NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUG 17 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-50454
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00248-GAF
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RAFAEL FLORES DE LA TORRE, a.k.a.
Rafael Flores, a.k.a. Rafael Delatorre
Flores,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 11, 2011 **
Before: THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Rafael Flores de la Torre appeals from the 37-month sentence imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry after deportation, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
we affirm.
Flores contends that the district court procedurally erred when it determined
that his motive for reentering the country was not a basis for a lower sentence.
This contention lacks merit as the record reflects that the district court considered
Flores’s motive for reentry as part of its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors, but found the circumstances insufficient to justify a lower
sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Flores, citing United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1054-56
(9th Cir. 2009), also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable due
to the age of his prior felony conviction that triggered a 16-level enhancement.
The district court considered Flores’s argument in this regard, and reduced his
criminal history category from level III to level I after concluding that it was
overstated, but found the circumstances insufficient to warrant a further reduction
below the adjusted Guidelines range. The sentence is substantively reasonable in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also
United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2010)
(emphasizing the limited scope of the holding in Amezcua-Vasquez).
AFFIRMED.
2 10-50454