Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp.

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1368

M ATTHEW Y ANCICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

H ANNA S TEEL C ORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 07-cv-1339—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

A RGUED O CTOBER 25, 2010—D ECIDED A UGUST 3, 2011

Before W OOD , W ILLIAMS, and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Matthew Yancick brought a
racially hostile work environment claim against Hanna
Steel Corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hanna Steel
moved for summary judgment; the district court ruled
on Hanna Steel’s motion without considering Yancick’s
response brief or exhibits. Yancick’s response was
non-compliant with local rules, and the court declined to
permit him additional time to file a rule compliant re-
2 No. 10-1368

sponse. The district court, after reviewing the record
submitted by Hanna Steel, granted summary judgment
in its favor.
Yancick, who is white, worked with Brad Johnson, who
is African-American, at Hanna Steel. Johnson was a
workplace bully; he was confrontational, rude, and dis-
ruptive in the workplace. Hanna Steel’s workforce was
predominantly white and Hispanic; out of the eighty
workers, there was only one other African-American
employee and he worked a different shift than Yancick
and Johnson. In December 2005, Yancick was working
with Johnson when a 940-pound steel coil fell on Yancick
from a machine operated by Johnson, leaving Yancick
with severe, permanent injuries. Yancick asserts that
Johnson dropped the steel coil on him purposefully
because of his race.
We affirm the district court’s rulings. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider
Yancick’s response in opposition to summary judgment
and based on the record submitted by Hanna Steel,
Yancick’s § 1981 claim fails. The record contains insuf-
ficient evidence for a jury to find that Johnson’s offensive
conduct before the accident was severe or pervasive.
While Yancick’s workplace injury was severe, no rea-
sonable inference can be drawn that Johnson pur-
posefully dropped the steel coil on Yancick because of
race or that Hanna Steel was negligent in discovering
the alleged racial harassment.
No. 10-1368 3

I. Procedural Issue
A. Background
On September 21, 2009, Hanna Steel filed its motion
for summary judgment and on October 15, Yancick
moved under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for additional time to respond so he could
locate two witnesses, Adriel Novoa 1 and Scott Terrell.
The district court granted Yancick’s motion, but warned,
“Plaintiff will be allowed no further Rule 56(f) continu-
ances or enlargements of time to respond to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.”
On Friday, October 30, 2009, at 4:56 p.m., four minutes
before the filing deadline, Yancick filed a motion for
leave to file his response with excess pages, attaching
his response brief (which was about 1,500 words over
the allowed word limit) but not the referenced exhibits.
Yancick sought leave to file his exhibits after the motion
for leave was granted. Yancick’s concern was that under
the electronic case filing (ECF) system, the response
brief was going to be referenced as an exhibit to the
motion for leave and the exhibits to the response (if
attached) would be off-numbered and not accurately
correspond to the numbering cited in the brief. Yancick
reasoned in his motion that “[s]ubmission of the exhibits
as an attachment to this motion alters the ECF num-
bering system used when filing exhibits.” Hanna Steel

1
We refer to him as Adriel throughout this opinion because
his brother, Jamil Novoa, is also mentioned throughout the
opinion and referred to as Jamil.
4 No. 10-1368

objected, particularly because the response referred to, but
did not attach, exhibits. Based on a review of Yancick’s
response brief, it appears he did not yet have a signed
declaration from witness Adriel Novoa. The response
brief stated that “Yancick’s counsel is filing the unsigned
declaration and will supplement it with the signed dec-
laration as soon as it is received.”
On November 10, 2009, before the court ruled on
Yancick’s motion, Yancick filed a motion for leave to file
a response within page limits, attaching a response that
met the page and type limitations of Rule 7.1(D)(5) of
the Local Rules of United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois (CDIL-LR). Again, Yancick did
not file his exhibits. Counsel for Yancick filed this
motion after he was alerted in another case that Judge
McDade was not accepting responses with excess pages.
Hanna Steel objected, noting that Yancick still had not
filed his exhibits. On November 13, Yancick filed his
exhibits two weeks late. One of the exhibits was Adriel’s
declaration, dated October 31, 2009.
The district court denied Yancick’s motions for leave on
November 16, reasoning that Yancick failed to meet the
extended response deadline, which required a Local
Rule-compliant response brief with any referenced
exhibit attached by October 30. The court indicated that
it had “generously granted” the earlier motion for con-
tinuance under Rule 56(f) and that Yancick’s last minute
filing “virtually ensured that the Court would not have
an opportunity to rule on the motion for leave until after
the response deadline.” The court also indicated that
No. 10-1368 5

Yancick’s failure to include exhibits was “particularly
suspect” and led to the reasonable inference that “counsel
structured his 4:56 p.m. filing . . . so as to buy himself
additional time to prepare exhibits in support of his
summary judgment response brief.”
Yancick moved to alter the November 16, order ex-
plaining that the exhibits were in fact ready to file
before the October 30 deadline and providing reasons
why he did not file them on that day, i.e., counsel did not
believe he was entitled to file exhibits until the motion
for leave was granted and he was concerned about the
exhibit numbers not corresponding to the response
brief. The court denied the motion, explaining, “The
deadlines imposed in this case mandate action; they are
not starting dates for intention or diligence. Plaintiff was
required to file a complete and Local Rule compliant
response by the deadline and failed to do so. Whether
he intended to do so or worked diligently to do so is
irrelevant.” The court declined to consider Yancick’s
response brief or his disputed factual contentions when
ruling on Hanna Steel’s motion for summary judgment.
The court stated, “Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted
the contents of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2), and the Motion
for Summary Judgment will be decided by the Court on
the record now before it.” The court granted Hanna
Steel’s motion for summary judgment.

B. Order
We review the district court’s decision not to consider
Yancick’s response in opposition to summary judgment
6 No. 10-1368

for an abuse of discretion. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442
F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2006). Yancick was given an exten-
sion until October 30 to file his response; he was ex-
pressly told that no further Rule 56(f) continuances or
enlargements of time to respond would be granted. On
October 30, Yancick filed a motion for leave to file his
response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment
with excess pages, attaching his proposed response
brief without the referenced exhibits. Yancick’s counsel
incorrectly assumed that the district court would grant
the motion and allow him to file his exhibits after the
October 30 deadline.
Local Rule 7.1(D) states that “[a]ll motions for sum-
mary judgment and responses and replies thereto must
comply with the requirements of this rule. Any filings
not in compliance may be stricken by the court.” CDIL-LR
7.1(D). This court has “routinely held that a district
court may strictly enforce compliance with its local rules
regarding summary judgment motions.” Schmidt v. Eagle
Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2010).
Yancick’s brief did not comply with the word limita-
tions set forth in Local Rule 7.1, CDIL-LR 7.1(B)(4)(b)(1)
and (D)(5), but more significantly, did not comply with
the requirement that the non-movant support his
response “by evidentiary documentation” and “[i]nclude
as exhibits all cited documentary evidence not already
submitted by the movant[,]” CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2).
Additionally, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure requires the opposing party’s response to be
supported by “affidavits or as otherwise provided” setting
out specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial and
No. 10-1368 7

instructs that if the adverse party does not properly
respond to a motion for summary judgment, “summary
judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against
that party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (2009). Accordingly,
Yancick did not file a rule-compliant brief by the court-
imposed deadline.
Yancick argues he was following this practice be-
cause other judges in the district routinely grant mo-
tions for leave to file excess pages and allow exhibits
to be filed only after leave has been granted. This argu-
ment assumes that the motion for leave would be
granted as a matter of course, which is at odds with the
Local Rules, and incorrectly presumes that because
other judges in the district routinely grant such motions,
that all judges must. Yancick filed his motion within
minutes of the deadline and by doing so, he risked the
court denying the motion and deeming his response
untimely.
Yancick argues that because his violation of the local
rules was nonwillful, it should not cause him to lose
his rights, citing to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 83 provides that “[a] local rule im-
posing a requirement of form must not be enforced in a
way that causes a party to lose any right because of a
nonwillful failure to comply.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2).
Rule 83 does not help Yancick. The requirement to file
evidentiary matter in support of a response brief is more
than a “requirement of form.” The Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 83 state that it does not alter “the court’s
power to enforce local rules that involve more than
8 No. 10-1368

mere matters of form—for example, a local rule requiring
parties to identify evidentiary matters relied upon to
support or oppose motions for summary judgment.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee’s notes, 1995
amend. Similarly, the failure to timely submit exhibits
identified in Yancick’s response rendered the filing defi-
cient not only in form, but also in substance.
The issue then is whether the district court abused its
discretion by not affording Yancick additional time to
file a rule-compliant response, particularly where coun-
sel indicated that he had the exhibits, but was waiting
to file them until after the court ruled on the motion
for leave. Rule 6(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides in relevant part:
When an act may or must be done within a speci-
fied time, the court may, for good cause, extend the
time:
(A) with or without motion or notice if
the court acts, or if a request is made,
before the original time or its extension
expires . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Because
Yancick filed his motion for leave before the deadline
expired, albeit within four minutes, Rule 6(b)(1)(A)
applies and Yancick had to show good cause for his
request to file exhibits after the deadline. Yancick did not
show good cause.
Yancick claims he did not file the exhibits because
they would have been attachments to the motion for
leave and the exhibit numbers would not have corre-
No. 10-1368 9

sponded to those stated in the response brief. This
reason is weak. Yancick could have noted the dis-
crepancies in the numbering and sought to correct the
numbering after filing or submitted the response and
exhibits as a separate filing. What Yancick could not
do was simply fail to file the exhibits, particularly
where the district court stated that it would not grant
any further continuances. The district court granted
the first continuance so Yancick could secure Adriel’s
declaration, but in the response brief attached to the
motion for leave, Yancick noted that he did not yet have
a signed declaration from Adriel; it was apparently
signed on October 31 (one day after the deadline). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Yancick’s failure to include exhibits was “particularly
suspect” and led to the reasonable inference that “counsel
structured his 4:56 p.m. filing . . . so as to buy himself
additional time to prepare exhibits in support of his
summary judgment response brief.”
In Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 154 (7th Cir.
1995), the issue was whether the district court abused
its discretion when it denied the plaintiff’s request for
one more day to respond to a defense motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. The district court had granted the
plaintiff two extensions to file his response and while
he was able to meet the new deadline, he did so only
partially. Id. at 156. He filed a brief by the deadline, “but
it was not accompanied by any ‘affidavits or other docu-
mentary material controverting the movant’s position’
as required” by local rules. Id. (citation omitted). The
plaintiff claimed he had a “catastrophic computer fail-
ure,” and filed an “emergency” motion requesting an
10 No. 10-1368

additional day to file his supporting materials. Id. Some
supporting documentation was filed the next day, but
the plaintiff continued to file material for another week.
Id. The district court denied the emergency motion and
granted the defendant’s motion to strike any sup-
porting materials filed after the deadline. Id.
This court held in Spears that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying additional time to
respond pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1), observing that:
We live in a world of deadlines. . . . A good judge
sets deadlines, and the judge has a right to assume
that deadlines will be honored. The flow of cases
through a busy district court is aided, not hin-
dered, by adherence to deadlines. . . .
....
In exercising discretion regarding enlargements
of time, courts should be mindful that the rules are
intended to force parties and their attorneys to
be diligent in prosecuting their causes of action.
Id. at 157 (quoting Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 331 (7th
Cir. 1988)). While the circumstances of the plaintiff’s
problems (a computer breakdown) evoked sympathy, it
seemed that his problem really was that “he waited until
the last minute to get his materials together.” Id. He
“apparently neglected the old proverb that ‘sooner
begun, sooner done’ ” and that “[w]hen parties wait
until the last minute to comply with a deadline, they are
playing with fire.” Id.; see also Raymond, 442 F.3d at 607
(holding that strict enforcement of summary judgment
No. 10-1368 11

deadlines is “justified in light of the district court’s sig-
nificant interest in maintaining the integrity of its calen-
dar.”) (quotations omitted).
Similarly, Yancick’s counsel took a huge risk by
waiting until the last minute to file his motion for leave
to file a response with excess pages. Yancick’s counsel
was well aware of Judge McDade’s enforcement of dead-
lines. On October 2, 2009, Judge McDade ruled against
that same attorney in another case where he attempted
to file his response to summary judgment a day late.
Shah v. Am. Bottling Co., No. 07-cv-1042, 2009 WL 3229405,
at *1-2 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2009). Yancick’s counsel should
not have assumed he would be granted additional time
to file his exhibits. The district court properly found
that Yancick’s request was not made in good faith.
While this result may seem harsh, we do not find that
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to
require adherence to a deadline that it had previously
informed counsel it would not extend.

II. Summary Judgment
A. Background
We recount the story in the light most favorable to
Yancick. Hanna Steel provides steel tubing and pre-painted
steel to distributors and manufacturers. Yancick was
employed at Hanna Steel from 2003 until December 12,
2005, when a steel coil fell on his legs in a work-
related accident, severely injuring him. Yancick, who is
white, asserts that his former co-worker, Johnson, who is
12 No. 10-1368

African-American, intentionally dropped the coil on him
out of racial animus. Johnson became employed at
Hanna Steel in the fall of 2004; he worked the same
shift as Yancick. Hanna Steel employed approximately
eighty workers and only two were African-American.
The other African-American employee worked a dif-
ferent shift.
Hanna Steel has a policy against all forms of harassment
and directs employees to report harassment to Human
Resource Manager David Monroe or General Manager
Richard Daniel, and provides a toll free number at which
to reach them. Yancick had a copy of the policy and
Monroe addressed it in a September 15, 2003 meeting
that Yancick attended. A memo addressed to all em-
ployees from the September meeting stated, “If you
believe you are being harassed, you must immediately
report the matter, either to your General Manager or to
me [David Monroe] at 1-800- . . . .” Yancick signed an
acknowledgment in January 2005 “stating that [he] was
aware of what was considered harassment, what to do
in case of harassment or anything racial or anything hate
related . . . and know[s] there is to be no toleration of
harassment of any type.” As a condition of his employ-
ment, Yancick pledged “to report promptly, to [his]
General Manager or to Hanna’s Director of Human Re-
sources David Monroe (1-800-. . .), all instances of harass-
ment that happen to [him] or that [he sees] happening
to other Hanna employees.” The chain of command at
Hanna Steel was Mike Duncan (Yancick’s immediate
supervisor), Sergio Becerra, Sr. (Plant Manager), and
then Daniel (General Manager). Yancick was aware
No. 10-1368 13

of the chain of command. Although Duncan was Yancick’s
immediate supervisor, he had no authority to hire, fire,
transfer, or discipline any Hanna Steel employees.
For the first several months of Johnson’s employment,
he and Yancick had a friendly relationship. Yancick
testified that “when [Johnson] first started he was in-
credibly friendly and outgoing.” Their relationship,
however, began to deteriorate in 2005. In January 2005,
Yancick was talking to another employee when Johnson
approached them and said: “You’re fucking talking about
me.” Yancick explained that they were not, but then
Johnson raised his fist in what Yancick believed was a
black panther or black power symbol. Johnson did not
make any other remarks when making this gesture.
Yancick testified, “I didn’t feel like [Johnson] was going
to strike me, but he was making a very powerful state-
ment.” Later that year, Yancick observed Johnson make
that same gesture to another white co-worker. Again,
Johnson did not say anything to accompany the gesture.
Other employees witnessed Johnson raise his fist and
discussed it with Yancick. Yancick did not report these
incidents to any supervisor or manager of Hanna Steel.
The next incident occurred around July 2005, when
Johnson came up to Yancick with an attitude and asked
why he had a better radio and nicer boots. Yancick re-
sponded that “this is the radio given to me. I spent an
extra $70 to get these boots.” Johnson responded: “Oh,
this is how it’s going to be, huh?” Yancick mentioned this
incident to Hershel Hicks, the lead man of Yancick’s
crew. Yancick said that the confrontation had an “uncom-
14 No. 10-1368

fortable air to it” and that Johnson’s attitude “just
doesn’t make any sense.” Yancick, however, did not say
that race was a factor.
Around that same time, Yancick was on his way to get
a coil and Johnson walked up to him like he was
“getting ready to pounce” and came nose to nose with
Yancick. Yancick just stood there until Johnson said, in
a civil tone, “May I get a coil behind you.” Yancick re-
sponded “sure” and got out of the way. Yancick ex-
plained why he thought Johnson behaved that way:
“It felt like it was territorial or that Alpha-dog syn-
drome. I’m a big guy. . . . It just felt like little big
man syndrome. Brad [Johnson] is a very powerful in-
dividual. He was very, very, very muscular, but
I wasn’t going to work in an environment where I’m
bullied every day.” Yancick reported this incident to
his immediate supervisor, Duncan. Yancick testified
that race was not a part of that incident.
On several occasions, Johnson used the epithet
“nigger” around Yancick. He would often (weekly and
sometimes multiple times in one night) say to someone,
“you fucking talking about me,” or “you talking about
this nigger.” Yancick heard Johnson say the word
“nigger” in this context about ten times. Johnson came up
to Yancick one day and out of the blue said, “if you want
to see me kill somebody, call me a fucking nigger.”
Yancick reported Johnson’s use of the word “nigger” to
Duncan at least three times. Yancick testified that several
times he informed Duncan that Johnson has a problem
with whites or Mexicans. Duncan would say that unless
No. 10-1368 15

there is a witness, he could not do anything. Duncan told
Yancick that if he had to be around Johnson, try to be
with somebody else.
Yancick explained that when he was allowed to go
home early because work was slow, Johnson said,
“[T]hey let you go, but they keep my black ass here. They
keep me here to work . . . .” Yancick said there was rage
in his statement. Yancick reported this incident to
Duncan. Duncan said the same thing, “Unless I have a
witness, I can’t do anything.” Yancick described another
incident where he was talking to an employee about his
name and heritage and Johnson interjected, “I don’t
know what my name was because my heritage was I
was a fucking slave.” Yancick said, “I’m sorry that hap-
pened,” and Johnson responded, “Yeah, you should be.”
Yancick testified that there were “a lot of things [con-
cerning Johnson] I told Mike Duncan about over and
over again, and it got to the point where he’s like if you
don’t have a witness, don’t bother me. You’re just
wasting my time.”
Johnson failed to comply with workplace policy re-
garding meetings and equipment, and at times, was
disruptive. Yancick testified that Johnson got away
with a lot more than other employees and acted with
“rage ready to be unleashed.” He stared and leered at
co-workers, bumped into them, invaded personal space,
and on a few occasions was physically aggressive. Yancick
witnessed Johnson bully his closest friends at Hanna
Steel, Adriel, a Hispanic employee, and Larry Andrews,
a white employee. Yancick saw Johnson knock Adriel
16 No. 10-1368

out of his way and smack Andrews in the head. While
Yancick reported some incidents to Duncan, the record
doesn’t indicate that Yancick conveyed to Duncan that
Johnson was physically violent or threatening.
There were several reasons why Yancick thought
Johnson may have acted this way. For example, he says
that “[a] lot of this, . . . stemmed simply from the fact I was
not the straw house that could be blown down. I was not
somebody that cowered from him and that aggravated
the hell out of him, but, like I said, I will not work in
an environment where I have to be afraid every day to
do my job. I did my most to avoid conflict with him.” He
further testified that “what a lot of it I think boiled
down to was the fact that he couldn’t make me bend or
make me cower.” Yancick believed Johnson was picking
on his friends because he could not get to Yancick.
Yancick testified that if Johnson could not beat up the
big guy (referring to himself), then he was going to
stomp on his buddies.
Yancick also believes that Johnson was a racist. He
testified that the manner in which Johnson spoke was
an indication that he acted based on race and stated,
“I know [Johnson] was racist. There was never a doubt
about that in my mind how he acted towards me and
others.” Yancick testified that Johnson “hated everything
white.” He stated that Johnson was not a bully to the
other African-American employee at Hanna Steel, but
he only observed them interact briefly during shift
changes. Yancick also testified to other reasons he
thought Johnson’s behavior changed, including his spec-
No. 10-1368 17

ulation that Johnson was using steroids or was upset
that he was transferred from the slitter job to crane opera-
tor, which paid less.
On a few occasions after Yancick complained to
Duncan, Duncan responded by saying that Johnson is the
“biggest racist I’ve ever seen in my life.” Duncan did not
take any action and Yancick never followed up with
Human Resource Manager Monroe or General Manager
Daniel even though he was aware that Hanna Steel’s
policy against harassment informed employees to direct
their complaints to these individuals. Despite his prob-
lems with Johnson, Yancick testified that he enjoyed
working at Hanna Steel and loved his job.
Other co-workers testified about Johnson’s workplace
behavior. Johnson was confrontational with Andrews,
and Andrews witnessed Johnson raise his fist in what
he believed to be the black power symbol. Andrews
informed Duncan he thought Johnson might be a racist.
Duncan told Andrews to stay away from him, but
agreed that Johnson might be a racist. Shortly before
Yancick’s injury, Andrews also had a discussion with
Plant Manager Becerra and Duncan concerning his com-
plaints about Johnson’s harassment. The record does
not provide any specifics about what was addressed
during this meeting or that Andrews’ complaints were
race-related. Andrews testified that other than Johnson
raising his fist, there was nothing that Johnson did or
said that he would interpret as having to do with race.
The record reveals that Johnson also made complaints
against Andrews. Becerra told Andrews that the only
18 No. 10-1368

thing that could be done would be to fire both of them if
Andrews wanted to press the issue. Because Andrews
wanted to keep his job, he decided not to press the issue.
Another employee of Hanna Steel, Nicholas Joestling,
testified that he had confrontations with Johnson that
he believed boiled down to the fact that Johnson did
not like white people. Joestling’s opinion was based
partially on his observation of Johnson interacting differ-
ently with James Parker, the only other African-American
employee at Hanna Steel. He testified: “[I]f you’d see
the way he would interact with James compared to
every other guy in the plant, you know, it doesn’t take
a rocket scientist to figure it out. . . . It all seemed to boil
down to he just didn’t like white people . . . to see him
interact with somebody that wasn’t white compared
to every other person in there . . . .” There is no indica-
tion in the record that Joestling reported these occur-
rences to his supervisor.
Jamil, Adriel’s brother and also a Hanna Steel employee,
helped Johnson get his job at Hanna Steel. They were “best
friends,” but that changed after Johnson started working
at Hanna Steel and eventually they stopped talking
altogether. Johnson would stare at Jamil in a hostile
manner while raising his fist in the air. Johnson told Jamil
that it was okay to call him the “N word.” On numerous
occasions, Johnson accused Jamil and his brother of
trying to get him in trouble or fired or would say things
like “everybody’s out to get [me] fired.” Jamil testified
that on at least one occasion, Johnson called Jamil and
Adriel “stupid Mexicans,” and on another occasion, said
No. 10-1368 19

generally, “stupid white people” and that white people
were trying to get him fired. Johnson was aggressive
toward Adriel and bullied him at work by staring at
him and pushing him around. At the gym (outside of
work), Johnson threatened Jamil that he was going
to break his back and grabbed Adriel by the throat. John-
son also pushed Adriel (by bumping into him hard) at
work. Jamil complained to Duncan many times (at least
ten) mainly about things that happened to his brother
at Hanna Steel. The record doesn’t indicate specifically
what Jamil told Duncan, but presumably he told Duncan
about the pushing incident. Duncan told Jamil that he
could not do anything because there were no witnesses.
Jamil witnessed Johnson show hostility toward other
African-Americans outside of work. Jamil attested that
“[t]his was consistent with my observations of Brad John-
son’s attitude he sometimes displayed toward coworkers
at Hanna Steel; he was just an aggressive guy who tried
to act tough at times with everyone, white, black or
whatever color.” Jamil testified that Johnson was just
mean and that he was “mean with everybody.”
Yancick was an “end coater” at Hanna Steel. He painted
both ends of a cut coiled piece of steel and moved it
down the conveyor for further production. An end coater,
this case Yancick, paints one side of the steel coil on a
turnstile (or tree) and then another worker, in this case
Johnson, controls a lift table (or arbor machine) that
picks up the coil. The table can be brought to a vertical
or horizontal position hydraulically. While in a verti-
cal position, the table is moved forward toward the
20 No. 10-1368

turnstile and the horn (or arbor) on the table is extended
to retrieve the coil. Once the coil is retrieved, the table
is moved back about four feet, so the end coater can
paint the other side of the coil. Once the coil is painted,
the table is placed in a horizontal position (referred to
as laying down the “back-ender”) and the horn is
retracted to transfer the coil onto the conveyor. (The
parties have used differing terminology to describe the
process involved here; we have attempted to simplify
that terminology).
An employee controls the table from a control panel
that is approximately two to six feet behind the end
coater. There are four knobs and a toggle switch
on the control panel. One knob turns the table either
horizontally or vertically, another extends the horn, an-
other lifts up the entire arbor assembly to pick up the coil,
and another activates the rollers on the table to move
the coil onto the conveyor. The toggle switch moves the
machinery forward or backward. The knobs are spring
loaded; they must be turned against pressure for about
five to seven seconds to complete the process activated
by that knob. For example, it takes five to seven seconds
of continuous pressure for the horn to retract completely.
If the operator lets up on the knob, the horn will stop
retracting. Yancick testified that the control panel was
simple to use and was labeled one, two, three, four so that
employees could easily follow the proper sequence.
While Yancick was painting a 940-pound coil on the
turnstile and the table was vertical and moved back
toward the conveyor, Johnson retracted the horn, causing
No. 10-1368 21

the coil that was resting on it to roll off toward Yancick.
The coil hit Yancick’s legs, resulting in severe injuries.
There is no reason to turn this knob when the table is
vertical. Johnson turned the wrong knob and held it
for five to seven seconds while the horn retracted,
allowing the coil to fall toward Yancick. The next step
in the process was to turn the table horizontal, then
retract the horn, so that the coil could be moved onto
the conveyor. While one person is finishing painting a
coil on the turnstile, the controller could be “laying
down the back-ender and going ahead and sending the
next coil down the line” on the conveyor. Yancick had
trained Johnson on the control panel and at the time of
the incident, Johnson had been an operator for four
days. The record indicates that Johnson was talking
to another co-worker at the time of the incident, and
Yancick, painting a coil, had his back to Johnson.
After this incident, Daniel called Yancick and Yancick
said to him, “According to your handbooks, [Johnson]
should have been fired almost a year before my injury. . . .
Can you explain to me why you didn’t do your job and
I did mine and I get crushed?” Daniel responded: “Well,
that racism went both ways.” Duncan also went to
speak to Yancick after the accident and said, “[Johnson]
had it out for [you]” and that Yancick “took one for
the team.” Yancick testified that he did not know what
Johnson’s motivations were in dropping the coil, but
believed it had to do with him being a racist.
Other employees operating the control panel have
accidentally dropped a steel coil from the table, but they
22 No. 10-1368

have done so when removing the coil from the turnstile,
not after the table has been moved back to the conveyor.
One employee testified that he almost dropped a coil
because he hit the wrong control and began retracting
the horn when there was a coil on it.

B. Order
Yancick’s failure to respond to Hanna Steel’s statement
of facts in its summary judgment motion was deemed an
admission of those facts. CDIL-LR 7.1(D)(6). Because
Yancick’s statement of disputed facts was not properly
before the district court, the court could accept as true
the undisputed facts set forth by Hanna Steel, but had to
view those facts in the light most favorable to Yancick.
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006). Hanna
Steel still had to show that summary judgment was
proper given the undisputed facts. See Wienco, Inc. v.
Katahn Assoc., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Where
the evidentiary matter in support of the motion [for
summary judgment] does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even
if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.”) (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
As we have previously stated, “[e]mployment discrimi-
nation cases are extremely fact-intensive, and neither
appellate courts nor district courts are ‘obliged in our
adversary system to scour the record looking for factual
disputes . . . .’ ” Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Ill., 267
F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The
district court decided the motion for summary judg-
No. 10-1368 23

ment on the record presented by Hanna Steel and both
parties indicated that Judge McDade addressed the
entire record before him when ruling on the merits of
Hanna Steel’s motion. Accordingly, even though the
district court did not need to search the record for
disputed facts, we have reviewed the record submitted
by Hanna Steel, and in particular, Yancick’s citations to
that record. Based on that record, we find that summary
judgment was properly granted in favor of Hanna Steel.
Yancick brought this racially hostile work environment
suit against Hanna Steel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
He claims that Johnson was hostile to him because of
his race and that he informed Duncan of the hostile
work environment, but Duncan did not take any action
to remedy the situation. He contends that Johnson pur-
posefully dropped the steel coil on him and that all
the incidents leading up to his injury are sufficient to
show that Johnson dropped the coil because Yancick was
white.
We analyze § 1981 discrimination claims in the same
manner as claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626
F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010). As such, we cite to both
§ 1981 and Title VII cases. For Yancick to succeed on
his § 1981 claim, the record needed to contain sufficient
evidence to create a material issue of fact as to four ele-
ments: (1) the work environment must have been both
subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) race must have
been the cause of the harassment; (3) the conduct must
have been severe or pervasive; and (4) there must be a
24 No. 10-1368

basis for employer liability. Id. at 390. The district court
found that Yancick could not show that Johnson’s harass-
ment was because of race, was severe or pervasive, or
that there was a basis for employer liability.
We begin by analyzing Johnson’s actions before
Yancick’s injury. We find that taken as a whole, the facts
do not lead to a reasonable inference that the harass-
ment was pervasive or severe or motivated by race. We
do not focus on discrete acts of individual employees
when evaluating a hostile work environment claim, but
must consider the entire context of the workplace. Vance
v. Ball State Univ., Case No. 08-3568, ___ F.3d ___, 2011
WL 2162900, at *7 (7th Cir. June 3, 2011). To support a
hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff need not
show that the complained-of conduct was explicitly
racial, but must show it had a racial character or purpose.
Vance, 2011 WL 2162900, at *6. Further, the plaintiff
must show that the alleged harassment was both sub-
jectively and objectively so severe or pervasive that it
altered the conditions of his employment. Thompson v.
Mem’l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir.
2010). “In other words, the environment must be one
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,
and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.”
Smith v. Ne. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quotations omitted). We will not find a hostile work
environment for mere offensive conduct that is iso-
lated, does not interfere with the plaintiff’s work per-
formance, and is not physically threatening or humili-
ating. McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Madison Cnty., 226 F.3d
558, 567 (7th Cir. 2000).
No. 10-1368 25

Yancick does not allege that he was the target of any
racial slurs, epithets, or other overtly race-related be-
havior. Yancick believes that Johnson may have raised
his fist as a black power symbol, but there is a lack of
support showing that Johnson’s gesture was meant as
a racial attack. And there is no evidence that Johnson
wanted or attempted to harm Yancick or that Johnson
said anything to Yancick to make him feel physically
threatened. Johnson did tell Yancick that “if you want
to see me kill someone, call me a fucking nigger,” but
there is no evidence that Yancick reported this statement
to any supervisor or found it physically threatening.
See, e.g., see Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 836
(7th Cir. 2009) (occasional inappropriate comments, in-
cluding that the plaintiff was “made for the back seat of
a car” and looked like a “dyke,” did not rise to the
level of objectively hostile work environment).
Yancick also testified that he witnessed Johnson bully
his two closest friends, Adriel and Andrews. Yancick
believes that this was because of their races (Hispanic
and white, respectively), but Yancick did not witness
Johnson make any racial slurs or derogatory remarks to
them. While Johnson made the comments “stupid white
people,” and “white people are trying to get me fired,”
these comments were not directed at Yancick or even
made in his presence.2 “[I]ncidents directed at others and

2
It does not appear that the district court considered this
testimony that was in the record, but not cited in the
(continued...)
26 No. 10-1368

not the plaintiff . . . do have some relevance in demon-
strating the existence of a hostile work environment.”
Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotations omitted). However, the more remote
or indirect the act claimed to create a hostile working
environment, the more attenuated the inference that it
had an effect on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s
workplace. Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 555-
56 (7th Cir. 2007) (If the offense is “based purely on hearsay
or rumor . . . it is less confrontational [and] less wounding
than offense based on hearing or seeing”). Johnson’s
conduct toward other co-workers, while troubling, is
insufficient to alter the conditions of Yancick’s employ-
ment such that it created an abusive working environment.
Yancick’s inaction in following up on his complaints or
taking them up the chain when no apparent action was
taken by Duncan, belies the notion that Johnson’s harass-
ment was severe or pervasive. Yancick had Hanna
Steel’s harassment policy and knew that harassment
complaints should be directed to Monroe or Daniel, but

2
(...continued)
defendant’s statement of facts. The defendant’s statement of
facts focused primarily on Johnson’s conduct toward Yancick,
not his co-workers; the district court similarly focused on
Yancick’s interactions with Johnson. As noted, the district
court could accept as true the material facts submitted by the
defendant and did not need to search the record to find facts
favorable to Yancick. See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d
1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000). We could similarly disregard these
facts on appeal, id., but for completeness, we address them,
and find that they do not change the result.
No. 10-1368 27

instead of contacting these individuals, he continued to
complain to Duncan. For the most part, his complaints to
Duncan focused on Johnson’s general hostility in the
workplace, not racial tension. This is probably because
there were several reasons why Yancick believed Johnson
harassed him. Yancick testified that for the first several
months of Johnson’s employment, he and Yancick had a
good relationship and that when Johnson first started
he was friendly and outgoing. Yancick said that began
to change in early-to-mid 2005 and gave several rea-
sons why he thought that was the case, including “the
Alpha-dog syndrome,” transfer of jobs, steroid use, and
racism. Yancick testified that he thought Johnson
might have targeted him because Yancick wouldn’t
succumb to Johnson’s intimidation.
Despite Johnson’s disruptive behavior in the work-
place, Yancick testified that he did not allow Johnson to
intimidate him and loved his job. Even though Johnson
may have made some gestures or comments that were
racial in nature, Yancick hasn’t established that Johnson’s
conduct was anything more than immature and ignorant
behavior. See, e.g., Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d
663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that despite the sexual
and physical nature of the co-workers’ conduct, the
plaintiff “ha[d] not established that his encounters with
[the co-worker] reflected more than personal animosity
or juvenile behavior”); see Scruggs, 587 F.3d at 840-41
(“Offhand comments, isolated incidents, and simple
teasing do not rise to the level of conduct that alters
the terms and conditions of employment.”). Reviewing
Johnson’s conduct in the aggregate reveals “boorish
conduct and unexplained animosities toward” his
28 No. 10-1368

co-workers (who all happened to be white and Hispanic),
“but not to the extent that it meets the legal require-
ments of [finding a hostile work environment].” Durkin v.
City of Chi., 341 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Ford
v. Minteq Shapes & Servs., Inc., 587 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009)
(finding conduct seemingly worse than Johnson’s pre-
accident conduct inactionable).
Yancick cites to Smith, 189 F.3d 529, in support of his
claim, but that case is distinguishable. In Smith, Gamble,
the plaintiff’s male co-worker, called her a “bitch,” threat-
ened to “fuck [her] up,” pinned her against a wall, and
twisted her wrist severely enough to damage her liga-
ments, draw blood, and eventually require surgical
correction. Id. at 531. The plaintiff complained to her
employer, who did little to remedy the situation, so
she brought suit. Id. We found the evidence sufficient
to show that her co-worker took these actions be-
cause of her sex. Id. at 533. The plaintiff produced affida-
vits from six other female workers illustrating that
Gamble had a history of offensive interactions with his
female co-workers, calling them “bitches,” threatening to
“kick [their] ass,” and making other derogatory com-
ments and vulgar threats of physical harm. Id. at 531.
The evidence revealed that Gamble targeted female co-
workers for his assaultive outbursts. Id. at 533. We held
that “the explicitly gendered and sexually charged
epithets Gamble hurl[ed] at his victims . . . may provide
additional evidence that Gamble’s hostility toward his
female coworkers is based on their sex.” Id. Gamble’s
assault on the defendant was “part of a broader pattern
of behavior hostile to women.” Id. at 533.
No. 10-1368 29

