FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA,
Petitioner, No. 09-72060
v.
Agency No.
A028-976-760
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney
General, OPINION
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted
May 6, 2011—Pasadena, California
Filed July 21, 2011
Before: John T. Noonan and Richard A. Paez,
Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,
Senior District Judge.*
Per Curiam Opinion
*The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Eastern New York, Brooklyn, sitting by designation.
9693
RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA v. HOLDER 9695
COUNSEL
Lori B. Schoenberg, Law Offices of John R. Perry, P.C.,
Encino, California, for the petitioner.
Blair T. O’Connor, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., counsel for the respondent.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jose Rodriguez-Valencia, a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration
judge’s order finding him removable and denying his applica-
tion for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
Rodriguez-Valencia challenges the BIA’s finding that his
six convictions for “willfully manufacturing, intentionally
selling, and knowingly possessing for sale more than 1,000
articles bearing a counterfeit trademark,” in violation of Cali-
fornia Penal Code § 350(a)(2), constitute an aggravated fel-
ony as an “offense relating to . . . counterfeiting.” INA
§ 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R). Rodriguez-
Valencia maintains that the generic offense of counterfeiting
refers only to the imitation of currency and that his conviction
under California Penal Code § 350 did not require proof of his
intent to defraud. We review de novo whether an offense is
9696 RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA v. HOLDER
an aggravated felony. Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).
To determine whether a conviction qualifies as an aggra-
vated felony, we apply the categorical approach articulated in
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Penuliar v.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this
approach, we “look to the statute under which the person was
convicted and compare its elements to the relevant definition
of an aggravated felony in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).” Penuliar,
528 F.3d at 608. An offense is an aggravated felony “if and
only if the full range of conduct covered by the [criminal stat-
ute] falls within the meaning of that term.” Id.
I.
[1] We turn first to the argument that the generic offense
of counterfeiting refers only to the unlawful imitation of cur-
rency and other government obligations. INA section
101(a)(43)(R) defines an aggravated felony as “an offense
relating to . . . counterfeiting . . . for which the term of impris-
onment is at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).
While the common law may have limited the crime of coun-
terfeiting to “debasing or imparing the coin,” Fox v. State of
Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 428 (1847), by the time Congress enacted
INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R),1 federal
counterfeiting offenses had grown to encompass, inter alia,
the unauthorized imitation of: state securities, 18 U.S.C.
§ 513; foreign securities, 18 U.S.C. § 478; court seals, 18
U.S.C. § 505; federal department and agency seals, 18 U.S.C.
§ 506; customs papers, 18 U.S.C. § 496; ship’s papers, 18
U.S.C. § 507; letters patent, 18 U.S.C. § 497; passports, 18
U.S.C. § 1543; postage stamps, 18 U.S.C. § 502; and Post
Office keys, 18 U.S.C. § 1704. Indeed, over a decade before
1
Congress enacted INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), as
part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1278 (1996).
RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA v. HOLDER 9697
Congress enacted INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(R), it criminalized trafficking in counterfeit
goods and services. See Trademark Counterfeiting Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 1837, 2178 (1984)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320); see also United States v.
Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 was intended “[t]o
help stem . . . an ‘epidemic’ of commercial counterfeiting . . .
[and to] provide[ ] for stiff criminal penalties for those who
intentionally traffic in goods or services knowing them to be
counterfeit.”) (ellipses in original) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Accordingly, when Congress added con-
victions relating to counterfeiting to the definition of aggra-
vated felony, it was well understood and clearly established
that the generic crime of counterfeiting extended far beyond
the imitation of currency.
[2] A plain reading of INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(R), further bolsters a broad construction of an
“offense relating to . . . counterfeiting.” When interpreting the
INA, we “construe[ ] the ‘relating to’ language broadly.” Luu-
Le v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000). In Albillo-
Figueroa v. I.N.S., 221 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000), we
held that the “relating to” language of INA “[s]ection
101(a)(43)(R) necessarily covers a range of activities beyond
those of counterfeiting or forgery itself.” Other circuits have
similarly found that “Congress evidenced an intent to define
[counterfeiting] in [its] broadest possible sense” by employing
the phrase “relating to.” See Magasouba v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d
13, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Park v. I.N.S., 472 F.3d 66, 72
(3rd Cir. 2006); Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 154 (2d
Cir. 2004) (“The term [‘relating to’ in INA § 101(a)(43)(R),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R),] . . . suggest[s] Congress’s intent
to reach more broadly than any single statute.”); see also
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383-84,
(1992) (finding that the phrase “relating to” has “a broad
scope . . . and an expansive sweep.”) Indeed, both the First
and the Third Circuits have held that convictions for counter-
9698 RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA v. HOLDER
feiting trademarks categorically relate to counterfeiting under
section 101(a)(43)(R) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).
See Magasouba, 543 F.3d at 15 (finding a Rhode Island stat-
ute that punishes “[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully
sells, offer[s] to sell, or possesses with the intent to sell goods
which contain a counterfeit trademark,” R.I.G.L. § 11-14-
03(c)(1), qualifies as an offense relating to counterfeiting);
see also Park, 472 F.3d at 71 (finding a conviction for traf-
ficking in counterfeit goods or services, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2320, relates to counterfeiting). We similarly hold
that the definition of aggravated felony extends to convictions
for the unauthorized imitation of trademarks.
II.
[3] We quickly dispose of Rodriguez-Valencia’s remaining
argument that California Penal Code § 350 does not incorpo-
rate “an intent to defraud” as an essential element of the
offense. Pet’r Br. at 7. While there may be some counterfeit-
ing crimes that do not require an intent to defraud, see e.g.,
United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Congress deliberately chose to require an intent to defraud
for some forgery and counterfeiting crimes, but not for oth-
ers.”) (Sotomayor, J.), assuming arguendo that the generic
offense of counterfeiting requires such an intent, California
Penal Code § 350 “is an inherently fraudulent crime.” Tall v.
Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “[a]ll
of the conduct punished by [California Penal Code] § 350,
‘willfully manufactur[ing], intentionally sell[ing], or know-
ingly possess[ing] for sale any counterfeit . . . mark,’
‘involve[s] knowingly false representations made in order to
gain something of value.’ ” Id. at 1119-20 (citation omitted)
(third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original). Because
“[t]he commission of the crime necessarily defrauds the
owner of the mark, or an innocent purchaser of the counterfeit
items, or both,” id. at 1120, we “have difficultly distinguish-
ing such intent from a general intent to defraud,” Winestock
v. I.N.S., 576 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1978).
RODRIGUEZ-VALENCIA v. HOLDER 9699
The petition for review is DENIED.