UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5246
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO MCREYNOLDS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00154-BO-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 9, 2011
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Reginald McReynolds pled guilty without a plea
agreement to one count of larceny of personal property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 661 (2006), arising from his
theft of a motorcycle on federal property. McReynolds’
Guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(2010) was calculated at nine to fifteen months’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, the district court imposed an upward variance and
sentenced McReynolds to sixty months’ imprisonment. McReynolds
appeals his sentence. We affirm.
This Court reviews the sentence imposed by the
district court, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range,” under a “deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). This review entails appellate consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
at 51.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we first assess whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 49, 51. We
must then consider whether the district court treated the
Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors and any arguments presented by the
parties, selected a sentence based on “clearly erroneous facts,”
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or failed to explain sufficiently the selected sentence. Id. at
50-51; United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007). We also review whether the district court made an
“individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50; see also United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325,
330 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that, while the “individualized
assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, . . . it must
provide a rationale tailored to the particular case . . . and
[be] adequate to permit meaningful appellate review”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
If the sentence is free of significant procedural
error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Although “we may consider the extent of
any variance from the advisory Guidelines range, we must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 165 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he fact that we might reasonably have
concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” United
States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 307 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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At sentencing, the court stated it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and explained that the sixty-month sentence
was warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of the
offense, McReynolds’ history and characteristics, and the need
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, to provide just punishment for McReynolds, and to
provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. The court
emphasized McReynolds’ pattern of repeatedly committing crimes
of theft of motor vehicles and possessing stolen property. The
court noted that McReynolds is a “chronic and serious thief of
property and needs an extended prison sentence because
apparently the state courts have failed to keep him off the
streets and protect society from his repeated and almost
uninterrupted theft.” The court’s rationale in this regard was
both plausible and appropriately tied to the § 3553(a) factors.
See Morace, 594 F.3d at 346.
McReynolds also contends that the amount of the upward
variance was unreasonable because it was “three times above the
top of the [G]uidelines range.” We afford “due deference to the
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Engle, 592 F.3d at
500 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our deferential review
of the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors in
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determining the fact and the amount of the variance discloses no
abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm McReynolds’ sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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