Unlike in Smith, the evidence in this case shows that
Johnson was an equal opportunity bully. Holman v.
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (section 1981
does not cover the “equal opportunity” harasser). As
noted, Johnson made some remarks with racial under-
tones, but he did not hurl racially charged epithets at
his co-workers. He had a hostile attitude and was at
times aggressive, but other than speculation, Yancick
cannot connect Johnson’s behavior with racial animus.
There is evidence that Johnson may have been friendly
with the only other African-American employee at
Hanna Steel; however, they only interacted briefly
during shift changes. Jamil, on the other hand, attested
that outside of work, Johnson showed hostility toward
other African-Americans. He testified that this was
“consistent with my observations of Brad Johnson’s
attitude he sometimes displayed toward coworkers at
Hanna Steel; he was just an aggressive guy who tried
to act tough at times with everyone, white, black, or
whatever color.” Johnson only worked with white and
Hispanic co-workers, so his hostility toward them
cannot be viewed as singling out a group based on
race. Cf. Smith, 189 F.3d at 533 (“One method of demon-
strating that harassment is based on sex is to provide
evidence of discrepancies in how the alleged harasser
treats members of each sex in a mixed-sex workplace.”).
We now must turn to the incident that led to Yancick’s
injury, because even “one act of harassment will suffice
if it is egregious.” Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218
F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000). Without question, purpose-
fully dropping a steel coil on a co-worker qualifies as
30 No. 10-1368

egregious conduct. See Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983
(7th Cir. 2008) (“We have held that assaults within the
workplace create an objectively hostile work environ-
ment for an employee even when they are isolated.”).
Thus, to proceed to trial, Yancick needed to produce
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Johnson pur-
posefully dropped the steel coil on Yancick because of
his race. Vore v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th
Cir. 1994) (plaintiff must show that the hostility is
based on a protected characteristic). Yancick argues that an
inference can be drawn that Johnson acted purposefully
in dropping the steel coil because of his racial hostility
toward Yancick and his co-workers in the past, lay
opinion testimony that Johnson is a racist, and Johnson’s
blatant mishandling of the machinery.
While it’s true that some of Yancick’s co-workers and
his supervisor, Duncan, stated that they believed Johnson
to be racist, this lay opinion testimony doesn’t lead to
a reasonable inference that Johnson dropped the steel coil
on Yancick because he is white. Rule 701 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence allows lay testimony of mental state as
long as it is (a) rationally based on the perception of
the witness; (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701; see also United
States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We
have held that lay opinion testimony regarding mental
states is admissible under Rule 701.”). The district court’s
decision to admit lay opinion testimony pursuant to
Rule 701 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
No. 10-1368 31

Yancick cites to Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729
(7th Cir. 1981) to support his argument that the lay opin-
ion evidence creates a question of fact. In Bohannon, we
found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to have admitted a witness’ lay opinion
testimony that the plaintiff’s arrest was motivated by
racial prejudice. Id. at 731. The defendant argued that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the wit-
ness’ testimony because the rest of her testimony did not
contain any facts indicating social prejudice and as
such, the opinion could not have been rationally based
on her perception. Id. at 732. We disagreed because the
district court had determined that the witness was
present at the time of the arrest and the opinion, which
was based on personal knowledge and rational percep-
tions, was helpful to the jury. We reasoned that the de-
fendant’s arguments went to the weight the evidence
should be given, not its admissibility. Id.
Bohannon is distinguishable from this case. Unlike in
Bohannon, Yancick’s witnesses were not present when
the coil fell, so they didn’t observe Johnson and have
no basis upon which to testify about his state of mind
at the time of the accident. Further, the procedural
posture of Bohannon sets it apart from this case. Bohan-
non involved our review for abuse of discretion of a
district court’s decision to admit lay opinion testimony of
racial animus during a jury trial. The key issue in that case
was not whether the defendant’s actions were motivated
by race, but rather, whether they were wanton and mali-
cious, and there was “ample evidence from which the
jury could have found malice.” Id. at 733. Here, neither
32 No. 10-1368

party, nor the district court, addressed Rule 701 below,
so there is no decision to review for abuse of discretion.
The question here is whether the lay opinion testimony
provides a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find
that Johnson’s actions were racially motivated. The wit-
nesses provide no factual basis for their testimony.
Joestling testified that he believed Johnson did not like
white people based on his observations of how Johnson
interacted with Parker (the other African-American who
worked at Hanna Steel). But Johnson only interacted
with Parker briefly during shift changes, and without
more, such observations are not sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact.
The district court found that “[w]hile Plaintiff ‘believed’
that Johnson was a racist, there is no evidence that much
of the objectionable behavior outlined in his deposition
was race related.” Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., No. 07-cv-
1339, 2010 WL 323505, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2010) (unpub-
lished). The district court did not discuss the evidence
related to Andrews’, Duncan’s, or Joestling’s opinions
of Johnson. Because the court properly declined to
consider Yancick’s statement of disputed facts, the court
had no obligation to scour the record to find these facts.
The district court considered Yancick’s testimony and
properly found that more was required to create a rea-
sonable inference that Johnson dropped the coil on
Yancick because of race. See Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 513-14
(“Attempts to introduce meaningless assertions which
amount to little more than choosing up sides require
exclusion for lack of helpfulness by Rule 701.”); see also
Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659-60
No. 10-1368 33

