United States v. Eric Wolfe

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5256

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

ERIC W. WOLFE, a/k/a Fritz,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-42)

Submitted: June 9, 2011 Decided: August 2, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Tim C. Carrico, CARRICO LAW OFFICES, LC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
Attorney, Blaire L. Malkin, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Eric W. Wolfe was convicted after a jury trial of

possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of drugs, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), 924(a)(2) (2006). The

district court sentenced Wolfe to time served and five months’

home confinement. On appeal, Wolfe challenges the district

court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress a Rock Island

Arsenal .45 caliber pistol (“the Rock Island firearm”) that was

seized from a pawn shop following the execution of a search

warrant and a pawnshop ticket associated with the firearm.

Before entertaining the merits of Wolfe’s challenge, however, we

consider our jurisdiction to decide the issue. See Friedman's,

Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he

question of whether we are presented with a live case or

controversy is a question we may raise sua sponte.”). For the

reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction only

over “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

This requirement permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction

only where “conflicting contentions of the parties present a

real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse

legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not

hypothetical or abstract.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l

Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks and

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ellipsis omitted). A case is moot, and thus no longer

justiciable, when resolution of the issues presented no longer

implicates a legally cognizable interest. Townes v. Jarvis,

577 F.3d 543, 546 (4th Cir. 2009). “Mootness has been described

as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite

personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the

litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence

(mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, for a controversy to be moot, it must lack at least one of

the three required elements for Article III standing: “(1)

injury in fact, (2) causation, or (3) redressability.” Townes,

577 F.3d at 546-47.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), it is unlawful for any

person “who is an unlawful user of . . . any controlled

substance . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any

firearm.” To convict Wolfe, then, the Government was required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other elements, that

he possessed a firearm that affected commerce. 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(3). At trial, Wolfe and the Government stipulated that

Wolfe had possessed the Rock Island firearm and that it had

moved in and affected interstate commerce. The stipulations

were signed by Wolfe and his attorney and admitted into evidence

at trial. Wolfe does not contend that the stipulations are

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invalid. Cf. United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 1016, 1020

(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that, if defendant’s trial

stipulation to elements establishing conviction for possession

of a firearm by a felon was found valid, court would lack

jurisdiction to consider denial of defendant’s earlier motion to

suppress). Even if we were to determine that the Rock Island

firearm and pawn ticket should have been suppressed, Wolfe

admitted by his stipulations that he possessed the firearm and

that it affected commerce. Wolfe does not contend that the

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, nor does he

raise any other challenge to his conviction, sentence, or any

other ruling issued by the district court. Thus, the relief

Wolfe seeks—reversal of the district court’s ruling refusing to

suppress the Rock Island firearm and pawn ticket—would not

affect the soundness of his conviction and, thus, would not

redress Wolfe’s proffered injury.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED