UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4648
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL MANDEL TRENT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00202-MR-1)
Argued: January 25, 2011 Decided: August 22, 2011
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Irene C. BERGER,
United States District Judge for the Southern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Andrew Brady Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, PLLC,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kurt William Meyers,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant United States Attorney, Kelli
Ferry, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury convicted Michael Mandel Trent of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, the district court sentenced
him to 235 months of imprisonment. The court held that Trent’s
two previous state convictions for fleeing to elude arrest, in
violation of North Carolina law, qualified as predicate offenses
permitting the application of a sentencing enhancement pursuant
to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). On appeal, Trent
challenges both his conviction and sentence. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm his conviction, vacate his sentence, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
On January 16, 2008, a police officer on routine
highway patrol witnessed a green Ford Taurus traveling at a rate
of speed below the posted limit. Neither Trent (the driver) nor
Kimshon Bennett (the passenger) made eye contact with the
officer. After a subsequent check of the license plate led the
officer to believe that the vehicle carried insufficient
insurance, the officer activated his blue lights and attempted
to initiate a traffic stop.
Trent did not stop. Instead, he “immediately sped up”
and made a U-turn through a grassy field, running a stop sign
and turning onto a two-lane highway. At one point during the
2
ensuing chase, Trent drove faster than 100 miles per hour into
oncoming traffic. He eventually lost control of the Taurus and
crashed into a commercial storefront.
After the crash, Trent attempted to leave the car
through the driver’s side door, but an officer positioned his
patrol car across that door and obstructed Trent’s escape.
Trent then slid across the car and, along with Bennett, escaped
through the passenger’s side door. During Trent’s escape from
the Taurus, an officer witnessed him fumble and drop an object
“about the size of his hand.” Trent and Bennett attempted to
flee on foot, but the police quickly apprehended them. A
subsequent search of the Taurus revealed a handgun lying on the
passenger’s seat, along with some drug paraphernalia.
Trent and Bennett were charged with violations of
state law, and Bennett pled guilty to those state charges.
Trent’s state charges were eventually dismissed in light of this
federal prosecution, in which Trent was charged with possession
of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At trial, police officers described the car chase and
their subsequent discovery of the handgun, and Bennett
identified the recovered handgun as one that she had briefly
held for Trent the night before. According to Bennett, the gun
rested on Trent’s lap during the police pursuit, and she refused
his request that she “throw it out the window.” The Government
3
also introduced evidence relating to two prior instances –- one
in 2004 and one in 2005 –- in which Trent threw away firearms
while fleeing apprehension for speeding and other traffic
violations.
The jury convicted Trent of being a felon in
possession. Trent’s Presentencing Investigation Report (PSR)
concluded that Trent had been convicted of three previous
“violent felon[ies],” which mandated an enhanced sentence under
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Trent conceded that the
first conviction, for federal carjacking, qualified as an ACCA
predicate. He objected, however, to the conclusion in the PSR
that the other two convictions –- the 2004 and 2005 convictions
described above for felony speeding to elude arrest in violation
of state law --could serve as predicate offenses. The district
court overruled his objection and applied the enhancement, which
raised Trent’s guidelines range from 120-150 months to 235-293
months. The court then sentenced Trent to 235 months of
imprisonment.
Trent appeals both his conviction and his sentence.
II.
We first address Trent’s conviction. Trent contends that
the district court erred in admitting evidence of his prior
4
firearm possession and in denying a motion for psychological
evaluation. Both arguments lack merit.
A.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the
admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior or subsequent acts
“to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” Rule 404(b) allows, however, the use of
such evidence as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, or
absent of mistake or accident.” Trent argues that the district
court violated this rule by admitting testimony describing the
two previous incidents in which he possessed a firearm.
We apply a four-factor test to Rule 404(b) evidence,
holding it admissible if it is: (1) relevant to an issue other
than the defendant’s character; (2) probative of an essential
claim or element of the offense; (3) reliable; and provides (4)
probative value not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir.
1997).
In conducting this inquiry, we review the district
court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 2003). We afford
the district court “wide discretion” in its assessment of
“whether evidence is unduly prejudicial,” and we will overturn
5
its decision to admit evidence only “under the most
extraordinary of circumstances.” United States v. Aramony, 88
F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996).
The district court admitted the challenged evidence
because it found the evidence relevant to Trent’s knowledge of
the handgun discovered in the Taurus. We agree with the
district court’s assessment. The challenged evidence pertained
to prior incidents closely resembling the Concord car chase.
Indeed, in all three incidents, Trent drove recklessly, wrecked
his vehicle, fled on foot from police, and then attempted to
dispose of his firearm. Given these similarities, the prior
incidents shed significant light on the issue of Trent’s
knowledge of the firearm ultimately found in the Taurus.
The disputed evidence was also “necessary in the sense
that it is probative of an essential claim or an element of an
offense.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 997 (internal quotation omitted).
Trent could not dispute at trial that he drove the Taurus in
question or that the police discovered a handgun inside. But
Trent did contend that Bennett, not he, bore responsibility for
that firearm. Resolution of this issue turned on Trent’s state
of mind with respect to that firearm, of which the evidence
describing Trent’s previous acts proved particularly probative.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
6
Trent does not dispute that the prior incidents bear
striking similarities to the Concord chase. Nor does he contest
the reliability of the evidence describing those previous
incidents. He does, however, insist that our previous decision
in United States v. Tate, 715 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1983),
foreclosed the admission of the challenged evidence. In that
case, the police stopped Tate, who was driving his wife’s car,
and discovered two pistols in the trunk. Tate was charged with
receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 865. At
trial, the district court allowed the Government to introduce
evidence that witnesses had previously seen Tate in possession
of a different pistol. Id. We vacated Tate’s conviction,
observing that the “possession by the defendant of a different
gun on a previous occasion has no relevance to the issue of
whether the defendant knew on the day he was stopped that the
two pistols were in the trunk of his wife’s car.” Id. at 866.
Trent’s reliance on Tate is misplaced. This is so
because the Rule 404(b) evidence we rejected in Tate bears
little resemblance to the evidence that Trent challenges here.
In Tate, the challenged evidence concerned a prior incident
unlike the one for which Tate was convicted. Here, by contrast,
the prior incidents closely resemble the offense of conviction.
Accordingly, they illuminate the critical issue of whether Trent
7
knowingly possessed the firearm in the Taurus. See United
States v. Oaks, 606 F.3d 530, 539 (8th Cir. 2010).
Nor did the challenged evidence create unfair
prejudice that “substantially outweighed” its probative value.
Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. Trent contends that this evidence
prejudiced him because it “had the effect of corroborating Ms.
Bennett’s otherwise impeached testimony.” Appellant’s Br. at
10. Such an effect, however, does not amount to unfair
prejudice, which does not include any “damage to a defendant’s
case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence.” Mohr, 318 F.3d at 619 (internal quotation and
emphasis omitted). Here, the evidence of the prior incidents
damaged Trent’s case only in that it suggested a legitimate
inference that Trent knowingly possessed the firearm inside the
Taurus. Moreover, the district court, by properly (and
repeatedly) issuing an agreed-upon limiting instruction,
ameliorated the risk that the jury would extract a forbidden
propensity inference from the challenged evidence. See Queen,
132 F.3d at 997.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence of Trent’s prior firearm
possession.
8
B.
Trent also argues that the district court erroneously
denied his motion for a psychological examination. A court may
order a psychological examination pursuant to a competency
hearing, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b), which it must conduct “if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent.” Id. § 4241(a). We review a district court’s
denial of a competency hearing for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether there existed “reasonable
cause” sufficient to trigger Trent’s right to a competency
hearing, “we look to all of the record evidence pertaining to
the defendant’s competence, including: (1) any history of
irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor [during the
legal proceedings]; and (3) prior medical opinions on
competency.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 397 (4th
Cir. 2002). A review of these factors here demonstrates that
the denial of Trent’s motion did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
The magistrate judge, in denying Trent’s initial
motion for a psychological examination, observed that Trent
presented only a “self-report” of general “psychological
issues.” The judge also noted that the Government presented
9
specific evidence -- in the form of Trent’s phone calls from
jail –- that revealed his comprehension of the charges facing
him. The magistrate judge further observed that Trent’s
behavior in court “evidenced an understanding of the proceedings
against him.” See General, 278 F.3d at 298 (noting that
defendant’s “demeanor” undermined his “claim of incompetency”).
Moreover, the district court later agreed that “Trent was able
to converse with counsel such as to assist in his defense” and
that he consequently had received “a very good defense.” Given
these uncontested findings, and that no formal medical reports
supportive of Trent’s claims appear in the record, cf. Mason, 52
F.3d at 1290, we cannot hold that the court abused its
discretion by rejecting Trent’s motion for psychological
examination.
III.
We turn finally to Trent’s challenge to his sentence.
He argues that the district court, in enhancing his sentence
under ACCA, improperly relied on two predicate convictions that
were not for “crime[s] punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). We review de
novo the question of whether Trent’s prior convictions qualify
10
as ACCA predicates. See United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365,
367 (4th Cir. 2009).
Our recent decision in United States v. Simmons, --
F.3d –- (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), requires that we vacate
Trent’s sentence. There we considered this precise question,
i.e. whether a defendant’s North Carolina prior conviction was
for an “‘offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year.’” Id. (slip op. at 4) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
802(44)). In that case, a North Carolina judge had imposed a
sentence of six-to-eight months of community punishment, which
was the maximum sentence the defendant could have received under
North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act. Nevertheless, this
offense would have triggered a sentencing enhancement under
prior Fourth Circuit precedent, which had held that a conviction
was for “a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year
if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a
sentence of more than one year.” United States v. Harp, 406
F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
Alternatively, Trent contends that the same two
convictions do not qualify as “violent” felonies under the
principles articulated in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137
(2008). We need not reach this argument. But see United States
v. Sykes, --- S. Ct. ---- (2011).
11
We held in Simmons that the Supreme Court’s
intervening ruling in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct.
2581 (2010) foreclosed us from following our old approach. In
light of Carachuri, we concluded that, under the North Carolina
Structured Sentencing Act, a defendant is convicted of a crime
“punishable” by more than a year only if some offender
possessing the same prior record level and convicted of similar
aggravating factors could have received a sentence exceeding one
year. Id. (slip op. at 14-19). We also held that federal
courts must make this determination relying only on facts
contained in the offender’s “state record of conviction.” Id.
(slip op. at 27). In Simmons, we examined the defendant’s state
record of conviction and observed that it contained no findings
exposing him to the elevated state sentence necessary to trigger
the disputed federal enhancement. Id. Accordingly, we held
that the defendant was not subject to the federal enhancement
and so vacated his sentence. Id.
Applying the Simmons holding here, we conclude that
Trent’s two previous convictions were “punishable” by a maximum
of twelve months of imprisonment. Both convictions were for
speeding to elude arrest, which North Carolina designates a
Class H felony. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.5(b). In
addition, Trent’s judgments of conviction reveal that in both
cases he possessed a “prior record level” of III and was charged
12
with no aggravating factors. Given these facts, the Structured
Sentencing Act allowed the sentencing judge to impose a maximum
possible sentence of twelve months of imprisonment in each case.
Id. § 15A-1340.17(c)-(d). Accordingly, neither conviction for
speeding to elude arrest qualifies as a predicate permitting the
application of a sentencing enhancement under ACCA.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Trent’s sentence
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
affirm his conviction.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED
AND REMANDED IN PART
13