(7th Cir. 1991) (“Discrimination law would be unman-
ageable if disgruntled employees—the friends of the
plaintiff . . . —could defeat summary judgment by affida-
vits speculating about the defendant’s motives.”). “If the
subjective beliefs of plaintiffs in employment discrimina-
tion cases could, by themselves, create genuine issues
of material fact, then virtually all defense motions for
summary judgment in such cases would be doomed.”
Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1058 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Belvidere,
83 F.3d 833, 841-42 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Not only is there a lack of evidence that Johnson’s
mishandling of the machinery was racially motivated,
but the record also suggests that this was a careless
accident, not intentional conduct. Yancick argues that
an inference can be drawn that Johnson purposefully
dropped the coil because he had been standing just a
few feet from Yancick when he pushed down on the
wrong knob against spring-loaded pressure for seven
seconds until the arbor fully retracted and the coil came
crashing down.3 Yancick contends that this could not
happen by accident because Johnson should not have been
pressing down on any of the knobs. But two employees
testified that while one person is finishing painting a

3
Yancick testified in his deposition that co-workers told him
that because of the way the incident happened and Johnson’s
blatant mishandling of the controls, that Johnson was trying
to kill him. The district court found that this evidence was
inadmissable hearsay. Yancick does not dispute this finding
on appeal.
34 No. 10-1368

coil on the tree, the controller could be “laying down the
back-ender and going ahead and sending the next coil
down the line” onto the conveyor. Further, the evidence
shows that coils have fallen in other circumstances and
one employee testified that he almost dropped a coil
because he hit the wrong control and began retracting
the horn when there was a coil on it. Johnson was being
trained by Yancick on the machine and had only been
in that position for four days. There is no evidence that
Johnson said anything to Yancick indicating that he
was angry or had intentions to injure Yancick with the
machinery. Yancick believes that Johnson dropped the
coil intentionally because someone could not be so
careless or reckless. But this is mere speculation and
without more, Yancick cannot show that Johnson’s
conduct was intentional (or even if intentional, that it
was racially motivated).
Because we conclude that Yancick hasn’t presented
facts upon which a reasonable jury could find that
Johnson purposefully dropped the steel coil on him
because of race, his claim fails as a matter of law. Al-
though we could end our discussion here without ad-
dressing employer liability, we note for completeness
that Yancick’s claim would fail on this front as well.
Because Johnson had no supervisory authority over
Yancick, we apply a negligence standard to employer
liability. See Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600,
604 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 758-59, 765 (1998)).
An employer is not liable for co-employee racial harass-
ment “when a mechanism to report the harassment
No. 10-1368 35

exists, but the victim fails to utilize it.” Durkin v. City of
Chi., 341 F.3d 606, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing
sexual harassment). A complainant, however, need not
specifically comply with the company’s internal pro-
cedure if the employer is adequately put on notice of
the prohibited harassment. See Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463
F.3d 773, 786 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that even though
plaintiff didn’t follow letter of harassment policy, the
defendant couldn’t reasonably claim that it did not
have sufficient notice of harassment).
Hanna Steel had a reasonable procedure in place for
detecting and correcting harassment, but Yancick didn’t
avail himself of that procedure. As a condition of his
employment, Yancick pledged “to report promptly, to
[his] General Manager or to Hanna’s Director of Human
Resources David Monroe (1-800-. . .), all instances of
harassment . . . .” Yancick could have either followed
the harassment policy reporting requirements or reported
“the alleged harassment to anyone who had the authority
to deal with the harassment or at least to someone
who could reasonably be expected to refer the complaint
up the ladder to the employee authorized to act on it.” See
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1037
(7th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted); see also Bombaci v.
Journal Cmty. Publ. Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir.
2007). Yancick did neither.4

4
Yancick doesn’t develop an argument as to constructive notice
on appeal and therefore, he has waived any contention that the
alleged racial harassment was sufficiently obvious to charge
(continued...)
36 No. 10-1368

Given Duncan’s limited duties and authority (he was
a low-level supervisor who had no authority to hire, fire,
transfer, or discipline any Hanna Steel employees),
Yancick’s awareness of Hanna Steel’s harassment policy
and chain of command, and Duncan’s unwillingness
and refusal to address the situation, it was unreasonable
for Yancick to believe that Duncan would convey his
complaints up the ladder. See Montgomery, 626 F.3d at 390
(finding it unreasonable for plaintiff to believe that his
crew chief was “the type of employee who could be
expected to convey [his] complaints to someone who
could stop the harassment” (quotations omitted)). Even
if complaining to Duncan was initially reasonable,
“any reasonableness quickly evaporated when [the plain-
tiff’s] requests for relief went unanswered.” See Parkins,
163 F.3d at 1038.
We further question whether the nature of Yancick’s
complaints would have been sufficient (even if directed
to the right person) “to make a reasonable employer
think there was some probability” that he was being
racially harassed. Id. at 1035 (discussing sexual harass-
ment). Similarly, although Andrews complained to Plant
Manager Becerra about Johnson’s workplace bullying,
and notice may come from someone other than the
victim, see Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“[T]he employer’s knowledge of the miscon-

4
(...continued)
Hanna Steel with knowledge of the conduct. See Montgomery,
626 F.3d at 392.
No. 10-1368 37

duct is what is critical, not how the employer came to
have that knowledge.”), there is no evidence that
Andrews reported Johnson’s conduct as race-related.
The record doesn’t reveal the content of Andrews’ discus-
sion with Becerra and vague complaints unrelated to
racial hostility are insufficient to establish employer
liability. Montgomery, 626 F.3d at 391-92 (finding insuffi-
cient notice where complaints were too vague to put
plaintiff on notice of racial harassment). Accordingly,
nothing in the record would allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that Hanna Steel was negligent in failing
to discover or remedy the alleged racially hostile environ-
ment.
A FFIRMED.

8-3-11