FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARK STEVEN CORRINET, No. 10-35568
D.C. No.
CV 09-498
MARK STEVEN CORRINET,
Appellant.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
May 3, 2011—Portland, Oregon
Filed July 19, 2011
Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, A. Wallace Tashima
and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge A. Wallace Tashima;
Dissent by Judge Ikuta
9857
IN RE CORRINET 9859
COUNSEL
Mark S. Corrinet, Waldport, Oregon, appearing pro se.
9860 IN RE CORRINET
OPINION
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
We are called upon to review the revocation of an attor-
ney’s membership in the District of Oregon bar on the ground
that he is not a member of the Oregon State Bar.
I
Mark Corrinet is an attorney and a member of The State
Bar of California. He moved to Oregon about ten years ago
and sought to take the Oregon bar examination, but he was
not permitted to sit for the exam at that time.1 Nonetheless, in
2002, Corrinet was admitted to practice before the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon, notwithstand-
ing a local rule limiting admission to attorneys “who are
active members in good standing with the Oregon State Bar.”
D. Or. LR 83-2. Corrinet represents that the then-chief judge
of the District “waived” Local Rule 83-2.
Corrinet does not appear to have practiced regularly in Ore-
gon federal court, but he represents that he remained in good
standing. Two years ago, he appeared as counsel for the plain-
tiff in a civil action filed in that district. Several months after
the complaint was filed, the district judge assigned to the case
issued a scheduling order for a show cause hearing. The order,
however, gave no indication of the reason for or the subject
matter of the hearing.
1
Although the reason for this is unclear, it may have been due to Corri-
net having attended a law school not accredited by the American Bar
Association. See Supreme Court of the State of Oregon Rules for Admis-
sion of Attorneys 3.05(1) (2010). But Corrinet may now be eligible to sit
for the Oregon bar examination. See id. 3.05(2) (providing that a graduate
of a law school in the United States who has been admitted to practice in
another state may, subject to certain conditions, sit for the Oregon exami-
nation if he “[h]as been actively, substantially and continuously engaged
in the practice of law for at least three of the five years immediately pre-
ceding the taking of the examination”).
IN RE CORRINET 9861
At the hearing, Corrinet learned that he was personally the
subject of the hearing and that he was being asked to show
cause. Specifically, the district judge asked Corrinet “to
explain why he should be allowed to continue as the only
member of the District of Oregon’s bar without an active
license from the Oregon State Bar.” The district judge “tem-
porarily allowed [Corrinet] to continue to appear [in the] case,
while seeking admission to the Oregon State Bar,” with
instructions that he “inform the court as to the progress of
admission to the Oregon State Bar.” Five months later, the
district judge ordered Corrinet “to submit a letter informing
the Court of the status of his admission to the Oregon State
Bar, including the steps that were taken to seek admission.”
Corrinet did not get admitted to the Oregon state bar. The
district judge “having learned that [Corrinet’s] application to
the Oregon State Bar was unsuccessful,” issued an order “re-
vok[ing] Mark S. Corrinet’s membership to the Federal Bar
for the District of Oregon pursuant to [Local Rule] 83-2.”
Corrinet timely appealed this order.
II
As we must, we first consider whether we have jurisdiction
to hear Corrinet’s appeal. We lack jurisdiction to review an
order denying a petition for admission to practice before a dis-
trict court. In re Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213, 216 (9th Cir.
1956) (holding that a “routine order[ ] of denial or granting of
admission of attorneys where the District Court followed its
own rules and did not violate any right of applicant . . . . is
not a final determination within the meaning of [28 U.S.C.
§ 1291] which gives this Court jurisdiction”). However,
where a district court suspends or disbars a previously-
admitted attorney, we do have jurisdiction. See In re North,
383 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2004); see also In re Snyder, 472
U.S. 634, 644 (1985).
9862 IN RE CORRINET
The leading case applying Wasserman is Gallo v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 349 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2003).
