Tracy Russell v. Commissioner of Social Sec

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2348

TRACY BRUNER RUSSELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00005-jpj-pms)

Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 22, 2011

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Hugh F. O’Donnell, CLIENT CENTERED LEGAL SERVICES OF SOUTHWEST
VIRGINIA, Norton, Virginia, for Appellant. Eric P. Kressman,
Regional Chief Counsel, Victor Pane, Supervisory Attorney,
Jordana Cooper, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Tracy Bruner Russell appeals the district court’s

order granting the Commissioner of Social Security’s summary

judgment motion in Russell’s action seeking review of the

Commissioner’s decision denying her disability insurance and

supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security

Act (“the Act”). On appeal, Russell raises only one issue–

whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in rejecting

the opinion of her treating rheumatologist regarding her ability

to work. Finding no error, we affirm.

“[W]e review de novo the district court’s award of

summary judgment, viewing the facts and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th

Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

Additionally, we review the denial of benefits under

the Act to ensure that the ALJ’s findings of fact “are supported

by substantial evidence and [that] the correct law was applied.”

Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
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U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

will not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations

because those functions are left to the ALJ. Johnson v.

Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). “Where conflicting

evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a

claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls

on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

An ALJ is required to weigh medical opinions based on:

“(1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the

treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant,

(3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the

consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the

physician is a specialist.” Id. at 654 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527 (2005)). While “[c]ourts often accord greater weight

to the testimony of a treating physician,” id. (internal

quotation marks omitted), the ALJ is not required to do so “if a

physician’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if

it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence.” Craig v.

Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996); see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(2). If the ALJ does not give the treating

physician’s opinion controlling weight, she must “give good

reasons in [her] notice of determination or decision for the

weight [she] give[s] [the] treating source’s opinion.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
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Upon review, we conclude that the ALJ did not err in

discounting the opinion of Russell’s treating rheumatologist.

In her decision, the ALJ noted that Russell saw the

rheumatologist, Dr. Morris, infrequently, and had not seen him

for six months prior to his filling out the disability

assessment. The decision further explains that Dr. Morris’s

opinion about Russell’s disability was not supported by his

treatment notes or by other information in the file. Although

his assessment form precluded Russell from working due to

limited use of her hands, his notes indicate that she was

improving with treatment and his opinion is unsupported by

medical tests or other evidence. On Russell’s last visit to Dr.

Morris prior to his assessment of her ability to work, Dr.

Morris noted that Russell had no active synovitis and had the

full range of motion in her hands. These notes constitute

substantial evidence sufficient to allow the ALJ to discount Dr.

Morris’s disability assessment.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for the Commissioner. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED