Okoli v. City of Baltimore

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

KATRINA OKOLI, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BALTIMORE,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN P. STEWART, Executive
Director; MARTIN O’MALLEY,  No. 08-2198
Mayor; MICHAEL R. ENRIGHT, 1st
Deputy Mayor; COLM
O’COMARTUN, Special Assistant;
COMMISSION ON AGING &
RETIREMENT ED. (CARE);
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
William M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge.
(1:06-cv-03025-WMN)

Argued: March 22, 2011

Decided: August 8, 2011

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
2 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory
wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Wynn
joined. Judge Wynn wrote a separate opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: April Gordon Dawson, NORTH CAROLINA
CENTRAL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham,
North Carolina, for Appellant. David Eugene Ralph, BALTI-
MORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Mary-
land, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George A. Nilson, City
Solicitor, William R. Phelan, Jr., Chief Solicitor, BALTI-
MORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Baltimore, Mary-
land, for Appellee.

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

Appellant challenges the grant of summary judgment for
her employer when her boss forcibly kissed her, fondled her
leg, propositioned her, asked sexually explicit questions,
described sexual activities he wished to perform, and then,
after she spurned the advances and filed a harassment com-
plaint, fired her. Because those allegations are sufficient to
make out claims of hostile work environment, quid pro quo
harassment, and retaliation, we vacate and remand.

I.

We recite the facts, with reasonable inferences drawn, in
favor of the non-movant, Katrina Okoli (Appellant-Plaintiff).
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 3
John P. Stewart is the director of Baltimore’s Commission
on Aging and Retirement ("CARE") and serves in the
Mayor’s cabinet. On June 21, 2004, Stewart hired Okoli, an
African-American woman, to serve as his executive assistant.
The parties agree that for the first few months, Stewart and
Okoli worked well together.

Beginning in September 2004, things changed for the
worse: Namely, Stewart began propositioning Okoli to have
sex with him in a Jacuzzi as part of his sexual fantasy. He first
did so on September 13, 2004, during a visit to a CARE facility.1
During a September 24, 2004 work meeting, Stewart then
asked Okoli whether she was wearing any underwear, what
color it was, and whether she would come to work the next
day without underwear. Next, on October 4, 2004, Stewart
told Okoli about a sexual experience he had with an African-
American woman and her daughter. Okoli reacted with shock
and disgust, which Stewart noticed. Another time, Stewart
again mentioned this sexual experience with a mother and
daughter. Okoli reiterated that the daughter would despise and
regret having such a lewd sexual encounter with her mother.
Stewart laughed it off and returned to work, as Okoli suggests
he often did.

Stewart continued to proposition Okoli about his Jacuzzi
fantasy, and on November 10, 2004, asked her to sit on his lap
and to join him in a Jacuzzi in Las Vegas. Whenever Stewart
traveled, he continued to request Okoli to join him in his
Jacuzzi, and became angry when she rejected his advances.
1
Also in September 2004, Stewart and others joked about various col-
leagues’ sexual orientation. Okoli told Stewart she did not want to be a
part of such conversations. Stewart gave Okoli a miniature American flag
as a "[ ]sign of bigger and better things to come." J.A. 88. Stewart later
gave or sought to give Okoli other gifts such as coats, lunch, and a holiday
greeting card containing cash. When Stewart first started asking if Okoli
had a similar Jacuzzi fantasy, she replied "no, not like that," and said she
had not discussed Stewart’s proposition for group sex with another col-
league. J.A. 89.
4 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
Furthermore, Stewart touched Okoli’s legs under the confer-
ence table "two or three times" during their morning meet-
ings. J.A. 17B, 105-06, 319-20. Whenever this occurred,
Okoli would move away from Stewart and tell him "don’t do
that." J.A. 17B. In November 2004, Okoli met with a manager
about transferring to another department, and in January,
Stewart gave her an "informal" performance review with
areas of suggested improvement. J.A. 71-72.

On January 10, 2005, Stewart asked Okoli to come back in
a conference room, then forcibly grabbed and kissed her.
Okoli pushed him away and ran out the door. She was so dis-
traught that she went home and remained there for the day.
When she returned to work the next day, Okoli stressed to
Stewart that she still wanted to have only a professional rela-
tionship. While he initially said "O.K.," Stewart repeated his
Jacuzzi fantasy again that same day. J.A. 9, 17B, 90-91.2

Okoli then began reaching out for help in various ways, to
no avail: On January 26, 2005, Okoli emailed Alvin Gillard,
the Executive Director of the Baltimore Community Relations
Commission, asking to speak with him about "a complaint."
J.A. 149. Gillard never responded. On March 23, 2005, Okoli
emailed Gillard with a "high" importance flag, stating her
desire to "file a harassment complaint against my supervisor,
Mr. John P. Stewart." J.A. 171-172. Gillard suggested she
speak with an intake specialist during work hours. Okoli also
emailed Michael Enright, the First Deputy Mayor, as well as
Clarence Bishop, the Mayor’s Chief of Staff, with a "high"
importance request to meet with the Mayor as soon as possi-
ble. J.A. 176.

On April 1, 2005, Okoli sent a formal complaint to Mayor
2
After January 2005, Stewart began criticizing Okoli’s work more
harshly, placed added demands on her schedule, spread rumors that she
was a lesbian, and reminded her that she was an "at-will" employee. J.A.
17B, 90.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 5
Martin O’Malley, copying Michael Enright and Clarence
Bishop:

. . . Mr. Stewart displayed unethical and unprofes-
sional business characteristics, e.g., harassment,
degrading and dehumanizing yelling and demanding,
disrespect, mocking and gossiping about other col-
leagues (anyone in the City government) and lack or
disregard for integrity.

J.A. 197. Enright promptly forwarded that complaint on to
Stewart through Enright’s special assistant, Colm
O’Comartun. Later that afternoon, Stewart fired Okoli.3

On April 3, 2005, Okoli approached Mayor O’Malley after
a public speech and asked if he had reviewed her complaint;
he said he had not, but would have someone look at it. In an
April 5, 2005 memo to the Mayor, Stewart stated generally
that he had "never been accused" of such sexual harassment
in the past and denied the allegations in Okoli’s April memo.
J.A. 246-47. Stewart did not deny or address Okoli’s specific
allegations of sexual harassment in either of his two affidavits
to the court.

A City human resources official, Kathy Phillips, met with
Okoli on April 5, and said Okoli "shared three times in which
she felt that she had been sexually harassed." J.A. 203. Phil-
lips concluded her written summary of the meeting by stating,
"I think this goes without saying but I strongly recommend
that due to the nature of these allegations, a thorough investi-
3
That morning, Okoli and Stewart also had a disagreement about when
the two could meet. Stewart contends he drafted a termination letter on
March 23, stemming from the disagreement he had with Okoli about meet-
ing times. Stewart ended up not firing her then and revised his letter on
March 24 and 30.
6 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
gation is necessary. It should be referred to an EEO Officer."
J.A. 208.4

On April 29, 2005, Okoli repeated the same allegations to
Yolanda Winkler in the Mayor’s office, who referred her to
the Baltimore Community Relations Commission (BCRC).
On May 5, 2005, Okoli filed a charge of discrimination with
the BCRC, claiming harassment, retaliation, and "unsolicited
inappropriate touching." J.A. 212. On July 3, 2005, the Com-
mission dismissed the action for lack of probable cause that
Okoli had been discriminated against.

On September 26, 2006, Okoli initiated a pro se action
against Stewart, Enright, O’Comartun, the Mayor, CARE, and
the City Council of Baltimore (hereinafter, collectively known
as "the City"). She asserted claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, 2000e, common law, and Article 4 § 3-1 of the
Baltimore City Code.

On November 16, 2006, the City filed a notice of removal
to federal court, where Okoli amended her complaint. Both
parties moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the City’s motion. The court analyzed the same three
issues which arise in this appeal, hostile work environment,
quid pro quo harassment, and retaliation: First, regarding hos-
tile work environment, the court stressed that there were
"[j]ust three or four incidents [of physical contact] over a five
month period," and no physical threat to Okoli. J.A. 380. The
court also reasoned that Stewart ceased his conduct on his
own and "according to [Okoli’s] own positive assessment of
her job performance, it is clear that she does not believe that
Stewart’s conduct interfered with her work performance."
J.A. 380. The court emphasized that Okoli over-read certain
4
Okoli told Phillips that she had provided enough information and
declined to go into more detail about inappropriate touching. Okoli and
Phillips also discussed various ways to resolve the situation, including
being placed in a new job or contacting another state agency.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 7
inferences and innocuous gifts, and cited cases where similar
or "more egregious" conduct did not constitute a hostile work
environment. J.A. 381-82 (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Weiss v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Second, regarding quid pro quo, the district court found
that there was a legitimate basis to fire Okoli due to "perfor-
mance issues," namely her attitude, errors, and absence. J.A.
385. The court found these to be valid grounds for terminating
an at-will employee and concluded that her other allegations
of adverse actions were not actionable.

Third, regarding retaliation, the district court found that it
was "questionable whether the sending of this letter [to the
Mayor] constitutes ‘protected activity,’" because Okoli made
"simply a general complaint about Stewart’s unprofessional
behavior . . . ." J.A. 389. Even assuming this was protected
activity, the court found the retaliation claim failed because
Stewart made the decision to terminate her before she sent the
letter. The court relied on a computer file’s timestamp to
establish this fact.

II.

"In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review
. . . ." Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991).
We draw "[a]ll inferences . . . in a light most favorable to the
non-movant." Id.

A.

First, Okoli alleges she was subject to a hostile work envi-
ronment. "To demonstrate sexual harassment and/or a racially
hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that there is
‘(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s
sex [and/or race]; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive
8 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create
an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to
the employer.’" Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d
326, 334 (4th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Con-
ner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 (4th
Cir. 2000)).

The third factor is dispositive here: whether Stewart’s treat-
ment was severe or pervasive enough. The City contends it
was not, characterizes Stewart’s conduct as sporadic and
infrequent, depicts Stewart as promptly stopping this conduct
once Okoli objected, and questions whether some of Stewart’s
comments and gifts were sexual at all.

We conclude that Okoli presents a strong claim for hostile
work environment. Here, we look to the totality of the circum-
stances, including the "‘frequency of the discriminatory con-
duct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work perfor-
mance.’" Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-
88 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 23 (1993)). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Okoli, she suffered upwards of twelve (12) incidents in just
four months: (1) disparaging jokes about gays and lesbians;
(2) comments about Okoli and Jacuzzi fantasy; (3) comments
about Okoli and group sex fantasy; (4) questions about
Okoli’s underwear; (5) comments about sexual relations with
another African-American woman; (6) additional inquiries
about Okoli sitting on lap and Jacuzzi fantasy; (7-10) three
incidents of fondling her leg under a table; (11) forcible kiss-
ing; (12) more propositions to join in a Jacuzzi fantasy. These
events took place from September 8 through January 11.
Functionally, these incidents span fondling, kissing, proposi-
tioning, describing sexual activities, and asking intimate ques-
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 9
tions. Some of the incidents may have been severe enough to
be actionable in and of themselves.5

Collectively, Okoli was subject to repeated propositioning
and physical touching. By any objective and reasonable stan-
dard, the allegations here are far beyond "simple teasing [and]
offhand comments." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Moreover, Stewart’s alleged conduct is
much more than "‘generalized’ statements that pollute the
work environment"—they clearly constitute "‘personal
gender-based remarks’ that single out individuals for ridi-
cule." EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, 609 F.3d 320, 328-29
(4th Cir. 2010). Indeed, the conduct here is arguably at least
as severe as conduct we have previously deemed to be action-
able. See, e.g., Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d
326, 336 (4th Cir. 2010) (gender-based language, songs, and
comments); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (coach’s explicit inquiries into and com-
ments about student athletes’ sexual lives); Smith v. First
Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2000)
(repeated remarks that belittled employee because she was a
woman). Here too, there is a significant "disparity in power,"
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697: Stewart is a political appointee
who sits in the Mayor’s cabinet and heads an agency with
more than a hundred employees. Okoli was a new secretary
whose job required her to have a lot of one-on-one contact
with her boss.
5
See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000)
(indicating that "a single incident [of sexual harassment that] was extraor-
dinarily severe" can be actionable); E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496
F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2007) (same); Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288
F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Bowen v. Missouri Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 311 F.3d 878, 884 (8th Cir. 2002) ("A claimant need only establish
discriminatory conduct which is either pervasive or severe."); Smith v.
Norwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997)
(same); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 525 F.3d 1139, 1146
(11th Cir. 2008) (same) (citations omitted).
10 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
Furthermore, the sexual advances here were more numer-
ous and explicit than in Beardsley v. Webb, which Okoli cites.
In Beardsley, we found a hostile work environment when,
over six months, a supervisor massaged an employees shoul-
ders, stated he wanted to "make out" and "have his way" with
her, falsely accused her of having an affair, and asked her
about her underwear, birth control, and the bodily effects of
taking maternity leave. 30 F.3d 524, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1994).6
Additionally, this case involves more severe accusations of
sexual harassment than the pre-Jennings cases which the dis-
trict court and City cited.7

Finally, the district court’s reasoning was flawed in two
other ways. First, the court over-emphasized the role of Stew-
art’s gifts in light of the extensive remarks and touching here.
Some of those gifts, such as a holiday card, flag, or tea set,
may seem innocuous when viewed alone or out of context.
But our legal analysis "requires careful consideration of the
6
The City attempts to distinguish Beardsley because the defendant there
had "unequivocally rejected every advance," whereas here Okoli was more
tepid and already had poor performance. While some of Okoli’s early
responses are somewhat general, she explicitly told Stewart she was not
interested in a sexual relationship on January 11, 2005.
7
The City points to Hopkins, where we found no hostile work environ-
ment existed when, over a seven year period, a supervisor "bumped into
[an employee], positioned a magnifying glass over his crotch, flipped his
tie over to see its label, gave him a congratulatory kiss in the receiving line
at [the employee’s] wedding, and stared at him in the bathroom . . . [but
n]ever made an overt sexual proposition or touched [the employee] in a
sexual manner." 77 F.3d at 753. Here, by contrast, the conduct transpired
during just over four months, and included more physical contact, more
sexual propositions, and more explicit language.
Nor is this case Weiss, where the Seventh Circuit found no hostile work
environment when a supervisor asked an employee out on dates, called her
a "dumb blond," touched her shoulder several times, posted "I love you"
signs, and tried to kiss her at a bar. 990 F.2d at 334. Stewart’s advances
were graphic sexual propositions—not innocuous requests for "dates."
Moreover, Stewart’s comments were far more sexually explicit, and his
touching of her leg more intimate, invasive, and unseen.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 11
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is
experienced by its target." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Here, Okoli alleges Stewart
was engaging in an escalating pattern of sexual advances.
Gifts could certainly have been a part of his effort to coerce
Okoli into having sex. A gift which may seem harmless in the
abstract can have sexual connotations when delivered with a
suggestive comment (this flag is "[ ]sign of bigger and better
things to come," J.A. 88) or symbol (i.e., a phallic or sexual
allusion).

Second, the district court reasoned that Stewart’s advances
could not have interfered with Okoli’s work since she had a
high opinion of her performance. But this conflates aspects of
Stewart’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims.
Okoli can argue that Stewart negatively impacted her work,
while still defending her performance against the City’s
attempt to show a legitimate basis for firing her. Indeed "[t]he
fact that a plaintiff continued to work under difficult condi-
tions is to her credit, not the harasser’s." EEOC v. Fairbrook
Med. Clinic, 609 F.3d at 330. Overall, Okoli presents a strong
claim for hostile work environment, when "objective[ly view-
ing the] severity of harassment . . . from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position." Oncale, 523
U.S. at 81.

B.

Second, Okoli claims she experienced quid pro quo dis-
crimination. This requires an employee prove five elements:

1 The employee belongs to a protected group.

2 The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment.

3 The harassment complained of was based upon
sex.
12 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
4 The employee’s reaction to the harassment
affected tangible aspects of the employee’s com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. The acceptance or rejection of the
harassment must be an express or implied condi-
tion to the receipt of a job benefit or cause of a
tangible job detriment to create liability. Further,
as in typical disparate treatment cases, the
employee must prove that she was deprived of a
job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to
receive because of the employer’s use of a pro-
hibited criterion in making the employment deci-
sion.

5 The employer, as defined by Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), knew or should have known of the
harassment and took no effective remedial
action.

Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added, citations omitted). With the fourth element, "[a] tangi-
ble employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington
Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). The fifth
element is "automatically met" when the harassment was
alleged to have been perpetrated by a supervisor. Spencer v.
General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 n.10 (4th Cir. 1990).

If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse action. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Baqir v. Principi,
434 F.3d 733, 747 (4th Cir. 2006). Then, if the employer sat-
isfies its burden, the burden returns to the plaintiff to establish
that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimi-
nation. Baqir, 434 F.3d at 747.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 13
In this case, the inquiry turns on the fourth factor: whether
Okoli’s reaction to Stewart’s advances affected "tangible
aspects" of her employment. The parties focus mostly on
whether Stewart’s decision to conduct an informal perfor-
mance feedback—as opposed to a formal, periodic perfor-
mance review—was "tangible" enough. Performance reviews
are clearly related to employment and promotion. But the
record contains no details about what reviews are standard or
required by office policy. The more "tangible" employment
action taken by Stewart was Okoli’s allegation that Stewart
fired her for rejecting his advances and complaining about his
conduct.

The City also maintains it had a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Okoli that has not been
shown to be pretextual. Okoli must then show that the prof-
fered reason is false: "‘In appropriate circumstances, the trier
of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation
that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose.’" Washington v. City of Charlotte, 219 Fed. Appx.
273, 279 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (Gregory, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 147 (2000)). "‘[O]nce the employer’s justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most
likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is
in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its deci-
sion.’" Id. at 279-80 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147).

In this case, there is some evidence that Okoli occasionally
had scheduling conflicts and made typographical errors. But
it appears deeply suspicious that Stewart fired Okoli only
hours after she culminated her rejection of him by complain-
ing to the Mayor. There is little in the record to suggest Okoli
would have been fired for the occasional typo, notwithstand-
ing her "at-will" employment status. Specifically, Stewart and
Okoli’s last disagreements were about whether to meet at 8:30
AM instead of 8:00 AM and 2:15 PM instead of 2:10. J.A. 73-
75, 120-22, 146. It is hard to believe those lone scheduling
14 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
conflicts were so egregious as to provide a legitimate basis for
firing Okoli the same afternoon she complained about harass-
ment. "[W]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant
have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we gen-
erally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration . . . ." Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis in original).

C.

Third, Okoli maintains that Stewart retaliated against her.
"To state a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity,
such as filing a complaint with the EEOC; (2) the employer
acted adversely against the plaintiff; and (3) the protected
activity was causally connected to the employer’s adverse
action." Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir.
1997) (citing Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir.
1994)).

The parties disagree centrally about whether Okoli’s April
1 letter to the Mayor constituted protected activity because it
did not explicitly mention sexual harassment. The City also
emphasizes that Stewart decided to fire Okoli before she com-
plained, as evinced by his deposition and the timestamp on
the computer file he used to fire her. Okoli’s previous com-
plaints are insufficient, according to the City, because they
were too vague or too long before she was ultimately fired.

Here, it was enough for Okoli to twice complain of "harass-
ment," even if it might have been more ideal for her to detail
the sexual incidents she later relayed.8 While Okoli’s January
8
Several sister circuits have noted that sexual harassment complaints
need not include "magic words" such as "sex" or "sexual" to be effective.
See, e.g., Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
("While no ‘magic words’ are required, the complaint must in some way
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 15
26 email to Gillard referenced only a "complaint," her March
23 email was entitled "Harassment Complaint." J.A. 171
(emphasis added). Okoli’s April 1 memo to the Mayor further
described "unethical and unprofessional business characteris-
tics, e.g., harassment, degrading and dehumanizing yelling
and demanding, disrespect, mocking and gossiping about
other colleagues (anyone in the City government) and lack or
disregard for integrity." J.A. 197 (emphasis added).

The City surely should have known that Okoli’s complaints
of "harassment" likely encompassed sexual harassment.9
Indeed, Okoli’s description of "unethical," "degrading and
dehumanizing" conduct suggest severe misbehavior related to
her identity—not a mere workplace squabble. Moreover,
based on his alleged conduct, Stewart himself surely would
have known that Okoli was complaining of sexual harass-
ment.

