UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5139
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DIANGELLO DARNELLE STRONG,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00095-WO-1)
Submitted: July 14, 2011 Decided: August 11, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Diangello Darnelle Strong pleaded guilty, pursuant to
a plea agreement, to one count of possession of ammunition by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)
(2006). The district court sentenced Strong to 188 months in
prison followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed
a $100 special assessment. We affirm.
On appeal, Strong’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states
that he could find no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel
seeks our review of the reasonableness of Strong’s sentence.
Strong filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several
additional grounds for appeal. Strong also moved for
appointment of additional appellate counsel.
We review Strong’s sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review
requires us to inspect for procedural reasonableness by ensuring
that the district court committed no significant procedural
errors, such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating
the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th
Cir. 2010). We then consider the substantive reasonableness of
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the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Strong’s sentence fell within the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory range. We presume a sentence within a
properly-calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). Our review
of the record reveals nothing indicative of an abuse of
discretion by the district court in imposing Strong’s sentence.
We have assessed the further grounds for appeal set
forth by Strong in his pro se brief and find them wholly lacking
in merit. We lend only abbreviated comment to each. Strong has
no cognizable speedy trial claim because he pleaded guilty
within seventy days of his initial court appearance. Strong has
no cognizable double jeopardy claim because the use of criminal
activity that is not part of the current conviction to determine
the appropriate punishment for the current conviction is not
punishment that implicates double jeopardy. United States v.
McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1039 (4th Cir. 1996). Strong has no
meritorious disparate sentencing claim because his sentence was
only eight months longer than the fifteen-year statutory
mandatory minimum sentence. Strong has no cognizable cruel and
unusual punishment claim because proportionality review under
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is not available for any
sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of
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parole. United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 180 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Strong’s conviction and sentence. We deny
Strong’s motion for appointment of additional appellate counsel.
This court requires that counsel inform Strong, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Strong requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Strong.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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