FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVE JOSEPH NOBLE, IV, No. 09-17251
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v.
1:03-cv-05407-SMS
D. ADAMS; D. CUEVAS, ORDER AND
Defendants-Appellants. AMENDED
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011*
San Francisco, California
Opinion Filed March 17, 2011
Amended Opinion Filed August 2, 2011
Before: John T. Noonan, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and
Stephen S. Trott, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Trott
*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
9861
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9863
.
COUNSEL
Constance L. Picciano, Deputy Attorney General, Sacra-
mento, California, for the appellants.
Steve Joseph Noble IV, Pro Se, Represa, California, for the
appellee.
9864 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
ORDER
With the filing of the Amended Opinion, Pro Se Appellee’s
petition for rehearing filed April 8, 2011, is hereby DENIED,
no further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.
OPINION
TROTT, Circuit Judge:
Adams and Cuevas are prison officials responsible for a
post-riot lockdown of Corcoran State Prison in California.
They appeal the district court’s denial of their assertion of
qualified immunity against inmate Noble’s claim that the
lockdown resulted in a denial of his Eighth Amendment right
to outdoor exercise. We have jurisdiction over this timely
appeal, and we reverse and remand with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the officials.
BACKGROUND
During 2002, Noble was a prisoner in the Substance Abuse
Treatment Center (“SATF”) at Corcoran State Prison. He is
an African-American who was also a “former” street gang
member from Los Angeles — a “Crip.” Noble was classified
as a “Level IV” inmate, the highest level of custody, and he
was housed in Facility C.
Because of a particularly violent armed riot on Facility C’s
exercise yard by African-American prisoners against staff on
January 09, 2002, described by the Facility Captain of SATF
as the most violent and savage attack he had observed in 20
years, Warden D.G. Adams of the SATF formally declared a
state of emergency (approved by the Director of Corrections)
and imposed a “lockdown” on the entire prison.1 The riot in
1
Cal. Code Regs. 15, § 300 defines a lockdown as follows:
Lockdown means that a portion of the facility is affected by sus-
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9865
the exercise yard, which was started by a Crips gang member,
included an attempt by prisoners to kill one of the correction
officers and resulted in injuries to 21 staff. Nine staff mem-
bers were taken to the hospital for evaluation and treatment.
The mass assault on staff was an unprecedented event. It was
unusual because of the normally antagonistic gangs acting
together. The Facility Captain said that this attack on staff
was a “life changing event.” According to Noble, “Numerous
inmate manufactured weapons were found [after the January,
2002] riot on the Fac. ‘C’ exercise yard.” Noble concedes that
Crips directly participated in the attack.
This violent riot occurred only one day after a previous
prison-wide lockdown had been lifted, a lockdown caused by
intermittent prisoner riots during 2001. Those riots, which
involved Hispanic groups, created tension between prison
staff and African-American inmates because the latter felt
they were being arbitrarily punished for the acts of other
groups. As recognized by the district court, “African-
American inmates at SATF were dissatisfied with the way
they were treated and became openly defiant of authority by
being deliberately slow to obey orders or submit to searches.”
The lockdown resulted in the curtailment of outdoor exer-
cise and all regular privileges for all prisoners, including
Noble. Because the inmates had directed their attack against
staff, increased tension between inmates and staff was a seri-
ous concern to those responsible for the safety and security of
the prison.
pension of required programs or services, and inmates are not
released except as determined by the facility administration on an
individual, case-by-case basis. As determined by the facility
administration, under such circumstances only critical inmate
workers in the affected housing units/sub-facilities will be per-
mitted to attend to work assignments under escort, and all but
essential functions are suspended in those affected housing units
or sub-facilities, e.g., yard, canteen draws, religious services, and
visiting.
9866 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
Three months later, prison officials gradually and in mea-
sured stages began to resume normalcy. The first step in the
process was instituted on April 11, 2002: African-American
and white inmates were permitted to have contact visitation
with outside visitors. According to prison officials, after it
was demonstrated to their satisfaction that the controlled visit-
ing program was successful, a modified day room access pro-
gram was instituted on June 14, 2002. On June 25, non-gang
affiliated African-American inmates were included in the day
room access program.
On June 27, defendant Cuevas met with selected African-
American inmates to discuss modifications to the lockdown.
