Case: 10-10660 Document: 00511577829 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/19/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 19, 2011
No. 10-10660 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
STUART GOODNER; LISA GOODNER, Individually and as Legal Heirs of
the ESTATE OF SARAH GOODNER, deceased, and as next friends to R.G., a
minor,
Plaintiffs – Appellees
v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY, LIMITED
Defendant – Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
In this design defect case, Hyundai Motor Company Limited appeals a jury
verdict in favor of Stuart and Lisa Goodner after their daughter, Sarah,
sustained fatal injuries in an automobile accident. Hyundai argues there was
insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found that a design defect was
the producing cause of Sarah’s injuries. Applying the deferential standard of
review required when examining jury verdicts, we affirm the judgment.
I.
In July 2007, R.G., 16-years-old at the time, and her 19-year-old sister,
Sarah, drove five hours from their home outside of Dallas to watch their younger
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sister play in a softball tournament. The next morning, after sleeping for only
five hours, Sarah and R.G. started the long drive back home.
Mrs. Goodner told Sarah not to let R.G. drive because she was tired and
a young driver. However, R.G. started the drive, and the girls planned to switch
drivers later. Sarah reclined the passenger seat of the 2005 Hyundai Tucson
SUV and napped while her sister drove.1 With the cruise control set to around
80 miles per hour, R.G. started falling asleep at the wheel, drifting off the
highway. Sarah woke her, and R.G. overcorrected twice. The overcorrection
caused the vehicle to drive off the road and crash into a barbed wire fence. Once
off-road, the SUV rolled over three complete times before eventually stopping
upright.
Both girls were wearing their seatbelts, and R.G. sustained only minor
injuries. Sarah, however, was ejected from the vehicle. She was air-lifted to a
nearby hospital but died en route.
The Goodner parents, Stuart and Lisa, filed suit against Hyundai and
proceeded to trial on a strict liability design defect claim. The Goodners argued
that the front passenger seat and the restraint system were defective because
the seat could recline to an unsafe position—according to their expert, any
recline of more than 45 degrees—permitting Sarah to be ejected from the vehicle
even though she was wearing a seatbelt. After the plaintiffs rested their case,
Hyundai moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, arguing that the
Goodners had failed to prove the seat design was unreasonably dangerous. The
district court denied the motion. Hyundai then renewed the motion at the jury
charge conference, and it was again denied.
1
The parties dispute how far the seat was reclined at the time of the accident.
Plaintiffs’ expert testified that Sarah’s seat was reclined approximately 65 degrees. A defense
expert testified that the recline was close to 60 degrees. A seat reclined 20 to 25 degrees is
considered “the nominal seating position.”
2
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The jury found that a design defect was “a producing cause of the
occurrence or injuries in question.” The jury assigned 45% responsibility to R.G.,
10% to Sarah, and 45% to Hyundai, awarding $900,000 each to Stuart and Lisa
for loss of companionship and mental anguish. The final judgment was reduced
to $405,000 for each parent, based on the liability allocations.
Hyundai timely appealed, claiming that the district court should have
granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
II.
If the issue is properly preserved, this court reviews de novo a district
court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same
standard as the district court.2 In order to survive a Rule 50 motion, “the party
opposing the motion must at least establish a conflict in substantial evidence on
each essential element of their claim.”3 We are “wary of upsetting jury verdicts”4
and will “uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly
and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable [jurors] could not
arrive at any verdict to the contrary.”5 In other words, the “jury verdict must be
upheld unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find as the jury did.”6
When considering Rule 50 motions, a court “should consider all of the
evidence—not just that evidence which supports the non-mover’s case—but in
the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed
2
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir.
2008).
3
Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2002).
4
Travelers, 542 F.3d at 481.
5
Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001).
6
Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
3
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to the motion.”7 Although the federal standards of review apply, a court sitting
in diversity, as here, “refers to state law for the kind of evidence that must be
produced to support a verdict.”8 Texas law will thus be used to determine the
evidence the Goodners must produce to support their design defect claim.
Under Texas law, “[t]o recover for a products liability claim alleging a
design defect, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product was defectively
designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative
design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which
the plaintiff seeks recovery.”9 On appeal, Hyundai asserts that the Goodners
failed to prove each of these three elements.
III.
Unreasonable dangerousness is a common law element evaluated using
the following five factors:
(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole
weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2)
the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the
manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly
increasing its costs; (4) the user’s anticipated awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of
the general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; (5) the
expectations of the ordinary consumer.10
7
Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by
Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997)); see Cousin, 246 F.3d at 366.
