FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 15 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH L. BLACKWELL, No. 10-15986
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:05-cv-00856-AWI-
SMS
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MEMORANDUM *
CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 12, 2011 **
Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Former California state prisoner Keith L. Blackwell appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal of claims for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir.
2010), and its summary judgment ruling, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the claims against Pennywell, Escobar,
McGrew-Reese, and Lawhorn for failure to exhaust because Blackwell did not
exhaust his claims against these defendants prior to filing suit. See Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95 (2006) (“proper exhaustion” is mandatory and
requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); McKinney v. Carey, 311
F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (administrative remedies must
be exhausted before suit is filed); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120
(9th Cir. 2009) (grievance must alert prison officials to the nature of the wrong for
which redress is sought).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Vo because
Blackwell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Vo acted
with deliberate indifference. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir.
2004) (defendants are deliberately indifferent only when they know of and
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm); Franklin v. Or. State Welfare Div.,
2 10-15986
662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A difference of opinion between a
prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give
rise to a § 1983 claim.”).
Blackwell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 10-15986