UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6017
WILLIAM G. HARDEN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SCOTT BODIFORD, Administrator, in his official and
individual capacity; JAMES M. DORRIETY, Administrator, in
his official and individual capacity; CORPORAL CATHEY,
Detention Officer, in her official and individual capacity;
GREENVILLE COUNTY DETENTION CENTER; PAUL B. WICKENSEIMER,
Clerk of Court for Greenville County, in his official and
individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Richard Mark Gergel, District
Judge. (6:09-cv-02362-RMG)
Submitted: July 8, 2011 Decided: August 11, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
William G. Harden, Appellant Pro Se. Russell W. Harter, Jr.,
CHAPMAN, HARTER & GROVES, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
William G. Harden, a South Carolina prisoner, seeks
review of the district court’s orders granting summary judgment
and partial summary dismissal to Defendants in Harden’s pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) suit and denying Harden’s motion for
reconsideration. Harden alleged claims of forced labor and
denial of access to courts (among others) during his
incarceration at the Greenville County Detention Center
(“Detention Center”). We affirm in part and vacate and remand
in part. 1
I.
Harden alleged that from June 2007 to October 2007,
when he was a pretrial detainee, he was assigned to work as a
“pod worker.” He was informed that, if he refused work
assignments, he would be placed in punitive segregation. He was
required to work seven days a week, ten hours a day, until he
was released. His alleged duties included serving meals to more
than 145 inmates; sorting uniforms; distributing blankets;
cleaning floors, tables, walls, windows, and railings; scrubbing
showers; emptying trash; and cleaning up after other inmates.
1
We previously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Harden’s
interlocutory appeal from certain of the district court’s
orders. Harden v. Bodiford, No. 10-6041 (4th Cir. May 27, 2010).
3
Harden further alleged that he was 66-years-old at the time and
that he was one of only four to six workers assigned to clean
the entire institution. As “relief,” Harden calculated his
damages based on an hourly wage.
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
asserted that Harden voluntarily signed up to participate in
the inmate worker program, that he was appropriately screened
medically for his assignments, and that he earned certain
benefits and privileges from his participation in the program,
e.g., extra food, etc. Defendants asserted that there was a
waiting list of inmates desiring to participate in the work
program and that it would have been easy for Harden to terminate
his participation had he wished to do so. In his response to the
motion for summary judgment, which took the form of a hand-drawn
affidavit submitted under penalties of perjury, together with a
memorandum of legal authorities, Harden denied that he
volunteered to participate in the inmate work program. He again
insisted that his claim was a claim of forced labor and
involuntary servitude and that, contrary to the Defendants’
contention, his choices were stark: work or solitary
confinement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants, holding that “a claim arising from the non-
payment of wages to an inmate is not valid under 42 U.S.C.
4
§ 1983, whether asserted as breach of contract, denial of equal
protection, involuntary servitude or cruel and unusual
punishment.” The court denied Harden’s motion for
reconsideration, ruling that “[a]ssigning a prisoner to a work
detail without compensation is not unconstitutional.”
We review de novo a district court's award of summary
judgment, S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 612
F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010), viewing the underlying facts and
the permissible inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See In Re French, 499 F.3d
345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007).
It is settled that a pretrial detainee may not be
subjected to any form of punishment. Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d
1079, 1085 (4th Cir. 1993). To establish that a particular
condition of confinement is constitutionally impermissible
punishment, the pretrial detainee must show that it was either
(1) imposed with intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related
to a legitimate non-punitive governmental objective (such that
an intent to punish could be inferred). Id. In Hause, we found
that “general housekeeping responsibilities” are not inherently
punitive and are related to the legitimate, non-punitive
governmental objective of prison cleanliness. Id.; see also
Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding
that “housekeeping chores” like “fixing meals, scrubbing dishes,
5
doing the laundry, and cleaning the building” fit within the
Thirteenth Amendment’s “civic duty” exception to the prohibition
against involuntary servitude). 2
Having carefully reviewed the record here in the light
most favorable to Harden, we conclude that Harden’s sworn
allegations, if true, describe circumstances that rise above
those in the “general housekeeping” cases. Specifically, we
conclude that Harden’s allegations are sufficient to sustain a
claim of unconstitutional punishment. See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “the
nature of the services” and “the amount of time they took” was
required information before the court could determine if prison
officials deprived pretrial detainee of Thirteenth Amendment or
due process rights); see also Channer, 112 F.3d at 217-18
(noting that threatening prisoners with segregation if they
refused to work could rise to the level of involuntary
servitude); Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41 F. Supp.2d 392,
398 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that “unduly strenuous” tasks might
indicate intent to punish). We are persuaded that the district
2
Harden also frames his claims under the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude. While
the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to convicted prisoners,
it may provide a cause of action, under certain circumstances,
when a pretrial detainee is forced to work. See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
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court erred when it credited the Defendants’ assertion that
Harden had voluntarily consented to participate in the Detention
Center’s inmate work program. To the contrary, in the face of
Harden’s sworn denial of the Defendants’ factual assertions,
there remained genuine disputes of material fact not amenable to
resolution on summary judgment.
Moreover, the district court construed Harden’s claim
too narrowly as one for “lost wages.” Specifically, the
district court concluded that “[a]ssigning a prisoner to a work
detail without compensation is not unconstitutional” without
considering Harden’s pretrial detainee status or the actual
nature of his job(s). We note that the type of tasks Harden
alleges he was required to perform –- distributing food and
uniforms, cleaning, etc. –- are mainly of the general
housekeeping nature that this court approved in Hause. Indeed,
to hold that such tasks are inherently punitive might deprive
both detainees and staff of constructive activities useful to
the proper maintenance of detention facilities and to the
prevention of prolonged inactivity and the accompanying
frustrations it might engender among those awaiting trial.
Harden has, however, alleged a particularly onerous volume of
such ordinary housekeeping tasks, and we thus cannot affirm
without proper review as to whether Harden’s specific
circumstances evidence an impermissible intent to punish.
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For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s orders
and remand for further proceedings. 3
II.
Harden also alleged that the Detention Center had no
law library or any alternative resources for detainee legal
assistance. As such, he was not able to determine that he had a
claim for involuntary servitude until after his release. The
Defendants did not address this claim in their motion for
summary judgment. In his response, Harden realleged his claims
and added that, during his separate 2008 incarceration, he was
unable to research and file a motion to set aside his
convictions or a notice of appeal in the same cases.
The magistrate judge recommended granting summary
judgment on the basis that Harden was able to file the instant
action upon his release. The magistrate judge did not address
Harden’s allegations that he could not attack his criminal
3
In remanding the “forced labor” claim for further
consideration, we note that the district court decided the
motion for summary judgment without the benefit of any discovery
by the parties and without the benefit of a reply memorandum
from the Defendants. We further note that there is some question
as to whether Harden has fully identified the correctional
officer who allegedly threatened him with punitive segregation
should he refuse work assignments. In any event, we of course
intimate no view as to the extent or the ultimate outcome of
further proceedings before the district court.
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convictions. In his timely objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, Harden argued that he was held at the
Detention Center based on an “unwarranted bench warrant (as the
Circuit Court later determined)” and for lack of legal resources
he was unable to apply for injunctive relief or habeas corpus to
obtain his liberty. Despite these allegations, the district
court granted summary judgment, ruling that, “Plaintiff has
offered no evidence of any impediment in the timely assertion of
his legal rights.” In his motion for reconsideration, Harden
again alleged that he was unable, in 2008, “to have his
conviction set aside and his release from the detention center
effectuated.” The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration, concluding that, “Plaintiff has not and cannot
demonstrate any actual injury.”
The Constitution does not guarantee an inmate adequate
legal assistance and an adequate law library; rather, it
guarantees a right to reasonable access to the courts. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 838 (1977). In order to establish a claim of denial
of access to the courts, an inmate cannot rely on conclusory
allegations but must instead allege an actual injury or specific
harm or prejudice that has resulted from the denial. Cochran v.
Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
9
In the course of the proceedings below, Harden alleged
that he was imprisoned on improper bench warrants erroneously
issued based on his alleged failure to appear. This
incarceration took place from March to October 2007 and for
eight days in March 2008. He further asserted that the bench
warrants were shown, in later state court proceedings, to be
improper. Specifically, with regard to the first warrant,
Harding asserts that he (eventually) proved that he had not been
properly notified of his duty to appear. Regarding the second
warrant, Harden claimed that the warrant was lifted when the
Solicitor’s Office admitted “that it had submitted false
testimony.” Harden claimed that, had he been given access to a
law library or other legal assistance, he would have determined
that he could challenge these bench warrants and would have
spent a shorter time in detention.
Neither the Defendants nor the district court
addressed Harden’s allegations that his lack of access to legal
assistance prevented him from challenging his unwarranted pre-
trial incarceration. Similarly, the Defendants did not dispute
his assertions that the Detention Center lacked a law library or
alternative resources affording detainees basic legal
assistance. Instead, the Defendants contended, and the district
court concluded, that Harden had failed to show any actual
injury. We disagree. Because Harden’s undisputed allegations
10
are sufficient, if believed, to show that he was denied access
to courts and suffered genuine prejudice, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, we vacate the portions of the district court’s
orders dismissing the access to courts claim and remand for such
further consideration as the district court deems advisable in
light of our disposition of this appeal.
III.
Harden claims that the district court treated the
parties inequitably. Specifically, Harden asserts that the
court sua sponte granted the Defendants an extension of time to
file their motion for summary judgment, while denying his motion
for an order of default. In contrast, the court allegedly
ignored Harden’s motions for extension of time.
The record belies Harden’s assertions. His requests
for extensions of time were promptly granted. Defendants did
informally request an extension of time to file a motion for
summary judgment. While Defendants’ motion for an extension of
time was not timely made, the deadline in question was a matter
of court scheduling, rather than a statutory requirement.
Accordingly, we conclude that it was within the court’s
discretion to grant the Defendants’ belated request to extend
time.
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IV.
Finally, Harden asserted that the Clerk of Court of
Greenville County, Defendant Paul B. Wickenseimer, abused his
powers to issue subpoenas to compel attendance at court. The
magistrate judge recommended dismissing the claims against
Wickenseimer on the ground that Wickenseimer was protected by
quasi-judicial immunity (among other bases). In his objections,
Harden sought to withdraw his damage claims against
Wickenseimer; he sought, instead, declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring the creation of a new attendance-tracking
system. He also sought to add a claim under the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act. Finding that Harden did not object to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court dismissed
the claims against Wickenseimer without prejudice. On appeal,
Harden challenges the district court’s conclusion that
Wickenseimer was protected by immunity. 4
The district court reviews de novo those portions of
the magistrate judge’s report to which specific objections are
made. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In
the absence of objections, the district court is not required to
4
In his reply brief on appeal, Harden also asserts that he
sought to amend his complaint. However, Harden has waived this
issue by failing to raise it in his opening brief. See Yousefi
v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (declining to consider
claim raised for the first time in reply brief).
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explain its reasons for adopting the report. Camby v. Davis,
718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). Additionally, the filing of
specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is
necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of the
recommendation when the parties have been warned that failure to
object will waive appellate review. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d
841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 155 (1985).
Because Harden received notice of the consequences of
a failure to object and yet did not object to the finding of
quasi-judicial immunity, he has waived his right to appellate
review. Accordingly, we do not disturb the district court’s
order dismissing (without prejudice) Harden’s claims against
Wickenseimer.
V.
For the reasons set out above, we affirm in part and
vacate and remand in part. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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