PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-5166
LAURY ARTHUR WILKS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(5:08-cr-01263-MBS-1)
Argued: September 22, 2010
Decided: July 28, 2011
Before AGEE, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge, and James C. DEVER III, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge
Hamilton wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge
Dever joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Vijay Shanker, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John
2 UNITED STATES v. ILKS
Herman Hare, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Kevin F. McDonald, Acting United States Attorney,
Robert C. Jendron, Jr., Robert F. Daley, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
OPINION
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:
The issue presented is whether the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule permits the admission of evidence
obtained by a police officer who conducts a search in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on binding appellate (in our case,
Fourth Circuit) precedent that is later overruled. On June 16,
2011, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved this
issue, holding that "searches conducted in objectively reason-
able reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to
the exclusionary rule." Davis v. United States, 2011 WL
2369583, at *3 (U.S. June 16, 2011). Because the district
court’s decision in this case granting the motion to suppress
by the defendant, Laury Arthur Wilks, Jr., is inconsistent with
Davis, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
I
A
On September 21, 2006, Officer Cueto of the Orangeburg
Department of Public Safety stopped a car being driven by
Wilks on McKinney Avenue in Orangeburg, South Carolina.
Officer Cueto executed the stop because he observed that the
car had an expired license plate.
UNITED STATES v. ILKS 3
Officer Cueto approached the car and explained to Wilks
the purpose of the stop. Officer Cueto then asked Wilks for
his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance.1
While Wilks was in the process of producing these materials,
Officer Cueto and Wilks engaged in some small talk, during
which Wilks reached under the front seat with his right hand
several times, as though he was trying to reach for something.
These furtive acts made Officer Cueto feel uncomfortable, so
he instructed Wilks to keep his hands on the steering wheel.
Officer Cueto and Wilks continued to converse, but Wilks
once again reached under the front seat with his right hand.
Instead of returning to his patrol car, Officer Cueto, out of
concern for his safety, remained next to the car occupied by
Wilks while he contacted a police dispatcher to obtain infor-
mation on the validity of Wilks’ driver’s license. The police
dispatcher informed Officer Cueto that Wilks’ license had
been suspended.
Officer Cueto then ordered Wilks to exit the car, which he
did. As Officer Cueto advised Wilks that he was under arrest
for driving with a suspended license, Wilks "struggle[d] a lit-
tle bit," (J.A. 55), which lead to his being handcuffed and
placed in the back seat of Officer Cueto’s patrol car.
Around this time, Officer O’Cain arrived on the scene. He
was instructed by Officer Cueto to search under the front seat
of the car. Officer O’Cain recovered a .380 caliber pistol from
under the front seat, and then proceeded to search the rest of
the car at Officer Cueto’s direction. In the trunk, Officer
O’Cain recovered some ammunition.
B
On December 16, 2008, a federal grand jury sitting in the
District of South Carolina charged Wilks with possession of
1
The car Wilks was driving was owned by his sister.
4 UNITED STATES v. ILKS
a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). On September 19, 2009, Wilks filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the stop, claiming, among
other things, that the search of the car violated Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). In Gant, the Supreme Court
held that a car search incident to a lawful arrest is not valid
where the defendant is stopped for a traffic violation, arrested,
handcuffed, and placed in the back of the patrol car prior to
the time of the search. Id. at 1719. In response to Wilks’
motion, the government argued that the exclusionary rule
should not apply because Officer O’Cain acted in good faith
in relying on binding Fourth Circuit precedent. There was no
dispute below (nor in this court) that Officer O’Cain’s search
of the front seat was permissible at the time of the search
under binding Fourth Circuit precedent. See United States v.
Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that, once a
person is lawfully arrested following a traffic violation, a
police officer may conduct a search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile, including the glove compartment,
even if the arrestee has been separated from the automobile
prior to the search of the passenger compartment).
Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion
to suppress. The district court was "persuaded by those courts
declining to apply the good-faith exception" in these circum-
stances, and noted that this court previously had applied Gant
in unpublished cases pending on appeal, which the district
court observed was a signal of our intent to apply Gant retro-
actively. (J.A. 41). The district court also noted that "applica-
tion of the good-faith exception would be contrary to the
[Gant] Court’s admonition that ‘[w]e have never relied on
stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional
police practice.’" (J.A. 41) (quoting Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722).
The government filed a timely notice of appeal.
On September 22, 2010, we heard oral argument. On
November 1, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Davis. We placed this case in abeyance, pending the Court’s
UNITED STATES v. ILKS 5
decision in Davis on January 21, 2011. As Davis was decided
on June 16, 2011, this case is ripe for decision.
II
The government acknowledges that Officer O’Cain’s
search of the car violated Wilks’ Fourth Amendment rights,
because, at the time of Officer O’Cain’s search, Wilks was
secured in the back of Officer Cueto’s patrol car. However,
the government argues that the remedy for such a violation
(the exclusionary rule) should not apply because Officer
O’Cain, in conducting the search, acted in objectively reason-
able reliance on binding Fourth Circuit precedent that was
later overruled.