Finally, the district court improperly inferred that Stewart
had intended to fire Okoli before she complained simply
because his Word document, "Katrina[ Okoli].doc" was cre-
ated on March 23. The court did so largely on the basis of a
CARE technician who stated that the file properties show it
was created on March 23 and modified on March 31. To
therefore infer that Stewart necessarily intended to fire Okoli
for legitimate reasons on March 23 was clear error. That a
computer file was created on a certain day tells us nothing
about its contents on that day. It is entirely possible
"Katrina.doc" could have been blank—or contained an unre-

allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition."); Olson v.
Lowe’s Home Ctrs. Inc., 130 Fed. Appx. 380, 391 n.22 (11th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished) ("There is no magic word requirement. That is, the
employee need not label the events ‘sexual harassment’ in order to place
an employer on notice of the offending behavior.").
9
Courts and employers generally understand "harassment" to be a term
of art. See, e.g., Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (discussing "the legal term of art ‘harassment.’").
16 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
lated or favorable review of her work, which Stewart later
modified. Indeed there is already evidence in the record that
Stewart modified his letter three times before delivering it.
Okoli’s second amended complaint alleges that Stewart typed
up a termination letter after reading her complaint. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Okoli, we can infer
that Stewart did not intend to fire her before April 1—and
therefore a genuine dispute of material fact still exists on this
front.

Moreover, it is undisputed that Stewart actually fired Okoli
only after learning of her complaint. This is unaffected by the
fact that he may or may not have had a draft termination letter
on his computer beforehand. Even assuming Stewart previ-
ously contemplated firing her—Okoli’s complaint might have
been an additional or superseding cause of her ultimate termi-
nation. Regardless, Okoli presented more than an adequate
claim that her complaint was "causally connected to the
employer’s adverse action." Beall, 130 F.3d at 619. Any dis-
pute about Stewart’s alternative, legitimate basis for firing her
returns to the question of mixed-motives and pretext. For the
purposes of summary judgment, Okoli has eliminated legiti-
mate reasons for her firing, so "it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration . . . ."
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. We now return this case to a jury to
assess and resolve Okoli’s three claims.

III.

For these reasons, the grant of summary judgment is
vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED

WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment:

In this case, Katrina Okoli ("Okoli") was fired after reject-
ing what she alleged to be persistent sexual advances, of both
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 17
a verbal and physical nature, made by her supervisor, John
Stewart ("Stewart"). I agree with the majority that, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Okoli, the
nature and prevalence of Stewart’s alleged advances was suf-
ficient to support a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII. That said, I differ somewhat in my analysis of the
causal link between Okoli’s opposition to those sexual
advances and the adverse employment action eventually taken
against her. Ultimately, however, I too would conclude that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendants regarding Okoli’s quid pro quo and retaliation
claims.

I.

Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to "discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. This language encompasses a prohibi-
tion on sexual harassment in the workplace. Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986). Because
Okoli brought both a "quid pro quo" claim and a "hostile
work environment" claim, this case requires us to address two
distinct types of workplace sexual harassment that constitute
intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII.

The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment"
are absent from the statutory text of Title VII. As recognized
by the Supreme Court,

The terms appeared first in the academic literature,
see C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (1979); found their way into decisions of the
Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., Henson v. Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 909 (C.A.11 1982); and were mentioned in
this Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See generally E.
18 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 307 (1998).

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752
(1998). In her book, Professor MacKinnon distinguished
between "harassment that creates an offensive environment
(‘condition of work’ harassment) and harassment in which a
supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for job
benefits (‘quid pro quo’)." Henson, 682 F.2d at 908 n.18 (cit-
ing C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women
32-47 (1979)). In 1983, this Court adopted the dichotomy
suggested by Professor MacKinnon and agreed that there are
these "two basic varieties" of sexual harassment. Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d
at 908 n.18), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in
Mikels v. City of Durham, N.C., 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1999).

In 1986, a useful distinction between so-called quid pro
quo claims and hostile work environment claims was drawn
by the Supreme Court in Meritor. Essentially, the court was
asked to rule on whether a claim of "hostile environment"
sexual harassment is a form of actionable sex discrimination
under Title VII. More precisely, the Court considered whether
constructive changes to the conditions of employment, absent
evidence of direct financial injury1, could support Title VII
liability. The Court noted that the EEOC’s Guidelines sup-
ported the conclusion that sexual misconduct violates Title
VII "whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial
of an economic quid pro quo, where ‘such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
1
The Court was responding to Petitioner’s contention "that in prohibit-
ing discrimination with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges’ of employment, Congress was concerned with what petitioner
describes as ‘tangible loss’ of ‘an economic character,’ not ‘purely psy-
chological aspects of the workplace environment.’" Meritor, 477 U.S. at
64.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 19
offensive working environment.’" 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)). The Court ultimately held that "a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment." Id. at 66; see also id. at 65 (referring to
these claims as involving "so-called ‘hostile environment’
(i.e. non quid pro quo) harassment").

After Meritor, the Supreme Court has instructed that "[t]he
principal significance of the distinction [drawn therein
between quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment
claims] is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either
explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions
of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or per-
vasive." Burlington, 524 U.S. at 752. In Burlington, the Court
considered whether, when an employer threatens to retaliate
against an employee if she denies him sexual liberties, Title
VII liability exists if the threat is not carried out. The Court
concluded that even when the employer does not act on such
a threat, if the sexual harassment is sufficiently severe or per-
vasive, liability can exist on the theory that the harassment
constructively altered the employee’s conditions of employ-
ment by creating a "hostile work environment." Id. at 753-54.
The Court stated that, the labels "quid pro quo" and "hostile
work environment," when applied to a sexual harassment
claim, "illustrate the distinction between cases involving a
threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general."
Id. at 753.2
2
The distinction was drawn because, as the Burlington court recognized,
it affected questions regarding an employer’s vicarious liability. When a
supervisor takes a "tangible employment action" (defined as "a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits," 524 U.S. at 761) against an
employee, vicarious liability for the employer is automatic. Id. at 762-63.
When no tangible employment action is taken, vicarious liability exists
subject to a two-pronged affirmative defense. Id. at 765 ("The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reason-
20 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
II.

