In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2479
V ATCHAREE P RONSIVAKULCHAI,
Petitioner,
v.
E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A079-190-556
A RGUED JUNE 6, 2011—D ECIDED JULY 25, 2011
Before B AUER, K ANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) finding
the petitioner removable from the United States and
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.
The petitioner is a native and citizen of Thailand who
was extradited from Thailand to the United States to stand
trial on drug charges in the Northern District of Illinois.
2 No. 10-2479
Once in the United States, the petitioner wrote letters
to people in Thailand who were suspected of being in-
volved in the drug trade in order to assist the Drug En-
forcement Administration (the “DEA”) in its investigation
of drug trafficking from Thailand. The government ulti-
mately moved to dismiss the charges against her
in the Northern District and commenced removal pro-
ceedings.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case before us is a sequel to the decision by the
same panel reported at Pronsivakulchai v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2006). In that opinion, we vacated an
order by the BIA finding the petitioner removable from
the United States and ineligible for asylum and with-
holding of removal. We remanded the case for further
proceedings because the immigration judge (the “IJ”)
reviewing her case had denied her an opportunity to
rebut the government’s contention that she had com-
mitted a serious non-political crime in Thailand prior to
her arrival in the United States; this argument had
formed the basis of the order that she be removed.
On remand, the petitioner was allowed to present
evidence on her own behalf and to rebut the govern-
ment’s testimony that she was involved in drug
trafficking in Thailand. She also attempted to establish
her entitlement to protection under the Convention
Against Torture (the “CAT”). On January 12, 2009, IJ
Jennie Giambastiani issued a 41-page decision and
order finding the petitioner removable as charged. After
No. 10-2479 3
reviewing the IJ’s decision, the BIA ordered that the
petitioner’s appeal be dismissed. She now challenges the
sufficiency of the procedural aspects of the removal
proceedings below as well as the IJ’s finding that there
was “serious reason to believe” that she had committed
a “serious non-political offense outside of the United
States,” namely drug trafficking.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Proceedings Held On Remand Were Procedur-
ally Fair
We review the sufficiency of the procedural aspects of
an immigration hearing de novo. Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales,
450 F.3d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 2006). The Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process in deportation proceedings.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). This entails a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present evi-
dence on one’s own behalf. Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales,
422 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir. 2005).
The petitioner’s arguments on this score are very remi-
niscent of those that were made in her last appeal to
this court. While the first round of proceedings below
struck us as fundamentally unfair, the same cannot
be said of the proceedings that were held on remand.
Whereas on the first go-around the petitioner was denied
a meaningful opportunity to rebut the government’s
evidence against her, on remand she was able to cross-
examine the government’s witnesses (who traveled from
Thailand for the proceedings), and to present her own
4 No. 10-2479
testimony and the testimony of three other witnesses
appearing on her behalf. Both parties submitted addi-
tional documentary evidence in support of their respec-
tive positions and the IJ carefully weighed the evidence
on both sides, as evidenced by her lengthy and compre-
hensive written decision. This is precisely what due
process requires in such proceedings. We find that the
proceedings were fair and deny the petitioner further
review of her petition on due process grounds.
B. The IJ’s Findings About The Petitioner’s Alleged
Role In Drug Trafficking Were Adequately
Supported By The Evidence Presented
The success of the petitioner’s appeal depends on
her challenge to the IJ’s finding that the evidence pre-
sented gave rise to “serious reason to believe” she had
committed drug trafficking crimes in Thailand. That
finding, if affirmed, bars her from eligibility for asy-
lum, cancellation of removal, and CAT protection. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (barring asylum); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (barring withholding of removal);
and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (barring withholding of
rem o val u n der t he C A T b ased on 8 U.S.C .
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)).
Even though the evidence presented on remand
included the testimony of a DEA officer and a Royal Thai
police officer implicating her in drug activity, arrest
warrants from both Thailand and the United States, and
the petitioner’s own testimony admitting that she had
engaged in drug transactions, the petitioner still claims
No. 10-2479 5
that there was insufficient evidence to meet the “serious
reason to believe” standard. However, we agree with
the IJ that the “reasonable, substantial and probative
evidence presented during the entirety of the petitioner’s
removal proceedings” on remand establishes serious
reason to believe she is or has been a trafficker of heroin.
The petitioner claims that the overwhelming evidence
of her involvement in the drug trade should be
disregarded because hearsay statements were improperly
entered into evidence. The statements the IJ relied upon
were based in large part on personal knowledge. Even
accepting the petitioner’s argument that some of the
statements amounted to hearsay, hearsay is admissible
in removal proceedings, so this argument does not
require further discussion. See Ogbolumani v. Napolitano,
557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2009). She also disputes credi-
bility determinations the IJ made in favor of the govern-
ment’s witnesses, even though specific reasons were
given for making such determinations and many were
supported by documentary evidence in the record. Since
we defer to credibility determinations made below, this
argument similarly merits no further discussion. See
Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that “[c]redibility determinations are questions
of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary
circumstances”); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that an IJ’s credibility determina-
tions enjoy “highly deferential” review when supported
by “specific cogent reasons” that bear a “legitimate
nexus” to the findings).
6 No. 10-2479
III. CONCLUSION
The outcome of this case follows the Latin phrase
“dura lex, sed lex”—the law is hard, but it’s the law. The
petitioner was brought to the United States to stand trial,
never received a trial, and, after cooperating with the
DEA, will be returned to Thailand where those she
tried to help the DEA identify still lurk. While we are
sympathetic, the evidence produced at a full and fair
hearing squarely links her to the serious crime of drug
trafficking, barring her from the relief she seeks in
this matter. The petitioner’s request that the case be
remanded again is therefore D ENIED.
7-25-11