UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SANDRA D. DEAN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:09-cr-00893-HFF-2)
Submitted: June 23, 2011 Decided: July 15, 2011
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Bradley Bennett, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sandra D. Dean pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The district court
sentenced her to ninety-six months’ imprisonment. Dean’s
counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s view, there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Dean’s
sentence was reasonable. Dean has filed a pro se brief
challenging factual statements in the presentence report,
asserting that she was promised a downward departure for
assistance, and contending that her counsel was ineffective.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
this court reviews the adequacy of the guilty plea pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 for plain error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the
transcript of the plea hearing leads us to conclude that the
district court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Dean’s
guilty plea. The court ensured that Dean understood the charge
against her and the potential sentence she faced, that she
entered her plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea
was supported by an independent factual basis. See United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm Dean’s conviction.
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We have also reviewed Dean’s sentence and determine
that it was properly calculated and that the sentence imposed is
reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
see United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
The district court followed the necessary procedural steps in
sentencing Dean, appropriately treated the Sentencing Guidelines
as advisory, properly calculated and considered the applicable
Guidelines range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors. An extensive explanation is not required as
long as the appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)
(“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy
explanation.”)); see also United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d
339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a district court need
not “robotically tick through” each subsection of § 3553(a)).
Here, after hearing the argument of counsel as to the
application of the sentencing factors, the court imposed a
sentence in the middle of the applicable Guidelines range. The
court specifically noted that Dean and her husband were within
the same advisory Guidelines range, but, due to her greater
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criminal history, Dean received a higher sentence. We conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v.
Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate
presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
In her pro se brief, Dean contends that she only
purchased Sudafed and did not manufacture methamphetamine and
did not know the co-defendants. These statements do not negate
her knowing and voluntary guilty plea to conspiracy. See United
States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[O]ne may
be a member of a conspiracy without knowing its full scope, or
all its members, and without taking part in the full range of
its activities over the whole period of its existence.”).
Also in her pro se brief, Dean contends that she
should have received a downward departure due to her cooperation
with authorities. Absent a cooperation agreement and promise of
such a departure, a downward departure based on substantial
assistance is within the discretion of the Government. The
record evinces no abuse of discretion.
The final issue asserted in Dean’s pro se brief is
that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance
with respect to her sentencing by only discussing the
presentence investigation report with her by phone and by
failing to have a corrected version of the presentence report
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prepared. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
establishes counsel’s constitutionally inadequate performance.
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006).
Because the record does not conclusively demonstrate that Dean’s
counsel was ineffective, we decline to consider this claim on
direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Dean, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Dean requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Dean. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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