occurred,
making the natural inference from the cropped statement that
DeJesus was implicating another shooter. Of the five
codefendants, two were not alleged to have been shooters,
Pagan and Centeno. That leaves only Pabon, Hernandez, and
Guatauba (with DeJesus the fourth alleged shooter) as the
person referred to as “another.” If the jury credited DeJesus‟s
confession that he shot Vargas but “another” should be
arrested for shooting Carisquilla, Pabon and Hernandez are
the only two codefendants to whom he plausibly could have
referred in this passage of his confession (three persons in all
could have been referenced, but one was not a codefendant14).
While this is not so clear-cut a situation that only one
defendant is implicated by a codefendant‟s statement, it is
also a far cry from the situation in Priester, for example, in
which 15 codefendants were all equally implicated. 382 F.3d
at 401. Here, because one of three persons was implicated by
the statement, it is possible that attempting to avoid a Bruton
violation for one codefendant may have created one for two
13
We note that, even were this an “unnatural locution,”
“another” was the word DeJesus used. It is the context, and
the truncation of DeJesus‟s explanation, that implicates Pabon
(or the other alleged shooters) rather than Pagan.
14
Guatauba was not one of the codefendants, as he had not
been apprehended at the time of trial. However, he was
referenced at trial as an alleged shooter.

23
of the others.15

In addition, as noted above, Pabon allegedly confessed
to shooting toward “Franklin Street,” the street from which
shots were fired at Ortiz. (N.T. 7/30/99: 64). This increases
the likelihood that DeJesus‟s statement regarding the shooting
of “two females who were standing on Franklin Street” was
particularly damaging to Pabon (rather than Hernandez or
Guatauba, the other alleged shooters). Pabon claims that his
challenged confession “is cumulative to the harm suffered . . .
because of the admission of the DeJesus statement . . . .”
Pabon Br. 22. The potential corroboration of Pabon‟s
confession by DeJesus‟s does raise flags under Cruz. That is,
the “interlocking” nature of these two confessions makes it
less likely, not more, that curative instructions would solve
the Bruton problem. Reinforcing this point, Pabon also
argues that the prosecutor‟s closing argument to the jury
contended that Pabon and DeJesus‟s confessions corroborated
each other. (N.T. 8/4/99: 94). In these ways, DeJesus‟s
confession may have prejudiced Pabon by increasing the
likelihood that the jury would believe he was one of the
shooters.

3. Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s Analysis of Pabon‟s
Bruton Claim

The DA asserts that the state trial court reasonably
concluded that Pabon‟s Bruton claim “is plainly meritless.”

15
This is also not a case in which the statement at issue was
scrubbed of all reference to codefendants. As in Gray, the
“statement . . . obviously refer[s] directly to someone . . . .”
523 U.S. at 196.

24
Supp. Br. for Appellees 28. As noted, however, in Vazquez
we rejected explicitly the bright-line approach taken by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under which a substitution of a
pronoun for a name is adequate provided no specific name
was used and limiting instructions were given. Vazquez, 550
F.3d at 282. That same flawed, bright-line approach was
applied in deciding Pabon‟s direct appeal. This implies that
Pabon‟s Bruton claim was decided under Pennsylvania case
law that is an “unreasonable application of Federal law.” Id.

In addition, Judge Greenspan repeatedly emphasized
the “curative” instructions issued at several times during the
trial. These instructions, however, are beside the point. The
central premise of Bruton is that “[l]imiting instructions may
not in fact erase the prejudice” created by a codefendant‟s
confession. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132. Moreover, as Cruz
noted, under Bruton it is the “likelihood that the instruction
will be disregarded,” not the quality of the instruction or its
repetition, that is relevant in determining whether a Bruton
violation has occurred. Cruz, 481 U.S. 186. The United
States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that instructions can
exacerbate the problem jurors face in trying to segregate
evidence that is admissible as to one codefendant but not
another. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 193. Thus, the Court that
decided Pabon‟s direct appeal should have focused on the
degree to which DeJesus‟s confession implicated Pabon and
the extent of any resulting prejudice in the particular
circumstances of the trial, rather than the quality or number of
jury instructions given.

