FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 15, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE CHRISTIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-5020
(D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00622-GKF-TLW)
AHS TULSA REGIONAL MEDICAL (N.D. Okla.)
CENTER, LLC, d/b/a OSU Medical
Center,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Michelle Christian appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of her
former employer, AHS Tulsa Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”), on her
Title VII sex discrimination claims. We agree with the district court that
Ms. Christian was unable to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
material fact with regard to either prong of the Hospital’s two-part affirmative
defense, and therefore affirm.
I. Background
Ms. Christian began working for the Hospital as a pharmacy clerk in June
2005. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 105, 168. She became a pharmacy technician in July
2005 and worked in that job until she resigned at the end of January 2008. Id.
at 168, 175-76. Mr. Terry Moorhead became Ms. Christian’s immediate
supervisor in February 2006. Id., Vol. II at 398. She claims he sexually harassed
her and other female pharmacy technicians during the nearly two years that he
was her supervisor, and that his actions created a hostile work environment.
Specifically, Ms. Christian describes four situations where Mr. Moorhead
made sexually charged comments, and two situations where he leaned against her
while she was at a computer or copy machine. She alleges that the two incidents
involving physical touching occurred in early 2007, and three of the four
comments occurred between February and May 2007. The last comment occurred
on October 17, 2007.
Ms. Christian made her first complaint to the Hospital’s Human Resources
department (HR) on October 18, 2007. But her initial complaint was not just
about sexual harassment—it was primarily about her work schedule. She had
started taking classes at a community college in August 2007, and Mr. Moorhead
was no longer willing to accommodate her work schedule. He also had recently
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assigned her to work Christmas day, even though she had children at home. After
discussing these complaints with the HR representative, Ms. Christian raised her
allegation of sexual harassment. She described one unwelcome touching incident
that occurred in early 2007, and one crude comment Mr. Moorhead had made the
day before her complaint. She also asserted that three other women in the
pharmacy had been subjected to inappropriate behavior by Mr. Moorhead. Given
the allegations of unwelcome sexual conduct, the HR representative told
Ms. Christian that HR would have to investigate the charges.
Later that day, Ms. Christian attempted to retract the complaint, but was
told the investigation would have to go forward. Ms. Christian was asked to
provide additional information in writing that detailed Mr. Moorhead’s conduct.
After receiving a reminder from HR, Ms. Christian provided a brief list of her
harassment allegations on October 26, 2007. An HR representative explained that
HR needed a complete and detailed description of the events that took place, and
Ms. Christian agreed to return later that day with more information. However,
she did not do so.
In the weeks following the complaint, HR interviewed several of the
women and men who worked in the pharmacy. Investigators interviewed one of
the other women Ms. Christian named as having been a victim of harassment, but
did not interview the other two after learning from Ms. Christian and another
co-worker that the women were unwilling to be involved and unhappy that
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Ms. Christian had named them. HR also interviewed the two co-workers
Ms. Christian named as potential witnesses.
The pharmacy witnesses the Hospital interviewed did not confirm the
allegation of sexual harassment. One woman Ms. Christian identified as another
victim denied having experienced harassment. She stated further that while
Ms. Christian was her friend and she wished to support her, she had never
witnessed any inappropriate behavior from Mr. Moorhead. Another employee
told HR that Mr. Moorhead would joke and play around with staff, but that she
never witnessed any behavior she thought inappropriate. A male employee did
confirm Ms. Christian’s account of Mr. Moorhead standing too close behind her
as she replaced the paper in the copy machine, causing her to stand into him, but
could not describe other inappropriate comments or behavior.
Finally, Mr. Moorhead denied the allegations made against him. After
evaluating the conflicting but ultimately inconclusive evidence, HR counseled
Mr. Moorhead about his workplace conduct and specifically warned him not to
retaliate against Ms. Christian because of her allegations. On November 5, 2007,
HR notified Ms. Christian that it had completed the investigation and considered
the matter closed. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Christian went on pre-approved
medical leave. Id. at 346, 348.
On November 27, 2007, while she was still on medical leave, Ms. Christian
sent a detailed written account of her allegations. The document contained four
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additional and previously undisclosed allegations of inappropriate comments and
touching occurring in February, April, and May of 2007, but did not identify new
witnesses or any events taking place after her original complaint. HR responded
with a letter explaining that the new information did not change its decision. The
letter stated further that if Ms. Christian disagreed with this decision, she could
pursue a fair hearing process.
When Ms. Christian returned to work in January 2008, she claims other
pharmacy employees harassed her because of the complaint she had lodged
against Mr. Moorhead. Claiming intolerable working conditions as a result, she
resigned.
II. The District Court’s Ruling
Ms. Christian subsequently brought this action against the Hospital, raising
claims of a hostile work environment, retaliation, negligent supervision, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Hospital sought summary
judgment on each of the claims. The district court made two rulings relevant to
this appeal: (1) Ms. Christian failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because no rational jury could conclude that the conduct she
alleged, however obnoxious, was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered
the conditions of her employment; and (2) the Hospital successfully asserted an
affirmative defense by establishing that its investigation was reasonable and that
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Ms. Christian had hindered the investigation by unreasonably failing to cooperate.
Aplt. App., Vol. II at 549-52.
III. Discussion
“On appeal, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, applying the same standards that the district court should have applied.”
EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., Nos. 09-4207, 09-4217, 2011 WL 1651372, at *5
(10th Cir. May 3, 2011) (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The district court’s grant of summary judgment must be affirmed ‘if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 1
“In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To establish a hostile workplace claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements set forth in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Under Meritor,
“for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was recently amended, effective December 1, 2010.
Under the amended rule, the standard previously enumerated in subsection (c)
was moved to subsection (a), and the term genuine “issue” became genuine
“dispute.” See Rule 56 advisory committee’s notes (2010 Amendments).
However, “the standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.” Id.
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working environment.” Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1412
(10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted)).
We explained in Smith that the plaintiff must make a two-part showing to
satisfy this standard. First, the plaintiff must establish that a reasonable person
would find the work environment hostile or abusive. Smith, 129 F.3d at 1413
(citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22). And second, the plaintiff must show that she
subjectively perceived the work environment to be hostile or abusive. Id.
We determine whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” by
looking at the totality of circumstances, such as “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”; and
the context in which the conduct occurred.
Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) (ellipsis omitted).
In a case of discrimination that did not result in a tangible employment act,
such as discharge or demotion, an employer may avoid liability by raising the
affirmative defense outlined by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052,
1059 (10th Cir. 2009). The purpose of this defense is “to recognize the
employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit . . . to
employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty,” and acknowledge
that the employee has “a coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm” by
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“avail[ing] herself of the employer’s preventive or remedial apparatus.”
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07. To succeed in this defense, the employer must
establish by the preponderance of evidence that: (1) the employer “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” Pinkerton, 563 F.3d 1059 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Christian argues on appeal that the district court erred in ruling:
(1) that she failed to establish that the sexually hostile work environment was
severe or pervasive and therefore objectively hostile; and (2) that the Hospital
succeeded in making its Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Since we agree
with the second of the district court’s rulings, we need not reach the issue of
whether the workplace was sufficiently hostile. In short, Ms. Christian cannot
establish a genuine factual dispute as to either prong of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense—the Hospital took reasonable preventive and corrective
actions based on the information provided to it, and Ms. Christian unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the hospital’s corrective processes.
A. The Hospital Took Sufficient Preventive and Corrective Action
First, the district court was correct in concluding the undisputed material
facts show that the Hospital took reasonable preventive and corrective actions and
therefore satisfied the first prong of the defense. See Pinkerton, 563 F.3d
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at 1062-63. Generally, an employer can show it took reasonable preventive
measures by establishing that it promulgated and enforced an effective sexual
harassment policy. Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir.
2008); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir.
2003).
An employer’s reasonable remedial measures “should be designed to stop
the harassment, correct its effects on the employee, and ensure that the
harassment does not recur.” Walton, 347 F.3d at 1288 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The most significant immediate measure an employer can take in
response to a sexual harassment complaint is to launch a prompt investigation to
determine whether the complaint is justified.” Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184,
1193 (9th Cir. 2001). But “there is nothing in the Faragher or Ellerth decisions
requiring a company to conduct a full-blown, due process, trial-type proceeding in
response to complaints of sexual harassment.” Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007). “All that is required of an
investigation is reasonableness in all of the circumstances, and the permissible
circumstances may include conducting the inquiry informally in a manner that
will not unnecessarily disrupt the company’s business, and in an effort to arrive at
a reasonably fair estimate of truth.” Id.
The Hospital’s preventive policies and investigation meets these standards.
The undisputed evidence shows that the Hospital had a sexual harassment policy
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which set forth employee rights in detail. Ms. Christian was given a copy of the
employee handbook and was familiarized with the harassment policy at an
orientation meeting shortly after she began work. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 105, 194.
