Jones v. Astrue

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 4, 2011 Decided August 5, 2011

No. 09-5414

MELVIN A. JONES,
APPELLANT

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:08-cv-01591)

Jonathan K. Osborne, student counsel, argued the cause as
amicus curiae in support of the appellant. With him on the brief
were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Doug Keller,
Supervising Attorney, and Amanda Boote Santella, student
counsel.

Melvin Jones, pro se, filed briefs.

Fred E. Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for the appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen
Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Alan Burch,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
 2

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Melvin Jones challenges a
judgment of the district court affirming the Social Security
Administration’s denial of his application for disability benefits.
Jones contends that an Administrative Law Judge did not
properly apply the “treating physician rule” in evaluating his
application, and further argues that new evidence has come to
light that warrants a remand to the agency. We agree with both
contentions.

I

Jones suffers from a variety of health problems. He has
been diagnosed with degenerative disk disease, lumbar spinal
stenosis, congestive heart failure, cardiomyopathy, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema, and gout. As a
child, he underwent several surgeries, which created an
asymmetry in the length of his legs. In 2006, he was involved
in a car accident that aggravated his pre-existing back problems.
Jones engaged in manual labor for most of his life and held jobs
moving furniture and office equipment. He alleges that, by
2004, he was unable to perform the tasks required for those jobs
-- including lifting and driving -- and could no longer work.

To qualify for disability benefits under Title XVI
(Supplemental Security Income) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., a claimant must establish that he is
disabled. Id. § 1381a. The Act defines “disability” as the
“[inability] to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment[,] . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for
 3

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); cf. id. § 423(d)(1). The Act further states
that “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental . . . impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); cf. id.
§ 423(d)(2)(A).

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has established
a five-step sequential process for assessing a claimant’s
eligibility for disability benefits. In the first four steps, the
claimant bears the burden of proof. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353
F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). At step one, the claimant must
demonstrate that he is not engaged in “substantial gainful” work.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At step two, he must establish that he
has a “severe impairment” that “significantly limits [his]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id.
§ 416.920(c). At step three, the claimant must show that he
suffers from an impairment that meets or equals an impairment
listed in the appendix to the SSA regulations. If so, he is found
to be disabled within the meaning of the Act, and the inquiry
concludes. Id. § 416.920(d). If not, the inquiry proceeds to step
four, which requires the claimant to show that he does not have
the “residual functional capacity” to perform the requirements
of his past relevant work. Id. § 416.920(e), (f). If he makes that
showing, the claimant has carried his burden, and the burden
then shifts to the Commissioner of Social Security to
demonstrate, at step five, that the claimant is able to perform
other work. Id. § 416.912(g); see also Butler, 353 F.3d at 997.
At this stage, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience to determine whether the claimant can make an
adjustment to other work, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v),
 4

(g)(1), and must show that there are jobs in the national
economy that the claimant can perform, id. § 416.912(g). If
there are not, the claimant is disabled and eligible for benefits.
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).

Jones applied for supplemental security income disability
benefits in May 2005. In the ensuing three years, he saw a
number of doctors, including his treating physician, Dr. Ashwini
Sardana. In 2008, after evaluating him on several occasions, Dr.
Sardana completed a medical assessment, which noted that
Jones suffered from numerous infirmities affecting his back,
heart, and lungs. In assessing Jones’ capacity for work, Sardana
concluded that, while Jones could occasionally bend or balance,
he could never stoop, crouch, crawl, or climb. Of greatest
significance to this appeal, Sardana opined that Jones could
stand for only two hours of an eight-hour work day and could sit
for only four hours.

Following his car accident in 2006, Jones saw Dr. Peter
Moskovitz, the orthopedic surgeon who had operated on his
knee when he was a child. Dr. Moskovitz reported that Jones
had progressive back and leg pain, left-sided sciatica, and
degenerative disc changes. He recommended a comprehensive
lumbar spine program.

In March 2007, Jones went to see Dr. Rafael Lopez, a
physician to whom the SSA had referred him for a disability
examination. Dr. Lopez’s report stated that Jones had normal
range of motion, and could squat, rise, and walk without
difficulty. He opined that Jones had full ability to use his upper
and lower extremities for work-related activities.

Jones’ medical records were also reviewed by Drs. M.V.
Kumar and Subramanian Srinivas as part of the disability-claims
process. Based on the records, the doctors concluded that,
 5

although Jones was impaired in his occupational functioning, he
could sit for six hours in an eight-hour work day and could stand
for two.