25
 C. Pabon’s Bruton Claim is Debatable for the
Purposes of a COA

Under the Miller-El standard, Pabon‟s alleged Bruton
violation need only be debatable. For the reasons explained
above, we conclude that reasonable jurists could debate
whether Pabon has a meritorious claim regarding the
introduction of DeJesus‟s confession at their joint trial and
that claim deserves developing.16 See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at
327.

IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING
A. The R&R and the District Court’s Ruling

As noted earlier, the District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge‟s R&R, which denied Pabon‟s habeas
petition as untimely. Under AEDPA, a prisoner has one year
from the date a state court conviction becomes final, not
including the time during which state post-conviction appeals
are pending, to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Judgment becomes final at “the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review.” Id.

Pabon‟s conviction became final on August 12, 2002,
when the time expired for seeking certiorari for direct review

16
We note that Pabon‟s pro se habeas petition raised four
claims. Although his appointed counsel deals with only one
of those claims (the Bruton claim) for COA purposes, that
does not foreclose consideration of his other claims in the
District Court were Pabon to succeed on his equitable tolling
claim.

26
by the United States Supreme Court. See Kapral v. United
States, 166 F.3d 565, 567 (3d Cir. 1999). About nine months
later (May 12, 2003),17 statutory tolling of the limitations
period began when Pabon filed his PCRA petition in the
Court of Common Pleas. On August 8, 2006, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal, ending the
statutory tolling period.18 As about nine months had passed
before Pabon filed his PCRA petition, he had three months
left before AEDPA‟s one-year filing deadline. His habeas
petition was filed on September 20, 2007, well past the one-
year mark.

The R&R stated that “Pabon does not allege
circumstances which prevent him in some extraordinary way
from filing a timely habeas petition.” R&R at 7. It also
stated that Pabon “fails to allege circumstances indicating that
he exercised reasonable diligence.” Id.

Pabon filed objections (handwritten by a fellow
inmate) to the R&R. They were that: (1) timely filing of his
habeas petition was unlawfully impeded by state action and

17
As with federal law, see supra note 8, under Pennsylvania
law the “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that prisoner filings
are deemed filed on the date they are delivered to authorities
for mailing. See Commonwealth v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2001). Pabon‟s petition appears to have
been postmarked on May 12, 2003. See Br. for Appellees 7
n.1.
18
Pabon filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court
following denial of his PCRA appeal, but statutory tolling did
not continue while that petition was pending. See Lawrence
v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329 (2007).

27
AEDPA allows a habeas petition to be submitted up to one
year after an unlawful impediment to filing created by state
action has been lifted, see § 2244(d)(1)(B), so, he contends,
his petition was timely under AEDPA; and/or (2) equitable
tolling should apply. As to his second argument, he asserts
that he should have been entitled to equitable tolling from
September 7, 2006 (the date he initially requested legal
assistance from a prison paralegal) to September 20, 2007
(the deemed filing date of his habeas petition) due to his
inability to read, write, or understand English, the lack of
Spanish-language legal materials in the prison‟s restricted
housing unit (the “RHU”), and repeated denials of requests
for legal or translation assistance.19

The District Court concluded that there was no basis
for equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period. In
doing so, it did not hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to
Pabon‟s language ability, his access to Spanish-language
legal materials in prison, or how he may have been affected
by his inability to obtain legal or translation assistance. As
noted, Pabon appealed and we granted his application for a
COA.

B. The Standard for Equitable Tolling

In determining whether equitable tolling should be
granted, we address two questions: (1) whether the petitioner
faced extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of
timely filing; and (2) whether he or she exercised reasonable
diligence. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005);
see also Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003)

19
Pabon also objected to the denial of his motion for counsel.

28
(same). In Holland v. Florida the Supreme Court confirmed
that equitable tolling may be applied to AEDPA‟s statutory
limitations period. 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).20

There are no bright lines in determining whether
equitable tolling is warranted in a given case. Rather, the
particular circumstances of each petitioner must be taken into
account. Id. at 2563. As Holland explains, while prior
decisions provide guidance, rigid reliance on precedent
should be avoided. Id. In each case, there is a need for
“flexibility,” “avoiding „mechanical rules,‟” and “awareness .
. . that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in
advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate
case.” Id. (internal citation omitted).21 In sum, equitable
tolling is appropriate when “principles of equity would make
the rigid application of a limitation period unfair.” Miller v.
N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998);
see also LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005).
20
Holland confirms our Court‟s rulings that AEDPA‟s statute
of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., LaCava
v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005); Miller v. N.J. State
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998).
21
The Commonwealth urges an approach that defies the
fundamentals of equity, asking us to conclude that a certain
type of circumstance can never be extraordinary. Despite
Holland’s admonition against bright-line rules, the
Commonwealth continues to argue that Pabon “has failed to
state even potentially extraordinary circumstances,”
suggesting that similar circumstances as those alleged in
Mendoza and Diaz could not potentially be extraordinary.
(DA‟s Rule 28(j) letter at 3). That kind of rigid rule is
precisely what Holland warns against.

29
However, courts need to be “sparing in their use of” the
doctrine. Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

C. Equitable Tolling Analysis

1. Extraordinary Circumstances

Our Court has not yet addressed whether a language
deficiency may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for
the purposes of equitable tolling. We find it persuasive that
the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both
determined that equitable tolling might be warranted when a
non-English speaking petitioner could not comply with
AEDPA‟s statute of limitations because the prison did not
provide access to AEDPA-related materials, translation, or
legal assistance in his or her language.

In Mendoza, the petitioner asserted that he did not
speak English and that “the prison law library possessed no
Spanish books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no
postings about the AEDPA time limitations in any language.”
449 F.3d at 1067. The Ninth Circuit held that the
“combination of (1) a prison law library‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials, and (2) a petitioner‟s inability to
obtain translation assistance before the one-year deadline,
could constitute extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1069.
Mendoza‟s case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
his equitable tolling claim in light of that holding. Id. at
1071.

Pabon has alleged almost identical extraordinary
circumstances as the petitioner in Mendoza (indeed, Pabon‟s
are perhaps more extraordinary given his confinement in the
RHU). In Mendoza, the petitioner eventually “found a newly-

30
arrived, bilingual inmate willing to offer assistance” for a fee,
and was able to file a habeas petition (though only after the
AEDPA deadline had passed). Id. at 1069. Again similar to
Mendoza, Pabon eventually received help from an English-
speaking inmate in filing his habeas petition, but after the
AEDPA deadline.

Second, in Diaz, the Second Circuit adopted a similar
approach to that used in Mendoza. 515 F.3d at 154 (holding
that “English language deficiency can warrant tolling of the
AEDPA limitations period”). The petitioners in Diaz—Angel
Diaz and Yoke Yew Tan—had asserted, respectively, being
“„primarily a Spanish speaker‟” and having “a lack of „a
working knowledge‟ of English and „difficult[y]‟ in finding
interpreters in the Department of Correctional Services.” Id.
at 151-52 (alterations in original). The Diaz Court noted that
“the proper inquiry is not how unusual the circumstance
alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners,”
as the State had argued (and the Commonwealth urges in
Pabon‟s appeal), “but rather how severe an obstacle it is for
the prisoner endeavoring to comply with AEDPA‟s
limitations period.” Id. at 154 (emphases added). “For the
prisoner who cannot read English, the obstacle is undoubtedly
serious . . . and can, in some circumstances, justify equitable
tolling.” Id. In that case, however, the petitioners failed on
the reasonable diligence prong. Neither had made efforts “to
learn of [AEDPA‟s] requirements within their places of
confinement.” Id.

As these Circuit Courts did in Mendoza and Diaz, we
now hold that inability to read or understand English,
combined with denial of access to translation or legal
assistance, can constitute extraordinary circumstances that

31
trigger equitable tolling.22 In addition, as the Diaz Court did,
we note that the relevant inquiry is not whether the
circumstance alleged to be extraordinary is unique to the
petitioner, but how severe an obstacle it creates with respect
to meeting AEDPA‟s one-year deadline.

In light of this holding, we conclude that the District
Court erred in rejecting Pabon‟s claim without an evidentiary
hearing. First, it erred in concluding that Pabon had not
explained why his inability to read, speak, or write English
caused his inability to timely file his habeas petition. Pabon
explained that there were no Spanish-language legal
materials, and there was no notice of AEDPA in Spanish, in
the RHU where he was housed for five years. These facts, he

22
The Commonwealth argues that Cobas v. Burgess, 306
F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002), supports its position that a language
barrier cannot constitute an extraordinary circumstance. First,
as explained above, Holland throws into serious doubt the
notion that there exist types of circumstances that can never
be extraordinary, as courts must use a case-by-case analysis
rather than bright lines in this inquiry. 130 S.Ct. at 2563. In
any event, Cobas did not hold that language barriers can
never be “extraordinary” for equitable tolling purposes—it
merely concluded that in that case, while the petitioner had
alleged an inability to speak or understand English, he
appeared to have access to an interpreter, so his language
inability had not created a language barrier. 306 F.3d at 444.
Thus, Cobas is consistent with the approach we adopt today.
See also Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069-70 (citing Cobas to
support the holding that language inability, coupled with
denial of translation assistance, can constitute an
extraordinary circumstance).

32
argued, coupled with repeated denials of legal or translation
assistance from prison officials despite efforts on his part,
were “extraordinary circumstances” that prevented him from
timely filing his habeas petition. See Pabon Br. 18-19. He
asserted quite clearly that language inability, coupled with
denials of assistance, created a barrier to timely filing.

The District Court also assumed that Pabon‟s potential
language barrier was negated by his communication with a
“Spanish-speaking attorney.” Op. at 2 n.1. We disagree, as
the evidence currently before us supports the contrary
conclusion—that Pabon continued to face a language barrier
until his habeas petition was filed, as he had been unable to
obtain legal or translation assistance despite continuing
efforts. The record also reflects that Pabon required a
Spanish-language translator in trial and pre-trial proceedings.
A129-130. A Spanish-speaking detective (Detective Perez)
testified at trial that he read Pabon his Miranda rights in
Spanish, questioned him in Spanish, and asked him (in
Spanish) whether he reads, writes, or understands English, to
which Pabon answered “no.” (N.T. 7/30/99: 52-62).23

In sum, there is substantial evidence in the record that
Pabon may have faced an extraordinary circumstance: he has

23
The Commonwealth argues that Pabon‟s “proficiency [in
English] when he gave his confession and was tried, between
1997 and 1999, are simply immaterial to his proficiency in
November 2006, the time of the AEDPA deadline.” Br. for
Appellees 50 (emphasis omitted). It may be that Pabon‟s
language proficiency has changed while in prison, but that is
precisely the type of factual inquiry for which an evidentiary
hearing is required.

33
consistently claimed to be a non-English speaker, required a
translator in his interactions with police and the court system,
lacked access to legal materials or notice of AEDPA in
Spanish in the RHU where he was housed for five years, and
was repeatedly denied legal materials in Spanish or
translation assistance.24 As the District Court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing on this issue, we reverse and remand for it
to do so.

24
Although the Commonwealth urges otherwise, Br. for
Appellees 43-45, we emphasize that the assistance Pabon
eventually received from another inmate does not bar the
possibility that he had faced extraordinary circumstances up
to that point. To conclude otherwise would yield the perverse
result of leaving prisoners at the mercy of fellow inmates.
This presents many problems. For example, an inmate who at
first might be willing to provide translation or legal help
could change his or her mind, being under no obligation to
assist fellow inmates, or could be transferred at any time.
Moreover, an inmate who understood enough of the
petitioner‟s language to translate a two-paragraph grievance,
such as the one prepared for Pabon by José Ortiz, might not
have enough language skills (or might not be willing) to help
a petitioner decipher federal statutes, let alone prepare an
entire petition for habeas corpus requiring legal research and
a considerable investment of time. For these reasons, we
reject the Commonwealth‟s argument that eventually
receiving help from an inmate bars the potential for equitable
tolling. We also reject the Commonwealth‟s conclusory
assertion that equitable tolling based on a language barrier is
improper because Pabon “commit[ed] crime” in Philadelphia
“with considerable speed and ease.” Id. at 43.

34
 2. Reasonable Diligence

Even if a petitioner has faced extraordinary
circumstances, he must also “exercise[] reasonable diligence
in . . . bringing [the] claims.” Miller, 145 F.3d at 618-619
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court
addressed reasonable diligence in Holland, explaining that
“[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is
„reasonable diligence,‟ . . . not „maximum feasible
diligence.‟” 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations omitted).
Our Court has established a similar standard. “Due diligence
does not require „the maximum feasible diligence;‟” “it does
require reasonable diligence in the circumstances.” Schlueter
v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations
omitted); see also LaCava, 398 F.3d at 277.

Here, based on the documents Pabon submitted with
his objections to the R&R, we count ten or more efforts
where he sought assistance, both before and after the AEDPA
deadline. After ascertaining that there were no Spanish-
language legal materials in the RHU, Pabon wrote to his
PCRA attorney, in Spanish, before October 28, 2004. He
wrote a second letter seeking help from that attorney before
November 30, 2004. At various times before September 7,
2006, he submitted “numerous written requests” seeking legal
materials or assistance within the prison system.25 While in
the RHU, he submitted a letter to the general population law
library, with help from an English-speaking inmate,

25
The prison paralegal‟s denial of Pabon‟s subsequent
request states that he had already submitted “numerous
written requests,” A-55, and his appeal of that denial also
notes that he had submitted prior request slips. A-56.

35
requesting assistance from the staff paralegal, but was denied
assistance on September 19, 2006. On November 6, 2006,
Pabon filed an “Official Inmate Grievance,” with the
assistance of inmate José Ortiz, again requesting access to
legal services and stating that he does not speak, read, or
write in English.26 That grievance was denied without
explanation.27 All of these efforts occurred before the
AEDPA filing deadline of November 6, 2006.

Pabon‟s efforts did not stop there. Before December
22, 2006, he again sought help from an attorney. He
submitted a second appeal for access to paralegal services
before January 23, 2007. On February 4, 2007, he requested
the appointment of an Inmate Legal Reference Aide, but
never received a response to his request. Thereafter, he found
a bilingual inmate who agreed to help him with his pro se
habeas petition. That petition was signed (and, as noted,
delivered to prison officials) on September 20, 2007.

The District Court‟s conclusion that Pabon did not
demonstrate diligence is based, at least in part, on the

26
The grievance explained that “[i]t appears that the paralegal
referred to prior request slips written by other inmates, but
sent by me, to base her decision in not to help me [sic].” A-56
(emphases in original).
27
The response to Pabon‟s Official Inmate Grievance merely
states who made the previous decision to deny his request. It
does not state why it was denied or review the paralegal‟s
decision in any manner: “It was [the paralegal‟s] decision
that you did not require legal assistance in accordance with
DC ADM 007. It is not the decision of the SCI-Mahanoy
Library Staff.” A-57.