I agree with the majority that, when viewed in the light
most favorable to Okoli, the litany of unwelcome sexual
advances allegedly made by Stewart was sufficiently severe
and pervasive to alter the conditions of Okoli’s employment
by creating a hostile work environment.3 Moreover, I agree
that Okoli’s firing constituted a tangible employment action.
In other words, drawing every inference in her favor, Okoli
has demonstrated both constructive and explicit changes to
the terms and conditions of her employment. To recover for
the latter, however, Okoli must demonstrate that her rejection
of Stewart’s sexual advances was the basis for the decision to
terminate her "at will" employment contract.

Perhaps due to Professor MacKinnon’s initial conception of
"quid pro quo" harassment, courts have sometimes insinuated
that to recover on that theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the receipt of a job benefit was conditioned on acceptance

able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise."); see also Reinhold v. Com. of Va., 151 F.3d
172 (1998).
3
I do not believe, however, that certain "gifts such as coats, lunch, and
a holiday greeting card containing cash" given to Okoli contributed to the
hostility of her work environment. Indeed, Okoli does not dispute that
Stewart often took his employees to lunch for their birthday and gave his
employees Christmas gifts, often of cash. Nor does Okoli dispute that,
after Stewart’s mother died, he distributed a number of his mother’s per-
sonal belongings to the staff at C.A.R.E.. He gave Okoli some used coats
for her daughters as well a used bowling ball. Still, even without consider-
ation of these gifts, the record indicates that Okoli subjectively perceived
numerous sexual advances by Stewart as creating an abusive work envi-
ronment, and I agree with the majority that Stewart’s alleged sexual
harassment was "of the type that would interfere with a reasonable per-
son’s work performance . . . to the extent required by Title VII." Morgan
v Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990).
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 21
of a supervisor’s sexual advance. See, e.g., Spencer v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990) (defining "quid
pro quo sexual hararassment" as that in which "sexual consid-
eration is demanded in exchange for job benefits"), abrogated
on other grounds, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992);
Katz, (defining "quid pro quo sexual harassment" as "harass-
ment in which a supervisor demands sexual consideration in
exchange for job benefits . . . ." (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at
908 n.18)).

In this case, there was no evidence that Stewart ever
expressly conditioned Okoli’s job or the benefits thereof on
her acceptance of his sexual advances.4 Cf. Burlington, 524
U.S. at 747-48 (supervisor warned employee who gave no
encouragement to sexual commentary to "loosen up" because
he "could make [her] life very hard or very easy at Burling-
ton"); Katz, 709 F.2d at 254 ("Uncontradicted testimony by
Katz indicated that the supervisor . . . once stated in her pres-
ence that he would consider accepting her transfer to his crew
because of her sexual abilities."). Indeed, even when viewed
in the light most favorable to Okoli, there is scant evidence
that such a condition was even implied.5 See Brown v. Perry,
4
Okoli did assert in her complaint that "Plaintiff was led to belief by Mr.
Stewart that her employment opportunities would be enhanced if she
accepted the sexual advances." J.A. 10. (Citations herein to "J.A. __" refer
to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
However, she failed to point to a single instance in which Stewart
expressly indicated any causal connection between her acceptance or
rejection of his advances and any potential change to the conditions of her
employment. In fact, Okoli herself indicated that when Stewart proposi-
tioned her he would say "Okay, but you know this doesn’t mean you get
any perks." J.A. 107.
5
It is of course difficult to state as a matter of law that a certain body
of evidence fails to support an implication. However, the standard on sum-
mary judgment requires us to draw "all reasonable inferences" in favor of
Okoli. See Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1129 (4th Cir.
1987). Nothing in the record can be reasonably inferred to indicate that
Stewart’s actions or comments impliedly conditioned Okoli’s job benefits
22 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
184 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that quid pro quo
claim can be established when acceptance of harassment is an
"express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit")
(emphasis added).

However, that observation does not bar recovery. Instead,
liability for discrimination on a quid pro quo theory can be
established when "rejection of the harassment [is the] cause of
a tangible job detriment." Id. at 393; see also Burlington, 524
U.S at 753-54 ("When a plaintiff proves that a tangible
employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a
supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms
and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title
VII."); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) ("Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when . . .
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual . . . .").

Okoli argued that she was fired for refusing Stewart’s
advances. The City proffered non-discriminatory reasons for
Okoli’s discharge which the majority appears to cast as mere
pretext for discrimination. While we must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to Okoli, I would allow a jury to
decide whether the City’s reasons for Okoli’s termination
were transparently false or facially illegitimate. Assuming
arguendo that Okoli made a prima facie case for quid pro quo
sexual harassment, I would hold that the City effectively

on her acquiescence to his advances. Cf. Spencer, 894 F.2d at 659 (finding
that prima facie quid pro quo claim was established where plaintiff pro-
duced evidence that a female co-worker who succumbed to sexual
demands of their employer received promotion but plaintiff refused sexual
demands and was denied a promotion to a position that remained unfilled,
thus evidencing, through implication, the existence of an impermissible
condition).
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 23
rebutted the presumption of harassment created by the prima
facie case. It bears mention that to effectively rebut the pre-
sumption, "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is suffi-
cient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact
as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)
(citation omitted). I would conclude that the City’s showing
was sufficient to raise that issue of fact. However, because a
jury could credit Okoli’s evidence indicating that the City’s
proffered reasons were pretextual, I would conclude that it
should be for the jury to determine whether the City’s non-
discriminatory reasons were the true motivation for Okoli’s
termination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (establishing the burden shifting
scheme which controls Title VII discrimination claims).
Accordingly, I would hold that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the City.