8
Wackman v. Rubsamen, 602 F.3d 391, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
9
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009).
10
Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Amer. Tobacco Co.
v. Grinnell, 951 S.W. 2d 420, 432 (Tex. 1997)).
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This “risk-utility analysis does not operate in a vacuum, but rather in the
context of the product’s intended use and its intended users.”11 Generally,
unreasonable dangerousness is a question of fact for the jury. It only becomes
a matter of law if reasonable minds cannot differ.12 Evidence on the five factors
may be presented to the jury, but the factors themselves are not set out as a
definitional requirement of design defect.13 Here, the jury instructions defined
“design defect” as “a condition of the product that renders it unreasonably
dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and
the risk involved in its use.” For courts considering judgment as a matter of law,
the five factors are evaluated holistically; no single factor needs to be proven on
its own, so long as all factors working together point to a finding of unreasonable
dangerousness.14
The holistic analysis of the five factors does not compel judgment in
Hyundai’s favor as a matter of law. The first factor is a cost-benefit analysis of
the utility of the design, here, a seat that can recline, compared to the risk to
users. The evidence did not show a high utility for a seat that can recline more
than 45 degrees, and the Goodners’ expert testified that a reclined seat
significantly increases the risk of ejection. While consumer preference is a
consideration in the risk-utility analysis,15 limiting seat recline would not
“impose liability in such a way as to eliminate whole categories of useful
11
Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 312.
12
Hernandez, 2 S.W.3d at 260–61.
13
See Shipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421–22 (5th Cir. 1983); Turner v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848–49 (Tex. 1979).
14
See Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tex. 1997).
15
See Hernandez, 2 S.W.3d at 260 (finding that some adults may prefer lighters that
are not child-resistant and consumer preference should be considered).
5
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products from the market.”16 There may be some benefits to a fully reclining
seat, such as carrying cargo or napping at a rest stop, but a jury would not be
unreasonable in concluding that the risks of this design outweigh the benefits.
The second factor, availability of an alternative, requires the jury to have
reason to find that a proposed substitute is available that would not increase the
risk for harm. The Goodners proposed limiting the seat recline to 45 degrees, a
design which other car manufacturers had implemented. There was no
indication that a seat with its recline limited to 45 degrees would create new
hazards, other than possibly prohibiting a small subset of the population from
purchasing very compact cars. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of
upholding the verdict. The third factor, the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate
the defect without impairing usefulness or significantly increasing cost, overlaps
with the first two factors. There was evidence supporting a conclusion that
Hyundai could have limited the recline of the seat without seriously impairing
the overall usefulness of the seat or car. Indeed, the Hyundai Tucson’s rear
seats had a limited recline as did the front seats of competitor’s vehicles.
The fourth and fifth factors involve consumer expectations and the user’s
ability to avoid harm through general knowledge or suitable warnings. Under
Texas law “[w]hether the risk of injury is common knowledge is a question of
law, not fact.”17 However, the Supreme Court of Texas “did not foreclose the
possibility that in some situations there could be a fact question about whether
consumers have common knowledge of risks associated with a product.”18 This
is such a situation—it is not a matter of law whether the risk of injury from a
16
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. 1995).
17
Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 313.
18
Caterpillar, 911 S.W.2d at 383.
6
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reclining seat is common knowledge.19 Rather, common knowledge on reclining
seats requires factual analysis, creating a jury question.
The only warnings against seat recline were in the owner’s manual.
Although a Hyundai expert testified these warnings were adequate, the jury is
free to disregard his testimony and rely on their own impressions of the
warnings admitted into evidence. There is no evidence that the jury improperly
considered the fourth or fifth factors in reaching its verdict.
A holistic analysis of the unreasonable dangerousness factors does not “so
strongly and so overwhelmingly” favor Hyundai as to create a matter of law.
There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the SUV’s seat design was
unreasonably dangerous.
IV.
Next, Hyundai contends that the Goodners failed to prove there was an
available safer alternative design. “Safer alternative design” is defined by
statute to mean a product design that in reasonable probability “would have
prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the claimant’s personal injury” and
“was economically and technologically feasible at the time the product left the
control of the manufacturer.”20 Although Hyundai adequately preserved its
challenge to the first element, its Rule 50 motion did not challenge the economic
and technological feasibility of the proposed safer alternative designs.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law must “specify the judgment
sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.”21 The
focus at trial, by both Hyundai and the Goodners, was on causation and
19
Cf. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (finding that the
danger of excessive alcohol consumption was generally known and did not require a warning).
20
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 82.005(b).
21
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(a)(2); see McCann v. Tex. City Refining, Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 672
(5th Cir. 1993).
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unreasonable dangerousness. One of the statutorily required elements to find
a safer alternative design—whether the product would have prevented or
significantly reduced the claimant’s injuries—is also encompassed in the
unreasonable dangerousness calculus. But feasibility is a separate element, only
arising in the safer alternative design statute.
The focus throughout trial was on causation and unreasonable
dangerousness, not feasibility. In closing arguments, Hyundai’s trial counsel
continued with his strategic decision to rest on causation. Counsel turned the
jury away from questions of other issues, telling the jury: “And then
economically and technologically feasible. You know, economically and
technologically feasible with regard to a 45-degree recline angle--I'm not saying
we couldn't have done that; there just wasn't a reason to do it.” Counsel then
quickly turned to his argument that there was no proof that the safer alternative
design would have prevented Sarah’s injuries.
Consistent with counsel’s trial strategy, when making the Rule 50 motion
in open court, counsel did not challenge the sufficiency of the safer alternative
design evidence. The transcript reads: “They might have some evidence--and,
of course, we dispute it--that it’s a safer alternative design, but in terms of that
first element, that it’s unreasonable for this to have a seat that would recline,
they just simply don’t have enough evidence to get there.” Likewise, Hyundai’s
Rule 50(b) brief did not mention feasibility, stating that “plaintiffs failed to
present sufficient evidence that (1) the product at issue was unreasonably
dangerous or (2) that the alleged design defect was a producing cause of Sarah
Goodner’s death.” In sum, trial counsel focused the case on unreasonable
dangerousness and causation, which to our eyes on this record was both an
understandable and wise strategic decision, while appellate counsel now
attempts to summon up sufficiency of the evidence on economic feasibility.
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We must conduct “an evaluation of whether [a Rule 50] motion sufficiently
alerted the court and the opposing party to the sufficiency issue.”22 For Hyundai
to be entitled to de novo review of its motion for directed verdict, it must have
been specific in its sufficiency challenge so that the plaintiffs would be aware of
any “insufficiency before the case [was] submitted to the jury.”23 Because
Hyundai did not raise the issue of economic or technological feasibility at trial,
our standard of review shifts, and we will only reverse the judgment if it results
in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.”24 In other words, “the question before this
Court is not whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict,
but whether there was any evidence to support the jury verdict.”25
The Goodners presented three alternative designs: (1) a seatbelt
mechanism integrated into the seat, also known as the “all-belts-to-seat” model;
(2) a seat that cannot recline more than 45 degrees; and (3) an interlock device
that prevents the vehicle from operating when the seat is significantly reclined.
Of these, the second alternative was sufficiently proven for a reasonable jury to
conclude it met the statutory requirements.26
To succeed on their design defect claim, the Goodners must have shown
that a safer alternative—limiting the seat recline to a 45 degree angle—would
have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of Sarah’s injuries. The
Goodners’ expert, Stephen Syson, testified that seats reclined more than a 45
22
Polanco v. City of Austin, 78 F.3d 968, 975 (5th Cir. 1996).
23
Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 288 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24
McCann, 984 F.2d at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
Id.
26
Because we find that the limited seat recline is a sufficient alternative to withstand
appeal, we do not discuss whether the integrated seatbelts or the interlock device would also
have met this standard.
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degree angle lead to a significantly increased risk of ejection. He further
testified that ejection increases the risk of serious injury or death by six to
thirteen times. The Texas statute only requires proof of a safer alternative
design that “in reasonable probability” would have reduced the claimant’s
injuries, which Syson’s testimony adequately provided.
The Goodners must also provide evidence of technological and economic
feasibility. Under Texas law, the use of an alternative design by another
manufacturer may establish technological feasibility.27 Syson testified that other
car manufacturers had limited their seats’ recline to 45 degrees, which satisfies
the evidentiary burden. Hyundai’s expert also admitted that limiting the seat
recline was possible.
