IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60338
Summary Calendar
CHRISTIAN TOURS, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HOMERIC TOURS, INC.
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:99-CV-79-B-A)
November 13, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christian Tours, a Mississippi corporation, contracted with
Homeric Tours, a New York corporation, to provide air travel to
Greece, along with hotel accommodations, for a tour group. A price
dispute later occurred, causing Christian Tours to sue in
Mississippi state court. Homeric removed on diversity grounds.
The district court dismissed the case for want of personal
jurisdiction. Christian appealed.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
The district court was correct. Federal courts sitting in
diversity follow state personal jurisdiction rules. We therefore
inquire whether Homeric could have been reached by the Mississippi
long-arm statute, and if so, whether assertion of jurisdiction over
Homeric would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That latter inquiry consists of two parts: 1) does
Homeric have sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi, and 2)
if so, is assertion of jurisdiction by Mississippi fair?1 We hold
that Homeric lacked sufficient minimum contacts. We therefore need
not analyze the Mississippi long-arm statute, nor the other prong
of the Due Process inquiry.
The parties concede that Homeric does not do business in
Mississippi. Christian argues that the minimum contacts requirement
is met by various incidents of the contract upon which they sue:
communications from New York to Mississippi and (allegedly) the
mailing of some airline tickets from New York to Mississippi.2
According to Christian, this provides a basis for specific
jurisdiction over disputes over that contract.
1
See Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon Battery Technologies,
Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871 (5th Cir. 1999).
2
The parties dispute whether the tickets were actually
mailed. We need not resolve that question. Assuming that the
tickets were mailed, that does not suffice to produce personal
jurisdiction.
2
However, the mere fact that Homeric contracted with a
Mississippi resident does not, alone, establish minimum contacts.3
Rather, one must look to the overall transaction of which the
contract was a part, with an eye towards determining whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum state.4 In Caldwell v. Palmetto State
Savings Bank,5 we held that a letter sent by the defendant to the
plaintiff:
[I]s not enough to meet the constitutional requirement that a
defendant purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the
forum before he is hailed into court there. A court does not
acquire jurisdiction over a defendant as the result of
unilateral activities by another person. This case is unlike
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., in which the
solicitation of a single insured was sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant insurer. The
undisputed facts in this case show that the plaintiffs
solicited the transactions.6
In other words, responding to a solicitation by an in-state party
does not constitute purposeful availment.
Caldwell controls this case. Christian solicited this
transaction, therefore communications incident to that solicitation
do not constitute purposeful availment by Homeric. Further,
Homeric’s obligations under the contract were to be performed in
3
See Electrosource, 176 F.3d at 872.
4
Id.
5
811 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1987).
6
Id. at 918 (citations omitted).
3
New York and Greece. The mailing of tickets, even if it occurred,
was not Homeric’s essential duty under the contract. Homeric’s
duty was to procure the tickets at the stated price and arrange
accommodations in Greece. None of that occurred in Mississippi.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
4