UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4093
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GERALD LEE CUNNINGHAM,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00605-TLW-1)
Submitted: July 19, 2011 Decided: July 29, 2011
Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, William Day, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Lee Cunningham pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to one count of copyright infringement,
in violation of 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011)
and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011), and was
sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment. In the plea
agreement, Cunningham reserved the right to challenge the
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence
seized from his vehicle. On appeal, Cunningham challenges the
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated in various ways. We
affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of
Cunningham’s suppression motion, we review the court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009).
Because the district court denied Cunningham’s motion, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). We
also defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
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IV. “[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment[, however,] do
not bear on every encounter between a police officer and a
member of the public; it is only when a ‘search’ or a ‘seizure’
has occurred that the Fourth Amendment comes into play.” United
States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2008). A “seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an
individual and asks a few questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 434 (1991). Rather, a seizure warranting protection
of the Fourth Amendment occurs when, under the totality of the
circumstances, “a reasonable person would not feel free to leave
or otherwise terminate the encounter” with the police. United
States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002).
Cunningham argues that he was unlawfully seized, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when law enforcement officers
approached him in a vacant lot and one of the officers began
asking him questions after observing Cunningham standing next to
a vehicle and speaking with a known drug dealer. After
reviewing the transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude
that the record amply supports the district court’s finding that
this encounter between Cunningham and the officers was a
consensual police-citizen encounter that does not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 310 (listing factors appropriate
for consideration in reviewing whether a seizure has occurred).
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Cunningham also challenges the district court’s
finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of the
vehicle. We conclude, however, that the facts of the encounter
between Cunningham and the officers confirm that Cunningham
consented to the search of the vehicle and that such consent was
voluntarily given. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
219, 227 (1973) (recognizing that consent is an exception to the
warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on
the totality of the circumstances); United States v. Lattimore,
87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (listing factors
appropriate for consideration in reviewing whether consent was
voluntarily given).
Cunningham also argues that, even assuming his consent
to search the vehicle was valid, law enforcement was not
authorized to search through and seize a brown box and bags
found in the vehicle during the search. Again, we disagree.
“[W]hen a suspect gives his general and unqualified consent for
an officer to search a particular area, the officer does not
need to return to ask for fresh consent to search a closed
container located within that area.” United States v. Jones,
356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004). A suspect’s “general consent
to a search permits the opening of closed but unlocked
containers found in the place as to which consent was given.”
United States v. Gant, 112 F.3d 239, 243 (6th Cir. 1997)
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(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Cunningham
gave his unqualified consent for a law enforcement officer to
search the vehicle, thus permitting the officer to search the
bags and box located inside it. Further, because Cunningham
consented to the search of the vehicle, and it is undisputed
that the contents of the bags and box readily appeared
incriminating, the seizure of these items was authorized under
the plain-view doctrine. See United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d
1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the warrantless seizure
of incriminating evidence is authorized under the plain-view
doctrine where the officer is lawfully in a place from which the
object may be viewed and has a lawful right to access the object
and where the object’s incriminating character is immediately
apparent).
Because the district court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress, we affirm the court's judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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