The purpose of this meeting was to notify the inmates in
Facility C about plans gradually to restore privileges and nor-
malcy. As reflected in a synopsis of the meeting, the selected
inmates were told that if the opening of the day room “runs
smoothly then dayroom will be open for the remaining black
population. If dayroom program is disruptive program [sic]
will stop until further notice.” In response to an inmate
inquiry as to why the day room was not open to all black
inmates, Captain Cuevas’s answer was, “Most of the incidents
on Facility C have involved black affiliated gang members.
Start programming with the ones who are not involved, the
fairest way. The dayroom will open with nonaffiliated black
gang members. Once that shows promise, dayroom will be
open for the affiliated black gang members.” He added that
opening up the day room for African-Americans not affiliated
with a gang was a “stepping-stone,” and that the plan of
action in place depended upon “behavior,” which, if positive,
would occasion more privileges. At the conclusion of the
meeting, one of the inmates advised Captain Cuevas that he
was “worried that this is going to fall through.”
On July 8, 2002, all African-American inmates — includ-
ing gang affiliates were allowed access to the day room pro-
gram. Finally, on August 1, 2002, all inmates in Facility C
were given access to a modified program for outdoor exercise.
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9867
The next day, as Noble concedes, another riot occurred, this
time involving Hispanic prisoners. As a result, full exercise
privileges were not restored until April 1, 2003. These facts
are beyond dispute.
Captain Comfort, the Facility C official responsible for
determining when the lockdown could be lifted, offered this
unchallenged explanation of the rigor of this task:
The primary goal of any lockdown, including the
one imposed on January 9, 2002, is to determine
when it is safe to release the inmates to normal pro-
gramming. This is not a determination that is easily
made, and the consequences for making a mistake
can be the resumption of violence, with injuries to
inmates and staff. . . . The investigation of a major
incident, including this one, is a long process, com-
plicated by many factors. Initially inmates will not
talk to staff, because of the anger, and hostility gen-
erated by the incident itself.
Captain Comfort also explained that the general security
characteristics of inmates housed in Facility C factored into
the officials’ decisionmaking process. “Level IV is the highest
[security] level that can be assigned to a general population
inmate. . . . The majority of [Facility C inmates] are there
because they have demonstrated through their institutional
behavior that they need higher levels of custodial supervision
than other Level IV inmates.”
THE LAWSUIT
Noble, who has not been shown to have participated in the
January, 2002 riot, sued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 inter
alia for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment right to
outdoor exercise. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33
(9th Cir. 2000); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th
Cir. 1979). The focus of his claim covers the period beginning
9868 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
with the January 9, 2002 riot, and ending April 1, 2003. This
appeal comes from the district court’s denial of the prison
officials’ motion (1) for summary judgment on the merits, and
(2) for qualified immunity asserted on the ground that a pris-
oner’s right to outdoor exercise during a lockdown imposed
in the aftermath of a prison riot was not “clearly established”
in 2002.
[1] Here, the appellant-officials argue that the law concern-
ing the provision of outdoor exercise under the particular cir-
cumstances of this case was not so clearly established that
reasonable prison officials acting in their place would have
been on notice that their actions violated the commands of the
Eighth Amendment. They point out that there is no control-
ling case that specifies how long a lockdown can be continued
before it trespasses upon the right in question, or what the
monitoring process must be in order for the lockdown to
remain in place. The officials rely in the main on Norwood v.
Vance, 591 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a pris-
oner’s right to outdoor exercise is neither absolute nor inde-
feasible in the light of prison violence. Id. at 1068-69.
Noble on his part defends the district court’s decision and
asks us to dismiss the appeal as untimely, a motion which a
Ninth Circuit motions panel denied without prejudice.2 On the
merits, Noble relies primarily on Hayward v. Procunier, 629
F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980), and Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237
(9th Cir. 1982).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The district court denied the officials’ motions because it
“could not find [from the officials’ submissions] that a legiti-
2
We deny this “motion to dismiss.” The district court’s denial of the
motion for qualified immunity was not a judgment controlled by F.R.A.P.
4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Here, the defendants’ notice of appeal was properly filed
within 30 days of the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9869
mate penological purpose existed” for the lockdown beyond
January 30, 2002, when the “investigation of the riot, which
was the basis of the lockdown, appears to have been com-
pleted . . . .”
The court said in its Order Denying Reconsideration that it
simply couldn’t figure out from the record “whether there
were other factors which necessitated the continued lock-
down, or whether the defendants considered allowing inmates
access to the exercise yard.” The court also said that “circum-
stances may justify long-term outdoor exercise deprivation if
the defendant provides evidence of the reason for the depriva-
tion,” which the court found lacking in this record.
In an earlier order regarding summary judgment, the court
spelled out its specific concerns as follows:
In this case, the court finds that the deprivation of
exercise for the seven month period is sufficiently
serious to meet the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment violation. The issue remaining is
whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s needs during this time period. This is
especially true given the limited information Defen-
dants have provided regarding whether the restric-
tion in exercise bore an attempt to ease the
emergency, and whether the restriction had a peno-
logical purpose.
In its previous order, the court noted that Defen-
dants had not provided “specific facts concerning
what was done in the investigation from January 9,
2002 to July 31, 2002, to demonstrate that the
restriction to the exercise yard had a penological pur-
pose that would warrant a deprivation of exercise for
nearly seven months.” For example, it was not clear
on what day the investigation was concluded, or why
this particular investigation took several months to
9870 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
complete. Furthermore, there was no explanation of
why privileges were restored in the order that they
were given, or why officials felt that allowing pris-
oners access to the exercise yard would pose a dan-
ger to the safety of the institution for the seven
month period from January 9, 2002 to August 1,
2002.
Counterintuitively, the district court granted qualified
immunity to these officials for the period running from
August 1, 2002 through April 1, 2003 “after . . . the decision
was made [by the officials on August 1] to open the exercise
yard to all inmates on a modified program that entailed releas-
ing one building at a time to the [exercise] yard on a rotational
basis.” The reason given by the district court for this decision
was the occurrence of new disruptive prisoner incidents in the
yard, one involving African-American inmates and a battery
against a police officer.
We conclude pursuant to what is now known as prong 2 of
the Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.194 (2001) test, see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009), that it
was not clearly established in 2002 — nor is it established yet
— precisely how, according to the Constitution, or when a
prison facility housing problem inmates must return to normal
operations, including outside exercise, during and after a state
of emergency called in response to a major riot, here one in
which inmates attempted to murder staff.
[2] According to Norwood, we defer to prison officials’
judgment so long as that judgment does not manifest either
deliberate indifference or an intent to inflict harm. California
Code of Regulations title 15, § 3383 (“Code”) says in relevant
part that
[d]uring a state of emergency, the cause and effect
shall be constantly reviewed and evaluated by the
institution head. . . . The facility’s affected areas,
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9871
programs, and operations shall be returned to normal
as soon as the institutional head . . . determines that
it is safe to do so. (Emphasis added).
On this precise issue, prison officials are entitled to “ ‘wide-
ranging deference.’ ” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1069 (quoting
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
Norwood, who was not a gang member, was imprisoned at
the California State Prison at Sacramento. Because of prison
violence, which included violent attacks by Crips on staff, he
endured “four separate extended lockdowns over the course of
two years.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1065. In total, he was
denied exercise during this period for over twelve months in
increments of three, three, four and a half, and two months.
A jury concluded that these denials violated Norwood’s
Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise, but awarded
him only $11 in nominal damages and $39,000 in punitive
damages. Id. at 1066. Not only did we reverse the judgment
in Norwood’s favor because of erroneous jury instructions,
but we declined to remand for a new trial. Instead, we con-
cluded on the record that the officials were entitled to quali-
fied immunity and remanded instead for entry of judgment on
their behalf. In so doing we said, “We decline Norwood’s
invitation to micro-manage officials whose expertise in prison
administration far exceeds our own . . . .” Id. at 1070.
[3] We reversed the district court’s merits judgment in
favor of Norwood because of the court’s refusal to give to the
jury the following instruction:
In considering whether defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the need for outdoor exercise, the jury
should consider that defendants had a competing
obligation under the Eighth Amendment to ensure
the safety of prisoners, including protecting prison-
ers from each other. In considering these factors, you
should give deference to prison officials in the adop-
9872 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
tion and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve discipline and
to maintain internal security in a prison.
Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). We also said in Norwood the
following:
[P]rison officials have a duty to keep inmates safe,
and in particular to protect them from each other.
Officials must balance this imperative against other
obligations that our laws impose, such as providing
outdoor exercise. When violence rises to unusually
high levels, prison officials can reasonably believe it
is lawful to temporarily restrict outdoor exercise to
help bring the violence under control. We’ve
explained that “prison officials have a right and a
duty to take the necessary steps to reestablish order
in a prison when such order is lost. This is for the
benefit of the prisoners as much as for the benefit of
the prison officials.”
...
Such decisions are not to be judged with the bene-
fit of hindsight, in any event. It matters not whether
the measures taken actually worked but whether
prison officials reasonably believed they would be
effective in stopping the violence. At most, prison
officials here may be faulted for erring on the side of
caution by maintaining lockdowns for longer than
necessary. But, when it comes to matters of life and
death, erring on the side of caution is a virtue. Cer-
tainly, no officer could reasonably have anticipated
that such prudence would be found to violate the
Eighth Amendment.
[W]hen balancing the obligation to provide for
inmate and staff safety against the duty to accord
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9873
inmates the rights and privileges to which they are
entitled, prison officials are afforded “wide-ranging
deference.” When a “lockdown was in response to a
genuine emergency,” and “restrictions were eased as
the prison administration determined that the emer-
gency permitted,” we may not lightly second-guess
officials’ expert judgments about when exercise and
other programs could safely be restored. “These
decisions are delicate ones, and those charged with
them must be given reasonable leeway.”
...
Attacks on staff are, by their nature, more serious
challenges to prison authority than attacks on other
inmates.
Id. at 1066-70 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
[4] Here, following this attack in the exercise yard against
prison staff, there is no doubt that the declaration of an emer-
gency and a lockdown for multiple security reasons were jus-
tified. A lockdown by definition normally precludes the type
of exercise Noble says he was denied. Regular operations
cease during lockdown and are restored gradually according
to prison officials’ judgment as to the safety of the conditions
on the ground.
In its Order of March 25, 2009, regarding summary judg-
ment, the district court listed as undisputed relevant facts the
following:
6. After the assault was controlled, numerous
inmate manufactured weapons were found in the
area of the attack.
7. After the lockdown was imposed, the first prior-
ity was the gathering of information and the
9874 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
completion of the incident report. The report of
the January 9, 2002, incident was not completed
until January 30, 2002, because of the serious-
ness of the incident, the number of staff injured,
the number of inmates involved, and the number
of weapons recovered.
8. Following a major incident such as the January
9, 2002 attack on staff, a lockdown serves a
number of purposes. Because both staff and
inmates have strong emotional responses to a
major incident, the initial phase of a lockdown
acts as a “cooling-off” period. With the passage
of time, the emotions subside and inmates will
become more cooperative, will be more willing
to provide information to staff, and more willing
to cooperate in resolving whatever conflict
exists, whether it is between inmate groups or
between inmates and staff.
9. The initial phase of the lockdown of C-Facility
also included a thorough search of the entire
facility. There are eight housing units, and a
thorough search includes searching all inmates,
the contents of every cell, all inmate property,
and all common areas of the housing unit. A
search of a housing unit has to be completed in
one day to prevent inmates from moving contra-
band to an area of the housing unit that has
already been searched.
10. The primary goal of any lockdown, including
the one imposed on January 9, 2002, is to
determine when it is safe to release the inmates
to normal programming. This is not a determi-
nation that is easily made, and the conse-
quences for making a mistake can be the
resumption of violence, with injuries to
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9875
inmates and staff. As the Facility Captain, it
was R. Comfort’s responsibility to provide rec-
ommendations to his superior staff concerning
the risks posed by releasing inmates from the
January 9, 2002, lockdown.
11. The inmates housed in C-Facility had unique
characteristics which influenced the decisions
regarding the lockdown.
12. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilita-
tion has an objective point scoring system used
to determine the level of custody assigned to an
inmate. Level IV is the highest level that can
be assigned to a general population inmate.
The length of an inmate’s prison commitment
can be a major component of a high classifica-
tion score, meaning that many inmates who are
disciplinary free who have a high point score
are classified as Level IV.