There, the attorney was admitted to practice in the District of
Arizona pursuant to a local rule allowing the admission of
non-resident attorneys who were admitted to the bar of any
United States District Court. Id. at 1173. The District of Ari-
zona later amended its local rules to provide that
“ ‘[a]dmission and continuing membership in the bar of this
Court is limited to attorneys who are active members in good
standing of the State Bar of Arizona.’ ” Id. (quoting United
States District Court for the District of Arizona Local Rule
1.5(a)(2003)). The Attorney Admissions Clerk sent Gallo a
letter telling him he was no longer admitted to practice in the
District of Arizona. Id. at 1173-74. Gallo filed an ex parte
application with the district court, seeking a waiver of the new
requirement. Id. at 1174. The district court denied the applica-
tion, and Gallo appealed. Id.
We lacked jurisdiction over Gallo’s appeal because “the
order issued by the District Court denying Gallo’s request for
a waiver from the Local Rules in effect at the time he submit-
ted filings on behalf of his clients” was a “denial of a petition
for admission to a district court bar[, which] is n[ot] a final
order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. . . nor an interlocu-
tory order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.” Id. at 1176.
We explained that the denial of Gallo’s application for re-
admission was not a disbarment, but “a petition to the District
Court for a waiver of Rule 1.5 or, alternatively, permission to
proceed pro hac vice.” Id. Thus, it “constituted a request to
practice before the court despite the existing laws proscribing
such appearances.” Id.
A year after Gallo, we decided In Re North. There, the
attorney was suspended from the District of Arizona bar after
the Arizona State Bar summarily suspended him for failure to
pay dues and imposed a subsequent six month disciplinary
suspension. See North, 383 F.3d at 873. The Arizona District
Court explained that under its Local Rule 1.5(a), “continuing
IN RE CORRINET 9863
membership . . . is limited to attorneys who are active mem-
bers in good standing of the State Bar of Arizona.” Id. at 874.
Because active membership in the State Bar was required by
the local rules, the issue was “not one of reciprocal discipline
but of qualification for continuing membership in the bar of
this Court.” Id.
We had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order,
even though the court had based the order on a local rule reg-
ulating admission and continuing membership in the bar. Id.
The order “was clearly an order of suspension and not a
denial of admission.” Id. The district court had considered
North’s motion challenging his suspension from the district
court bar, not a petition for admission. Id. And, unlike Gallo,
North had not formally re-applied for admission to the Dis-
trict of Arizona bar. Id. Moreover, “the district court itself
believed it was considering an attorney suspension order.” Id.
at 874-75.
[1] From Gallo and North, we discern that although we
lack jurisdiction to review routine orders denying admission
to a district court, the citation of a local rule governing admis-
sion does not shield what is essentially a disbarment from
appellate review. We apply these principles in our case.
[2] First, although the district judge concluded that Corri-
net did not meet a criterion of admission to the bar, it is undis-
puted that Corrinet was a member of the District of Oregon
bar and had been for almost a decade. The district judge rec-
ognized this by styling the order at issue here as an “order
revoking federal bar membership.” See North, 383 F.3d at
874-75 (finding jurisdiction where the attorney sought “re-
view of [an] order of suspension, not a denial of admission”).
Unlike Gallo, Corrinet does not seek review of the district
court’s denial of an application for a waiver of the local rules
governing attorney admission. See id. at 875 & n.3. He in fact
claims that he received such a waiver already. As in North,
Corrinet seeks review of an order barring him from practicing
9864 IN RE CORRINET
before the district court. Corrinet did not knock on the court-
house door seeking entry; he was already inside when he was
shown the door.
[3] Second, unlike Gallo, there has been no intervening,
generally-applicable change in the local rules rendering Corri-
net ineligible for continued membership. Rather, the district
judge unilaterally revoked his admission. From the limited
record before us, it is impossible to know whether Corrinet’s
initial admission was the result of a knowing waiver by the
district court or a clerical error. In either case, it is uncon-
tested that he was admitted notwithstanding his failure to
meet the Oregon State bar membership requirement, and that
his federal bar membership was revoked years later, in the
absence of a change in the rules. Corrinet’s case is very differ-
ent from the routine “matter[s] . . . of court administration” in
Wasserman and Gallo. Wasserman, 240 F.2d at 216.
[4] We conclude that the district judge’s order is more like
a disbarment order than a denial of admission. The order of
revocation constitutes a final decision subject to appellate
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. North, 383 F.3d at 875.
We review the order for abuse of discretion. See In re
Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Patterson,
176 F.2d 966, 968 n.1 (9th Cir. 1949) (“The scope of appel-
late review in disbarment proceedings is limited to the inquiry
whether there was an abuse of discretion, or grave irregulari-
ty.”) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529 (1824))2.
2
Even if we lack jurisdiction under § 1291, we would construe Corri-
net’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Gallo, 349 F.3d at
1177. Corrinet clearly satisfies three of the factors for granting a writ: (1)
he has no other adequate means to obtain relief; (2) he will be damaged
in a way that cannot be corrected on appeal; and (3) the district judge’s
order raises the new and important problem of whether a single judge may
revoke an attorney’s bar membership. See id.; see also Bauman v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). If Corrinet is right, then
he satisfies the two remaining factors: (4) disregard of the federal rules;
and (5) clear error on the district court’s part. See Gallo, 349 F.3d at 1177.
IN RE CORRINET 9865
III
[5] Corrinet challenges the revocation of his federal bar
membership on the ground that he was denied due process. It
is well established that an attorney subject to disbarment is
entitled to due process, including notice and an opportunity to
be heard. E.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282
(1957) (“Disbarment being the very serious business that it is,
ample opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an
accused practitioner should not be disbarred.”); In re Kramer,
193 F.3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the dis-
trict courts’ “inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers
. . . . must be exercised within the parameters of due process”
(citations omitted)); In re L. A. Cnty. Pioneer Soc’y, 217 F.2d
190, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1954) (collecting cases). The attorney
“must in advance be informed of the purpose of the proceed-
ing and of the grounds therefor, and be afforded a fair oppor-
tunity . . . to produce evidence in refutation or rebuttal.” Id.
at 193.
[6] The district judge abused his discretion by committing
multiple errors in revoking Corrinet’s bar admission.3 First,
the judge failed to issue a proper order to show cause; there-
fore, Corrinet was not on notice of the purpose of the show
cause hearing.4 See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d
1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing an attorney discipline
order where the district court failed to issue an order to show
cause notifying the attorney of possible discipline). The
docket entry setting the hearing does not indicate which party
was required to show cause or for what reason cause needed
to be shown. This notice was deficient.
3
These errors in fact rise to the level of clear error and disregard of the
federal rules, so our ruling would be no different were we to construe Cor-
rinet’s appeal as petition for mandamus. See Gallo, 349 F.3d at 1177.
4
It appears that, after receiving notice of the hearing, Corrinet actively
made inquiries regarding the purpose of the hearing; however, he received
no written notice or reasons from the district court.
9866 IN RE CORRINET
Second, the district judge failed to adhere to the District of
Oregon’s rules regarding the discipline of attorneys. District
judges must adhere to their court’s local rules, which have the
force of federal law. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct.
705, 710 (2010) (per curiam); Prof’l Programs Grp. v. Dep’t
of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that “a departure from local rules that affects ‘substantial
rights’ requires reversal” and “is justified only if the effect is
so slight and unimportant that the sensible treatment is to
overlook [it]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Courts
enforce the requirement of procedural regularity on others,
and must follow those requirements themselves.” Hollings-
worth, 130 S. Ct. at 706. For example, in Weissman, we over-
turned an attorney discipline order where “[t]he district court
did not observe its own rules — no order to show cause was
issued, no hearing was held, and the discipline imposed was
imposed by the complaining judge.” 179 F.3d at 1199.