36
assumption that he had a Spanish-speaking attorney. In its
Order dismissing Pabon‟s habeas petition, the Court stated
that he “has made no attempt to explain why, in light of the
fact that he contacted a Spanish speaking attorney, his
petition was close to one year late.” Op. at 2 n.1. The record
belies that statement. The attorney the Court references
seems to be Pabon‟s post-conviction (PCRA) attorney, who
did not speak Spanish. She wrote the following letter to
Pabon on October 28, 2004:

Dear Mr. Pabon:

You have sent a letter to me in
Spanish. I do not understand it.
If you are asking about your
appeal, there will not be a
decision on it until some time next
year (or longer). You must
correspond with me in English in
the future if you expect me to
comprehend what you are saying.
Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sondra R. Rodrigues, Esq.

A-51 (emphases added).28

28
In response to further requests for assistance from Pabon,
Ms. Rodrigues later wrote him another letter containing about
two paragraphs of broken Spanish and one paragraph in
English, again reiterating that she does not speak Spanish and

37
 Thus, unlike the Diaz petitioners who had made no
efforts to communicate with anyone outside of prison or learn
of next steps to pursue their legal claims within their places of
confinement, 515 F.3d at 154, Pabon attempted to pursue his
claims repeatedly. Moreover, within prison he sought access
to legal materials in Spanish or translation assistance, but was
denied or left without a response each time he did so. Under
these circumstances, we hold that Pabon was reasonably
diligent.

Because we hold that language inability, when coupled
with lack of translation assistance, may constitute an
extraordinary circumstance, and because Pabon was
reasonably diligent in pursuing his claims, we conclude that
the District Court erred in dismissing Pabon‟s equitable
tolling claim without considering the evidence he offered.
The Commonwealth should also have an opportunity to
submit evidence in response. Thus, we remand for an
evidentiary hearing on the extraordinary circumstances prong
of Pabon‟s equitable tolling claim.

attempting to explain that her great-grandparents were from
Portugal. A-54. It appears that the District Court did not
consider this correspondence regarding Ms. Rodrigues‟s
language abilities (or lack thereof), but instead may have
assumed based on her last name that she would have Spanish-
language proficiency (as Pabon himself may have done). We
see no other basis for the conclusion that Pabon “contacted a
Spanish-speaking attorney.” Op at 2 n.1.

38
 D. Timeliness under § 2244(d)(1)(B): “Impediment
to Filing”

AEDPA provides that “a one-year period of limitation
shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Sub-parts to that section provide
four possible starting dates for the tolling period. “The
limitation period shall run from the latest” date of those four
options. Id.

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period runs
from “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review of the expiration of the time for
seeking review.”29 However, Pabon argued in his application
for a COA that § 2244(d)(1)(B) applies. Under it, the
limitation period runs from “the date on which the
impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action.” § 2244(d)(1)(B). Pabon claims that the
Commonwealth‟s denial of Spanish-language legal assistance
or notice of AEDPA in Spanish is an “impediment to filing”
within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(B). Our Court has not
addressed the meaning of “impediment to filing” under §
2244(d)(1)(B). We do not reach the issue here because the
impediment Pabon argues prevented him from filing

29
The District Court concluded that the AEDPA limitations
period began running for Pabon on the date on which his
judgment became final (August 12, 2003). No party disputes
that August 12, 2003 is the correct starting date if §
2244(d)(1)(A) is applicable.

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remained un-removed: As far as we know, and as Pabon
himself argues, at the time that he filed his habeas petition he
was still denied Spanish-language materials, translation and
legal assistance.

V. CONCLUSION

We hold that language inability, when coupled with
denial of legal or translation assistance, can be an
extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes in
the habeas context. We also hold that Pabon was reasonably
diligent in pursuing his claims. Thus, Pabon‟s equitable
tolling claim merits an evidentiary hearing. We thus reverse
the District Court‟s ruling, vacate its order of dismissal, and
remand for an evidentiary hearing on the extraordinary
circumstances Pabon has alleged in his equitable tolling
claim.

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