13. The Department has two different housing unit
designs for Level IV housing. The housing unit
in C-Facility is what is called a 180 degree
design. The other Level IV design is called a
270 degree design. The 180 degree type of con-
struction provides a high level of observation,
and therefore, control over a housing unit. The
majority of inmates confined in 180 degree
design housing are there because they have
demonstrated through their institutional behav-
ior that they need higher levels of custodial
supervision than other Level IV inmates.
14. Many of the inmates housed on C-Facility at
the time of the January 9, 2002, assault on
staff, had been released from a security hous-
ing unit, had a history of in-prison violence, or
9876 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
were gang affiliated. Most of the African
American inmates in C-Facility were affiliated
with street gangs such as the CRIPS or the
Bloods. Therefore, the potential for violence, if
the lockdown was released prematurely, is
much greater than if C-Facility had been a
Level III facility, or even a 270 degree level IV
Facility.
15. The ultimate conclusion for the January 9,
2002, attack on staff, more reasonably charac-
terized as staff’s “best guess” of the reason,
was that inmate Moreno, H-28772, seized an
opportunity to assault an officer he had a per-
sonal grudge against. Inmate Moreno incited
other inmates into joining in his assault on
staff. To this day, Declarant Comfort does not
believe that anyone is absolutely convinced
that this explanation is the actual truth, but it is
accepted as the most likely cause of the attack.
16. The incident contained many elements which
contradicted the “one inmate with a grudge”
explanation. For example, Inmate Moreno was
not known as a leader of the CRIPS affiliated
inmates yet he was able to command a large
number of other inmates to spontaneously
assault staff.
17. Most riots are planned events, which seems
consistent with the large number of weapons
being found after the incident. However,
inmate weapons were not used on staff, which
seemed consistent with information that an
attack on staff was not preplanned.
18. The investigation of a major incident, including
this one, is a long process, complicated by
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9877
many factors. Initially, inmates will not talk to
staff, because of anger, and hostility generated
by the incident itself. This is especially true of
the kind of inmates confined in C-Facility that
have a history of anti-social behavior. The
gang culture also forces its members and asso-
ciates to refuse to deal with staff.
19. After the initial hostility and anger subsided the
inmates were still unwilling to provide infor-
mation. Inmates have television sets, radios, or
CD players for entertainment. Ultimately, how-
ever, boredom set in and inmates were willing
to provide information in order to have normal
programming reinstated.
20. Information provided by inmates has to be
checked and verified and confirmed by other
sources before it can be considered trustwor-
thy. Many inmates who are willing to talk to
staff often provide deliberately false informa-
tion, or third-hand information, or information
that is not fact, but the inmate’s own conjec-
ture. It takes time to receive sufficient corrobo-
rating information to be sure that a release
from a lockdown will not result in further vio-
lence.
21. Another threat that had to be investigated and
resolved was the possibility of violence
between the Southern Hispanic and African-
American inmates. On January 9, 2002, a large
number of inmate manufactured weapons were
recovered. Even if the African-American
inmates had not planned to attack staff, there
was a high risk of future violence if they had
been planning to attack other inmates.
9878 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
22. Prior to the January 9, 2002 incident, there
were rumors circulating in C-Facility that the
Southern Hispanic inmates were planning to
assault CRIP affiliated inmates, which would
explain why the CRIPs had weapons on Janu-
ary 9, 2002.
23. Prison records reveal that the decision was
made to release the lockdown gradually. The
first step, instituted on April 11, 2002, was to
permit African American and White inmates to
have contact visits. This meant that all inmates
at C-Facility would mingle in the visiting room
and staff would be able to monitor their inter-
actions. After it was determined that the visit-
ing program was successful, a modified day
room access program was instituted on June
13, 2002. On June 25, 2002, non-gang affiliate
African American inmates were added to the
day room. Finally, on August 1, 2002, a modi-
fied program for outdoor exercise was imple-
mented for all inmates in C-Facility.
24. In addition to the threat posed by releasing
African-American inmates from lockdown sta-
tus, staff in C-Facility were also dealing with
other inmate conflicts. Institutional records
show that within one week of implementing the
modified outdoor exercise program, “Bulldog”
affiliated inmates and Southern Hispanic
inmates were returned to lockdown status, and
as of September 13, 2002, white inmates were
also returned to lockdown status.