[7] Here, the district judge did not adhere to the District of
Oregon’s local rules on attorney disbarment. Before an attor-
ney may be suspended or disbarred,5 the district court must
“issue an order to show cause why disciplinary action includ-
ing suspension, disbarment, or other appropriate disciplinary
action should not be taken.” D. Or. LR 83-6(b)(1). The attor-
ney is then entitled to file a response within twenty-one days
“showing good cause why he or she should not be subject to
5
We recognize that this case does not fall within the District of Ore-
gon’s enumerated list of reasons why an attorney may be disbarred. See
D. Or. LR 83-6 (providing that an attorney may be suspended or disbarred
from practice in the District Court of Oregon if: (1) he is suspended or dis-
barred from practice by another court; (2) he is convicted of a felony; (3)
he resigns from the bar of any court while a misconduct investigation is
pending; or (4) a change in admissions status in another court eliminates
his eligibility for admission to the bar of the District of Oregon). Local
Rule 83-6 nevertheless applies to Corrinet’s case because these enumer-
ated grounds are illustrative, not exclusive. Because the proceedings here
were indubitably disciplinary, they fell within the ambit of the District of
Oregon’s disciplinary rule.
IN RE CORRINET 9867
disciplinary action.” Id. 83-6(b)(2). The attorney may request
a hearing, and “the Chief Judge may appoint a judge or spe-
cial master to preside over the hearing.” Id. 83-6(b)(3)-(4).
Contrary to the requirement of the local rules, Corrinet
received no notice from the district court. The hearing was
held only twelve days after the scheduling order was entered,
when Corrinet should have had twenty-one days to muster his
response. Id. 83-6(b)(2). Consequently, Corrinet was denied
an opportunity to provide a written response and gather the
evidence necessary to present his case.
Further, we read the District of Oregon’s local rules to pre-
clude the complaining judge from disbarring an attorney. The
rules provide for the Clerk of Court to issue an order to show
cause. See D. Or. LR 83-6(b)(1). Should the attorney request
a hearing, the chief judge must decide whether to grant one
and appoint a judge or a special master to preside. See D. Or.
LR 83-6(b)(3). Nowhere do the local rules permit the single
complaining judge unilaterally to preclude an attorney from
appearing before the other judges in the district. Cf. Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 521 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir.
2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissental).
[8] Third, the hearing itself did not provide Corrinet with
an adequate opportunity to present his case. It appears from
the docket entries and the order of revocation that the district
judge informed Corrinet at the hearing that his federal admis-
sion would not be revoked if he gained membership in the
Oregon State Bar. This is not a satisfactory resolution. If, as
Corrinet insists, he could have established a defense of waiver
or estoppel, he should have had the opportunity to do so and
thereby avoid the more onerous option of taking another bar
examination and resolving any disputes with bar officials.
Instead, apparently put on the spot and unprepared, Corrinet
could only agree to pursue admission to the Oregon State Bar.
See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (stating that
“[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional stand-
9868 IN RE CORRINET
ing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful
forms of compulsion”).
[9] Fourth, the district judge did not give Corrinet an ade-
quate opportunity to comply with the order to gain member-
ship in the Oregon State Bar. For various reasons (including
an unresolved dispute with the state bar), Corrinet was unable
to obtain state bar membership in the time allowed to him.
Given an adequate opportunity, Corrinet may yet be able to
gain admission to the Oregon State Bar.
[10] Because the district judge failed to follow the District
of Oregon’s local rules and did not afford Corrinet due pro-
cess, we reverse and remand to the district court for further
proceedings. We do not reach Corrinet’s arguments that: (1)
the state bar membership requirement was waived by the
then-chief judge, so the revocation order was mistaken; and
(2) the District of Oregon acquiesced to his membership with-
out admission to the state bar for almost a decade and should
now be estopped from asserting that he is ineligible for mem-
bership. Because Corrinet did not have the opportunity to
present these arguments or to marshal evidence in their sup-
port, we remand so that the district court may consider these
contentions in the first instance.
