Filed: July 15, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1849
(1:07-cv-00050-BEL)
WILLIAM BLAKE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, Maryland,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
THE BALTIMORE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; TERRANCE B.
SHERIDAN, Chief of Police,
Defendants.
O R D E R
The Court amends its opinion filed July 15, 2011, as
follows:
On the cover sheet caption, the name of Defendant “THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT” is corrected to “THE BALTIMORE
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT.”
On the cover sheet, attorney information section, the
name of Assistant County Attorney is corrected to “Jeffrey G.
Cook.”
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1849
WILLIAM BLAKE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, Maryland,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
THE BALTIMORE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; TERRANCE B.
SHERIDAN, Chief of Police,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-00050-BEL)
Submitted: June 27, 2011 Decided: July 15, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory E. Gaskins, Deputy County Attorney, Jeffrey G. Cook,
Assistant County Attorney, Towson, Maryland, for Appellant.
Kathleen Cahill, THE LAW OFFICES OF KATHLEEN CAHILL, LLC,
Towson, Maryland; Michael F. Smith, THE SMITH APPELLATE LAW
FIRM, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Baltimore County appeals the district court’s denial
of its pre-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law and
its post-verdict motion for remittitur. We affirm.
The failure of a party to renew its pre-verdict Fed.
R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 50(a) motion through a post-verdict Rule
50(b) motion leaves this court powerless to review the district
court’s ruling: “The Supreme Court has held time and again that
a party’s failure to file a post-verdict motion under Rule 50(b)
leaves an appellate court without power to direct the District
Court to enter judgment contrary to the one it had permitted to
stand.” A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md., 515 F.3d
356, 369 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)). “[A]n appellate court lacks the power even to order
a new trial if a party has failed to file a Rule 50(b) motion
following a jury verdict.” Id. at 370. Baltimore County failed
to renew its motions post-verdict through Rule 50(b). Thus, it
raises no issue reviewable on appeal as to the jury’s finding of
liability.
We review the district court’s denial of the County’s
motion seeking remittitur for abuse of discretion. Sloane v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 510 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir. 2007).
In denying a motion for remittitur, “[a] district court abuses
its discretion only by upholding an award of damages when the
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jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence or based on
evidence which is false.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
A compensatory damage award “must be proportional to
the actual injury incurred” and “focus on the real injury
sustained.” Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169,
173 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A jury’s damage award should stand “unless it is
grossly excessive or shocking to the conscience.” Fox v.
General Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 180 (4th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Courts defer to a jury’s award of damages for
intangible harms, such as emotional distress, because the harm
is subjective and evaluating it depends considerably on the
demeanor of the witnesses.” Fox, 247 F.3d at 180 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). But “[a] plaintiff
seeking compensatory damages for emotional injuries cannot rely
on conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional
distress or the mere fact that a constitutional violation
occurred, but, rather, the testimony must establish that the
plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must
be sufficiently articulated.” Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d
625, 640 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks, brackets,
and citation omitted). Our review of the record leads us to
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conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the County’s motion for remittitur. ∗ Accordingly, we
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
∗
Like the district court, we presume that the jury followed
the instruction commanding it to exclude any litigation-induced
emotional distress from its damages calculation. United
States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009).
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