In Davis, the Supreme Court dealt with a case with facts
similar to the case currently before this court. The search at
issue took place before the Supreme Court decided Gant.
Davis, 2011 WL 2369583, at *5. Police officers conducted a
routine traffic stop which resulted in the arrests of both the
driver and the passenger (Davis). Id. Both the driver and
Davis were handcuffed and placed in the back of separate
patrol cars. Id. In the subsequent search of the passenger com-
partment of the car, the police officers recovered a revolver
inside Davis’ jacket pocket. Id.
Davis was indicted in the Middle District of Alabama on
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Davis, 2011 WL 2369583, at *5. Davis
moved to suppress the revolver on the basis of a Fourth
Amendment violation, though he acknowledged that the
search complied with existing Eleventh Circuit precedent. Id.
(citing United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 822, 824–827
(11th Cir. 1996) (upholding a substantially contemporaneous
search of car incident to arrest)). The district court denied the
motion to suppress, and, following his conviction, Davis
appealed the conviction to the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
6 UNITED STATES v. ILKS
While Davis’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Gant. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that Davis’
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search under
Gant, but refused to apply the exclusionary rule, because
"‘penalizing the [arresting] officer’ for following binding
appellate precedent would do nothing to ‘dete[r] . . . Fourth
Amendment violations.’" Id. (quoting United States v. Davis,
598 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2010)).
The Supreme Court in Davis framed the issue to be decided
as whether the exclusionary rule should be applied when
police officers conduct a search in compliance with binding
appellate precedent that is later overruled. Id. at *3. The
Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the exclu-
sionary rule is a "prudential" doctrine, created by the Court to
"compel respect for the constitutional guaranty." Id. at *5
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
exclusion of evidence is "not a personal constitutional right,
nor is it designed to redress the injury occasioned by an
unconstitutional search." Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to "deter future Fourth Amendment violations." Id. "Where
suppression fails to yield appreciable deterrence, exclusion is
clearly . . . unwarranted." Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
However, a demonstration of meaningful deterrence,
although a precondition for application of the exclusionary
rule, is not, standing alone, sufficient to require application of
such rule. Id. Application of the exclusionary rule also
involves weighing the societal costs of applying the rule,
because exclusion of evidence "almost always requires courts
to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or
innocence." Id. Exclusion of evidence only is appropriate if
the deterrence benefits of suppression outweighs the heavy
societal costs of exclusion. Id. The Court recognized that,
when the police deliberately, recklessly, or grossly negli-
gently disregard the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights,
UNITED STATES v. ILKS 7
"the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to out-
weigh the resulting costs." Id. at *6. However, when the
police act with an "objectively reasonable good-faith belief
that their conduct is lawful, . . . or when their conduct
involves only simple, isolated negligence, . . . the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its
way." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court concluded that
the application of the exclusionary rule was unwarranted,
because of the "absence of police culpability." Id. at *8. The
Court observed that exclusion of the evidence would not
result in meaningful deterrence of police misconduct. Id.
Moreover, the police conduct was not sufficiently culpable to
trigger application of the exclusionary rule. Id. The Court
noted that the police officers did not deliberately, recklessly,
or with gross negligence violate Davis’ Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. The Court further noted that the case did not
involve "recurring or systemic negligence" on the part of the
police. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court bolstered its decision in Davis by noting that, in
the twenty-seven years of practice under the good-faith excep-
tion, the Court had never applied the exclusionary rule to
"nonculpable, innocent police conduct." Id. The Court recog-
nized that, had the police officers "reasonably relied on a war-
rant in conducting their search, . . . or on an erroneous warrant
record in a government database, . . . the exclusionary rule
would not apply." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court further recognized that, "if Congress or
the Alabama Legislature had enacted a statute codifying the
precise holding of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gonza-
lez," the good-faith exception would apply and permit the
admission of the evidence. Id. According to the Court, the
same should be said about an error made by an appellate
court. Id.
8 UNITED STATES v. ILKS
The Supreme Court in Davis also rejected the argument
that applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
would conflict with the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence. Id.
at *10.2 The Court opined that the argument conflated the
principle of retroactivity with the question of what is the
appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. Id.
According to the Court, "retroactive application of a new rule
of substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question
whether a suppression remedy applies; it does not answer that
question." Id. Rather, to determine whether the exclusionary
rule applies in a given case, a court must analyze whether any
exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, such as the good-
faith exception, and whether the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is "effectively advanced" in the case. Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis is on all fours with
the case currently before this court. There is no dispute that
Officer O’Cain’s search of Wilks’ car was in compliance with
binding Fourth Circuit precedent that was later overruled by
the Supreme Court. In such a case, per Davis, the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply. Thus, the district court erred when it
applied the exclusionary rule in this case.
III
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district
court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
Under this jurisprudence, "a decision of [the Supreme Court] constru-
ing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions
that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered." United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982); see also Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (noting that, even decisions constituting a "clear
break" with past precedent have retroactive application).