UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7315
WILLIAM RICHARD HUNT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
LEROY CARTLEDGE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(0:09-cv-01444-TLW)
Submitted: May 23, 2011 Decided: August 9, 2011
Before KING, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tara Dawn Shurling, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Alan Wilson, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General, Alphonso Simon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Richard Hunt appeals the district court’s
judgment adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
granting summary judgment in favor of the State and dismissing
Hunt’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He argues on appeal that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel both at his suppression
hearing and at his South Carolina trial for marijuana
trafficking and possession of a weapon during the commission of
a violent crime. Finding no error, we affirm.
Hunt was indicted after a confidential informant told
law enforcement he frequently purchased marijuana from Hunt, and
that Hunt had a toolbox in his garage containing significant
quantities of the drug. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
Special Agent Michael Marbert directed the informant to make two
controlled purchases of marijuana from Hunt. After the
purchases were made, Marbert applied for a search warrant for
Hunt’s home, describing in his affidavit the controlled
purchases, and also stating that he had interviewed Hunt’s
neighbors who had informed him that Hunt was unemployed.
The magistrate judge issued the search warrant, and on
a search of Hunt’s home, law enforcement officers discovered
over fifteen pounds of marijuana hidden in the toolbox as
described by the informant. In addition, law enforcement
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located a .357 pistol by Hunt’s bed, over $51,000 in cash, and
various items of drug paraphernalia. Hunt moved to suppress the
evidence, but at a hearing on the motion, counsel did little
more than cross-examine Marbert on his relationship with the
informant. The motion was denied, and Hunt was ultimately
convicted and given a twenty-five year sentence.
While Hunt did not appeal, he did move for post
conviction relief (“PCR”) in South Carolina courts. He argued,
in pertinent part, that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate Marbert’s claims, that Marbert had
allegedly provided misleading information to the magistrate
judge in support of the warrant application, and that counsel
had failed to rebut certain evidence adduced at trial regarding
his income. The PCR court denied relief, and Hunt was
unsuccessful in challenging that result on appeal.
Hunt petitioned the district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) for a writ of habeas corpus. He made the
same ineffective assistance claims that were rejected by the PCR
court. The magistrate judge recommended denying relief, and the
district court adopted that recommendation. The court also
granted a certificate of appealability and this timely appeal
followed.
We review de novo a district court’s decision on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a state court
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record. Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008). A
state court’s fact determinations are presumed correct, and the
§ 2254 petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption
by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Relief is available under § 2254 only if the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law if the state court “arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000). A state court decision is an “unreasonable
application” of such precedent if the state court “identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.
In order to succeed on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, Hunt must satisfy the two-prong test set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Under
the first prong of Strickland, Hunt must demonstrate that
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counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at
688. To satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Hunt must show
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, “the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id.
I. Suppression
Hunt first claims that counsel was ineffective for
failing to mount a sufficient challenge to the basis for the
search warrant at the suppression hearing. In reviewing the
validity of a search warrant, the relevant inquiry is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a
substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause to
issue the warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983);
United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005).
“When reviewing the probable cause supporting a warrant, a
reviewing court must consider only the information presented to
the magistrate who issued the warrant.” United States v.
Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996). We afford “great
deference” to a judicial probable cause determination. United
States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004).
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If the affidavit for a search warrant is alleged to
contain false statements, a court must conduct the analysis set
forth in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In order to
obtain an evidentiary hearing on the affidavit’s integrity, a
defendant must first make a “substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit.” Id. at 155-56. Additionally, the false
information must be essential to the probable cause
determination: “if, when material that is the subject of the
alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there
remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a
finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.” United
States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).
Even assuming that Hunt is correct that Marbert
misrepresented his interactions with Hunt’s neighbors regarding
Hunt’s employment status, we easily conclude that the remainder
of the warrant application demonstrates probable cause. Law
enforcement officers coordinated two controlled purchases of
marijuana from Hunt. The informant was able to provide specific
details about the location and source of Hunt’s marijuana. In
addition, the controlled purchases were recorded and the
informant arranged for the purchases with Hunt over the phone in
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the presence of law enforcement. On these facts, and keeping in
mind our deferential review of the state court judgment, we
conclude the district court properly denied relief.
II. Trial
Hunt next claims that counsel was deficient at trial
for failing to impeach Marbert and failing to rebut evidence
that he had no legitimate income. In light of the overwhelming
evidence adduced against Hunt, however, we find this claim
without merit. Law enforcement officers seized fifteen pounds
of marijuana, paraphernalia, and significant quantities of cash
from Hunt’s home. Even if counsel had pursued the strategy Hunt
now suggests, we cannot conclude that the PCR court unreasonably
applied federal law by determining that the jury’s verdict would
have remained unchanged.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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