She also attended a training session where employees were encouraged to
promptly report any incidents of sexual harassment to HR. See Walton, 347 F.3d
at 1286 (“At a minimum, employers must ‘establish a complaint procedure
designed to encourage victims of harassment to come forward without requiring a
victim to complain first to the offending supervisor.’” (quoting Faragher,
524 U.S. at 806) (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted)).
And after Ms. Christian made her complaint, the Hospital engaged in a
timely and reasonably thorough investigation that included interviews with
Ms. Christian, other employees in the pharmacy, and Mr. Moorhead himself. In
addition, although Mr. Moorhead was not formally disciplined, he remained
subject to more serious sanctions if improper behavior was alleged again. In
these circumstances, the Hospital’s response to and investigation of
Ms. Christian’s allegations were reasonable.
Ms. Christian’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, she
claims the investigation was unreasonable because it discredited her allegations in
the face of Mr. Moorhead’s denial of misconduct. But “[t]he requirement of a
reasonable investigation does not include a requirement that the employer credit
uncorroborated statements the complainant makes if they are disputed by the
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alleged harasser. Nothing in the Faragher-Ellerth defense puts a thumb on either
side of the scale in a he-said, she-said situation.” Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1303.
And, in fact, HR did interview other employees in the pharmacy. Ms. Christian
claims that additional employees should have been interviewed, but HR spoke to
those Ms. Christian identified as having observed conduct directed at her and had
a reasonable explanation for not interviewing others. The pharmacy witnesses the
Hospital interviewed did not provide evidence that would support a charge of
sexual harassment against Mr. Moorhead. In short, the results of the investigation
were inconclusive, yet the Hospital still counseled Mr. Moorhead in light of its
anti-discrimination policy.
Next, Ms. Christian claims the Hospital failed to adequately investigate an
earlier complaint against Mr. Moorhead. In April 2006, an anonymous complaint
had been lodged against Mr. Moorhead, but it was later withdrawn. The Hospital
had begun an investigation, but discontinued it after the complaint was
withdrawn. Nonetheless, Mr. Moorhead was issued a reprimand and counseled
against inappropriate comments or touching. Nothing about the previous incident
calls into question the reasonableness of the Hospital’s investigation of
Ms. Christian’s allegations. If anything, it shows that the Hospital took the prior
allegation seriously, and underscores its unwillingness to allow Ms. Christian’s
allegations to go uninvestigated.
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In addition, Ms. Christian claims the Hospital should have suspended
Mr. Moorhead while it conducted the investigation. But the Hospital had no
obligation to suspend Mr. Moorhead during this time. It is true that, “[i]n certain
circumstances, an employer’s failure to remove a supervisor from close working
proximity with a subordinate who has alleged sexual harassment against that
supervisor might be seen as unreasonable.” Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1062. But this
is not so where, as here, the complaining subordinate did not ask for such a
separation, and the employer acted quickly to investigate and resolve the
complaint. See id.
Finally, Ms. Christian argues the Hospital should have launched a second
investigation based on events that took place after the first complaint. She alleges
that after she returned to work from medical leave in January 2008, Mr. Moorhead
commented that he was glad that she was feeling better, and that her “husband’s
taking care of you now.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 356. She also alleges that when
she told Mr. Moorhead a co-worker was “on” a customer’s request, he replied
“Oh, he’s on it? How is he on it?” Id. at 350. She perceived both remarks as
sexual. She argues the Hospital was unreasonable for failing to initiate a second
investigation on the basis of these allegations. But we agree with the district
court that the remarks were too ambiguous to support a hostile workplace claim,
and, in any event, Ms. Moorhead was asked to put the accusation in writing and
she refused to do so.
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In sum, we agree with the district court that given the undisputed facts
regarding the Hospital’s investigation into Ms. Christian’s allegations, “we see no
genuine issue left for trial about the reasonableness of [the Hospital’s] response.”
See Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063.
B. Ms. Christian Unreasonably Failed to Take
Advantage of the Hospital’s Corrective Process
We also conclude that Ms. Christian unreasonably failed to take advantage
of the Hospital’s corrective processes set forth in its policy handbook by delaying
in reporting her allegations. Though all but one of the incidents are alleged to
have taken place between January and May of 2007, Ms. Christian did not make a
complaint to HR until October. Cf. Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063-64 & n.6
(concluding that employee’s two-month delay in reporting alleged harassment was
unreasonable as a matter of law). Even then, she reported only two incidents, and
delayed in reporting four additional incidents until the end of November.
Moreover, she failed to cooperate with the HR investigation by providing the
written detail they asked for—until three weeks after she received notification
that the investigation had closed. Ms. Christian does not attempt to explain this
delay, and we conclude that it is unreasonable.
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III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant the Hospital
summary judgment on the claim of a hostile working environment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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