UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5256
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERIC W. WOLFE, a/k/a Fritz,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-42)
Submitted: June 9, 2011 Decided: August 2, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tim C. Carrico, CARRICO LAW OFFICES, LC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
Attorney, Blaire L. Malkin, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric W. Wolfe was convicted after a jury trial of
possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of drugs, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 924(a)(2) (2006). The
district court sentenced Wolfe to time served and five months’
home confinement. On appeal, Wolfe challenges the district
court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress a Rock Island
Arsenal .45 caliber pistol (“the Rock Island firearm”) that was
seized from a pawn shop following the execution of a search
warrant and a pawnshop ticket associated with the firearm.
Before entertaining the merits of Wolfe’s challenge, however, we
consider our jurisdiction to decide the issue. See Friedman's,
Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
question of whether we are presented with a live case or
controversy is a question we may raise sua sponte.”). For the
reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction only
over “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
This requirement permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
only where “conflicting contentions of the parties present a
real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse
legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not
hypothetical or abstract.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks and
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ellipsis omitted). A case is moot, and thus no longer
justiciable, when resolution of the issues presented no longer
implicates a legally cognizable interest. Townes v. Jarvis,
577 F.3d 543, 546 (4th Cir. 2009). “Mootness has been described
as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, for a controversy to be moot, it must lack at least one of
the three required elements for Article III standing: “(1)
injury in fact, (2) causation, or (3) redressability.” Townes,
577 F.3d at 546-47.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), it is unlawful for any
person “who is an unlawful user of . . . any controlled
substance . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm.” To convict Wolfe, then, the Government was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other elements, that
he possessed a firearm that affected commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(3). At trial, Wolfe and the Government stipulated that
Wolfe had possessed the Rock Island firearm and that it had
moved in and affected interstate commerce. The stipulations
were signed by Wolfe and his attorney and admitted into evidence
at trial. Wolfe does not contend that the stipulations are
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invalid. Cf. United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 1016, 1020
(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that, if defendant’s trial
stipulation to elements establishing conviction for possession
of a firearm by a felon was found valid, court would lack
jurisdiction to consider denial of defendant’s earlier motion to
suppress). Even if we were to determine that the Rock Island
firearm and pawn ticket should have been suppressed, Wolfe
admitted by his stipulations that he possessed the firearm and
that it affected commerce. Wolfe does not contend that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, nor does he
raise any other challenge to his conviction, sentence, or any
other ruling issued by the district court. Thus, the relief
Wolfe seeks—reversal of the district court’s ruling refusing to
suppress the Rock Island firearm and pawn ticket—would not
affect the soundness of his conviction and, thus, would not
redress Wolfe’s proffered injury.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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