FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 18 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KATRINA DEMOREST, No. 10-35862
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01310-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JANET NAPOLITANO, U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Security; DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, Division of
Customs and Border Protection,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: GILMAN,*** CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Katrina Demorest appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for
reconsideration and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
government on her claims arising under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq. We affirm.
Evidence offered by the government showed that regular attendance was an
essential function for all of the jobs at issue, and Demorest adduced no evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact on this point. By failing to show that she
could perform the essential function of attending work regularly, Demorest did not
establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination or failure to accommodate
under the Rehabilitation Act. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998,
1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the plaintiff’s burden on disability
discrimination claims); Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth the plaintiff’s burden on failure to accommodate claims).
The government was therefore entitled to summary judgment as to her
discrimination and accommodation claims. Because no reasonable accommodation
was possible, summary judgment was also appropriate as to the interactive process
claim. See Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006).
2
Demorest did not raise the retaliation claim in her Opening Brief. Demorest
has therefore waived this claim on appeal. See All Pac. Trading, Inc. v. Vessel M/V
Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427, 1434 (9th Cir. 1993).
Finally, Demorest’s motion for reconsideration failed to show manifest error
in the district court’s summary judgment ruling. See 389 Orange Street Partners v.
Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999); Local Rules, W.D. Wash. 7(h)(1).
AFFIRMED.
3