IV
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of revo-
cation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
While the facts of this case evoke sympathy, they do not
give us jurisdiction. The district court applied its generally
IN RE CORRINET 9869
applicable local rules in determining that Corrinet was ineligi-
ble for membership in the district court bar. See Local Rule
83-2 (Admission to General Practice), Local Rules for the
District of Oregon, Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Because
we lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s admission
decisions, see Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court, 349 F.3d 1169, 1176
(9th Cir. 2003), but do have jurisdiction to review disbar-
ments, see In re North, 383 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2004), the
majority claims that this determination of ineligibility is really
a “disbarment.” Maj. op. at 9862. But it is clear that the dis-
trict court’s determination lacked the hallmarks of a disbar-
ment: it was neither ethical nor disciplinary in nature.
Accordingly, I dissent.
I
Mark Corrinet is an attorney licensed to practice in Califor-
nia. He is not a member of the Oregon State Bar. When he
moved to Oregon ten years ago, he tried to but could not sit
for the bar examination. Oregon has stringent requirements
regarding who can sit for the bar. For example, it does not
allow graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to sit for
the bar exam without at least three years of practice experi-
ence. See Or. R. for Admission of Attorneys 3.05. And it does
not waive the bar exam requirement for attorneys licensed in
California. See Or. R. for Admission of Attys 15.05(2)
(requiring applicants for reciprocal admission to be members
of a state that admits Oregon attorneys without requiring bar
passage, which California does not1).
Like many district courts, the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon limits admission to practice and
1
See The State Bar of California, Summary of Requirements for Admis-
sion to Practice Law in California (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.calbarxap.com/applications/calbar/California_Bar_
Registration/ (last visited July 5, 2011) (“There is no requirement of citi-
zenship or residency, and there is no reciprocity with other states.”).
9870 IN RE CORRINET
membership in the district court bar to “attorneys of good
moral character who are active members in good standing
with the Oregon State Bar.” LR 83-2. Thus, Corrinet was, and
is, ineligible to practice before the federal district court in
Oregon.
Despite his facial ineligibility, Corrinet was admitted to
practice before the District Court for the District of Oregon in
2002 by virtue, Corrinet claims, of the then-Chief Judge’s
“waiver” of Rule 83-2. Corrinet’s practice in Oregon required
very few appearances in federal court, and thus his eligibility
to practice before the district court went unquestioned for
many years. In 2009, however, Corrinet filed a complaint in
district court and applied to use the court’s electronic filing
system. In the course of routine processing of this request, the
Clerk’s Office discovered that Corrinet was not an active
member of the Oregon State Bar. The district court scheduled
a show cause hearing to allow Corrinet “to explain why he
should be allowed to continue as the only member of the Dis-
trict of Oregon’s bar without an active license from the Ore-
gon State Bar.” At that hearing, Corrinet agreed to apply to
the Oregon State Bar, and was allowed to continue represent-
ing his client while he sought admission. Five months later,
after Corrinet failed to gain admission to the Oregon State
Bar, the court issued an order “revok[ing] Mark S. Corrinet’s
membership to the Federal Bar for the District of Oregon pur-
suant to [Local Rule] 83-2.”
II
As a general rule, federal courts lack subject matter juris-
diction over denials of admission to federal district court bars.
See Gallo, 349 F.3d at 1176; In re Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213,
214 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1956). In Gallo, we reasoned that the
denial of a petition for admission to a district court bar is nei-
ther a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor an
interlocutory order appealable under § 1292. 349 F.3d at
1176. Even if an attorney has been a practicing member of a
IN RE CORRINET 9871
district court bar, the court has authority to change the eligi-
bility requirements, thereby denying an attorney continued
membership. Such a determination is not appealable. See id.
There is a different rule for disbarment actions. See North,
383 F.3d at 874. We have long “asserted jurisdiction to
review orders suspending or disbarring attorneys from prac-
ticing before the bars of federal district courts within our cir-
cuit.” Id.; see In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966, 967 n.1 (1949).
Likewise, the Supreme Court has concluded that a district
court’s decision to suspend an attorney from practicing before
the district court (due, in that case, to the attorney’s refusal to
apologize for a letter deemed to be disrespectful to the court)
“would be subject to review by the Court of Appeals.” In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 n.4 (1985). For unlike a denial of
admission, an “order of suspension” is “a final decision of the
district court that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” North,
383 F.3d at 875 (quoting Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039,
1047 (9th Cir. 2002)).
In Gallo, we addressed the question before us here: whether
we had jurisdiction to review a district court’s revocation of
the bar membership of a previously admitted attorney who did
not meet the then-current eligibility requirements for admis-
sion. In that case, Gallo, an out-of-state attorney, had been
admitted to the Arizona district court bar under the then-
applicable local rules. Four years later, the district court
amended its rules to limit membership in the bar to active
members of the state bar. 349 F.3d at 1173. After the court
notified Gallo that he could not practice before the district
court, he appealed. Id. Responding to the district court’s posi-
tion that we lacked jurisdiction to review the order at issue,
Gallo argued that because “he had already obtained admission
to practice before the District Court” and then was deprived
of that right, he was not seeking review of an admissibility
determination but rather was “seeking redress for an improper
disbarment.” Id. at 1175. We rejected this argument because
9872 IN RE CORRINET
the revocation of Gallo’s right to practice did not involve any
ethical violation: he was “guilty of no misconduct and the
District Court’s finding that he could not appear generally
before it was not the result of any disciplinary action.” Id. at
1183. Thus, we concluded that the district court’s order pro-
hibiting Gallo from further practice before the district court
was an unreviewable “denial of a petition for admission to a
district court bar.” Id. at 1176.
Gallo is directly applicable here. The Oregon district court
“revoke[d]” Corrinet’s admission to practice solely due to its
determination that he was not eligible under its generally
applicable local rules. The district court did not consider or
make any ruling regarding an ethical violation or misconduct
on Corrinet’s part. Moreover, the district court’s local rules
governing suspension or disbarment of attorneys are inappli-
cable by their terms. Local Rule 83-6 provides that an attor-
ney may be suspended or disbarred from practice in the
District Court of Oregon if: (1) he is suspended or disbarred
from practice by another court; (2) he is convicted of a felony;
(3) he resigns from the bar of any court while a misconduct
investigation is pending; or (4) a change in admissions status
in another court eliminates his eligibility for admission to the
bar of the District of Oregon. As the majority concedes, none
of these criteria is applicable here. Maj. op. at 9866 & n.5.
Although the majority argues that “Local Rule 83-6 neverthe-
less applies to Corrinet’s case because these enumerated
grounds are illustrative, not exclusive,” Maj. op. at 9866 n.5,
it cites no authority for this assertion, and the plain language
of the rule makes clear that disbarment proceedings may com-
mence based only on the four grounds listed in rule 83-6(a).2
2
Local Rule 83-6 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Duty of Counsel to Notify Court
Every attorney admitted to general or special practice before this
Court has an affirmative duty to notify the Chief Judge and the
assigned judge in writing within fourteen (14) days after they
have:
IN RE CORRINET 9873
The majority asserts that Gallo is different because it
involved a generally applicable rule change, whereas the dis-
trict judge here “unilaterally revoked” Corrinet’s admission.
Maj. op. at 9864. But Corrinet’s admission was no more “re-
voked” than was Gallo’s. Both were individually informed
that their ability to practice before the district court had been
withdrawn, and neither was “knock[ing] on the courthouse
door seeking entry” (to borrow the majority’s formulation),
but were “already inside when [they were] shown the door.”
Maj. op. at 9864. See Gallo, 349 F.3d at 1173-74 (noting
Gallo’s receipt of a letter indicating that he was “no longer
admitted to appear generally before the District Court,” even
though he had previously been admitted based on another dis-
trict court order). Thus, if Gallo was not disbarred, neither
was Corrinet. See id. at 1176-77 (construing the district
court’s decision to “enforce the amended version of the Local
Rules” as a “denial of Gallo’s application for a waiver” rather
(1) Been suspended or disbarred from practice by any court.
