[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15886 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 20, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cv-00487-WTH-GRJ
LYNETTE SAETTELE,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARONDA HOMES, INC. OF FLORIDA,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 20, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lynette Saettele appeals the district court’s grant of Maronda Homes, Inc. of
Florida’s (Maronda Homes) motion to enforce the settlement agreement and
dismissal of her claims with prejudice in her employment discrimination action
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq., and the Florida
Civil Rights Act, ch. 760, Fla. Stat. Saettele asserts her counsel did not have clear
and unequivocal authority to settle the case for $60,000. Saettele also contends
there was no meeting of the minds as to an essential term of the agreement, as the
parties failed to agree regarding the terms of the release.1 After review, we affirm
the district court.
We review the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement for
an abuse of discretion. Hayes v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.
1
As an initial matter, Maronda Homes contends this appeal is moot because Saettele
accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement by depositing the settlement check. We have
held, however, “[m]erely accepting the [settlement] payment, without evidence of some intent to
end the litigation,” does not waive the right to appeal. Ass’n for Disabled Americans, Inc. v.
Integra Resort Mgmt., Inc., 387 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the record demonstrates
Saettele expressed her intent to receive the payment as ordered by the district court, and believed
she could appeal the judgment despite that fact. In the district court, Saettele argued Maronda
Homes was required to provide the check to her, as she did not want to risk Maronda Homes
becoming insolvent or bankrupt during the pendency of the appeal. Under these facts, Maronda
Homes had notice of the fact that Saettele did not intend for for the acceptance of the settlement
check to waive her right to an appeal.
2
1999). We refer to state law principles when reviewing the scope of an attorney’s
authority to enter into a settlement agreement. Id.
Under Florida law, the “party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement bears
the burden of showing that the attorney proposing the settlement had the clear and
unequivocal authority from his client to do so.” Hamilton v. Fla. Power & Light
Co., 48 So. 3d 170, 171-72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Murchison v. Grand
Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1485-87 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Florida’s
“clear and unequivocal authority” standard). “The trial court’s factual findings that
there was a clear and unequivocal grant of authority must be supported by
competent, substantial evidence in order to be upheld on appeal.” Hamilton, 48 So.
3d at 172. The mere representation by an attorney does not give the attorney the
implied or apparent authority to settle her client’s claim. Johnson v. Skarvan, 992
So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement
agreement, as Saettele admitted she gave her attorney permission to settle the case
for $60,000. Further, Maronda Homes agreed to waive the disputed written
release terms, such that Saettele will not be bound to any term to which she did not
agree at the time of settling her case for $60,000. Thus, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3