The SSA denied Jones’ claim in November 2005. In May
2007, the agency denied Jones’ petition for reconsideration.
Jones requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), which was held in January 2008.

The ALJ’s decision, issued in March 2008, followed the
five-step analysis outlined above. ALJ Opinion (March 3, 2008)
(J.A. 29-40). At step one, the ALJ determined that Jones had
not engaged in gainful activity since May 31, 2005 -- the date of
his application. At step two, he found that Jones had several
severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease, lumbar
spinal stenosis, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, and emphysema. Although the ALJ
concluded at step three that none of Jones’ impairments met or
equaled those listed in the regulatory appendix, he determined
at step four that Jones was unable to perform any past relevant
work.

Turning to step five, the ALJ found that Jones had the
residual functional capacity to perform other work, albeit only
sedentary work. In so finding, the ALJ rejected Dr. Sardana’s
opinion that Jones could not sit for more than four hours in an
eight-hour day. ALJ Op. at 5-6. The ALJ said that, although
“Dr. Sardana’s report provides a basis for the finding of some
limitations related to back pain, respiratory, and cardiovascular
problems,” the “report and the balance of the medical record do
not rule out work within the scope of the residual functional
capacity adopted here.” Id. at 9. Based on the views of a
vocational expert, the judge concluded that there were jobs in
the national economy for a person of Jones’ age and with his
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.
 6

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Jones was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 11-12.

Jones sought review of the ALJ’s decision in the United
States District Court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). He
argued that, in failing to adhere to Dr. Sardana’s determination
that he could not sit for more than four hours, the ALJ violated
the “treating physician rule,” which obligated the judge to
explain his reasons for rejecting Sardana’s opinion. Jones v.
Astrue, 654 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2009). The court was
unpersuaded, finding that “[t]here is nothing in Dr. Sardana’s
report or elsewhere in the medical record that supports his
opinion that Mr. Jones could only sit for four hours in an eight
hour work day.” Id. at 42. Accordingly, the court granted the
government’s motion for judgment of affirmance. Id.

While Jones was pursuing his district court litigation against
the SSA, he was also filing complaints against Dr. Lopez -- the
doctor whom the SSA had engaged to examine him during the
pendency of his disability claim. Jones complained about Lopez
to the District of Columbia Board of Medicine and, in July 2008,
received a letter stating that the Board had “determined that a
violation of the Health Occupations Revision Act did occur that
would warrant disciplinary action.” Letter from Jacqueline A.
Watson, Executive Dir., D.C. Bd. of Med., to Melvin Jones
(Feb. 12, 2010) (reproduced at Amicus Br. app. B). Jones also
filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, alleging that Dr. Lopez’s report constituted
fraudulent misrepresentation because he had performed only a
cursory examination and used no diagnostic tools to arrive at his
medical conclusions. Compl. ¶ 9, Jones v. Lopez, No. 2009 CA
233 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009). The judge in that case
determined that Lopez’s report did contain “a false
representation of material fact” regarding Jones’s physical
condition, but ultimately dismissed the complaint because Jones
 7

failed to show, by “clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence,” that Lopez made the false statement “knowingly” or
“recklessly.” Sup. Ct. Tr. 245-49, Jones v. Lopez, No. 2009 CA
233 (D.C. Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 2010) (appended to Appellant’s pro
se brief).

On November 30, 2009, acting pro se, Jones filed a timely
appeal from the district court’s judgment. In addition to
challenging that judgment, Jones proffered, as new evidence,
the letter from the Board of Medicine and the transcript of the
Superior Court proceeding. A special panel of this court
appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in support of
Jones’ position. We review those arguments below.

II

Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants the district court
power “to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing.” In reviewing an SSA decision, “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id.
Accordingly, the “Commissioner’s ultimate determination will
not be disturbed if it is based on substantial evidence in the
record and correctly applies the relevant legal standards.”
Butler, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). On appeal, this
court reviews the district court’s judgment of affirmance de
novo, “as if the agency’s decision ‘had been appealed to this
court directly.’” Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (quoting Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859,
862 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see Igonia v. Califano, 568 F.2d 1383,
1387 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
 8

Amicus contends that the Commissioner did not “appl[y]
the relevant legal standards,” Butler, 353 F.3d at 999, because
he transgressed the “treating physician rule” by rejecting the
opinion of Jones’ treating physician without explanation. As
this court noted in Butler: “‘Because a claimant’s treating
physicians have great familiarity with [his] condition, their
reports must be accorded substantial weight.’ . . . We thus
require an ALJ ‘who rejects the opinion of a treating physician
[to] explain his reasons for doing so.’” Id. at 1003 (quoting
Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (“Generally, we give more weight to
opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are
likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s)
. . . . We will always give good reasons in our notice of . . .
decision for the weight we give your treating source’s
opinion.”).