Okoli was hired on June 21, 2004, as an Assistant to the
Executive Director of C.A.R.E., a position requiring her to
provide "staff assistance and confidential secretarial and
administrative support to the Executive Director." J.A. 65.
The job required her to, inter alia, maintain the Executive
Director’s files and schedule as well as compose correspon-
dence, reports, and memoranda for the Executive Director.
She was expected to "deal with employees . . . with tact and
courtesy," and "deal with confidential materials and situations
with discretion." J.A. 66. Okoli does not dispute that she was
hired as an "at will" employee, meaning that she could be
fired for "no reason or any reason at all-except an unlawful
reason." Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 277 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Motz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

There is also no dispute that the first few months of Okoli’s
employment went well. However, according to Stewart’s affi-
davit, even as early as September 30, 2004, he had to counsel
Okoli on the requirements of her position after she discussed
24 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
confidential lay-offs with co-workers.6 Stewart claims that
even at the early stages of Okoli’s tenure he noticed clerical
errors on outgoing correspondence for which Okoli was respon-
sible.7 In early January 2005, Stewart asserts that he gave
Okoli an informal performance evaluation to indicate areas in
which she needed improvement. Stewart claims that during
the evaluation, he explained to Okoli that she needed to (1)
correct persistent clerical errors in outgoing correspondence,
(2) stop criticizing the work product of the Bureau Chiefs that
worked under Stewart, (3) implement a filing system, (4)
improve her time management skills, and (5) clean up her
cluttered office. Stewart stated that after this performance
review, Okoli became uncooperative and defiant while dem-
onstrating no improvement in the areas of concern.

On January 24, 2005, Stewart "formally counseled [Okoli]
about her performance." J.A. 72. According to Stewart, he
reiterated the need for her to improve her proofreading and
typing. He advised her that he would consider disciplinary
action, including termination, if she did not improve.

Stewart maintained that on February 14, 2005, he was pre-
paring to distribute documents supposedly proofread by Okoli
to the Baltimore City delegation to the Maryland General
Assembly when he noticed that there were several errors in
the documents. He claims he again spoke to Plaintiff regard-
ing her performance.

According to Stewart, on March 1, 2005, Plaintiff left the
office without telling him, although he later learned from
C.A.R.E.’s receptionist that Plaintiff had gone to take her
6
Okoli does not dispute that she disclosed this confidential information;
instead she asserts that Stewart unfairly criticized her for the disclosure as
retaliation for her opposition of his sexual advances.
7
For instance, the record includes a number of emails sent by Okoli in
early November 2004 which were returned because Plaintiff entered an
incorrect email address.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 25
child to school. He instructed the receptionist to tell Plaintiff
to see him immediately upon her return. Plaintiff received the
message, but did not report immediately as instructed. Stewart
claims he later confronted Plaintiff about being AWOL and
told her that it constituted grounds for termination. According
to Stewart, after this incident he spoke to the City’s Depart-
ment of Human Resources about the possibility of terminating
Okoli. The record includes a letter drafted by Monica Wilson,
a member of the City’s Department of Human Resources,
confirming that Stewart came to her office to discuss Okoli’s
unexcused absence. According to Wilson, "Stewart said that
[Okoli] had not discussed [her anticipated absence from work]
with him; that this was not the first incident of [Okoli] leaving
the worksite for extended periods of time without his permis-
sion and that he had spoken to her about it prior to this date."
J.A. 153.

On March 23, 2005, Okoli demonstrated what Stewart saw
as unacceptably insubordinate behavior. When Stewart
arrived and asked her at 8:10 to assist in the preparation of
documents for a meeting that morning, Okoli refused, stating
that she would not assist him until 8:30. After returning from
the meeting, Stewart asked Okoli to meet with him at 2:10.
Okoli refused, stating that her lunch hour would not be over
until 2:15. When Okoli finally met with Stewart, he informed
her that her insubordination and "failure to improve her per-
formance" constituted grounds for her termination.

