UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2263
CELESTIN NJIBECK NGWA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: July 8, 2011 Decided: July 28, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Danielle L. C. Beach-Oswald, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW
ASSOCIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Luis E.
Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathryn L. Moore, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Celestin Njibeck Ngwa, a native and citizen of
Cameroon, petitions for review an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds. . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
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“An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past
persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004).
Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear
standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete
facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances
to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d
351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective component can be met
through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere
testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . .
[It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances
and be validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it
cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d
at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if he was removed
to his native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened”
on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear
probability” means that it is more likely than not that the
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alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429-30 (1984). Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is
mandatory for anyone whose establishes that there “life or
freedom would be threatened . . . because of [their] race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).
A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]”
for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989).
“Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent
statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable
testimony[.]” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court accords
broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings
supported by substantial evidence. Camara, 378 F.3d at 367.
Credibility determinations are to be made based on the
totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors,
including the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account,
the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral
statements, the internal consistency of each such statement, the
consistency of such statements with other evidence of record and
any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
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goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li
Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This
court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that
an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless
manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’”
Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
adverse credibility finding. The inconsistencies noted by the
immigration judge were not minor errors, but were critical to
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Ngwa’s claim that he suffered past persecution. See Camara, 378
F.3d at 369. The immigration judge was not obligated to accept
Ngwa’s explanations for the inconsistencies. Dankam v.
Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007). We further
conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that
Ngwa did not establish eligibility for relief based on
independent evidence. We also conclude that the immigration
judge properly considered the independent evidence in finding
that Ngwa was not eligible for relief under the CAT. We find
the evidence does not support a different conclusion.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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