It is clear that the ALJ did reject the opinion of Jones’
treating physician. Dr. Sardana concluded that Jones could sit
no more than four hours in an eight-hour day. The ALJ, by
contrast, concluded that Jones could sit for six hours and, as a
consequence, was able to engage in sedentary work. It is also
clear that the ALJ did not, as required by the treating physician
rule, explain his reasons for rejecting Dr. Sardana’s opinion. He
did say that “Dr. Sardana’s report provides a basis for the
finding of some limitations related to back pain, respiratory, and
cardiovascular problems, but not below the sedentary level.”
ALJ Op. at 9. But he did not say why that was so. This kind of
“bare statement,” sans any explanation, violates the treating
physician rule. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003; Simms v. Sullivan, 877
F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The government disputes this conclusion on three grounds.
 9

First, the government contends it is unfair to characterize
the ALJ as “rejecting” Sardana’s opinion because the judge did
not reject the doctor’s entire report, instead agreeing that it
“provides a basis for the finding of some limitations.” Amicus,
the government charges, does not “acknowledge the difference
between an ALJ weighing an opinion versus rejecting an
opinion.” Gov’t Br. 15 (emphasis added).

This is just word play. Although the ALJ may have
accepted some of Sardana’s conclusions, the government does
not dispute that the ALJ rejected Sardana’s opinion that Jones
could only sit for four hours in a workday, and instead found
that he could sit for at least six. Id. at 21; see ALJ Op. at 5-6.
Moreover, the government acknowledges that “this is a
significant difference” because “a finding that Jones could only
sit for four hours in a work day would require a finding of
inability to perform sedentary work,” contrary to the finding of
the ALJ. Gov’t Br. 21. Hence, whether one calls what the ALJ
did “rejecting” or “weighing,” the treating physician rule
requires an explanation for his disagreement with Dr. Sardana’s
opinion. See Butler, 353 F.3d at 998, 1000-03 (finding the
treating physician rule violated where the ALJ rejected the
doctor’s opinion on the critical issue of whether the claimant
could stoop, even though he credited other findings); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(d)(2) (stating that, when a treating physician’s
opinion is not given controlling weight, the SSA “will always
give good reasons . . . for the weight . . . give[n] to [the] treating
source’s opinion” (emphasis added)).

Second, the government urges us to affirm the ALJ on the
ground offered by the district court: that “nothing in Dr.
Sardana’s report or elsewhere in the medical record . . . supports
his opinion that Mr. Jones could only sit for four hours in an
eight hour work day.” Jones, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 42. The amicus
vigorously disputes this claim on the merits. For our purposes,
 10

however, it is sufficient that the ALJ did not say this and
certainly did not explain it. The treating physician rule requires
an explanation by the SSA, not the court. See Butler, 353 F.3d
at 1002; cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)
(“[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is
to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a
determination or judgment which an administrative agency
alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”).

Finally, the government urges us to affirm the ALJ on the
ground that the record contained medical opinions supporting
the ALJ’s view that Jones could sit for at least six hours, and
thus contradicting Sardana’s opinion that he could not. As the
government points out, Drs. Kumar and Srinivas both opined
that Jones was capable of sitting for six hours. But again, the
ALJ did not cite those opinions -- or explain why he rejected the
opinion of Jones’ treating physician in favor of the views of two
doctors who did not personally examine Jones. See Gov’t Br. 5
(stating that Drs. Kumar and Srinivas “reviewed Jones’s medical
records”); Oral Arg. Recording 19:25-19:33 (acknowledgment
by government counsel that Kumar did not examine Jones). To
the contrary, the ALJ’s only reference to the reports of those
doctors was to state that he disagreed with their opinions that
Jones was capable of “light” (rather than only sedentary) work.
ALJ Op. at 9 (referencing Exhibits 8F and 15F).