In support of the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, Correctional Counselor V. Adams submitted a sworn
declaration about the management of this lockdown. In it, V.
Adams averred that when a lockdown occurs or when a war-
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9879
den declares a state of emergency, the staff of the affected
institution are required to prepare formal Program Status
Reports which outline the management Plan of Operation dur-
ing the lockdown. These status reports continue until nor-
malcy is achieved and are designed to notify both staff and
inmates of prevailing conditions. As an attachment to his dec-
laration, V. Adams submitted fourteen consecutive Program
Status Reports covering the period from January 8, 2002,
through August 8, 2002. These Status Reports are signed
either by R. M. Comfort or D. Cuevas as Facility IV-C Cap-
tains and by Derral G. Adams as the Warden.
The content of each Report and explanatory “Remarks” at
the bottom of each signed plan illustrate exactly what is con-
templated by § 3383 of the Code, i.e., that the lockdown was
under constant review by the responsible officials to deter-
mine when and how it could safely be lifted. These Reports
read as a whole are not consistent with Noble’s assertions of
“indifference,” and certainly not with his claim of “deliberate
indifference.” Similar Status Reports extending from August
8, 2002 through April 2003, when the lockdown was rein-
stated indicate attempted murders, a murder, assaults, batter-
ies with weapons, and the discovery of numerous prisoner
weapons within the Facility.
[5] The district court erred in viewing the end on January
30, 2002 of the formal investigation of the immediate precipi-
tating causes of the riot, which in any event was not conclu-
sive, as a point from which the officials must demonstrate
additional “specific facts” or new disruptive events supporting
their judgment that the emergency had not dissipated and that
the lockdown must continue. The absence of any additional
disruptive events was a good sign, but hardly one that sig-
naled the evaporation of the tension that sparked this riot and
clearly continued in its aftermath. The district court’s
approach manifestly trespassed against our warnings not to
micro-manage prisons. Moreover, the absence of any new
attacks demonstrates, if anything, appropriate prudence and
9880 NOBLE v. CUEVAS
the success of the lockdown, not that it might lack a “penolog-
ical purpose.”
Hayward and Hoptowit do not support Noble’s arguments.
In Hayward, we determined that because the lockdown was
in response to a genuine emergency, restrictions on exercise
were appropriate. We said, “Other restrictions were eased as
the prison administration determined that the emergency per-
mitted. These decisions are delicate ones, and those charged
with them must be given reasonable leeway.” 629 F.2d at 603.
Hoptowit, which dealt with a prison lockdown imposed to
restore order in light of a high level of tension and violence
following the killings of an inmate and a guard, is also of no
help to Noble’s cause. We said as a general proposition that
“when a genuine emergency exists, prison officials may be
more restrictive than they otherwise may be, and certain ser-
vices may be suspended temporarily.” 682 F.2d at 1259. We
added that “[i]n determining the existence of such needs, we
must give reasonable leeway to prison officials.” Id. (citing
Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603).
[6] Parenthetically, we are unable to detect any actionable
Eighth Amendment subjective intent in this case. The record
refutes the contentions that the lockdown was in excess of
what was required to restore order, was unrelated to the offi-
cials’ security and safety responsibilities, and was kept in
effect for a longer period than necessary. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d
at 1258. This case shares none of the conditions or circum-
stances we discussed in Hayward, such as a prison adminis-
tration “either unable or unwilling to deal with extreme
conditions which the court had previously found to be cruel
and unusual punishment.” Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603 (discuss-
ing Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977),
aff’d, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980)). If anything, the record
demonstrates that the officials were continuously, prudently,
and successfully looking out for the safety, security, and wel-
fare of all involved, staff and prisoners alike. This scenario is
NOBLE v. CUEVAS 9881
precisely what the doctrine of qualified immunity is designed
to cover.
CONCLUSION
[7] In summary, in 2002 it would not have been clear to a
reasonable officer that his or her conduct vis à vis the declara-
tion of an emergency, the lockdown, or the curtailment of use
of the exercise yard was unlawful in the situation he or she
confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to enter
judgment on behalf of the Defendants.