(2) Been convicted of a felony in either a state or federal court.
(3) Resigned from the bar of any court while an investigation
was pending into allegations of misconduct which would warrant
suspension or disbarment.
(4) Been notified of a change in their admissions status in any
other jurisdiction which would affect their eligibility for general
or special admission to the bar of this Court.
(b) Order to Show Cause
(1) Upon receipt of a notice pursuant to LR 83-6(a), or upon
notice or information that an LR 83-6 violation may have
occurred, the Court may direct the Clerk to issue an order to
show cause why disciplinary action including suspension, disbar-
ment, or other appropriate disciplinary action) should not be
taken against the attorney.
As explained in Local Rule 83-6(b), a district court may issue an order to
show cause for taking disciplinary action only if a violation enumerated
in LR 83-6(a) has occurred; on its face, the list of violations in LR83-6(a)
is exclusive.
9874 IN RE CORRINET
than a “disbarment,” which “generally involve[s] an ethical
violation sufficient to prevent an attorney from appearing in
any capacity before the District Court”).
In a footnote, the majority suggests that we have mandamus
jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Maj.
op. at 9864 n.2. This argument is particularly troubling, given
that Corrinet himself neither brought a petition for writ of
mandamus nor even asked us to treat his notice of appeal as
such a petition. Indeed, the majority’s eagerness to claim
authority to hear this case is a good example of what we wor-
ried about in Bauman: namely, that appellate courts might
succumb to the “temptation” to grant mandamus relief out of
sympathy for the petitioner, which both subverts “the policies
underlying the finality rule [and] the carefully limited con-
gressional scheme governing interlocutory appeals,” and
undermines the “mutual respect” between federal trial and
appellate courts. Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650,
653-54 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal citation omitted).
This subversion of our rules is clear in the majority’s con-
clusion that Corrinet satisfies the test for granting a petition
for mandamus because there would be “clear error on the dis-
trict court’s part”—but only “[i]f Corrinet is right.” Maj. op.
at 9864 n.2. It is well established that while “[a] petitioner
need not establish all five factors” of the test for granting a
petition for the writ, the petitioner “must establish the third,
that the district court’s order is clearly erroneous,” before we
can grant the writ. Islamic Shura Council of Southern Califor-
nia v. FBI, 635 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted); see also Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
absence of the third factor, clear error, is dispositive.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). In light of our on-point deci-
sion in Gallo, the majority’s conclusion that the district
court’s order was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law” is
untenable. See, e.g., Bauman, 557 F.2d at 660 (“In light of
this absence of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions
IN RE CORRINET 9875
and a split of authority in other jurisdictions, we simply can-
not conclude that the district court’s order is clearly erroneous
as a matter of law as that term is used in mandamus analy-
sis.”). Nor can the district court be faulted for failing to follow
the procedures set forth in Local Rule 83-6, which are inappli-
cable by their terms. See supra, at 9872 & n.1.
III
At bottom, the majority elides jurisdictional restrictions in
order to give effect to the equitable maxim “for every right,
a remedy.” It reasons that unless we have jurisdiction to
review the district court’s order, Corrinet will have no
recourse for protecting the membership he has enjoyed for the
better part of a decade. Of course, under the terms of the local
rules, which required membership in the Oregon State Bar,
Corrinet was never entitled to this “right.” Cf. In re Martin,
120 F.3d 256, 259 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (order) (holding that an
attorney admitted to the Tax Court bar on the basis of an erro-
neous state bar admission did not have a due process right to
“formal suspension or disbarment proceedings with notice
and a hearing,” because without a state bar membership, he
was not “an attorney facing suspension or disbarment”). More
important, no matter how sympathetic the appellant, we can-
not manufacture jurisdiction by relabeling the district court’s
application of a generally applicable rule as a disbarment, or
sua sponte construing Corrinet’s typical appeal as an extraor-
dinary writ. Because the district court’s revocation of Corri-
net’s right to practice was an eligibility determination that is
neither a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor an
interlocutory order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, we
lack jurisdiction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.Å