UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4459
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ARNOLDO SALAZAR CASTILLO, a/k/a Edgar Guadalupe
Medrano-Reyes,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-00060-NCT-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2011 Decided: July 13, 2011
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY, JOHNSON & LAWSON, LLP, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
against Arnoldo Salazar Castillo. Count one charged Castillo
with conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
846 (2006). Count two charged Castillo with possessing with
intent to distribute approximately 4.36 kilograms of marijuana
in violation of § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (2006). Lastly, count
three charged Castillo with possession with intent to distribute
approximately 5.07 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). Castillo filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to warrants issued by a
state district court judge, claiming the warrants violated Fed.
R. Crim. P. 41(b)(1) because the warrants were not issued by a
“judge of a state court of record.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(1).
The district court denied the motion, and Castillo pled guilty,
pursuant to a plea agreement, to count two of the indictment.
The district court sentenced Castillo to forty-one months in
prison. Castillo timely appealed. We affirm.
On appeal, Castillo first contends that the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. * This court
*
Castillo did not enter a conditional guilty plea pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). Because an
unconditional guilty plea generally waives all antecedent,
(Continued)
2
reviews factual findings underlying the district court’s denial
of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338
(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010). A
factual finding is clearly erroneous if this court “on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Harvey,
532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “if the district court’s account of the
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety,” this court will not reverse the district court’s
finding even if it would have “decided the fact differently.”
United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In other
words, when two views of the evidence are permissible, “the
district court’s choice between them cannot be clearly
nonjurisdictional issues, Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
266-67 (1973), Castillo’s right to challenge on appeal a Fourth
Amendment issue raised in a motion to suppress is waived by his
unconditional guilty plea. However, the Government failed to
argue that Castillo waived his right to pursue these issues by
virtue of his guilty plea. We thus accept the Government’s
invitation to consider the merits of Castillo’s appeal of the
denial of his motion to suppress. See United States v. Metzger,
3 F.3d 756, 757 (4th Cir. 1993).
3
erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).
This court also defers to the district court’s
credibility determinations, “for it is the role of the district
court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This court construes the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, as the party prevailing below.
United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1599 (2011).
Castillo does not contend that there was insufficient
probable cause for the state district court judge to issue the
warrants. Nor does he argue that the good faith exception does
not apply. Instead, he simply argues that the warrants were
issued in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(1) because the
issuing judge was not a judge of a “state court of record in the
district.” It is undisputed that the North Carolina district
court is not a court of record.
This court has held that, in the context of joint
state and federal undertaking, “Rule 41’s application must hinge
on whether the proceeding, as distinct from the investigation,
was federal.” United States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276, 281 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 259 (2010). When such
4
cooperation occurs, “investigating violations of both federal
and state law, an application for a search warrant cannot
categorically be deemed a ‘proceeding’ governed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, based simply on the role that
federal law-enforcement officers played in the investigation.”
Id. at 282. “[T]he fact that [the warrants] commanded a search
for evidence of a state-law violation would indicate that the
warrant proceeding was a state proceeding, not one under
Federal Rule 41(b).” Id. at 283. Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the request for a search warrant from
the North Carolina district court judge was not a federal
proceeding, and consequently, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 did not apply.
Next, Castillo contends that the district court erred
in basing his sentence on a drug quantity of 89.78 kilograms.
This court “review[s] the district court’s calculation of the
quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing
purposes for clear error.” United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d
195, 210 (4th Cir. 1999). “Under this standard of review, this
Court will only reverse if left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In determining drug quantity for sentencing
purposes, where “the amount seized does not reflect the scale of
the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the
5
controlled substance.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12 (2008); United States v. Cook, 76
F.3d 596, 604 (4th Cir. 1996). “The district court is afforded
broad discretion as to what information to credit in making its
calculations.” Cook, 76 F.3d at 604 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our review of the record indicates that the district
court did not clearly err in determining the quantity of
marijuana attributable to Castillo.
Lastly, Castillo contends that his sentence was
unreasonable. This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564
F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, the court first
examines the sentence for “significant procedural error,”
including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. Finally, the court then “‘consider[s] the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” Id.
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). A sentence imposed within the
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumed reasonable.
United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.
6
2010). After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that
Castillo’s sentence was both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
7