A few Texas appellate courts have found that the use of an alternative
design by another manufacturer alone cannot establish economic feasibility.28
Whatever its sufficiency by stricter measures, the Goodners presented sufficient
evidence on this issue such that we cannot find a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Syson testified that alternative designs were economically feasible, which he
defined as a cost that would not “render the vehicle so expensive that it’s
impractical to purchase it.” Moreover, the Goodners presented evidence during
a cross-examination of a Hyundai expert that the 2005 Hyundai Tucson—the
vehicle in question here—limited the rear seats’ recline to 45 degrees. The
feasibility of installing this design in the rear seats is some evidence that it
27
Honda of Am. Mfg. Inc. v. Norman, 104 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
28
See id.; Jaimes v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see also Champion v. Great Dane Ltd. Partnership, 286 S.W.3d 533,
541 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“The fact that another manufacturer uses
an alternative design may be evidence of the technical feasibility of that design. However,
economic feasibility refers to the cost of producing a particular design.”).
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would be possible to install this feature in the front seats. There was no
manifest miscarriage of justice.
V.
Finally, Hyundai contends that the Goodners failed to meet their
evidentiary burden in demonstrating that the design defect was the producing
cause of Sarah’s fatal injuries. Texas courts define producing cause as one that
is “a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred.”29 Further, “causation generally is a question of fact
for the jury.”30 However, if all the facts and inferences point so strongly against
causation that no reasonable jury could find causation, then the district court
should grant judgment as a matter of law.31 “[C]ausation need not be supported
by direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom are a sufficient basis for a finding of causation,”32 but “[p]roof of
causation requires more than conjecture or guess.”33
Syson testified that Hyundai’s seat recline caused Sarah’s ejection and
that ejection significantly increases the risk of serious injury or death. In
addition, the jury could consider that the driver of the vehicle, who was not
reclined and was not ejected, sustained only minor injuries. The district court
prohibited Syson from testifying as to the ultimate issue—that the seat recline
caused Sarah’s injuries—because he was unqualified to reach this conclusion.
However, the jury could make a reasonable inference, based on Syson’s
testimony and comparing Sarah’s injuries to those of her sister, to find that the
29
Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex. 2007).
30
Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2003).
31
Id.
32
Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 782 (5th Cir. 2000).
33
Mosley, 109 F.3d at 1009.
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seat recline was a substantial factor in bringing about Sarah’s injuries. Since
causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, there are not enough
inferences pointing against causation here to support overturning the jury
verdict.
After oral argument, Hyundai directed our attention to a recent Texas
Supreme Court case, BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter,34 which reversed a products
liability judgment in favor of a plaintiff. There, the Texas Supreme Court sought
specific evidence of causation, including expert testimony, to prove that a child
would not have been able to light a lighter but for manufacturing defects. The
court held that in order to demonstrate the lighter’s manufacturing defect
caused a fire, the plaintiffs must present evidence on how a child’s dexterity,
strength, motivation, hand size, and knowledge would interact with the
biomechanical flaws of the defective lighter. Hyundai urges that in both BIC
Pen and this case, no expert testified that the defect caused the injury.
BIC Pen stated that expert testimony “is generally required,” not always
required, to prove causation.35 Here, the Goodners’ expert testified that the seat
recline caused Sarah’s ejection. This element of causation is the most technical,
involving the physics of both the car and accident, and may be of the nature that
the Texas Supreme Court suggested requires an expert’s testimony. In addition,
the expert testified that ejection greatly increases the risk of injury, another
component that might require an expert’s analysis. Once sufficient evidence of
these two elements was established, however, it was not unreasonable for the
jury, without an expert’s testimony, to infer causation. BIC Pen does not require
an alternative finding by this court. The Goodners presented expert testimony
34
No. 09-0039, 2011 WL 2420125 (Tex. June 17, 2011).
35
Id. at *6.
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on some of the causation elements, and other reasonable inferences are sufficient
to find that the seat’s design caused Sarah’s injuries.
Although some facts weighed against causation, there remained “a conflict
in substantial evidence” regarding whether seat reclination caused Sarah’s
injuries.36 The evidence on causation is far from being overwhelmingly in favor
of Hyundai as to allow us to upset a jury verdict.
VI.
The facts and inferences in this case do not point so overwhelmingly in
favor of Hyundai such that any reasonable jury would have been obligated to
reach a verdict in its favor. This is a close, complex case, but our system relies
on juries to evaluate the evidence and reach an outcome. It is not the role of this
court to second-guess jurors, so long as there was a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for their verdict. In this case, there was. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
36
Mosley, 109 F.3d at 1009 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir.
1969) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13