Stewart avers that he had another of his employees draft a
termination letter for Okoli later on March 23. He claims that
it was his intention to terminate Okoli’s employment the next
day. However, on March 24, Okoli took a day off. The next
day was Good Friday, and Okoli had scheduled vacation for
the following Monday through Wednesday. Okoli took a sick
day on Thursday. Accordingly, the next day that she was in
the office was April 1, 2005, the day when she was terminated.8
8
Okoli does not dispute that she was absent from the office from March
24 until April 1.
26 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
Frank Johnson, the C.A.R.E. employee to whom Stewart dele-
gated the task of drafting the termination letter, confirmed that
it was initially drafted days before Okoli’s termination,
although he couldn’t remember the exact date.9

In light of this evidence, I would hold that the City carried
its burden of production by setting forth "‘through the intro-
duction of admissible evidence,’ reasons for its actions which,
if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that
unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment
action." St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507
(1993) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255). The question then
becomes whether Okoli presented sufficient evidence to indi-
cate that the City’s proffered reasons for firing her were mere
pretext. To avoid judgment as a matter of law on the question
of whether an employer’s proffered reason was merely pretext
and that opposition to sexual harassment was the real reason
for her termination, Okoli must establish a "‘legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [her].’"
Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 278-79 (4th Cir.
2000); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that notwith-
standing the burden shifting scheme, the plaintiff retains the
9
There is arguably a question as to whether, when viewed in the light
most favorable to Okoli, the evidence can support a reasonable inference
that the decision to terminate her was made on March 23. However, in
addition to the testimony of Johnson, who drafted Okoli’s termination let-
ter, and Stewart, who made the termination decision and ordered the letter
drafted, the record includes the affidavit of Lisa Veale, who stated that
Stewart "shared with me the desire to terminate Okoli due to her perfor-
mance and attitude prior to her termination date." J.A. 84. Admittedly, the
fact "[t]hat a computer file was created on a certain day tells us nothing
about its contents on that day." However, the record also includes a "ter-
mination letter" dated March 24, 2005, indicating that Okoli’s at will posi-
tion would be terminated "effective March 28, 2005." J.A. 184. I question
whether, even viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to
Okoli, there can be, in light of the evidence presented by Defendants, a
reasonable dispute regarding whether the decision to fire Okoli was made
before or after Stewart gained knowledge of Okoli’s letter to the Mayor
on April 1, 2005.
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 27
"ultimate burden of persuading the [trier of fact] that [she] has
been the victim of intentional discrimination").

As summarized above, the City contended that Okoli was
fired for her failure to correct repeated performance issues
and for her increasing insubordination. The bulk of Okoli’s
response is constituted of disagreement regarding the alleged
deficiencies in her work performance. For instance, Okoli
asserts that "in [her] nine months at CARE, there were no out-
going documents with even a single error." J.A. 94. She also
claims, regarding her absenteeism, that "Stewart advised [her]
as early as [her] interview that [she] could work anytime that
[she] wanted as long as [she] worked [her] allotted hours."
J.A. 96. Additionally, Okoli challenges the City’s assertion
that Stewart addressed performance concerns with her prior to
her termination.10 Finally, Okoli’s allegations that she was
repeatedly harassed are relevant to the contention that the
City’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual.
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 (stating that "facts
as to the [employer’s] treatment of [an employee] during his
prior term of employment" can be relevant to a showing of
pretext).

Okoli also generally opines that she performed well while
employed at C.A.R.E.. However, this merely indicates that
she disagreed with her supervisor’s assessment of her perfor-
mance. When considering whether an employee’s perfor-
10
Okoli asserts that "[Stewart] never told me to improve in any areas
and thus, he never gave me any verbal or written documentation address-
ing performance, attitude or discipline." J.A. 96. Curiously, however, the
record includes Okoli’s handwritten notes from January 25, the date Stew-
art claims he conducted Okoli’s formal evaluation. While those notes do
not mention errors in documents drafted by Okoli, they indicate that Stew-
art expressed displeasure with her unexcused and unannounced absence
and stated that she could be terminated for failure to call to explain future
absences. Moreover, Lisa Veale stated in her affidavit that she "sat in on
a couple of meetings when [Stewart] spoke to Okoli about issues with her
performance." J.A. 82.
28 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE
mance was the motivation for an adverse employment action,
"‘[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is rele-
vant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.’" Hawkins v.
PespiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting
DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir.
1998)).

In sum, two competing stories were proffered about the
City’s reason for firing Okoli, and there was evidence which,
if proven at trial, would permit a jury to believe either story.
"Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). As
such, I agree that Okoli’s claim for quid pro quo harassment
should have survived the City’s motion for summary judg-
ment.

III.

Title VII also makes it illegal "for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees . . . because he opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title
. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. As noted above, supra n.9, I ques-
tion whether a reasonable inference can be drawn from the
evidence that the decision to terminate Okoli was made on
April 1. However, even assuming arguendo that the decision
to fire her was made, as the City claims, on March 23, I would
still hold that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the City on Okoli’s retaliation claim.

To prove a prima facie case of retaliation, Okoli was
required to demonstrate that "(1) she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action
against her; and (3) a causal connection existed between the
protected activity and the asserted adverse action." Von Gun-
ten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863 (4th Cir. 2001). As the
 OKOLI v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 29
majority observes, the April 1 letter to the Mayor was not the
first attempt made by Okoli to use official channels to com-
plain about Stewart’s actions. I agree that the undisputed fact
that Okoli twice sent emails to City personnel complaining of
"harassment" was sufficient to establish that she engaged in
protected activity. Because she was subsequently fired, Okoli
need only demonstrate that a causal connection existed
between her opposition to Stewart’s actions and the decision
to terminate her. As explained above, an unresolved factual
dispute as to the reasons for Okoli’s termination made sum-
mary judgment for the City inappropriate.

IV.

In sum, I would hold that there is an unresolved factual dis-
pute regarding the cause for Okoli’s termination. In other
words, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that Okoli failed
to demonstrate the requisite causal connection. As such, I
agree with the majority that summary judgment in favor of the
City was inappropriate.