Citing Williams v. Shalala, the government maintains that
it is “‘of no moment’ that the ALJ did not expressly state his
reason for not applying the treating physician rule because he
noted the contradictory evidence in the record.” Gov’t Br. 23
(quoting Williams, 997 F.2d at 1499). In Butler, the government
made the same appeal to Williams, and we rejected it for the
same reason we do today: the ALJ did not “‘note[] the
contradictory evidence in the record,’” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1002
 11

(quoting Williams, 997 F.2d at 1499). As we said in Butler,
“[t]his case is not analogous to Williams . . . because the ALJ
here did not acknowledge the contradictory evidence in the
record [that] ‘supplie[d] the reason’ for rejecting the treating
physician’s opinion.” Id. (quoting Williams, 997 F.2d at 1499).
Indeed, as the government conceded at oral argument, the ALJ
cited no evidence contradicting Dr. Sardana’s finding that Jones
could sit for only four hours per day. See Oral Arg. Recording
19:07.

Because the ALJ failed to explain his reason for rejecting
Dr. Sardana’s opinion regarding Jones’ capacity to sit, his
decision cannot survive review. Cf. Simms, 877 F.2d at 1052-53
(reversing the SSA’s denial of an application for disability
benefits because the ALJ “offered no reason for crediting the
consulting physicians over” the treating physician). We will
therefore direct a remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g).
“[U]pon remand, ‘the ALJ should explain what weight he
attaches to [the treating physician’s] conclusions, or if he
attaches none, his reason therefor.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003
(quoting Simms, 877 F.2d at 1053).1

1
Amicus also contends that the ALJ did not properly
communicate the full scope of Jones’ impairments to the vocational
expert, who opined -- with respect to the fifth step of the disability
analysis -- that a person with the impairments described by the ALJ
could meet the demands of other available jobs in the national
economy. Specifically, amicus argues that the ALJ failed to include
drowsiness caused by pain medication in the hypothetical he put to the
expert. See Simms, 877 F.2d at 1050 (“Should the ALJ look to the
opinion of a vocational expert in determining the claimant’s ability to
perform ‘other work’ than he has done before, the ALJ must
accurately describe the claimant’s physical impairments in any
question posed to the expert.”). On this point, however, we agree with
the district court that the ALJ sufficiently communicated Jones’
impairments to the expert, including his medicine-induced drowsiness.
 12

III

Amicus contends that we should also remand this case to
the SSA pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which
states that the court “may at any time order additional evidence
to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only
upon a showing [1] that there is new evidence [2] which is
material and [3] that there is good cause for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.”
Amicus argues that the letter from the District of Columbia
Board of Medicine, responding to Jones’ complaint regarding
Dr. Lopez’s examination, constitutes such “additional
evidence.” The letter states: “The Board has determined that a
violation of the Health Occupation Revision Act did occur that
would warrant disciplinary action.” Jones, arguing pro se,
contends that the transcript of the Superior Court proceedings
constitutes such additional evidence as well. That transcript
records the following judicial finding regarding Dr. Lopez’s
report on Jones’ condition: “[T]he court finds that there was a
false representation of material fact. Plaintiff satisfies [this] by
clear and convincing evidence.” Sup. Ct. Tr. 245. We agree
with both amicus and Jones.2

See Hr’g Tr. at 31 (asking the expert to consider a claimant who, due
to “fatigue” and “the effects of medication,” could not be expected to
“concentrate, maintain attention for extended periods, [or] keep up
with the pace”).
2
As we recently noted in (Kevin) Jones v. Astrue, --- F.3d ----,
2011 WL 2652393 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011), three circuits have held
that a court ordering a remand under sentence four of § 405(g) -- as we
do in Part II above -- may also order the Commissioner to consider
additional evidence even if the requirements of sentence six are not
met. Id. at *3. We did not need to decide the issue to resolve that
case, and we do not need to do so here. Because we conclude that the
evidence proffered by amicus and Jones satisfies the requirements of
 13

The first and third requirements for a sentence-six remand
are satisfied when there is new “evidence not in existence or
available to the claimant at the time of the administrative
proceeding.” Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990).
In this case, Jones received the letter from the Board of
Medicine in February 2010, nearly two years after the ALJ
issued his decision. Similarly, the Superior Court transcript
records proceedings that did not take place until September
2010. Accordingly, neither document was available, or even in
existence, at the time of the ALJ hearing, and there was thus
good cause for Jones’ failure to incorporate that evidence into
the record of the disability proceeding. See Bauzo v. Bowen,
803 F.2d 917, 926 (7th Cir. 1986); Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d
872, 878-79 (11th Cir. 1986).3

