Celestin Ngwa v. Eric Holder, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2263

CELESTIN NJIBECK NGWA,

Petitioner,

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Submitted: July 8, 2011 Decided: July 28, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Danielle L. C. Beach-Oswald, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW
ASSOCIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Luis E.
Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathryn L. Moore, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Celestin Njibeck Ngwa, a native and citizen of

Cameroon, petitions for review an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the

immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,

withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes

the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person

unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).

“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,

torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one

of the enumerated grounds. . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405

F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility

for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.

2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011), and can establish

refugee status based on past persecution in his native country

on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).

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“An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past

persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of

persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.

2004).

Without regard to past persecution, an alien can

establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected

ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear

standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.

The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete

facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances

to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d

351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective component can be met

through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere

testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . .

[It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances

and be validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it

cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d

at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,

an alien must show a clear probability that, if he was removed

to his native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened”

on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see

Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear

probability” means that it is more likely than not that the

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alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.

407, 429-30 (1984). Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is

mandatory for anyone whose establishes that there “life or

freedom would be threatened . . . because of [their] race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).

A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony

on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]”

for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989).

“Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent

statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable

testimony[.]” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court accords

broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings

supported by substantial evidence. Camara, 378 F.3d at 367.

Credibility determinations are to be made based on the

totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors,

including the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the

applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account,

the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral

statements, the internal consistency of each such statement, the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record and

any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

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goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or

withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial

evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-

Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of

fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the

contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are

reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s

interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li

Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This

court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .

presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could

fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-

Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325

n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that

an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless

manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’”

Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the

adverse credibility finding. The inconsistencies noted by the

immigration judge were not minor errors, but were critical to

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Ngwa’s claim that he suffered past persecution. See Camara, 378

F.3d at 369. The immigration judge was not obligated to accept

Ngwa’s explanations for the inconsistencies. Dankam v.

Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007). We further

conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that

Ngwa did not establish eligibility for relief based on

independent evidence. We also conclude that the immigration

judge properly considered the independent evidence in finding

that Ngwa was not eligible for relief under the CAT. We find

the evidence does not support a different conclusion.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED