UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1082
LORRAINE LITTLE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, a/k/a United States Post Office, Postmaster
General,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:09-cv-00886-JFA)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 14, 2011
Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lorraine Little, Appellant Pro Se. Terri Hearn Bailey, Barbara
Murcier Bowens, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lorraine Little appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of John E. Potter, the Postmaster
General of the United States Postal Service, on Little’s claim
of retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006). * We
affirm.
We review de novo an award of summary judgment. PCS
Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.
2009). Little contends on appeal that a jury, rather than the
district court, should determine whether her dismissal was
motivated by retaliation for her assertion of rights protected
under Title VII. However, the district court did not err in
concluding that Little failed to offer sufficient evidence that
Potter’s nondiscriminatory reason for the dismissal “was false,
and that discrimination was the real reason for the challenged
action.” Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218
(4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
the district court properly awarded summary judgment on this
claim.
*
Little’s claim of hostile work environment proceeded to
trial, and the jury’s verdict in favor of Little on that claim
is not before us.
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Accordingly, we deny Little’s motion for appointment
of counsel and affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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