The government argues that the Board of Medicine’s letter
nonetheless fails to satisfy sentence six because, “[a]lthough the
date of the . . . letter makes it seem new, the underlying content
of the complaint is not new.” Gov’t Br. 32. Jones, the
Commissioner points out, “previously contended that Dr. Lopez
. . . provided a cursory examination and that his report relayed

sentence six, we need not decide whether we could also order an
evidentiary remand under sentence four.
3
The letter and the transcript were likewise unavailable during the
pendency of Jones’ district court case, which concluded with the
issuance of the court’s judgment in September 2009. The district
court thus had no occasion to consider that evidence. Because “our
review functions are as broad as those that may be performed by the
district court,” we may determine for ourselves whether the evidence
satisfies the requirements of § 405(g)’s sixth sentence. Johnson v.
Heckler, 767 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1985); see Goerg v. Schweiker,
643 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that, under similar
circumstances, “no useful purpose would be served by” returning the
case to the district court to rule on the sentence-six issue).
 14

some aspects of the examination that Jones could not have
physically performed.” Id. But sentence six requires only that
there be new evidence, not that there be an entirely new
allegation. At the time of the ALJ hearing, Jones could only
allege that Lopez’s examination and report were flawed. Now,
he can point to a letter from the Board of Medicine validating
his complaint, as well as a judicial determination that Dr.
Lopez’s report contained a false representation. These pieces of
evidence are certainly “new” within the meaning of § 405(g), as
neither existed at the time of the administrative proceeding. Cf.
Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877-79 (remanding for consideration of
new “objective” evidence of a claimant’s medical condition,
notwithstanding that the claimant had complained of the
problem before the ALJ).

The government also argues that the evidence is not
“material” within the meaning of § 405(g). In order to satisfy
the materiality requirement, the claimant must show that the
evidence “might have changed the outcome of the prior
proceeding.” Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991);
see Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626. The government maintains that
the evidence would not have altered the ALJ’s decision because
neither the letter nor the court’s determination undermines the
credibility of Dr. Lopez’s report. With respect to the Board’s
letter, the government insists that it “does not mean what it
says.” Oral Arg. Recording 21:42. While conceding that the
letter appears “fairly damning,” the government argues that it
was merely “inartfully worded.” Oral Arg. Recording 22:00-
22:10. Citing an email that government counsel solicited from
an attorney for the Board, the government insists that “there has
been no finding of misconduct” against Dr. Lopez. Oral Arg.
Recording 22:10-22:32. As for the Superior Court transcript,
the government notes that the Superior Court judge ultimately
dismissed the proceeding because he found insufficient evidence
that Dr. Lopez made a false statement knowingly or recklessly.
 15

The government misconstrues both pieces of evidence. The
email from counsel for the Board of Medicine does not say that
the Board has made no finding of misconduct against Dr. Lopez.
It states only that “[a]t [t]his point no sanctions have been
imposed.” Gov’t Br. Ex. A. And the Superior Court judge
plainly found -- by “clear and convincing evidence” -- that Dr.
Lopez did make “a false representation of material fact” in his
medical report concerning Jones. Sup. Ct. Tr. 245. Whether the
doctor did so knowingly or recklessly, while material to Jones’
Superior Court suit for misrepresentation, is immaterial to
Jones’ claim here that the ALJ should not have given weight to
Lopez’s opinion.

Since both the letter and the transcript undermine the
credibility of Dr. Lopez’s report, both pieces of evidence “might
have changed the outcome of the prior proceeding.” Melkonyan,
501 U.S. at 98. Although the government correctly observes
that the ALJ did not rely exclusively on Dr. Lopez’s report, it is
apparent that Lopez’s conclusion that Jones was only mildly
impaired did substantially inform the ALJ’s opinion. The ALJ
stressed Lopez’s “opin[ion] that the claimant had full ability to
use his upper and lower extremities regarding work-related
activities.” ALJ Op. at 8. Indeed, the judge recounted Dr.
Lopez’s findings in greater detail than those of any other
physician including Dr. Sardana, the treating physician.
Accordingly, evidence that Lopez’s conduct in the course of
examining Jones “would warrant disciplinary action,” Bd. Med.
Letter, and that his report on Jones’ physical condition contained
“a false representation of material fact,” Sup. Ct. Tr. 245, might
have prompted the ALJ to assign less weight to Lopez’s opinion
and thus to reach a different result. We will therefore direct a
remand to the Commissioner because the additional evidence
proffered by amicus and Jones satisfies the requirements of
sentence six of § 405(g). See Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086,
1089-90, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996).
 16

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand the case to that court with instructions
to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.