FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 05 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30298
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:07-cr-00255-EJL-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
DANIEL M. DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 11, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: CLIFTON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Senior
District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Eastern New York, Brooklyn, sitting by designation.
Daniel Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We dismiss Davis’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Davis waived the right to appeal any aspect of his conviction in the
unambiguous terms of his plea agreement. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d
1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2005). “We have consistently read general waivers of the
right to appeal to cover all appeals, even an appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea.” United States v. Rahman, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2619364
at *1 (9th Cir. July 5, 2011).
II.
The district court correctly denied Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea as the product of coercion. After a review of the record and during a hearing
on the motion, the court conducted “a more careful examination of the
voluntariness of [Davis’s] plea,” because Davis alleged the government and his
defense counsel threatened to have his family members prosecuted for obstruction
of justice if he did not plead guilty. United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815
(9th Cir. 1984). The court learned, both from testimony and the parties’ Statement
of Uncontested Facts, that (1) the government never threatened to pursue charges
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against Davis’s family members, and (2) the government never seriously
considered Davis’s family members to be suspects of any crime.
The district court also credited Davis’s sworn statements at the Rule 11
sentencing hearing—that his plea was voluntary—over his subsequent allegations
of coercion. At that hearing and in his written plea agreement, Davis thrice
affirmed that (1) “no person, directly or indirectly, threatened or coerced [him] to .
. . plea[d] guilty,” (2) he was not “threatened or forced or coerced in any way to
sign the [plea agreement],” and (3) he was entering the plea “voluntarily and of
[his] own free will” because he is, “in fact, guilty as charged.” Davis’s solemn
statements “during [the] guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity
in subsequent proceedings attacking the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d
1233, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In addition, the district court made credibility determinations casting doubt
on the veracity of Davis’s allegations and crediting the contrary testimony of
Davis’s counsel as “honest, forthright, and consistent.” The court determined that
Davis’s coercion allegations “presented nothing more than his own self-serving
testimony that is uncorroborated and inconsistent with the record.” The court also
(1) took notice of Davis’s “manipulative” dual personalities, apparently concocted
to deceive the court into believing Davis was incompetent; (2) noted Davis’s
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“pattern of filing pro se motions shortly before hearings” to stall and unwind the
proceedings; and (3) concluded that Davis’s “testimony and allegations generally
were lacking credibility because his appearances and conduct in court were
unconvincing as to his truthfulness.” We accord these credibility determinations
great deference on appeal. Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985).
For these reasons, we conclude Davis’s guilty plea and waiver of appeal
were made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179,
1182 (9th Cir. 2000).
DISMISSED.
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